A decision is made - and then? by Göransson, Bengt
  
  1
 
 
 
A decision is made – and then? 
 
An empirical study of implementation efficiency 
 
 
 
Bengt Göransson 
Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences  
Department of Economics 
Uppsala 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral thesis 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
Uppsala 2007   
  2
Acta Universitatis Agriculturae Sueciae 
2007:96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1652-6880 
ISBN 978-91-576-7395-4 
© 2007 Bengt Göransson, Uppsala  
Tryck: SLU Service/Repro, Uppsala 2007   
  3
Abstract 
 
Göransson, B., 2007, A decision is made – and then? An empirical study of implementation 
efficiency. Doctor’s dissertation. 
ISSN 1652-6880, ISBN 978-91-576-7395-4 
 
This thesis deals with the conditions and factors influencing the implementation outcome of 
top management decisions. The thesis presents an implementation model, which describes, 
and to a certain extent explains, the factors influencing the implementation efficiency of 
decisions made by top executives in complex profit-driven, Swedish organizations. The 
model is developed from a literature review and tested in an empirical study with both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The implementation efficiency is estimated as the 
sum of implementation process efficiency and decision goal satisfaction. The empirical 
study is carried out in the perspective of both the executives and the implementers. All 
types of decisions have been studied. The respondents have described how a specific 
decision is handled in the implementation phase (the qualitative part of the study). They 
have also estimated the performance of specific variables on a six-grade scale for the same 
decision (the quantitative part of the study). The analysis of the empirical data is carried out 
not only as comparisons of the opinions of respondents for each decision identifying 
similarities and differences, but also by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA, and 
a simultaneous equation model, LISREL. The analysis results show that the preliminary 
implementation model satisfactorily explains basic correlations between implementation 
conditions and implementation efficiency. The implementation efficiency is positively 
correlated with a simple implementation context and an evident implementation profile as 
well as decisions with only internal consequences, operational decisions and recognized 
decisions. The implementation efficiency is on average about 65%, with great variation 
between companies and between decisions, indicating a huge potential for improvements. 
There are differences between decision makers and the implementers in terms of perceived 
implementation conditions and implementation efficiency. It is also observed that decision 
makers engage themselves to a very limited extent in the implementation of their decisions. 
The preliminary implementation model has been developed with complementary variables 
as a result of the study. Furthermore, it has been possible to design a preliminary model 
describing the critical moment of transformation of the implementation task. Both models 
require further empirical tests. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
“We are quite good in our group at making decisions but not good enough to 
implement them”. This is a real quote from a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
1 in a 
Swedish business group (definition, see Appendix A). Another CEO expressed the 
same opinion saying “We make a huge amount of decisions but just a part of them 
will be put in action”.  
  
These statements are confirmed in discussions with managing directors, trade 
union leaders and consultants. As CEO in business companies during many years, 
I myself have personal experience with implementation shortcomings. So, the 
proper implementation of executive decisions seems to be a problem. Does this 
depend on a real lack of knowledge, or the inadequate adoption of existing 
knowledge? Or any other reasons, such as lack of motivation or incentive among 
the implementers? A review of the scientific literature gives interesting 
information expressed in the following excerpts:  
 
•  “The way implementation is managed appears to be vital for decision 
success. Yet it is the study of the making of strategic decisions which is 
well developed rather than the study of implementation” (Hickson et al., 
2003, p. 1803) 
•  “There are very few precedents in the literature for studying how 
individual strategic decisions are actually implemented” (Skivington & 
Daft, 1991, p. 53) 
•   “There is now a substantial body of research on the making of strategic 
decisions in organizations. … the emphasis has been on describing and 
explaining how decisions are arrived at. Though, to some extent, decision 
making and implementation are interwoven …very extensive study of 
decision making which looked at the process through ‘gestation’ to 
‘authorization’. The majority of these studies do not go beyond this 
‘authorization stage’, though there are exceptions. It is therefore not 
possible to find in them anything concerning the ‘success’ of decisions 
once implemented (however ‘success’ is defined, a point returned to 
later), and this has remained a relatively under-researched area.” (Miller, 
1997, p. 577) 
•  “Strategic decision making has long been a topic of great interest in both 
organization theory and strategic management. Although many studies 
have described and explained strategic decision making, there is limited 
evidence that strategic decision-making processes influence decisions’ 
effectiveness – that is, the extent to which they result in desired 
outcomes.” (Dean & Sharfman, 1996, p. 368)  
 
1 When a term is used for the first time it is written completely. An abbreviation is 
introduced and thereafter used continuously. All abbreviations are listed in 
Appendix A where definitions are presented if necessary.   
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•  “There has been considerable speculation about factors that influence the 
success of implementation, but little work in exploring these factors with 
actual decision outcomes, examining the artistry of skilled practice to see 
what works and why. Even less work has been devoted to differentiating 
the implementation approaches preferred by top managers from those 
employed by managers with less influence” (Nutt, 1998, p. 213)  
•  “… suggestions as to possible future directions for strategic decision 
research … three emergent themes: learning, implementation, and 
information systems” (Papadakis & Barvise, 1997, p. 290)  
•    “From the perspective of the strategist, organization theory is about 
implementation. However, you should be aware that, in practice, 
implementation has proven extremely problematic. While strategy 
researchers and strategists have developed sophisticated approaches to 
analysis and formulation, models for the implementation of strategy have 
not kept pace”. (Hatch, 1997, p. 110)  
•  “Implementing strategy is a tougher, more time-consuming challenge 
than crafting strategy. Practitioners emphatically agree that it is a whole 
lot easier to develop a sound strategic plan than it is to ‘make it happen’.” 
(Thompson & Strickland, 1992, p. 215) 
 
The excerpts indicate that an important answer seems to be lack of knowledge. 
If so, the executives need more basic knowledge of implementation conditions, 
manifested in developed tools and routines, in order to improve the 
implementation of decisions. The purpose of this thesis is therefore, in a general 
meaning, to increase our understanding of factors that influence successful 
implementation as a contribution to increased and improved knowledge of 
implementation and its conditions. A scientific aim of the thesis is formulated in 
Chapter 3.  
 
1.2 Three implementation cases from business life  
Decision and implementation situations differ in many aspects. An important 
dimension is the degree of implementation success. I describe in this chapter three 
cases of varying success in order to introduce the reader to the intended problem 
area of this study. The cases are selected to demonstrate completely successful and 
partly successful implementation but also no implementation carried out at all. 
These cases are from my own personal experience. 
 
1.2.1 Case A. Expanding the personal development dialogues  
At the Top Management Team (TMT) meeting, the President informs that he has 
had an informal contact with the company trade union regarding his idea of 
expanding the personal development dialogues to cover all staff members of the 
company. The trade union is positive. The long term aim is three-headed: to obtain 
an information base for internal recruitment of managers, to plan and improve 
competency development in individuals and to improve the job rotation system. 
There is a strong tradition among white collar employees for personal 
development dialogues but the blue collar workers have never been invited. The   
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company has functional tools and routines for personal development dialogues. 
The President puts the issue on the agenda for the next TMT meeting and asks the 
members to prepare themselves for a decision. The discussion at the next TMT 
meeting is quite good with many pros and cons. The TMT decision is a task for 
the Director of Human Resources to involve the trade union in an investigation 
and prepare a memo to TMT.  
 
The incoming memo proposes “a trial year” when all blue collar employees will 
get the possibility to have a personal development dialogue with the supervisor but 
it is not compulsory. The bosses will be trained in an internal seminar before 
starting up. The tools and routines will be adapted to the new target group. The 
short term goal is set to “90% of the staff members shall have participated in a 
personal development dialogue by the end of the trial year”.  
 
Based on the memo the TMT decides to carry out personal development 
dialogues. When put in action a few managers hesitate, but they are convinced 
after the training. After ten months 92% of the blue collar employees have had a 
development dialogue with their supervisors. The rest have declined. In all, it has 
been a success and the short term objective is well achieved. 
 
The conclusion of this case is that the key people were involved in the decision 
making process committing them to implement the decision successfully. Even 
more, the adaptation of the tools and the training program were important for 
success.  
 
1.2.2 Case B. Saving discount expenses 
The Marketing Director raises at the TMT meeting the question about discounts on 
customer sales. Discounts are now in total 18% of the gross prices. 5%-units are 
generated by the annual agreement and depends mainly on selling volumes. That 
situation seems to be OK. But remaining 13%-units are much more disputable. 
The sales force uses the discounts as an all too simple way just to sell, which is 
their main job, says Marketing Director. In his opinion the discount does not 
encourage the customers to buy more. His opinion is not shared by the Sales 
Manager. She claims that without discounts and a substantial freedom for the 
representatives to use them freely, the company will suffer a heavy loss in selling 
volume. After a brief discussion, TMT decides that the Marketing Director will be 
back at next meeting with a memo as a base for decision. 
 
At the next meeting Marketing Director presents a memo. Orally he also reports 
that the Sales Manager has accepted the content of the memo but without 
enthusiasm. After a short discussion TMT decides to accept the memo, which 
means that within six months the discounts, excluding 5% of annual agreements, 
should be halved using the recommended actions. 
 
Half a year later, TMT will conclude that the goal is far from achieved. The 
decline is just 2.8%-units instead of 7%-units. The Marketing Director reports that 
the main reason is obstruction by the Sales Manager. 
 
In this case, there could be many reasons for insufficient implementation. One 
reason could be that the Marketing Director has not involved the Sales Manager in   
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the entire process of decision making. It is possible that the Marketing Director 
has a hidden agenda as the Sales Manager thinks that the real objective of the 
Managing Director is that he will manage the sales force more or less directly. 
Perhaps the set goals are unrealistic. The actors perhaps have different pictures of 
reality. Is there a complex set of conflicts that continue because of bad personal 
relations? Altogether, there may probably be a grain of truth in every explanation 
 
1.2.3 Case C. Adding new suppliers  
The President of a company has used a consultant to carry out a risk management 
study. One conclusion is that the company should have at least two suppliers of 
the five most important inputs.  
 
The suggestion is presented by the President to TMT, which decides in 
accordance with the proposal and that the Purchasing Manager will be responsible 
for implementation. The Purchasing Manager is not a member of TMT and he gets 
just a short paper about the background, the decision and his task.  
 
After one year the President initiates an audit of the risk management plan. The 
review shows that nothing has happened about the purchasing case. When the 
Purchasing Manager is asked why, his answer is “I did not think it was important 
and I have had so much to do”.  
 
In this case too, there will probably be a set of possible explanations for the non-
implementation. The absence of a time-fixed goal could be one. In this 
circumstance, the Purchasing Manager thought that the case “was not important”. 
Another reason could be the non-involvement of the Purchasing Manager in the 
decision making process. A third explanation may be that the President and the 
TMT did not have an up-dated picture of the supplier market, leading to a “bad” 
decision. Another reason could be that the relations between the Purchasing 
Manager and the existing suppliers were very good; if this was so, then this was 
good for him but not the best for the company.  
 
1.2.4 Comments on the implementation cases 
These three examples demonstrate the complexity of the implementation of a TMT 
decision in business companies with several organizational levels. Human 
relations, routines or procedures of decision making and implementation, the 
transmission of the decision to implement, communications, and the decision 
clarity in terms of purpose and formulation are all factors derived from these three 
cases and seem to be of importance in determining the behavior of the 
implementers. Their commitment, acceptance or resistance have an impact on 
implementation success.  
 
1.3 An intended research problem to study 
Even if the knowledge of implementation conditions and success seems to be 
limited (see 1.1) it is too early to formulate a problem for the study. It is however   
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necessary to set the tone as a basis for the literature review. Therefore, the 
preliminary problem is formulated as an open question:  
•  Why will one decision made by top management in an organization be 
properly implemented, another just partly implemented and a third not at 
all implemented?  
This preliminary problem is linked to an intended aim of this study, which is to 
describe, explain and understand the conditions affecting the implementation 
success of top management decisions in organizations.  
 
Indeed, the question contains demarcations. At first, it deals with organizations 
where people per se cooperate and fight, trust and suspect; it does not deal with 
personal decision implementation such as not smoking or buying a new car. 
Secondly, the organization is supposed to contain some level of complexity with 
“top management”. The underlying starting point is that the decision made will be 
implemented by other people than those who made the decision. These 
demarcations are dictated so that the scope of the intended study will be 
manageable and that it is possible to focus on a potential answer to the question 
formulated above. Further demarcations of the study and the aim of the thesis may 
be established when the literature review is carried out (in Chapter 2).  
 
1.4 Disposition of the thesis  
This introductory chapter with a basis in business life will be followed by a 
literature review (Chapter 2) as a base for a precise problem formulation, a precise 
aim of the study, design of an implementation model, a main hypothesis and 
research questions (Chapter 3). The literature review is also an important input to 
the selection of research methods and tools (Chapter 4). Chapters 5 and 6 cover 
the collection and analysis of field data, respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 ties up 
and concludes the thesis.    
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2 Literature review 
 
 
In this chapter, I investigate and describe the state of our current understanding of 
decision implementation, based on a literature review. The review focuses on 
“complex organization”, since the intended research problem to study is initially 
demarcated in such a way (see 1.3).  
 
Implementation as a phenomenon itself is first examined. However, 
implementation assumes per se that a decision is made, which initiates what is to 
be done. Therefore it is necessary to investigate how decision making and 
implementation are linked according to research results. The findings are briefly 
presented and discussed but the implications for the study are analyzed and are put 
together in 2.4.  
 
2.1 How to understand complex organizations?  
What is the meaning of the word organization used in a management context? It 
is derived from the Greek organon, meaning a tool or instrument (Morgan, 1986). 
Morgan says “Organizations are rarely established as ends in themselves. They are 
instruments created to achieve other ends”. Robbins & Coulter (1999) define 
organization as “… a deliberate arrangement of people to accomplish some 
specific purpose”. Cook & Hunsaker (2001) define organization as “A group of 
people working in a network of relationships and systems toward a common 
objective”.  
 
What does complex stand for? The complexity of an organization is not only a 
matter of size or number of hierarchal levels (see, e.g., Czarniawska-Joerges, 
1992, and Perrow, 1986). It also depends on, for instance, technology and 
territory, business scope and customer profiles. Staff members form a social 
network; five persons create theoretically 10 relations, 50 persons 1225. The 
complexity is also built up by the different opinions among people; core values are 
not always shared by everyone. Czarniawska-Joerges (1992) summarizes “that an 
organization becomes complex when no one can sensibly and comprehensibly 
account for all of it”.  
 
  Kaufmann & Kaufmann (1998) discuss the differences of perspective with 
regard to organization in social sciences and in business administration. In the 
former area there is basic human relations outlook, which focuses on people as 
subjects. In the latter there is an instrumental basic outlook resulting in looking at 
people as objects. This approach is also supported by, e.g., Bolman & Deal (1981) 
and Czarniawska-Joerges (1993). 
  
  Morgan (1986 and 1997) helps us to understand organizations by using 
metaphors like machine, brain, political system, etc. Essential elements as power 
and authority, conflict and resistance, information and communication are 
managed differently in each metaphor helping us to better understand what is 
going on.  
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In summary, a complex organization is to be understood as a group of people 
working in integrated but also separated activities in order to achieve a set of goals 
on different levels and in different stakeholder dimensions. No one in the group 
can account for all of it. It is with this meaning that the term complex organization 
is used in the study.  
 
2.2 Implementation of decisions 
Many researchers remark on our lack of understanding regarding implementation, 
as already noted in the introduction chapter. However, there are literature findings 
to report. They come from two types of sources: the descriptive and the 
prescriptive. The findings are therefore presented in two separated sub-chapters. 
 
2.2.1 Descriptive reports 
Nutt (1999) has reported results from implementation studies carried out in 
different types of organizations during more than 20 years. His reports from 
studies in USA and Canada (Nutt, 1999) show the reasons why decisions that do 
not achieve their objectives are more often found in the implementation phase than 
in other phases of the decision making process. In one early study, Nutt (1989) is 
testing in practice four different tactics used by strategic managers to implement 
strategic decisions. The tactics were identified in an earlier study (Nutt, 1987) and 
labeled as Intervention, Participation, Persuasion and Edict. The intervention tactic 
implies that the manager exposes the difference between the actual strategy and 
results versus the new strategy and its perceived results; further action will be 
taken from the identified and committed differences. The participation tactic 
means that the manager initiates planning by stipulating strategic needs and an 
arena of action. The persuasion tactic is a delegation of the development of the 
new strategy to experts. Finally, the edict tactic means that directives are 
formulated in an atmosphere of power. The four tactics are linked to specific 
situational conditions as corporate culture and power. Implementation success was 
defined as putting the plan to actual use, as opposed to a symbolic or a conceptual 
use. The actual tactic used was compared to the recommended tactic, using the 
results from the earlier study. The over all success rate was 94% when used and 
recommended tactics were congruent. The corresponding figure using a non-
recommended tactic was 19%. These implementation cases were characterized by 
very low managerial involvement even if there was an over all tendency of the 
manager spending too little time in implementation.  
 
In another study (Nutt, 1998), the four tactics are further studied. 376 cases were 
examined in public, private and third sector (e.g., hospitals and symphony 
orchestra) organizations. The actual tactic used was identified for each case as 
well as the implementation success measured by adoption (=institutionalization of 
new practices), value (=decision importance for the organization) and duration 
(=time to implement). Contextual factors such as the decision’s disruptiveness and 
the implementing manager’s self-interest were also mapped. The tactic 
intervention was most successful but rarely used. It will favorably replace   
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participation, which was used more frequently. Managers were prone to use 
persuasion and edict but they were ineffective even in urgent situations.  
 
  Nutt reports similar results in other studies (Nutt, 1986, 1997 and 1999). 
However, he has also studied the procedure of generation of alternatives in 
decision making process and its relation to implementation success in the three 
types of organizations mentioned above (Nutt, 2000). Six alternatives were 
identified (p. 90): 
1. Cyclical search    Multiple searches in which needs are redefined 
according to what is available  
2.  Integrated  benchmarking    Amalgamation of ideas from several outside 
sources  
3. Search     A single search cycle with a decision after RFP 
(request for proposals) responses received  
4. Benchmarking                 Adapt a practice used by another organization  
5.  Innovation             Develop  a  custom-made  solution   
6.  Existing  solution    Validate and demonstrate benefits of a pre-
existing idea known to organization  
The implementation success is measured in the same way as earlier (Nutt, 1998). 
Nutt finds that there were almost no significant differences over all in 
implementation success, measured as adoption, value and duration, between the 
three types of organizations. He also finds in the private sector that the generation 
alternative innovation topped the implementation success ranking with existing 
solution in the bottom. It is, however, to be noted that innovation took the longest 
time to implement. Nutt concludes “Private organizations made much better 
decisions when innovative alternatives were sought. However, private sector 
decision makers prefer to use an existing solution approach in place of innovation, 
which produced inferior results. The desire of private sector decision makers to be 
pragmatic and swift hides behind internal politics, and the threat inherent in 
situations that can appear out of control. A reading of the cases suggests that this 
behavior leads to poor results in more than 80 per cent of the private sector 
decisions studied. … Fewer than one in five studied decisions demanded 
immediate action” (Nutt, 2000, p. 101). 
 
  “The Bradford Studies” dealing with decision making are summarized in a 
report (Hickson et al., 2003). Earlier stages of the research had identified eight 
variables having different degrees of explanation of successfully managing 
implementation. The variables are (descriptions from Appendix B, p. 1826):  
1.  Familiarity  the extent to which relevant experience was available 
(either in-house, outsourced or bought in)  
2. Assessability  the extent to which the criteria for success were clear       
3. Specificity  the extent to which what had to be done was determined 
beforehand  
4.  Resourcing  the extent to which what was needed was available 
(including people, money and time) 
5. Acceptability  the extent to which those affected were in accord with 
what was done  
6. Receptivity   the  extent to which the organization and/or external 
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7.  Structural  facilitation the extent to which organizational structure eased 
implementation (by appropriately allocated authority, for 
example by setting up a project team) 
8.  Priority  the extent to which implementation was put ahead of 
other commitments 
These occur as the independent variables in the model. The dependent variable is 
achievement measured as “the extent to which the performance over time of what 
was done was as intended or better”. The informants were top executives. They 
were interviewed and they also scored their variable opinions on scales adapted to 
each variable individually with scales from 3 to 6.  
 
The first analysis step showed a significant explanation to achievement, 
measured on a six point scale, just for acceptability and priority. Further analysis 
uncovered two groups of independent variables: factor 1 consisting of 
assessability, resourcing, familiarity, acceptability, specificity and factor 2 
structural facilitation, priority and receptivity (the variables are listed in the order 
with which they contribute to the explanation). The total degree of explanation 
was 55%, divided between factor 1 38% and factor 2 17%. In factor group 1, 
acceptability is a result of the four other variables (assessability, resourcing, 
familiarity, specificity). The same situation occurs among variables in factor group 
2, where priority is a result of the two others, structural facilitation and receptivity. 
These results indicate two different implementation approaches, the Experienced-
based approach and the Readiness approach. Hickson et al. (2003) show that a 
balanced combination of the two approaches is most successful and that two 
approaches are better than one. If one or even worse both are neglected, which is 
called weak management, the implementation success decreases significantly. Out 
of the 55 cases, this situation happened in 17 cases, which is almost a third.  
 
Based on the results Hickson et al. (2003) launch an implementation theory: 
“The identification of two approaches to the managing of implementation, 
Experience-based and Readiness-based, carries with it an inherent theory of 
management action …”. The management has two options called Planned Option 
(built on factor 1 above) and Prioritized Option (built on factor 2 above). A 
summary of the theory is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1. A theory of management action in decision implementation. Source: Hickson et al. 
(2003, p. 1823)  
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“Either Option can be successful, but a combination of both, resting on a dual 
approach which utilizes both courses of action, has the best chance of full success” 
(Hickson et al., 2003, p. 1823) They conclude “In decision implementation the 
human element is always crucial for success. It figures in both options. A 
successful Planned Option requires concurrent acceptability and the Prioritized 
Option rests in precedent receptivity. The managing of implementation cannot 
ignore it” (Hickson et al., 2003, p. 1824). They also ask the question if good 
implementation management can make up for a bad decision. Their answer is 
“certainly no” but the data cannot give an assured answer. 
 
Braga Rodrigues & Hickson (1995) studied the possible conditions for success 
in managerial decision making including implementation. The problem to define 
and operationalize the successfulness of a decision is discussed ending up in five 
variables (Appendix, p. 674): 
1.  Closure  the degree to which the problem(s) which evoked the 
decision was (were) solved by the making of the decision 
2. Realization   the degree to which the opportunity(ies) which evoked the 
decision was (were) taken 
3. Propitiousness  the extent to which unforeseen advantages were exposed  
by the decision process  
4. Disturbance   the extent to which unforeseen problems were exposed by 
the decision process  
5.  Perceived  success  the degree to which a decision is perceived as being 
successful or unsuccessful  
The variables 1, 2 and 5 were estimated by the respondents on scales. For the 
variable 3, the respondents reported opportunities and advantages and for variable 
4 they reported problems and difficulties. The number of reported issues were 
accounted for. 17 independent variables were measured initially. Among them, 
availability of resources and top managements’ influence had the strongest 
explanation rate. “Most striking, however, is the mutual exclusion of top 
management and the specialist departments. … There does not seem to be enough 
room in the decision-making process for both the top and the specialists” (Braga 
Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995, p. 664).  
 
Even more interesting things were uncovered when a separation of the dataset 
was done into two subsets, non-business organizations and business organizations. 
Success variables were agreement and participation in the former, availability of 
resources (especially information) and diversity of interests in the latter. Failure 
variables for non-business organizations and business organizations were undue 
higher management influence and misdirected higher management influence, 
respectively. However, the successfulness did not differ between the two types of 
organizations. 
 
How are different types of generic strategies (Porter, 1980) implemented? 
Skivington & Daft (1991) show that low cost strategies are implemented through 
internal systems (structure and system). Differentiation strategies are implemented 
through resource allocation to market-related activities and to training. In this 
study the implementation success was not measured.  
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A study (Miller, 1997) of 11 decisions in six organizations was carried out. 
Successful implementation was critically dependent on backing, clear aims and 
planning, and cultural receptivity. Miller says “Perhaps surprisingly, other factors, 
such as having relevant experience, giving implementation priority, having 
abundant resources, an appropriate structure and implementing flexibly, appear to 
matter rather less.“ Successful implementation is defined in terms of completion 
(that which is intended to be done is done), achievement and acceptability (by 
those involved).  
 
Bryson & Bromiley (1993) also deal with project implementation of strategic 
decisions. The study searches for answers to two questions, how does the context 
of a major project influence the process of project planning and implementation 
and how do the context and process influence the outcomes of major projects? The 
model is presented in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationships in an explanation model of implementation success (+ and – 
indicate significant relationships). Source: Bryson & Bromiley (1993) 
 
Outcome is estimated in two ways, in terms of success and learning. Success 
includes “goal achievement, satisfaction with outcome, deviation from success 
criteria”. Learning is “the improving of the lead organization’s capacity for future   
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endeavors and learning from the project”. As seen in figure 1 several contextual 
factors influence the process but also the outcomes directly. Communication 
during the process is favorable for success while forcing is negatively related to 
both success and learning. Power per se has no impact on outcomes; “this is 
surprising given the emphasis placed on the importance of power by several 
authors” (Bryson & Bromiley, 1993, p. 334). 
 
Dean & Sharfman (1996) and Sharfman & Dean (1997) look at the entire 
decision making process where the outcome is “strategic decision effectiveness, 
defined as the extent to which a decision achieves the objectives established by 
management at the time it is made” (Dean & Sharfman, 1996, p. 372). The model 
is presented in figure 2. Quality of implementation is defined as “the competence 
with which the steps are taken to execute the strategic decision” (Dean & 
Sharfman, 1996, p. 378). The study was carried out as interviews of high-level 
managers. They answered questions and ranked their answers on 7-point Likert-
type scales. It should be noted that the decision effectiveness was measured in 
several steps, which in the end was ranked using the scale; the decision 
effectiveness is accordingly estimated by the respondents. The authors summarize: 
“The primary finding of our study is simply that decision processes influence 
strategic decision-making effectiveness. Even when both environmental 
favorability and quality of implementation were included in our regression model, 
procedural rationality and political behavior were significantly related to 
effectiveness. … our study reconfirms that environmental instability and quality of 
decision implementation play important roles in influencing decision 
effectiveness” (Dean & Sharfman, 1996, p. 388-389).  
 
 
Figure 2. Strategic decision making effectiveness model (dotted lines indicates control 
variables). Source: Dean & Sharfman (1996, p. 373) 
 
Roberto (2004) poses the question “How do managers make decisions in an 
efficient manner and build the consensus often required to implement those 
decisions successfully?” after he has concluded that “… the decision-making 
literature presents a puzzle. It suggests that successful firm performance requires 
an efficient decision process and effective implementation, but it does not explain 
how managers can achieve both outcomes simultaneously” (p. 626). The study   
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(Roberto, 2004) shows that implementation success is most advantageous when 
consensus (decision understanding, commitment) and success are achieved 
simultaneously. When the decision to be made should be complex, novel, open-
ended and ill-structured the individual decision maker or the team must work 
along two ways, the substantial and the symbolic, to reach the stage of 
simultaneously achieved consensus and success. The substantial way is to make 
the decision process manageable. The symbolic way is to anchor and legitimate 
the decision making process.  
 
The famous book In search of Excellence (Peters & Waterman Jr, 1982) is not 
strictly scientific. Nevertheless it reports interesting findings. The authors argue 
that the old rationalism of management among CEOs is still frequent according to 
their experiences. “The job of the boss is to make decisions. Application and 
action is of secondary meaning. Change the management team if it is necessary for 
a successful implementation”. However, they found some companies with 
excellent leadership. They try to explain the excellence with a couple of 
characteristics. One of them is Focus on action. One critical method of the 
Executives are MBWA (Management By Wandering Around) providing situations 
of communications and dialogues, simplicity and experiments in a broader sense. 
The decision making process is therefore very much down-up. The decisions made 
by CEOs will not be surprises, more like confirmations. However, the companies 
used by the authors as examples and figureheads have not been long run 
successes. The proposed model to explain business success has therefore been 
criticized. Nevertheless, the openness forcing an information flow in all directions 
is an essential aspect of “make things happen”.  
 
  Brunsson (1985) postulates that “Action can be understood only in light of how 
the people concerned conceive of their situation” (p. 12). Actors in general want to 
avoid uncertainty of different types. Brunsson lists uncertainty in cognitive 
structure, judgment uncertainty and estimation uncertainty. Irrespective of which 
one, uncertainty affects motivation. But uncertainty must be understood taking 
stake into account. Risk is the product of uncertainty and stake. “Risk represents a 
greater threat to motivation than mere uncertainty. Risk reduces the motivation for 
a given action by providing a ‘contra-motivation’, i.e., motivation not to undertake 
the action. The balance may even swing in favor of non-action” (p. 43).  
 
An interesting aspect of leadership, the emotional side, is presented by Brundin 
(2002). “Furthermore, the co-producing of emotions between the strategic leader 
and other organizational members has power implications for the strategic 
leadership where the co-production of emotions might result in power gain or 
drain for the strategic leader, and thereby the strategic leadership. Emotions are the 
grounds for collective actions and create willingness or unwillingness within the 
change process, which in the end help the process to progress or work the other 
way around” (p. 318). The study shows the importance of dialogue between leader 
and subordinates for successful radical change process. The dialogue produces 
emotions, which may be driving or restraining forces. As the implementers may 
perceive a specific decision as “radical change”, the study results are applicable 
also in decision implementation situations.  
   
  26
2.2.2 Prescriptive reports 
A well-written textbook summarizes the scientific research results and formulates 
guidelines for successful management actions. The target groups may be students 
and/or managers. As this study emerges from experiences in business life and will 
collect data from this arena, I find it valuable to examine what is presented about 
implementation in some modern textbooks in order to expand the knowledge base.  
 
Thompson & Strickland (1992) propose six principal tasks of the executive(s) in 
order to consolidate a successful implementation:  
•  Building an organization capable of successful strategy execution 
•  Establishing a strategy-supportive budget  
•  Installing administrative support systems (policies, procedures, 
information systems and controls)  
•  Designing rewards and incentives that are tightly linked to performance 
objectives and strategy  
•  Shaping the corporate culture to fit the strategy  
•  Exercising strategic leadership  
The engagement of top management is the central dimension in all tasks in the 
implementation phase. The necessity to play on all six tangents with a situational 
approach depending on difference in human capacities, departments involved, 
implementation phases, etc., is another point.  
 
Thompson & Strickland (1992) make a difference between implementation as a 
process and the results of the implementation, the goal achievement: “Strategy 
implementation entails converting the strategy plan into action and then into 
results. Implementation is successful if the company achieves its strategic 
objectives and targeted levels of financial performance. What makes the process 
so demanding is the wide sweep of managerial activities that have to be attended 
to, the many ways managers can tackle each activity, the skill it takes to get a 
variety of initiatives launched and moving, and the resistance to change that has to 
be overcome.”  
 
The rational model proposes three parts for successful implementation of 
strategic decisions (see Hatch, 1997, p. 110): 
•  Resource allocation to support the selected alternative 
•  The development of control systems to measure and assess performance 
and provide feedback to management 
•  Creating of structures and human resource policies 
Successful implementation is a question of mobilizing all aspects of the 
organization: “… technology, structure (both social and physical), and culture as 
well as decision making, power and politics, control, and organizational change.” 
 
In a textbook (Robbins & Coulter, 1999), implementation is treated explicitly as 
one step in a decision making process of eight steps. The authors argue for the 
participation of implementers in the decision making process and this is 
exemplified with an operational decision. Their definition of implementation “ … 
includes conveying the decision to those affected and getting their commitment to 
it”. Decisions are implemented by effective planning, organizing, and leading (p. 
187). Three chapters in the textbook, 340 pages, cover these practical aspects of   
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implementation; they are not referred here. “Evaluation of Decision Effectiveness” 
is the last of the eight steps. It will ensure that the problem really has been 
resolved. It is a task of the decision maker to ask questions such as “Was the right 
alternative selected but improperly implemented? Was the problem incorrectly 
defined? etc.”. The decision making process is not completed until satisfactory 
results are achieved.  
 
Another textbook (Cooke & Slack, 1991) addressed to future managers in a top-
down perspective, underlines the importance of implementation: “This phase 
involves making whatever changes the selected option requires. The effectiveness 
of the implementation phase will depend on the skill and ability of the manager 
charged with the task and also on the ‘implementability’ of the option itself. In 
fact the ease with which an option can be implemented is often regarded as an 
attribute of the option which will be taken into account during the evaluation 
phase” (p. 7). They also remind the future manager, that “The moment of choice is 
really just the start of the implementation phase, not the end of solving the 
problem” (p. 320). 
 
The improvement of implementation success by the participation of the 
implementer in the decision making is situational (Cook & Hunsaker, 2001, and 
Vroom & Yetton, 1973). If the implementers participate in the decision making 
process, they are more likely to enthusiastically support the outcome than if they 
are just told what to do (see, e.g., Cooke & Slack, 1991; Göransson, 2001; Cook & 
Hunsaker, 2001). Empirical data say that there are three main criteria: decision 
quality requirements, implementer acceptance requirements, and time 
requirements. Decision quality requirements are about the nature (degree of 
complexity) and importance (impacts on organizational goal achievements) of the 
problem. Implementer acceptance requirements (motivation, resistance, 
commitment, efforts) must be predicted regarding the implementation of the 
decision considered. Time requirements are about the calculation of increasing 
decision quality if there is an investment in additional time. Combinations of these 
three factors can be managed in a decision tree. An example of the benefit of 
implementer participation in the decision making process is the combination of a 
high quality requirement decision, which needs high acceptance and with enough 
time available. Another example is the combination of a low quality requirement 
decision, which does not require high acceptance, and with enough time available; 
this combination will not benefit from implementer participation. As the 
participation itself is a decision, it is crucial how the manager judges the 
requirements. Vroom & Yetton (1973) show that not only different managers but 
also the single manager will act according to different decision situations. The 
action of the manager is dependent on her/his judgment of the degree of problem 
structure, the trust of subordinates and the prior probability of acceptance of an 
autocratic decision.  
 
There is a large difference in making a decision and the implementation of a 
decision (Russo & Schoemaker, 1989). “The ideal business person is a realist 
when making a decision but an optimist when implementing it. Unfortunately, few 
people can switch between realism and optimism at exactly the right time. To be 
effective, you have to motivate subordinates by convincing them that something is   
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achievable without developing an unrealistic belief in it yourself ” (p. 79). Without 
saying it explicitly the authors underline that implementation is a question of 
leadership. They also cite (p. 127) a dean of a business school, saying, “The 
individual with responsibility for implementing a decision should be a part of the 
decision-making process” but without any supporting data.  
 
Smith (1986) discusses the implementation of new technology. ”When firms 
decide to implement automated office systems, they are influenced by economic 
pressures and the desire to cut costs. The impacts of automation, however, are 
often organizational and social. When planning for technological change, it is 
often forgotten that organizations are not simply accounting sheets, five-year 
plans, office buildings, and flowcharts. They are human institutions. An 
organization’s strategies for change must address the human consequences of 
introducing new information systems” (p. 195). Smith continues saying, 
“Resistance often surfaces when users are not educated about how work roles are 
changing. One of the greatest sources of resistance to automation is the threat that 
it poses to job stability and security. Another fear is that automation will affect the 
quality of work life.”  
 
 Pressman & Wildavsky (1979) are dealing with the implementation of public 
decisions such as educational, environmental and welfare programs. Nevertheless 
there is a relevance of the topic as the complex business organization is not far 
from the political arena: someone decides about policies and operations, others 
have to implement the decisions. The following quote highlights the problem: 
“Experience with the innumerable steps involved in program implementation 
suggests that simplicity in policies is much to be desired. The fewer the steps 
involved in carrying out the program, the fewer the opportunities for a disaster to 
overtake it. The more directly the policy aims in its target, the fewer the decisions 
involved in its ultimate realization and the greater the likelihood it will be 
implemented. Simplicity is not an end in itself; a fast train is worse than a slow 
one if it takes you in the wrong direction. Simplicity can be ignored, however, 
only at the peril of breakdown” (p. 147). They underline that the value of a policy 
decision must also be measured in terms of implementability. This judgment will 
be facilitated by a systematic evaluation of how a decision is implemented: 
learning through evaluation. “Implementation is a Sisyphean labor” (p. xviii).  
 
  The implementation of political decisions in public life is discussed by Hjern & 
Potter (1981). They underline that actors and organizations in implementation 
structures have a variety of goals and motives. Subgroups of actors and 
organizations perform specialized roles. The responsible management must clarify 
and act according to these conditions. The findings are not immediately 
transferable to business life but many business firms are so big that you will find 
an implementation context quite close to that of public organizations.  
 
2.2.3 General comments on the literature review of decision 
implementation  
The literature review has shown that the our understanding of the implementation 
of decisions is particularly uneven and fragmentary. The research front is not easy   
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to ascertain; among other things, the absence of accepted and shared definitions of 
essential terms regarding implementation is striking. However, it is a challenge to 
summarize and conclude the existing research results in a manner making it useful 
for the study. It is carried out in 2.4. 
 
2.3 Decision making and implementation 
Some of the implementation studies referred to in 2.2 discuss if and how the 
decision making process is influencing implementation success. A complex 
picture has evolved. The influence may occur from how the process is carried out 
but also from its purpose and content. The process may include a stepwise 
approach, the potential implementers participation, the dialogue with the decision 
stakeholders, etc. The purpose and content may cover a precise problem definition, 
decision characteristics (strategic vs operational, repetitive vs unique, internal vs 
external applications, etc.), generation of alternatives, consequence evaluation, 
conditions for implementation (resources, plans, time schedules etc.). There are 
also interactions between process activities and content.  
 
This picture calls for a look at how the relationship between decision making 
and implementation is presented in literature, which is the purpose of the review. 
As “A respectable research library may hold hundreds of books and thousands of 
articles on various aspects of decision making” (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993, p. 5) 
it is possible to examine just a few of them. My criterion for this selection is that 
the literature has been used in other studies and textbooks as references.  
 
A specific emerging question is the use of the management terms. Problem 
solving, decision making and implementation are used differently. Cooke & Slack 
(1991) write, regarding problem solving and decision making: “It is partly a 
semantic problem. Although both terms are frequently used by management 
writers, there is some considerable difference and confusion in the literature as to 
what each term means” (p. 4). They take a position, saying “… decision making is 
part of the larger process of problem solving. We see decision making as focusing 
around the central problem of choice between alternative courses of action. 
Problem solving is a broader process which includes the recognition that problems 
exist, the interpretation and diagnosis of that problem, and the later 
implementation of whatever solution is thought to be appropriate” (p. 4). I adopt 
this definition of the terms and I use them when I discuss what has been found in 
the literature even if the findings are presented with the author’s individual use of 
vocabulary. 
 
Cyert & March (1992) describe four basic concepts as fundamental to an 
understanding of the decision making process in a modern, large-scale business 
organization. They are the quasi resolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, 
problemistic search, and organizational learning (p. 116). Implementation is 
acting. Their four basic concepts affect the conditions for acting but the process of 
acting is not included.  
 
Traditional decision research has dealt mainly with the decision event (Orasanu 
& Connolly, 1993). They conclude that “ … decision performance in everyday   
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situations is a joint function of two factors: (1) features of the task, and (b) the 
subjects knowledge and experience relevant to that task”. They also bring out as a 
key point that deciding and action are intertwined: “Decision making is intimately 
connected to action”.  
 
 Janis & Mann (1977) deal with implementation in a decision making context. 
They assume “… that decisions satisfying these seven ‘ideal’ procedural criteria 
have a better chance than others of attaining the decision maker’s objectives and 
of being adhered to in the long run”. The seventh paragraph “makes detailed 
provisions for implementing or executing the chosen course of action, with special 
attention to contingency plans that might be required if various known risks were 
to materialize” (p. 11). They also verify that “Indeed, an executive risks failure if 
he overlooks to work out a policy that will be approved by higher executives or 
legal authorities within the organization and accepted by the managers who will be 
required to administer it … Aside from the most obvious forms of employee 
resistance, there are other, subtle costs of implementing decisions that require the 
workers in a plant to change their work routines, to learn new operations, or to 
regroup into unaccustomed units: all such decisions result in some measure of 
lowered productivity” (p. 24). They refer to research results (p. 26), saying that the 
CEO often makes the second best decision related to expected result if it will 
cause less disturbances among the subordinates who will implement it. And once 
decided, the decision maker tends to bolster the decision made in a quite biased 
way (p. 194).  
 
Brunsson (1985) integrates implementation in the decision making process. He 
argues, that “The decision is often regarded as the equivalent of action; once we 
have learnt how to understand and predict decisions, we can also understand and 
predict actions … Researchers tend to evaluate decision making processes in terms 
of rationality, and they have established norms for rational decision-making. … 
Less attention has been paid to other phases in the decision-making process, or the 
implementation of the decision once made” (p. 15 and 16). He continues, “A 
decision-making perspective fails to recognize that managers do more than make 
decisions. Making a decision is merely a step towards taking action. The decision 
is not the end product. Managers get things done – act and induce others to act” (p. 
18). Brunsson (1985) includes implementation in the problem solving process, as I 
have chosen to use the term, so far I understand him.  
 
Kleindorfer et al. (1993) discuss implementation, legitimation and learning as 
outcomes of the decision making process. Their summary of current understanding 
is a “road map for problem solving” consisting of five elements where 
implementation is the fifth. To their own question, “Can specific approaches be 
successfully implemented by generating additional feedback, using legitimation 
criteria, and accountability procedures?”, they answer saying “Effective managers 
or consultants strive for integration by zooming in and out of a problem and 
moving backward and forward across the different /five/ elements discussed here 
… As a general rule, the more complex the decision, the greater the need to use a 
metastructure to guide the process”. I understand their approach as the 
implementation is a part of the problem solving process.  
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Bryson & Bromiley (1993) investigate the relations between critical factors in 
the planning process and implementation success. The planning process is not 
explicitly the same as the decision making process but very close as it contains a 
set of decisions. They approach their investigation by saying “The planning and 
implementation process will be defined as a set of generic activities that occur 
across an entire problem-solving sequence.”  
 
Janis & Mann (1977) include implementation in the decision making process 
regarding both individual decision and group decision. They go even further and 
add a stage Adhering despite Negative Feedback. They also say “Many decisions 
go through a honeymoon period in which the decision maker is quite happy about 
his choice and implement it without any qualms. All too often, however, this 
idyllic post-decisional state is rudely interrupted, sooner or later, by new threats or 
opportunities”.  
 
Öhlmér et al. (1998) launch a revised decision making model (see table 2). They 
describe the decision making process as a matrix of four phases and repeated sub-
processes in each phase instead of the traditional eight function steps model. 
Implementation is the fourth phase in the model. The model focus is on small scale 
organizations, where the same person makes the decision and carries out, or at 
least manages, the implementation. However, the introduction of the sub-process 
demonstrates that decision making is not a linear, stepwise process but a main 
process with repeated loops, sub-processes.  
 
Table 2. A conceptual model of the decision making process. Source: Öhlmér, Olson & 
Brehmer (1998, p. 285)  
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In a complex organization perspective the model evokes the needs for 
communication and dialogue and also the question about involving implementers 
in the early steps of the decision making process. The model in table 2 covers, as I 
understand, a complete problem solving process.  
 
So far I have selected examples from descriptive literature. Bridging over to 
prescriptive textbooks, what do they say? They present a decision making process 
in different numbers of steps including implementation and sometimes explicit 
follow-up (see, e.g., Cook & Hunsaker, 2001; Robbins & Coulter, 1999; Yates, 
2003; Cooke & Slack, 1991). I have not found any textbook without a connection 
between decision making, the decision made, and implementation. The above 
mentioned textbooks prescribe behavior and tools like Management By 
Wandering Around (MBWA-leadership), evident tasks, fixed time schedule, 
necessary resources, planning, commitment, feed back, control, and so on, in order 
to prepare success and avoid failure. The background to these recommendations 
may be found in research publications; “Enormous sums of money were being 
spent on decisions that were put to full use only half of the time” (Nutt, 1997) and 
“… decisions fail half the time” (Nutt, 2002). It is obvious that the textbooks 
integrate the implementation in the decision making process alternatively in the 
management process. In order to ensure a smooth implementation the textbooks 
underline the importance of involving implementation aspects during the decision 
making process. Such aspects may be implementer participating, implementation 
consequence analyses of possible decision alternatives and a leadership focus on 
implementation conditions. A decision made is just half way to completion. 
Implementation is the last step in the problem solving process, the decisive step 
for solving the problem. 
 
As my intended research problem is to elucidate the conditions affecting the 
implementation success (see 1.3), it may be interesting to look upon how this is 
dealt with in some studies within the Change Management area. Christensen et al. 
(2006) say “… that the first step in any change initiative must be to assess the 
level of agreement in the organization along two critical dimensions. The first is 
the extent to which people agree on what they want: the results they seek from 
their participation in the enterprise; their values and priorities; and which trade-
offs they are willing to make in order to achieve those results … The second 
dimension is the extent to which people agree on cause and effect: which actions 
will lead to the desired outcome. When people have a shared understanding of 
cause and effect, they will probably agree about which processes to adopt … “ (p 
1). They design an “Agreement Matrix” where the two axes show “Extent to 
which people agree on cause and effect” and “Extent to which people agree on 
what they want”. It is leadership challenge to establish a starting point for change 
in the upper-right area (high cause/effect and high want agreement) in order to 
ensure a succesful implementation. 
 
Kotter & Cohen (2002) have from their empirical studies of organization 
changes designed “The Eight Stages of Successful Large-Scale Change”. They are 
as follows: 
1.  Increase urgency  
2.  Build the guiding team    
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3.  Get the vision right  
4.  Communicate for buy-in  
5.  Empower action  
6.  Create short-term wins  
7.  Don’t let up  
8.  Make change stick  
“The central challenge in all eight stages is changing people’s behavior.” 
Changing behavior is about helping them to see a truth to influence their feelings. 
They have found that the flow of see-feel-change is more powerful than that of 
analysis-think-change. “People change what they do less because they are given 
analysis that shifts their thinking than because they are shown a truth that 
influences their feelings.” A big obstacle observed in step 5 is the “Boss Barrier”; 
even if the sub-ordinates have understood the new vision and they are ready to act, 
first line supervisors as well as vice-presidents may kill the efforts by actions 
and/or words. The executive leader has to manage such situations in order to 
obtain a smooth implementation. 
 
Normann (2001) deals with “… the consequences for intellectual knowledge-
based processes - the symbolizing processes of the mind - …” He underlines the 
importance of understanding how “the current established mental map” is built up 
by both the conceptual history and the conceptual future but also by the conscious 
and non-conscious dimension. “The current established mental map” has a third 
dimension, the individual versus collective. The leaders who understand how “The 
current established mental map” is established and its content will be more 
successful in reframing the business. 
 
Pettigrew et al. (1992) have in a longitudinal study followed strategic changes in 
the National Health Service in Britain. The most interesting finding is, given my 
intended research problem (see 1.3), the conclusion that “There is also a 
continuing need to select and develop individuals for leadership roles, and to 
encourage effective team building where the complementary assets provided by 
several people can energize and bring results”. 
    
Robbins & Coulter (1999) refer to a couple of studies when summarizing “Why 
do people resist change? An individual is likely to resist change for three reasons: 
uncertainty, concern over personal loss, and the belief that the change is not in the 
organization’s best interest” (p. 386).  
 
There are, so far as I can find, some common elements in the referred studies of 
Change Management. They all deal with strategic decisions. They have a general 
top-down perspective (leadership, vision, mission …) but also underlines the 
importance of understanding the sub-ordinates as human beings and understanding 
their “world picture”. How Change Management findings may be used in my 
study is discussed in 2.4. 
 
Finally, there is a finding of specific interest regarding generalization. Decision 
making styles influenced by national culture have been discussed in the literature. 
Hickson (1987) summarizes, “Yet it is impossible to believe that social processes, 
including those decision making processes that take place at the apex of an 
organization’s hierarchy, are not deeply affected by national wealth and economic   
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structure and by culture”. Papadakis & Barvise (1997) conclude that most studies 
about strategic decision making have been carried out in the US context and 
therefore are not directly applicable across cultures. The problem solving process 
has a culture dimension to take care of when formulating a problem to study. 
 
2.4 Conclusions of literature findings 
When making the conclusions, I am applying a holistic perspective based on the 
over all approach to combine a positivistic and hermeneutic tradition in the 
research (for further discussion, see 4.1). The conclusions may therefore be seen 
as a result of the literature findings interpreted and evaluated in an intellectual 
process where my experiences also play a role. Another important aspect of the 
conclusion is the aim of the process, which is to lay the ground for the up-coming 
task of formulating the study problem. 
 
The search for greater understanding about complex profit-driven organizations 
has pointed to theories and models explaining parts of organizational life. In the 
studied reports, there are sometimes short discussions concerning the issue of how 
to use such a theory or model as a framework for the implementation concept. 
However, I have not found any study doing so, but I am coming back to the issue 
when discussing the problem to study in 3.1.  
  
A general and important conclusion is well formulated by one of the researchers, 
saying that “… the great diversity in the methods and measures of past studies has 
made it impossible to arrive at a clear set of undisputed empirical generalizations” 
(Papadakis & Barvise, 1997, p. 290). The picture of factors influencing 
implementation success is unfocused. The following comments and conclusions 
must be understood in this context.  
  
Even if the results of the studies are uneven I find it possible to give them a 
structure. Implementation success, no matter how it is measured, is influenced by 
variables as contextual (internal and external) factors but also decision making and 
implementation sub-process factors. Managerial tactics influence the 
implementation success in another dimension. The survey of the studies has also 
uncovered “uncharted territory”, to which I come back later. 
  
Most reports cover the implementation of strategic  decisions. However, the 
definition of strategic decision has been mostly passed over. Looking at the 
decisions studied in the reports they seem often to be quite operational. “The cases 
included building programs, organizational restructuring, mergers, service and 
product designs, and internal operations, such as data processing systems and 
laboratories” (Nutt, 1989). Nutt (1998) defines strategic decision as "the 
magnitude of its resource demands and possible consequences made the choice 
important to the organization's continued success" but the decision cases seem to 
be of the same profile as in Nutt (1989). Hickson (1987) says, “Yet who knows 
whether one researcher’s strategic decision is the same as another’s?” (p. 189). So 
even if some of the studied decisions are strategic according to a more stringent 
definition categorizing them as over all cost leadership, differentiation or focus 
decisions (Porter, 1980), many of them fall outside as more or less operational.   
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This means that the results are not only strictly linked to strategic decisions but are 
also to a certain degree applicable to operational decisions. It could have been 
fruitful to characterize the cases in the referred studies in strategic and operational 
decisions according to strict definitions to examine differences in implementation 
efficiency, but the published information makes that approach impossible.  
 
So far I have found that the situations of non-implemented decisions are not 
highlighted. The method of selecting decisions for implementation study seems to 
be almost the same in all examined studies, a variation on the theme “The primary 
criterion for decision selection (from those originally covered) was that their 
implementation was traceable” (Hickson et al., 2003, p. 1806). Decisions difficult 
to manage for any reason have been excluded in some studies (see, e.g., Dean & 
Sharfman, 1996; Nutt, 1989; Braga Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995). It has often been 
the executives who have selected the decisions to study, which is a risk for bias, 
discussed in some reports (e.g., Braga Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995; Nutt, 1998). In 
some studies decisions that have not been successfully implemented as well as 
those that have been successfully implemented have been included. There has not 
been a random selection of decisions in any study. The over all conclusion of the 
studied reports is that decisions which have been more or less successfully 
implemented are in the majority, failures are accidentally represented, and non-
implemented not at all. This opens an area to study further. 
  
The top-down perspective has been dominating in the studies. Sometimes there 
have been informants on lower levels in the organizations but executives and 
managers are in the majority. If there have been different opinions between 
informants, many studies have used methods to reach a consensus situation instead 
of exploring the reasons for the differences, (see e.g., Nutt, 2000). In some studies 
adoption, resistance and commitment of implementers and stakeholders are 
evaluated, but it is still in a top-down perspective. There are good general reasons, 
(see Eysenck & Keane, 1995) that executives (decision makers) and subordinates 
(implementers) at least sometimes will have different opinions about the relevance 
of the decision, the implementation process, the results and even more items. It is 
not given beforehand that just one opinion is correct or true. The degree of 
implementation success is mostly measured following an executive perspective. 
These findings address the challenge to study the entire decision making process 
including implementation and its result in a dual perspective, down-up and top-
down. 
 
Linked to the perspective aspects are questions as “What is really happening 
when subordinates are to implement a decision?” and/or “How may the potential 
implementation process be described?” Yates (2003) expressed it as “That is what 
we decided to do. Now, how can we get it done, or can we get it done, after all?” 
The studies “answer” on an attitude level in terms of the implementer’s 
acceptability, resistance, commitment, self interest, learning, etc., but the 
underlying reasons such as the bonus system effects, the awareness of crisis or the 
risk of loosing the employment are not exposed. The role and impact of the 
personality of the implementers and the psychological conditions concerning the 
implementation receive no penetrating evaluation, but rather hints about their 
importance. The studies neither detect or describe, nor explain the structure of the   
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implementation process in an implementer’s perspective. It seems to be a black 
box.  
 
However, Change Management reports may give some ideas. As summarized in 
2.3, the studies referred to in this section deal with strategic decisions. They do not 
focus on the operational implementation phase even if they discuss the 
implementer situation. Their focus is rather on long term effects of the decision. 
Therefore, my conclusion, given my intended research problem (see 1.3), is that 
there is a difference between my approach and their research focus, which means 
that their methods and results are not directly applicable to my study. But 
nevertheless, there are aspects such as leadership performance and implementer 
attitudes and behavior that may be useful to take into account when designing my 
empirical approach (see Chapter 3). 
 
The literature review has not detected anything explicit about the event of 
transmission, from decision maker to the implementer, of the decision to 
implement. On the other hand, the situational importance of implementer 
participation in the decision making process as well as the emotions induced by a 
dialogue between decision makers and implementers has been evoked. In order to 
explain implementers’ resistance, commitment, acceptability, etc., different studies 
have measured available resources, competence, time schedule and other 
variables. These factors, if evaluated, are possible to change during the 
implementation process. The transmission event is on the contrary per se 
impossible to repeat or ameliorate. You only get one chance to make a first 
impression. Therefore, the transmission event is a potential important factor in the 
implementation process. The manner of the transmission of the decision to 
implement and its implications on implementation efficiency seems to be an 
uncharted territory so far.  
 
Most of the reports are based on research including private/profit-driven and 
public organizations as well as third sector organizations in some studies. They 
report differences both in the decision making process and the implementation 
success between different types of organizations. However, there does not seem to 
be any significant and repeated organizational type difference. A focus on one 
type probably makes the investigation more manageable, certainly in terms of 
context, taking into account the experienced complexity in both methods and 
results in the studies. 
 
  The dependent variable in the studies is not only measured in different ways but 
also occurs under different labels as implementation success and failure, 
implementation quality, implementation efficiency and implementation 
effectiveness. I have used the terms of the authors when referring to them. In 
general writing, I have used implementation success. Regarding measurements 
there are attempts to estimate both goal achievement (how well the intention of the 
decision is achieved) and implementation process efficiency (how close real 
resource consumption and implementation duration, etc., come to planned levels) 
as well as an over all estimation of both. No single approach seems “best in test”; 
they are quite a bit situational and designed to give the purpose of the study. It is 
therefore an essential task to define and label the implementation success in this 
study when the problem and the aim are formulated.    
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 The literature review has provided striking arguments for looking upon 
implementation as a last and decisive step or sub-process of the problem solving 
process, in which the decision making is the preceding sub-process. How the 
decision making sub-process is carried out may have impact on the 
implementation success.  
 
At last, recalling the three personally experienced cases described in 1.2, how do 
they apply to the studies presented above? Case A was well implemented and it is 
recognized in a couple of studies as an example of participation and commitment 
leading to implementation success. Case B was just partly successful and it is also 
recognized in some studies as an example of bad communication, unclear goals 
and hidden agenda leading to poor implementation success. Case C was not 
implemented at all and this special situation has not been observed in the studies 
as they are designed in ways excluding such decisions. I conclude that the 
preliminary selected problem is relevant as its general presence is confirmed in the 
studied literature. Further more, the non-implementation situation seems important 
to catch when formulating the problem to study.  
 
  An attempt to summarize the literature review, given the implementation context 
of a complex organization, is done in the following list: 
 
Existing implementation knowledge 
•  the implementation success of strategic decisions varies and the variation 
is influenced by many factors such as competence, available resources, 
clear aims, planning 
•  the choice of executive leadership strategy of implementation is 
situational as it leads to variation in implementation success 
Uncharted territory in terms of implementation knowledge 
•  operational and day-to-day decisions as well as non-implemented 
decisions  
•  down-up perspective of implementation including what is happening 
when an implementer receives the mission  
•  implementation process efficiency  
The next chapter, dealing with problem formulation and aim of the study, takes its 
starting point in the uncharted territory.   
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3 Problem, aim and implementation model 
 
 
In this chapter the findings from the literature review in Chapter 2 are used to 
formulate the research focus of this study, and also to formulate the aim. 
Furthermore, a preliminary implementation model is designed using the literature 
review as a starting point.  
 
3.1 Problem formulation 
Decision making in general has for a long time been a research field where many 
scientific disciplines make contributions. Implementation of decisions has not 
received the same attention. Therefore, our understanding of decision 
implementation is more fragmentary and incomplete, which both facilitates and 
complicates the problem formulation; it is facilitated in the sense that there is very 
much to study, and complicated in the sense that it is hard to find a segment to 
study where there is relevant material to add to our understanding.  
 
A key issue is the success of implementation per se. As concluded earlier, the 
literature review has not uncovered a shared definition of “implementation 
success”. The terms effectiveness and efficiency are used both with the term 
success. They are defined in study-specific ways as seen in table 3. Looking for 
generally useful definitions I have found examples in Robbins & Coulter (1999) 
and Cook & Hunsaker (2001). The following definitions are selected and cited 
from Robbins & Coulter (1999), p. 9, as they are precise:  
•  Effectiveness     Goal attainment (popular version: doing the right 
thing)  
•  Efficiency        The relationship between inputs and outputs, the goal  
of which is to minimize resource costs (popular 
version: doing the thing right) 
The popular versions are found in both sources. The terms are used in the 
continuation of this study according to the scientific definitions above. To be even 
more specific about efficiency, I introduce the following definition:  
•  Implementation   The resources used to implement the decision related 
efficiency   (IE)  to the achievement degree of the decision goal (or aim,  
purpose, etc.)      
The term is defined in a neutral way, so that it is not biased by the word “success”. 
As seen in table 3, both approaches are used in the studies. I have chosen the 
neutral definition to avoid measurement problems related to the use of an emotive 
word as “success”. Support for this choice is given by e.g., Patel & Davidsson 
(1991) and Trost (1997). Furthermore, I have considered to complete the 
definition with “… given that the margin costs for further improvements did not 
exceed the margin revenues” or something like that. However, this would induce a 
measurement complication from a respondent point of view so I have abandoned. 
The question of how to measure the implementation efficiency is discussed in 
Chapter 4. From this point onward, I use implementation efficiency instead of the 
term implementation success, which has been used so far in a general meaning, 
when I discuss my own study.    
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Implementation efficiency, as defined above, does not assume anything about 
the effectiveness of the decision made, “doing the right thing”. As mentioned 
earlier, (Hickson et al., 2003) good implementation cannot atone for a bad 
decision. However, the implementation efficiency is a part of organizational total 
success or efficiency. “To get all parts of the organization to work in the same 
direction, you need both coordinated decision making and coordinated acting. 
Total efficiency is the sum of decision efficiency and action efficiency … It is 
more complicated and difficult when several decision makers and several actors 
are involved, and when the decision makers and the actors are not the same 
persons” (Öhlmér et al., 2000, p. 234). In order to focus on implementation in this 
study, it seems necessary to avoid evaluating the decision itself, that is, if is good 
or bad, so as to remain objective. The perceived relevance of the decision to 
persons involved in the implementation process is on the other hand a fundamental 
factor to consider.  
 
The literature about implementation success analyzes strategic decisions as 
discussed in 2.4. It is well known in real life that top management also decides 
about many day-to-day and trivial cases (see, e.g., Mintzberg, 1973; Carlsson, 
1951; Tengblad, 2002). This situation occurs not least of all in organizations 
where the delegation of authority and responsibility is weak. The subordinates 
may feel this decision making as an infringement resulting in resistance and even 
animosity to implementation (see, e.g., Carlzon, 1985). Both the absence of 
studies of operational decision implementation and the frequency of their 
appearance in CEO decision making are important reasons to include operational 
decisions in the study but also to separate strategic and operational decisions 
according to an established definition. 
 
 The relations and the interplay between top executives and implementers are 
interesting in a decision implementation perspective. Does corporate culture 
matter? Do differing pictures of what’s going on exist? Who has the “right” 
picture? Many more questions can be asked. Some studies have made 
contributions to finding answers (see, e.g., Braga Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995; 
Nutt, 2000; Sharfman & Dean, 1997) but much more is to be known. The 
conclusion of the literature review makes a strong point that implementation is an 
integrated part of the decision making process (see 2.4). Research results indicate 
that the links between the activities within the entire decision making process are 
often critical (see, e.g., Sörqvist, 1998). The critical link issue is the transmission 
of responsibility from one person to another, from one function to another, from 
one department to another when moving from one activity to the next one. 
Knowledge about activities and their content in the process facilitates “undisturbed 
production”. The lack of necessary information, delays and low readiness of 
reception are examples of occurring problems (Mintzberg, 1973). It is therefore a 
key issue as to how the decision made is transmitted to the implementers mirrored 
in these experiences. The standpoint is, for instance, supported by Nutt (1999) 
saying that half the decisions in organizations result in failure, which is also 
implied in other studies. A complete down-up perspective seems necessary in 
order to catch the tensions in the organization. Such tensions are elements in 
building the long run corporate culture.  
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The type of organization is significant with regard to implementation and its 
conditions (see, e.g., Nutt, 1998). Therefore it seems wise to focus on any type. 
My choice is profit-driven (business) organizations. The reasons are the 
homogeneity (profit) of such organizations and my personal experience. 
 
It is reported in the literature that the implementation efficiency varies between 
decisions in the same organization (see, e.g., Hickson et al., 2003, and Miller, 
1997). Why is this so? Does the decision making process matter or the type of 
decision matter? Are there differences in contextual conditions? Is the actual 
decision evaluated by the implementers as solving the perceived problem or not? 
If we can find answers to these questions, and many more, it will be possible to 
improve the entire decision making process including implementation. Examining 
different decisions within the same organization is therefore a research strategy to 
consider in this study. 
 
A general difficulty, when approaching the research field, is the absence of a 
discussion of a general implementation theory or model. Contributions to such a 
discussion have been made by some researchers, e.g., Hickson et al. (2003) and 
Nutt (1998). An implementation model based on literature findings, developed 
with well-grounded premises from business organization experience and tested on 
field data may contribute to new knowledge.  
 
There is an uneven knowledge of conditions for the successful implementation 
of top management decisions and much is not known: uncharted territory exists. 
There are at least two main research strategies to consider: follow a selected track 
of earlier research in order to deepen the knowledge or tackle the uncharted 
territory in order to bring forward new knowledge. Most studies referred have 
been carried out in an Anglo-American context (see 2.2) and they have focused on 
strategic decisions implementation in a top executive perspective. These three 
statements are themselves reasons to approach another context, looking for 
different types of decisions and studying them in a mutual perspective of top-
down versus down-up. Therefore I select the second strategy, to approach the 
uncharted territory. It is still time to contribute more basic knowledge. This 
standpoint is supported by many researchers, e.g., Dean & Sharfman (1996) and 
Pinto & Prescott (1990).  
 
  In 1.3, a preliminary problem to study is formulated as a question: Why will one 
decision made by top management in an organization be properly implemented, 
another just partly implemented and a third not at all implemented? The literature 
review in Chapter 2 and the discussions above make it possible to be more precise. 
In summary, the specific problem to study in this thesis is the perceived lack of 
understanding concerning conditions and factors influencing the implementation 
outcome when top management decisions in complex profit-driven organizations 
are to be implemented. 
 
3.2 Aim of the study 
The reformulated, clarified aim of the thesis is to contribute to the understanding 
of the main conditions that affect the implementation efficiency of top   
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management decisions in complex profit-driven Swedish organizations. The 
formulation contains specifications and demarcations, which are commented 
below.  
 
The general knowledge level of a specific subject field may be expressed as a 
stair of four steps: description, explanation, understanding and prescription. On 
the fourth step a theory or a model is empirically developed which under given 
conditions is able to predict and evaluate an outcome. The aim does not include 
the stages of prediction and evaluation as the literature has evidently shown that 
our current knowledge is not extensive and homogeneous enough. The 
contributions on the step understanding are hopefully a down-up perspective and a 
knowledge of the implementation results of any types of decisions made on top 
management level. These aspects have rarely been studied earlier.  
 
Most research results have a top-down perspective according to the literature 
review. I give the down-up perspective an equal strength as the organization 
consists of human beings with different pictures of events and the outcomes of 
their efforts in the organization. 
 
When speaking about implementation efficiency it is obvious that decisions that 
have been made but not implemented are also of interest. How and why will some 
decisions not be implemented? Do decision makers and implementers agree? The 
answers are so far not given; it is an uncharted territory of knowledge. Therefore 
all decisions must be given the same probability to be caught and incorporated in 
the study. 
 
The decisions made by top management have different characteristics. They may 
be repetitive or unique, strategic or operational, unknown or recognized, etc. I 
have considered as a demarcation to select one or more categories of decisions but 
have decided not to do so as there is a specific value in comparing the treatment of 
different decision categories in this stage of existing knowledge.  
 
One demarcation is made saying Swedish. The literature indicates differences in 
processes and outcomes related to not only corporate culture but also national 
characteristics. Another demarcation is profit-driven. This is considered by taking 
into account the literature findings; there are differences between business firms, 
public organizations and third sector organizations in important factors regarding 
decision making processes and the outcomes. 
  
The term condition is intended to cover relevant aspects I have found in 
literature and grouped (see 3.3) as contextual, decision making, and 
implementation sub-processes factors. 
 
Finally, a better understanding of the conditions of implementation efficiency 
makes it possible to reengineer the Top Management Decision Making Process so 
as to include the implementation, which improves the organizational and business 
productivity. The generalization will be limited to complex profit-driven, Swedish 
companies. An extension to less complex business firms may eventually be 
possible. 
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3.3 A preliminary implementation model 
In this chapter I present a preliminary implementation model, based on literature 
findings reported in Chapter 2. A main hypothesis and a set of research questions 
are formulated.  
 
A theory is a system of interrelated ideas giving together a picture of a 
phenomenon (Patel & Davidsson, 1991). A model is a picture of reality, often 
simplified (see, e.g., Holme & Solvang, 1991). The model may be seen as a part of 
a theory. A model facilitates the study of reality. Therefore an implementation 
model is a useful tool in research.  
 
Are there in the studied literature any examples of implementation models 
integrated in a theoretical framework? I have not found such studies in my 
literature review (Chapter 2).  However,  given the aim of the study I have 
considered using any established theory. Two theories seem to be particularly 
interesting, the agency theory and the transaction-costs theory. They are shortly 
introduced here.  
 
The agency theory is built around the principal and the agent, their conflicting 
goals and the contracting to avoid failure. The theory has been developed in 
descriptive and mathematical branches applied in such disciplines as sociology, 
economics and accounting (Mahoney, 2005). Agency theory may be seen as an 
alternative to traditional economic theory trying to explain and predict 
organizational behavior. The agency theory might be applied to implementation 
situations with two or more actors, the CEO (principal) and the implementers (the 
agents). However, it has also been criticized as being more descriptive than 
explanative and for containing shortcomings in handling the distribution of power 
in organizations (see Perrow, 1986, and Mahoney, 2005).  
 
The transaction-costs theory “…represents an advance in complexity over 
agency theory, since it places more emphasis on bounded rationality and 
acknowledges more of conventional organizational theory” (Perrow, 1986, p. 
236). The theory is originally built on the four corner stones uncertainty, small-
numbers bargaining, bounded rationality, and opportunism. The theory takes into 
account not only economic variables but also social and cultural values, which 
makes it applicable to implementation situations. But transaction-costs theory has 
the same weakness as the agency theory: the bilateral relationship is not equal, 
often one of them is more powerful (see Perrow, 1986, and Mahoney, 2005). 
  
The knowledge of implementation is still in an early phase. This fact may be one 
reason why the studies so far have not used an established theory as a framework: 
if our knowledge is limited a theory may be a straitjacket. This standpoint is 
supported by Eisenhardt (1989), who has argued that “… most importantly, 
theory-building research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no theory 
under consideration and no hypotheses to test” (p. 536). These arguments guide 
me to concentrate my efforts on designing a model without integrating it in a 
specific theory. This decision is also supported by the studies (see Chapter 2), 
which have been carried out with the same approach.  
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In the literature, a set of interesting approaches covering different aspects of the 
implementation concept have been found. However, an implementation model 
used or accepted by a majority of researchers is not fond; Nutt (1998) says “The 
literature offers several insights into how managers go about implementation and 
situational factors that influence the process, but has yet to tie these factors 
together and link them to success”. I use the reported results and combine them in 
a creative procedure to design an implementation model, to “tie them together” 
with the words of Nutt, given the aim. The creative element in this design 
procedure is also influenced by my own experiences. This research process aspect 
is discussed in 4.1.  
  
  The most useful literature findings, given the problem to study and the 
formulated aim, are presented in table 3. I have used the variable names direct 
from the sources but have arranged them in independent and dependent groups. I 
have also tried to arrange the independent variables according to their importance 
in explaining the dependent variable. It is not that easy to combine correctness 
with overview in a balanced scheme. The use of original variable names, the 
information of sources and the given structure make it possible to check their 
relevance against the sources.  
 
I have analyzed “this map of the terrain” in order to get a more convenient 
picture of factors influencing implementation efficiency. The conclusion is a 
structure of independent variables grouped as follows: 
•  corporate culture (CC) 
•  leadership style (LS) 
•  decision making process (DMP) 
•  implementation context (IC) 
•  implementation profile (IP) 
The content of each factor group is commented further on. 
 
It has been observed that the findings in table 3 are not exclusively from profit-
driven organizations but from all types of organizations. In some studies there 
have been reported differences in model structure depending on organizational 
type. As there is not an overwhelming amount of research results I have used all 
the findings. This is a potential conflict with the demarcation “profit-driven”, but 
in the creative process to design an implementation model, I estimate that the 
advantages of using all information are greater than the risks of incorporating 
lesser errors.  
 
  When looking at the factor groups above, derived from table 3, the profit and 
growth situation of the organization are not explicitly covered by the variable 
groups, as the two factors are not examined in the literature referred. However, 
they influence the implementation situation according to leadership experiences 
(see, e.g., Wallander, 1990; Iacocca, 1984; Carlzon, 1985). As one possibility they 
may be included in the group corporate culture. Another possibility is to create a 
new group. I find the later alternative more advantageous as the approach is more 
transparent. Over time the corporate culture may be stable until it is deliberately 
changed by internal forces in opposition to profit and growth, which may be 
changed more or less unforeseen by external changes (see, e.g., Peters & 
Waterman Jr, 1982); this is another reason to separate them. Therefore I add   
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•  corporate profile (CP) 
as the sixth group, which consists of profit and growth and their status and trends. 
The differences between corporate profile and corporate culture are discussed in 
more detail later on. 
 
I have also considered incorporating the personality of the actors in the model. 
However, the conclusions of the literature review (see 2.4) show that this 
dimension has not been examined, just commented as an important aspect in a few 
studies (see, e.g., Yates, 2003). Further more, an inclusion of the personality of the 
actors and/or the situational psychological conditions of the implementation 
heavily increases the complexity of the model. At the current state of the 
knowledge of implementation I avoid this complication and leave these aspects of 
implementation to coming research.  
 
In 2.4, a black box (the image of the implementation process) and a special 
uncharted territory (the transmission event) are discussed. I have considered 
integrating them in the preliminary implementation model. However, I have 
decided not to do so; the main reason is that we do not know enough about them. 
Instead these dimensions are treated apart from the model. Learning more about 
them in the study makes it possible to include them “in the right place” in the 
model when concluding the results in order to develop the implementation model.  
 
The exclusion of personality, implementation process image, and the 
transmission event from the preliminary implementation model decreases the 
model complexity in a developmental phase but it also implies a risk of wrong 
conclusions if the excluded variables have an impact on implementation 
efficiency. So far I conclude that it is better to take a conscious risk in favor of a 
simplified model. 
 
The dependent variable has specific definition(s) in different studies as shown in 
table 3. The degree of explanation varies between the studies. The efforts in the 
listed studies referred are, in general, focused on estimations of how well the goal 
of the implemented decision is achieved. It is defined and measured in different 
ways. However, the implementation process efficiency has not been examined in 
the studies. Pinto & Prescott (1990) discuss the topic and underline the importance 
of incorporating it when defining “implementation success”. My conclusion is 
therefore to include both goal satisfaction (of the decision made and implemented) 
and process efficiency (of the implementation of the decision) when forming a 
dependent variable labeled as 
•  implementation efficiency (IE) 
in accordance with the definition in 3.1 “The resources used to implement the 
decision related to  the achievement degree of the decision goal (or aim, purpose, 
etc.)”.  
 
The chosen label goal satisfaction needs some comments. Other labels are used 
(see table 3) in different studies. After all, a decision is made to change something 
from an actual state into a desired state; the difference between them is formulated 
in the problem detection phase (see e.g., Öhlmér et al., 1998). The desired state 
may occur as a very clear goal or objective, but also less precisely expressed as an 
aim or a purpose. I have chosen goal so as to get a focus on the importance of   
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communication in complex organizations: a goal sticks out more than aim or 
purpose. 
 
Table 3. A compilation of literature findings of implementation models 
 
with impact/most success
without or little impact/less 
success
Bryson & 
Bromiley 
(1993) Success  Learning
Dean & 
Sharfman 
(1996)
Strategic Decision 
Effectiveness
Procedural rationality Political 
behavior Environmental favorability 
Quality of implementation 
Hickson et 
al (2003) Achievement
Experienced-based approach          
Assessability Resourcing Familiarity 
Acceptability Specificity                    
Readiness-based approach          
Receptivity Priority Structural 
facilitation 
One or neither of the two 
approaches
Miller 
(1997)
Successful 
implementation 
(completion, 
achievement 
acceptability)  
Backing Clear aims Clear Planning 
Conducive climate
Relevant experinece 
Implementation priority 
Abundant resources Appropriate 
structure Implementing flexibility
Nutt (1986)
Outcome (Success 
or Failure)
Implementation tactic, importance 
ranking:                                             
Innovation            Participation          
Persuasion                  Edict
Nutt (1989)
Strategic plan in 
action
Use of recommended tactic 
Intervention, Participation, 
Persuasion or Edict
Use of non-recommended tactic 
Intervention, Participation, 
Persuasion or Edict
Nutt (1998)
Adoption         
Value    Efficiency Tactics Intervention (Participation) Tactics Persuasion Edict
Nutt (2000)
Adoption         
Value    Efficiency
Pinto & 
Prescott 
(1990) Project Success
Roberto 
(2004)
Implementation 
Success
Rodrigues 
and Hickson 
(1995)
Successfulness  
(Closure) 
Realization 
Propitiousness Non-
Disturbance 
Perceived Success 
Availability of Resources (especially 
information)      Diversity of 
Interests 
Misdirected Higher Management 
Influence 
Dependent 
variable(s) Source
Independent vaiables
Implementation model
Consensus (Decision understanding, Commitment)  and Efficiency   
Simultaneously achieved     Partly achieved       Not at all achieved       
See Figure 1204!
Six approaches of generating decision alternatives; impact ranking, 
best and worse (private sector)                                                                
Innovation                                                 Existing solution
Project focus outcome is internal: Over project cycle first Planning, 
then Tactical factors                                                                              
Project focus outcome is external: Over total project cycle Planning
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I have chosen satisfaction for the same reason as for goal: to sharpen the 
attention on communication. It must also be emphasized that it is the decision goal 
we speak about; other goals may be present during the implementation phase such 
as activities goals.  
 
A third comment is about the time schedule of goal satisfaction. The decided 
goal to achieve may be well balanced at the moment of decision making but it may 
be less good when implementation is made and afterwards; time goes by and the 
internal and external contexts are changed. In this study, the measurement of goal 
satisfaction is defined to concern the goal originally decided about. One reason to 
this definition is the validity aspect (to measure what to be measured), another 
reason is my focus on the implementation process, which is terminated when the 
decision “works” in the organization. The problem of bad decision is already 
discussed in 2.2.1. 
 
In all, goal satisfaction is the chosen term to cover how well the intentions of 
the specified decision are achieved. 
 
The implementation model designed on these variable groups is presented in 
figure 3. The independent variables are grouped in corporate and decision factors 
in order to clarify their origin. It is to be noted that the implementation model is a 
synthesis of knowledge from different sources including my own experience. 
Therefore it is impossible to relate individual elements to a specific source.  
 
 
CEO Leadership Style
 Corporate Profile
 Corporate
Culture
Implementation Context
Implementation Profile
Decision Making
Process
Goal Satisfaction
Process Efficency
Corporate Factors
Decision Factors
Implementation  Efficency
 
Figure 3. Preliminary implementation model  
 
There are many types of decisions: strategic, tactical and operational decisions 
as well as unique and repetitive decisions and decisions aimed for different target 
groups. I cannot exclude, beforehand, different types of decisions from having a 
correlation with implementation efficiency. There are at least two ways to deal 
with this problem. One is to add a group “decision type” to the model, another to   
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classify field data in decision types and test them in the model. In the current state 
of knowledge I prefer to go the second way as it is assumed that the fitness of the 
model is easier to uncover. 
 
Goal satisfaction and process efficiency, constituting the implementation 
efficiency, may be interrelated or not. There are no findings in the literature 
review that can illustrate the problem. Goal satisfaction can be achieved in a more 
or less efficient use of resources. A goal may be justified during the 
implementation process. And even the most efficient implementation process may 
fail in the achievement of goal satisfaction. Therefore it makes sense to keep them 
separated but as a dual part of implementation efficiency. It hopefully throws light 
on resource allocation, time schedules and competency as important elements for 
perceived process efficiency by the implementers in a down-up perspective.  
 
It could have been advocated that CEO leadership style should have been 
included in corporate culture; the definition according to Cook & Hunsaker (2001) 
does this: “The pattern of learned behaviors shared and transmitted among the 
members of a society”. But other researchers have other approaches. Corporate 
culture is built by the organization members and not developed and transmitted by 
executives (see, e.g., Sjöstrand et al., 1999, and Alvesson, 1997). It is even more 
questioned if a complex organization is able to have a single, corporate culture 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992). This type of organization rather consists of a lot of 
sub-cultures with a few common features. If I accept the later theory of corporate 
culture it is a good reason to manage CEO leadership style as a separate variable.  
 
Corporate culture and corporate profile are kept apart. Corporate culture consists 
mainly of soft values (history, communication, attitudes, commitments, trust, etc.) 
and corporate profile consists of hard facts (economic figures as size, profit and 
growth). Culture is built up over a long time and it is hard to change; once 
established culture is deep-rooted. Corporate profile is dynamic and may change 
over a couple of month, e.g., moving from good profit into deficits. The separation 
underlines this difference facilitating analysis and conclusions. 
  
The literature indicates that the decision making process has an influence itself 
on implementation efficiency but it is situational. The factor group decision 
making process includes aspects such as the participation of potential 
implementers, the generation of alternatives and the information collection 
procedure.  
  
The implementation profile covers the decision purpose, available resources, 
implementer competence, time schedule, formulated effect and activity goals, feed 
back and follow-up plans and even more. The literature review indicates that the 
appearance and importance of each single variable are situational.  
 
Finally, the implementation context is a complex factor group including external 
as well as internal variables. External variables may be the decision influence on 
customers, potential reactions of competitors and changed corporate market 
reputation and image. Internal variables are, e.g., decision importance and 
complexity, resistance or commitment of subordinates, CEO participation and 
tactics regarding implementation. 
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There are probably connections between the six factor groups but also between 
individual variables constituting the factor groups. In this preliminary model it is 
not possible to design such a complexity. The analysis based on field data may 
hopefully create information making it possible to develop the model.  
 
The model is basically designed for an empirical approach where most variables 
represent views and opinions of actors in the organizational context. The purpose 
is not to find a “truth” but to catch the harmonies and the tensions among the 
actors by applying the dual perspective top-down versus down-up. The model 
however also treats objective information like economical information from 
annual reports.  
 
Specific aspects of the model, such as the variables constituting the factor 
groups, how to measure them and the top-down versus down-up perspective are 
discussed in Chapter 4 as well as the methodological dimension of data collection. 
  
Designing a model creates a risk of blindness: the model IS the reality. Even if I 
have done a lot of work to design the implementation model I am aware of the 
truth that everything cannot be foreseen. I definitively try to keep eyes open and 
ears open, when going to use the model, in order to ensure that unexpected 
information will not be over-looked or not treated. The theme is developed even 
more in Chapter 4.  
 
3.4 Main hypothesis and research questions 
It has not been possible to find an implementation model in the literature, which is 
agreed upon by the scientific society (see, e.g., Hatch, 1997). Therefore, I have 
designed an implementation model (see figure 3) based on literature review 
findings and matching the formulated problem and aim of the study. In this 
situation, there are at least two strategies of hypothesis development. The first one 
is to set up the model itself as the main hypothesis, possibly completed with a set 
of sub-hypotheses. The second strategy is to build up the model by hypotheses 
generated from the factor groups. I have decided to formulate just one hypothesis 
with the model in focus, complete with a set of research questions (RQ). The main 
reason is that an implementation model that is not falsified is a contribution to our 
knowledge about the conditions of implementation efficiency. Even if the 
implementation model is entirely or partly falsified, there is a possibility to re-
design the implementation model based on the analysis results in the study.  
 
As a consequence of the chosen strategy it seems relevant to formulate many 
detailed research questions. The literature survey has shown that our knowledge 
about implementation conditions contains uncharted territory. Many research 
questions help to keep focus on the construction of details in the implementation 
model.  
 
3.4.1 Main hypothesis 
The main hypothesis is formulated as    
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   H1 The implementation model satisfactorily explains differences in the 
implementation efficiency of top management decisions in complex 
profit-driven Swedish organizations  
 
The literature review identified differences in decision implementation success 
between organizations. Top management has often fragmented and insufficient 
information about what is going on in the organization (see, e.g., Cook & 
Hunsaker, 2001, and Carlzon, 1985). Executives and subordinates therefore have 
incongruent pictures. A certain down-up perspective is therefore motivated (see 
3.1). Many different proposals of measuring implementation success have been 
made and carried out in the reported studies. Most studies have analyzed strategic 
decisions. All these observations result in a set of research questions. 
  RQ1 Are there essential differences in implementation efficiency between 
complex profit-driven Swedish organizations? 
  RQ2 Do decision makers and implementers differ in their opinions on 
implementation conditions and results? 
  RQ3 How are goal satisfaction and implementation process efficiency, 
constituting implementation efficiency,  connected?        
  RQ4 Does the type of decision (strategic vs operational) matter regarding 
the implementation efficiency? 
  RQ5 Which are the reasons explaining implementer attitudes towards 
implementation action?  
 
3.4.2 Additional research questions 
I use the implementation model structure when presenting the research questions. 
This means that each factor group is presented under a separate headline with the 
background to research questions followed by the question(s). 
 
3.4.2.1  Corporate  profile        
Extreme business situations force or alert the organization (see, e.g., Wallander, 
1990). If business is very successful there may be a positive spiral. New decisions 
to implement may be seen as new possibilities for even more success. If business 
is poor “something must happen” and the decision may be managed as a new 
possibility to save the ship. Business “in the middle” is managed by a culture 
“quite well as it is, why change?” 
  RQ6 Do extreme corporate situations such as a very successful running 
business or a business in deep crisis improve the implementation 
efficiency?  
  RQ7 Does the size of an organization itself influence the implementation 
efficiency? 
 
3.4.2.2 Corporate culture  
As discussed in connection with figure 3, corporate culture is a difficult pattern to 
manage. A convential look at corporate culture is expressed as “A system of 
shared meaning within an organization that determines, to a large degree, how 
employees act” (Robbins & Coulter, 1999, p. 80). New research results propose 
that corporate culture is defined and experienced individually (see, e.g., Kaufmann   
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& Kaufmann, 1998, and Sjöstrand et al., 1999). These two perspectives lay behind 
the following formulations:  
  RQ8 Does strong, pervasive and committed corporate culture improve the 
implementation efficiency? 
  RQ9 Do differences in the individually perceived corporate culture of 
executives and subordinates affect their opinion about implementation 
efficiency?  
 
There is not always a demand or expectation in the organization of the decision 
to be implemented (see, e.g., Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979). There can be an 
unconsciousness or fear, blindness or wishful thinking. But there is sometimes a 
readiness to make things happen even if the “thing” is not wanted. 
  RQ10 Do implementers in general have a readiness to implement top 
management decisions even if they are perceived as controversial?  
  RQ11 Does an action-oriented corporate culture improve implementation 
efficiency ? 
 
3.4.2.3 Leadership style   
What is important for a CEO will be important in the organization (see, e.g., 
Carlzon, 1985, and Peters & Waterman Jr, 1982). CEOs spend their time on many 
different tasks (Mintzberg, 1973). Quantitative investigations have proved that 
they use less than 30% of their working time on decision making and execution 
(Tengblad, 2002, and Carlsson, 1951); Tengblad specifies 7% and 20% 
respectively. Executive participation in implementation is sometimes a good way 
but not always the best way to improve implementation efficiency (see, e.g., Nutt, 
1998).  
 
Leadership style may potentially include different leadership tactics for 
implementation (Nutt, 1987). This issue is studied in terms of strategic decisions 
to implement. However, it is doubtful if strategic decision means the same for 
different researchers (Hickson, 1987, p. 189). The approach in this study is to 
examine any types of decisions. Probably some decisions may be so trivial that the 
executives decide not engage themselves in the implementation. Therefore the 
tactic dimension is not studied per se; the study of the CEO action is not restricted 
to the decision type.  
  RQ12 Does a CEO leadership style characterized by engagement and 
confidence in people improve the implementation efficiency? 
  RQ13 Does the quantitative input of executive time and engagement in 
the implementation process improve the implementation efficiency?  
 
3.4.2.4 Decision making process   
If the implementers participate in the decision making process, they are more 
likely to enthusiastically support the outcome than if they are just told what to do 
(see, e.g., Cooke & Slack, 1991; Robbins & Coulter, 1999; Braga Rodrigues & 
Hickson, 1995). However, to a certain degree, the improvement is situational.     
  RQ14 Does the participation of implementers in the decision making 
process improve the implementation efficiency? 
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3.4.2.5 Implementation context  
The studied literature has covered many contextual aspects of decision 
implementation but the implementer perspective is not prominent; the perceived 
implementation context may differ between decision makers and implementers. 
The opinion about the decision itself is a specific situation: in an implementer 
perspective, the decision may be demanded, requested, appreciated or expected on 
one side, and undesired, unexpected or astonishing on the other side. In order to 
cover the first, positive group of attitudes, I have chosen to refer to such decisions 
as “demanded” throughout this study.  
 
The following research questions are formulated.  
  RQ15 Does the type of decision target group influence the 
implementation efficiency?  
  RQ16 Does the scope of the decision influence implementation 
efficiency? 
  RQ17 Does implementers’ recognition of the decision or a demanded 
decision improve the implementation efficiency? 
  RQ18 How do implementers’ perceived conflict between actual decision 
to implement and existing goals, guidelines, etc., influence the 
implementation efficiency?  
 
3.4.2.6 Implementation profile   
Clear aims, sufficient resources including time schedules, out-spoken 
responsibility and information are factors influencing the implementation 
efficiency (see, e.g., Miller, 1997, and Braga Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995), but 
they are situational. The need of a follow-up plan is also underlined: “Diagnostic 
control systems are the essential management tools for transforming intended 
strategies into realized strategies: they focus attention on goal achievement for the 
business and for each individual within the business” (Simons, 2000, p. 303). This 
is a top-down perspective but the given mission to implement is also evaluated by 
the implementers. Regarding implementation context, the perceived 
implementation profile may differ between decision makers and implementers. 
  RQ19  Does an implementation plan attached to the mission improve the 
implementation efficiency?  
  RQ20 Does a follow-up plan improve the implementation efficiency?   
 
3.4.2.7 Non-model factors   
The implementation process image and the transmission event are discussed in 3.3 
as potential variables in the implementation model. Even if they are not integrated 
in the model at this stage of the model design we have to learn more about them. 
Therefore the following research questions are raised. 
  RQ21 Is it possible to identify an implementation process and some of 
its elements? 
  RQ22 Does it matter how the decision to implement is transmitted? 
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3.4.2.8 Comments to the research questions  
Some research questions may be seen as overlapping, e.g., RQ10 vs RQ17 and 
RQ5 vs RQ9. However, they are formulated from different starting-points in order 
to manage the study analysis into relevant answers, given the research question 
context.    
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4 Research methods and tools 
 
 
In this chapter I present my reflections on the research process and I also comment 
and motivate the selected methods and tools in this study. Gender and ethics are 
also discussed. The purpose is to give a background to the empirical part of the 
study.  
 
4.1 Reflections on the research process 
A distinguishing quality of the human being is our desire to seek knowledge and 
to understand relationships. We have done so since we started our journey 
200.000 years ago. The roots to what we today call science go back 5000 years as 
far as we now know, to the civilizations around the big rivers in north Africa and 
Asia (Hansson, 1993). From that time until now, scientists have asked themselves 
questions about the character of knowledge, relevant research approaches, the 
researcher role, etc. The answers have varied over time, but, as a result of the last 
400 years development, we may today categorize them in two schools of the 
scientific society, the positivistic and the hermeneutic (Patel & Davidsson, 1991, 
and Hansson, 1993).  
 
 Quantitative methods, statistical analyses and an objective and invisible 
researcher role are elements in a simplified description of the positivistic school 
(Patel & Davidsson, 1991, p. 26). The corresponding characteristics of the 
hermeneutic school are qualitative system of interpretation and understanding and 
the role of the researcher as open and partly influencing the research objects. The 
modern form of positivism is applied mainly in the natural science, principally 
deducing universality from observations (collecting facts), and the hermeneutic 
approach is used in the humanities and social sciences, principally looking at the 
totality in order to understand human behavior (Patel & Davidsson, 1991, and 
Hansson, 1993).  
 
How do I relate to the two schools? On one side I have a positivistic approach as 
I am going to use statistical analyses based on measurable observations. On the 
other side, I am going to interview people in a qualitative way and afterwards 
evaluate their answers. In this process I act in a context, where I have been an 
actor for many years. In this dimension I have a hermeneutic relation to the 
research, as an essential element in the hermeneutic school is the experience of the 
researcher, both as a professional and as a social human being.  
  
To which scientific discipline does my research belong? How is practice linked 
to science? In figure 4 a systematic approach is given to sort the myriad of 
concepts, and also to link them, which may help me to understand the setting of 
my own research and my role as a researcher. Kast & Rosenzweig (1985) say “… 
contributions to organization theory come from many sources. Deductive and 
inductive research in a variety of disciplines provides a theoretical base of 
propositions that are useful for understanding organizations and for managing 
them. Experience gained in management practice is also an important input to 
organization theory. In short … the art of management is based on a body of    
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 Figure 4. The foundations of organizational theory and management practice. Source: Kast 
& Rosenzweig (1985, figure 1.1 p. 8)   
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knowledge generated by practical experience and scientific research concerning 
organizations” (p. 9).  
 
I can’t deny that I am familiar with the description. Using figure 4 as a starting 
point, I have spent my professional life in the area Management Art/Practice. As a 
researcher it is now time to understand that I change my position to the area 
Organization Science/Research, in which the different scientific disciplines are 
included. It is stimulating to consider a third area, Organization 
Theory/Knowledge, where theory and practice are joined. The answer to my 
second question above (practice linked to science?) can be found here! The answer 
to the first question (which scientific discipline?) is that it is not necessary to 
categorize my research approach; it is after all a contribution to our understanding 
of organizational theory by using methods from different scientific disciplines. 
Such a stand-point is also supported, as I understand her, by Czarniawska-Joerges 
(1993).  
 
So far, I have indicated that I have a foot in both the positivistic and the 
hermeneutic school when approaching my research. In practice this “two feet 
strategy” means two different ways to collect data to test the hypothesis and to 
answer the research questions. I observe events and measure results. I report what 
I have seen and understood. But I also ask people to tell their stories and make 
their own measurements. They tell me partly different stories about the same case. 
They measure with the same yardstick supplied by me but reporting different 
values. They sometimes give me contradictory opinions. All information is used 
both in the preliminary implementation model to find relations and causality and 
to improve the model.  
 
An explicit matter, of course, in scientific work is rationality in its literal 
meaning and motivated choices. An implicit effect is that you are searching “the 
best choice”, to optimizing methods, databases, information, etc. It is my personal 
experience that the optimal choice of system or tool is not so important as the 
correct and systematic use of chosen system or tool, given that it is satisfying 
specific needs. My experience is supported by both theoretical scientific method 
literature, see, e.g., Holme & Solvang (1991), and discussions of researchers in 
presented papers (see e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1996, and Roberto, 2004). I have 
approached the research process with this philosophy in mind. I have looked for 
functional tools that fit both the dissertation aim and my personality. The selected 
instruments are motivated and commented in 4.2 and 4.4 while the validity aspect 
is discussed in 4.3.1. 
 
In summary, I have an ambition to contribute to our understanding of 
implementation efficiency by combining a positivistic and hermeneutic approach 
to the research task through selecting tools, which have a satisfactory function 
given the aim and my personality. 
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4.2 Research method considerations 
The design of this research study requires many decisions regarding alternative 
methods that are available in several dimensions. These main decisions are made 
and motivated here.  
 
4.2.1 General considerations 
Our understanding of the implementation of executive decisions in complex profit-
driven organizations is fragmented and incomplete, according to literature 
findings. The implementation model (see figure 3) is a synthesis of results from 
studies designed and carried out in different manners but also influenced by my 
own experience. The model is therefore not yet ready for a pure quantitative test; it 
is a question of finding more relevant, principally independent but also dependent, 
variables. This situation is a reason to use a mainly qualitative approach in my 
empirical study. 
 
The literature (see Chapter 2) has clearly shown that the qualitative approaches 
may favorably be combined with quantitative methods. In a couple of studies (see, 
e.g., Hickson et al., 2003, and Nutt, 1998) the informants have given their 
opinions not only as verbal answers but also as judgments on scales regarding 
different items, often as a summary. The studies also report other uses of 
quantitative data. The implementation model is designed to treat such information. 
Therefore I also collect quantitative data and the research approach is not purely 
qualitative: “x” on the scale in figure 5 is an estimation of the research approach. 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods has advantages such as 
giving nuances and a holistic perspective (Holme & Solvang, 1991); a dis-
advantage may be that one method is subordinated to another and therefore there 
is a risk for the misuse of the subordinate method. I am treating this risk by using 
relevant tools in the data collection phase, commented later on in this sub-chapter, 
as well as in the analysis phase (see 4.4).  
 
Only 
statistical 
analysis
Quantitative
research
Only 
literal
analysis
Qualitative
research
x
 
Figure 5. A principal presentation of the orientation of this research. Source: Patel & 
Davidsson (1991, p. 12). x = the research position of this study 
 
To be more precise, I use qualitative case studies as my primary information 
base. It is a suitable approach when trying to understand mechanisms and to 
extend our understanding of a certain research area, and even to catch emotions 
(see, e.g., Merriam, 1994, and Yin, 1984). The latter says (p. 3) “In general, case 
studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real life context.” There are two main   
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ways to carry out case studies, the retrospective and the longitudinal. In business 
administration research the retrospective method seems to be the most used; at 
least, all implementation studies I have found have been retrospective. The pitfall 
of the method is a risk for respondent rationalization (see, e.g., Nutt, 1998; Nutt, 
2000; Miller, 1997). In most studies this disadvantage has been minimized by 
using at least two informants. The alternative, longitudinal, is discussed explicitly 
and rejected as “… longitudinal studies of decision making may report less 
structured-rational behavior and more opportunistic-heuristic behavior than 
actually occurs … overcomes some problems … and introduces new problems” 
(Nutt, 2000).  
 
Potential complexity in the context of the problem solving process and the 
process time prolongation are factors which could claim a longitudinal approach 
(see e.g., Pettigrew et al., 1992). However, the focus in this study is to follow a 
decision just over the implementation phase, in a technical meaning, not to 
evaluate long term effects of the decision and its implementation. Furthermore, 
one of the complex organizational dimensions, the top-down versus down-up 
perspectives, are treated explicitly in this study. In all, it seems therefore 
reasonable to use the retrospective approach as the implementation researchers 
referred to above have done.   
 
There is one reason more for me: the risk of an uncontrollable long time scale 
for observations from the start of a decision making process up to a complete 
implementation. The observer dilemma is also connected with longitudinal study. 
Although it is not necessary that the observer is directly visible or is in other ways 
involved in the on-going process, the fact that the actors know that they are 
observed causes a risk of observer influence on the action and the outcomes 
(Merriam, 1994). The final decision is to use a retrospective approach for case 
studies using interviews as the main data collection method, supplemented by 
written information in annual reports and minutes from meetings.  
 
The interview situation must be controlled professionally in order to obtain valid 
information (see, e.g., Trost, 1997, and Merriam, 1994). It is about the interview 
milieu (e.g., adequate amount of time, disturbance-free atmosphere, establishing 
good interview relations). It is also about interview technique. The talk between 
the interviewer and the respondent may be treated as a totally structured or a 
totally open interview or something between the extremes. I have chosen a semi-
structured policy, which also has been used in other studies, e.g., by Miller (1997), 
to give the informant many degrees of freedom to tell her/his opinion as I need as 
much non-managed information as possible in order to develop the preliminary 
implementation model. That means that I develop a list of prepared questions 
covering items discussed and described in 4.2.2. As I am also looking for un-
expected opinions, I open with a brief question letting the interview take its own 
direction and pick up interesting and sometimes probably unforeseen aspects with 
follow-up questions. Of course I go back to basic questions in order to get the 
required information. The interview covers the different factor groups in the 
implementation model. The respondent is in the end of a factor group sub-
interview confronted with a scale to summarize her/his opinion, a method used, 
e.g., by Dean & Sharfman (1996). The scale concept is presented in 4.2.2.1.  
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The method for selecting decisions to study differs in various studies. The 
decisions are sometimes selected by executives (Skivington & Daft, 1991, and 
Nutt, 1989), sometimes by the researcher (Miller, 1997). A third variant is to use 
decisions described in other reports (Hickson et al., 2003). Keeping in mind that 
most studies have analyzed strategic decisions, they all have had specific criteria 
for initial decision selection such as well/poor implemented or important decisions 
and just one decision from each organization. The number of organizations differs 
in the studies from just a handful up to almost 100.  
 
A decision selection method not found in the literature review is to identify a 
specific decision and study the implementation thereof in different organizations. 
Such a decision might be initiated by, e.g., a legal change. However, I have 
excluded this alternative taking into account the difficulty to find a decision and 
the risk of many contextual factors that may be out of my control. 
 
I have decided to study any type of top management decision (see 3.2). The 
selection method, inspired by the variation in literature findings, is to select just a 
few companies (with a possibility to compare implementation of different 
decisions within the same company) and to select the decisions myself (with a 
possibility of obtained type variation and avoiding any executive bias).  
  
 How and where can I find decisions to study? According to my experience, it is 
common that TMT is writing minutes of their meetings. This is an excellent 
source: the decision is made at top level (this is of some importance) and it is 
defined (possibility to categorize type). But not all top-level decisions are made 
formally in TMT. The CEO makes her/his own decisions. TMT members make 
their individual decisions with impact on the organization, partly or as a whole. 
These decisions may probably be operational and frequent and therefore a vital 
part of top management daily life, which impacts on the organization. However, 
these decisions are much more difficult to catch and there is a risk of bias (the 
executives select “fit” decisions). Balancing pros and cons, I have decided to focus 
on decisions from minutes of meetings. 
 
Which criteria are relevant when selecting decisions to study? The amount of 
time that has passed since decision was made, so that implementation has had time 
enough to be carried out is one criterion. Another is that the decision must be 
clearly defined in at least some relevant dimensions (scope, aim, time schedule, 
responsibility, recourses, etc.) that it is possible for me to get some sign of 
recognition when approaching the respondents, not at least the implementers. A 
third criterion is the variation in decision type mentioned above. The three 
selection criteria provide decisions to study, which are not randomly determined. 
Is there a risk of bias influencing the implementation efficiency? The risk cannot 
be neglected, but in a mainly qualitative study, it is not severe as every decision 
principally represents just itself.  
 
How many decisions should be studied? It is difficult to decide the number 
beforehand. In previous studies, the number of cases in parallel approaches varies 
between 11 and 376. I have decided to use interviews as my main information 
source, which means interviewing several respondents in each case. It is a time 
consuming technique but it makes it possible to extract much information from   
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every case. I must have enough selected decisions so that I acquire desired width 
and depth in the collected information.  
 
The selection of informants is important. In qualitative case studies, you want 
variation but not extreme variation (Trost, 1997). As I intend to have both a top-
down and a down-up perspective I need at least two respondents in each decision 
case. However, the number must be situational: the type of decision, the 
complexity of the context, etc., is important to take into account. In some decision 
cases it is possible to select the respondents from what is read in the minutes of the 
meetings. In others, the CEO may be supportive. There is a risk of CEO bias; 
she/he proposes respondents according to a personal hidden agenda. I have not, 
however, found a better way. I may manage the bias risk, if this occurs, by 
demanding and adding respondents when I feel it necessary in order to get relevant 
information about the decision case. 
 
Most results in literature are reported from Anglo-American contexts. It means 
that the results are not directly transferable to a Swedish context; “… and may not 
be generalizable beyond North American organizations” (Nutt, 2000) but Hickson 
(1987) and Papadakis & Barvise (1997) also support this conclusion. Therefore I 
have decided to organize the empirical data collection in two steps. The first step 
(Step I) is designed to confirm the existence of the research problem in a Swedish 
context. The second step (Step II) consists of the collection of data from case 
studies. However, the purpose of Step I is not only to confirm the research 
problem but also to generate information valuable for the final design of Step II. 
 
An excerpt of the aim of the study (3.2) “… complex profit-driven Swedish 
organizations” raises the question of which database to use. I prefer not to study 
the biggest companies as they are too complex. I have considered member 
organizations of employer associations and companies listed on Stockholm Stock 
Exchange but also companies registered at Swedish Companies Registration 
Office and Swedish National Tax Board as a potential database. My choice is the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange as it is totally open, easy to reach with much valuable 
information available, the companies are all profit-driven per se and the companies 
are grouped in different categories. A weakness is the fact that it is not a complete 
list of complex profit-driven Swedish organizations. Privately owned companies 
and cooperatives are missing. That raises a complication relating to the 
generalization of the study results; they are not immediately transferable to these 
types of profit-driven organizations.  
 
The exact selection of the database is the Stockholm Stock Exchange O-list. The 
reason is that neither the largest, nor the newcomers are listed there, which means 
that the database is homogeneous. The O-list contains more than 200 companies. 
A huge majority of them has their head quarters (HQ) in Sweden.  
 
In all, the decisions above about the direction of the empirical phase of the study 
have shown the important role of the researcher (me). Further more, during the 
data collection I am going to make more situational decisions regarding the 
selection of organizations, decisions, and respondents according to the guidelines 
presented here. I am also going to influence the course of the interview. My   
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awareness of the situation is not a guarantee but a condition in order to avoid 
pitfalls and ensure result quality in terms of validity and reliability (see 4.3.1).  
 
As I have decided to have a double perspective, top-down and down-up, there is 
no need to calibrate or even strive to reach a consensus of different opinions as 
done in some studies, e.g., Nutt (1989). The actors’ opinions are collected 
(answers on HOW-questions) and it is my challenge to answer WHY-questions 
through the analysis (Trost, 1997). Therefore, given my discussed role, the result 
is a laid out puzzle of decision makers’ and implementers’ opinions on 
implementation efficiency and underlying variables.  
 
4.2.2 Specific research questions regarding implementation model  
The measurement problem is very evident when going through the literature. The 
summary in table 3 shows this clearly. In this chapter, I present and motivate my 
solutions of these measurement challenges. 
 
4.2.2.1 Design of estimation scale 
The interview consists not only of verbal questions and answers but also of 
estimations on a scale. As reported earlier, many studies have used this approach. 
The scale steps have varied from five (Braga Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995) to 
seven (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). Some studies have used the Likert-scale, a 
method to measure attitudes by making a statement, to which the informant has to 
announce her/his degree of agreement on a seven-graded scale. Hickson et al. 
(2003) measure implementation success with a six-point scale.  
 
 Bolstad (1998) asks the question about the width of the scale. Bolstad argues 
that a ten-graded scale creates problems for the informants – it is too wide. Five to 
seven steps are possible to overview and the final decision depends of the relevant 
nuances. Bolstad also concludes that the question of odd or even numbers of scale 
steps divides the scientific society. Finally, the question about fixed, labeled 
positions versus a continuous scale between two poles needs an answer. Even 
here, no definite answer is available. I want to use the same scale for a couple of 
similar but un-identical measurements. It is a strong point that the respondents 
meet the same yardstick. Considering all this, I have decided to use a six-graded, 
continuous scale as presented in figure 6. 
 
01 23456
 
Figure 6. Estimation scale used in interviews to measure variable estimations 
 
For each purpose, the poles are indicated as “Not at all” (to the left) and 
“Completely” (to the right) taking goal satisfaction as an example. A paper with 
the scale including relevant pole descriptions is handed over to the respondent 
with the question “If you try to summarize your opinion about goal satisfaction (as 
an example) on this scale, where do you place your mark? You may place it 
wherever you want”.  
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The scale has been used in Step I, too, when asking the CEO about the 
distribution of implementation efficiency of the last year’s decisions (see 
Appendix B2), but this is then transformed into a labeled, discontinuous six-
category table. 
 
4.2.2.2 How to measure implementation efficiency? 
I have argued for a split of implementation efficiency into goal satisfaction and 
process efficiency (see 2.4 and 3.3). For both of them, the literature shows many 
approaches for their estimation, in content as well as in measurement. I have 
decided to focus on a scaled, over all estimation, a method used, e.g., by Nutt 
(2000). This method is built on the experience that “… a manager’s subjective 
estimates of value were highly correlated with objective measures …” (Nutt, 2000, 
p. 92). The definition of goal satisfaction is formulated as “How well did we 
achieve the aim of the decision?” and of process efficiency as “How successful 
was our implementation regarding procedures/methods, resource consumption and 
time schedules?”. The method allows a direct comparison between the estimations 
of decision makers and implementers, mirrored in their motives, given strict 
definitions. The disadvantage is that other aspects as learning, adoption, etc., are 
initially neglected but it may be possible to mitigate by follow-up questions about 
motives.  
 
In the interview situation I hand over a paper with the scale and the definitions. 
The poles are “Not at all” and “Completely” (goal satisfaction) and “Very bad” 
and “Optimal”(process efficiency). When the respondent has marked the scale I 
ask “why” and receive motives, which make it possible to ask follow-up questions.  
 
4.2.2.3 Variables in factor groups 
The factor groups in figure 3 are latent variables, which are to be estimated by 
relevant measurement variables (see Appendix A regarding definitions). In an 
interview situation the variables are measured by questions to the respondent. In 
this sub-chapter I discuss the approach and the foreseen problem to solve.  
 
Corporate Culture 
The concept of culture is discussed in a research overview by Alvesson (1997). He 
provides the definition as “culture is about consequences, significance and 
meaning – not about external, objective things (p. 177, my translation)”. People 
are both creators and carriers of culture. An important aspect of culture is power. 
In modern society, power is about the influence on how reality may be 
understood; a corporate culture may in this aspect vary from a uniform to a 
facetted reality conception, as controlled by a CEO with interpretation priorities. 
The CEO role is often overestimated when speaking about creating corporate 
culture. The more distinct an organization stands out in symbols, values, social 
group mechanisms, etc., the more it is a social identity of people. Similar results 
are conveyed in other parts of the organizational literature, e.g., Morgan (1986), 
Edström & Jönsson (1998), and Simonsson (2002). To conclude, the corporate 
culture seems to be built up not only in a complex manner but also expressed 
differently from person to person within the same organization. Therefore I have 
decided not to give my definition of the idea of corporate culture beforehand.   
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Instead I start this part of the interview with an open question “How will you 
describe the corporate culture?” leaving to the respondent to form the idea in 
her/his way. I follow the track chosen by the respondent by adding, at appropriate 
moments, questions from my prepared list about organization, communication, 
role of trade unions, business risk attitudes, etc. Finally, the respondent is 
requested to estimate the corporate culture on a scale where the poles are “Non-
existent” and “Strong and penetrating”. This approach guarantees that not only the 
“official” corporate culture (the respondent says what is expected to be said) but 
also her/his own opinions are recognized. It also makes it possible to estimate the 
degree of consensus, not at least in the down-up perspective, and to calibrate 
against written, official sources as annual reports and human relation policies. 
 
Corporate profile 
The variables size, profit, growth and solidity constitute corporate profile 
according to the definition (see 3.3). They are defined by official rules and 
Stockholm Stock Exchange follows up on the correctness of these variables in the 
annual reports of listed companies. Therefore the variables are easily picked up 
there. 
 
Leadership style 
How executives are acting during the implementation phase, and the outcomes, 
has been studied by Nutt (1987 and 1989). However, I have not found any 
attempts to investigate the influence of the soft side of executives on 
implementation success. Hickson et al. (2003) say “In decision implementation the 
human element is always crucial for success” (p. 1824) but the concept is not 
developed. As I have decided to set this aspect in focus, I must try to measure it. 
The literature about leadership is voluminous. Instead of referring to a set of 
publications, I account for the criteria when selecting a measurement tool. There 
are a few, well described styles, and they have relevance both in a Swedish 
business context and for top leaders. The criteria balance a possible respondent 
overview and my demand on relevant research questions. 
 
Badaracco & Ellsworth (1989) satisfy my requirement for a leadership style 
presentation useful in an interview situation. They present three types of 
leadership: political, directive and value-driven. Each of them has an 
implementation dimension as an extra bonus. Political leaders are characterized in 
the following way: “They have powerful, creative ideas about their companies and 
industries. But to reduce destructive internal resistance to their ideas, they do not 
pursue their visions head on. They keep their goals broad, flexible, and sometimes 
even vague, and they move incrementally, patiently, and often obliquely to 
translate their goals into reality” (p. 14). The implementation perspective is “What 
is the most effective way to implement this decision? How can I make the decision 
seem to be a win/win situation for the people who are critical to its 
implementation? Which set of participants, which agenda, and which setting are 
the most conducive to achieving the objectives? What can I do to ensure that the 
outcome is correctly interpreted when it passes through the organization?” 
 
Directive leaders “make three strong assumptions about people and 
organizations. First, people are motivated more by internal forces than by external   
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prods. Second, organizations need strong pushes toward coherence. Third, 
coherence and substance are more important than style. In other words, action is 
better than reaction. These three beliefs combined have far-reaching implications 
for how organizations are managed and how leaders should act” (p. 40). The 
implementation is handled in an implicit way. A directive leader spends a lot of 
time on communication but also on follow-ups. He or she is genuinely interested 
in people and tries to support them but also tries to get unfiltered information. 
 
Value-driven leadership …”is not simply an alternative to the other two. Rather, 
it transcends both of them” (p. 66). It is formulated as “When values and beliefs 
become embodied in work, they can intensify employees’ commitment, 
enthusiasm, and drive, making a company a much stronger competitor” (p. 73). 
“In implementing decisions, they ask themselves, ‘How can I reinforce basic 
values through what I say and do and through the agenda I set in working with 
others? How can I explain the decisions and actions in terms of values that are 
basic to the company?’” 
 
A summary in Swedish (my translation) of each description, written down on a 
paper, is presented to the respondent, who has to decide which one is the most 
relevant to describe the actual CEO. The same summary is used when the CEO 
performs a self-evaluation in Step I (see Appendix B2).  
 
Decision Making Process 
The procedure of decision making has an influence on implementation success 
(Nutt, 1986). Bolman & Deal (1981) discuss decision making in terms of power 
and conflicts: “Managers make decisions that subordinates must accept” (p. 192). 
Even if the positive effect of the participation of implementers in the decision 
making process on implementation is stated in textbooks, see, e.g., Robbins & 
Coulter (1999), I found little support in reported studies; Braga Rodrigues & 
Hickson (1995) reports a positive effect in non-business organizations. After all, it 
seems that CEO participation in implementation is more important for the 
implementation success but it is situational (Nutt, 1987). From Nutt’s studies 
about implementation tactics of executives it is obvious that resistance, conflicts, 
etc., among stakeholders and implementers often depend on the absence of 
relevant decision information such as goals and consequences.  
 
As I have a dual perspective, top-down and down-up, it is logical to search for 
information about how the decision making process has been carried out with a 
special focus on the participation of implementers, formulation of explicit goals 
and evaluation of consequences as these factors are affecting implementation. I 
open the interview a bit differently depending on the respondent category. The 
decision maker gets a question directly “Will you please describe the decision 
making process!” and the implementer on the other hand is asked “What do you 
know about the decision making process?” Following the given track, the 
questions from the list are inserted.  
  
Implementation context 
Looking at the studies that lie behind table 3, there are many contextual variables 
and they are treated differently. A list of variables consists of the decision   
  64
complexity, the scope and importance, the decision demanded and/or recognized 
by implementers, the decision target group(s) and number of persons involved, the 
decision effects on internal and/or external groups, decision business risk and 
implementer competence and probably many more. The list has been developed 
with this diversity in mind and I start the sub-interview by asking “What is the 
purpose of the decision?” following the respondent track. Follow-up questions to 
cover the diversity are included and in the end the respondent makes a mark on the 
scale, where the poles are “Impossible to manage” and “Perfect”. 
 
Implementation profile 
Examples of variables constituting the implementation profile are the time 
schedule, CEO involvement and support, resources, relevant implementer 
competence, responsibility and the follow-up schedule (see table 3 but also Miller, 
1997, and Braga Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995, for further details). The executives’ 
participation in implementation are important for the implementation success 
(Nutt, 1987) but it is situational. The need of a follow-up plan is underlined by 
Simons (2000). 
 
I open the sub-interview with “How did you comprehend the implementation 
task?” then following the respondent track. The opinions about the variables 
mentioned above are covered by follow-up questions. In the end the respondent 
marks on the scale, where the poles are “Non-existent” and “Complete”. 
 
4.3. Aspects on questions that emerged from selected methods  
I have so far made a set of method decisions. They have consequences in some 
dimensions not treated above. I discuss them in this chapter.  
 
4.3.1 Validity and reliability 
Validity is the conformity between what we are saying that we are going to 
investigate and what we really investigate. Reliability is the precision of the used 
tool and how well it resists any kind of random influence. There is an interrelation 
between validity and reliability, which can be expressed in three thumb rules 
(Patel & Davidsson, 1991): 
•  High reliability is no guarantee of high validity 
•  Low reliability gives low validity 
•  Complete reliability is a condition for complete validity 
 
The data collection is a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. To 
a certain extent they are intended to measure the same thing. Therfore it is possible 
to check the conformity between them, i.e.,  a kind of informal validity and 
reliability test.  
  
In a validity perspective, the measurement of implementation efficiency is 
probably the most important variable. As already discussed, there are many 
attempts in the literature to define implementation success. I have not used any of 
them directly but I have designed and motivated my definition (see 3.1, 3.3 and 
4.2.2.2). It means that it is not possible to check the study results directly with   
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other reported results. The main problem is probably not the validity itself but the 
definition of implementation efficiency. The challenge is to communicate the 
definition in such a manner that the respondent understands what to estimate 
according to the intentions of the definitions. Therefore a written definition is 
handed over when the respondent is asked to mark on the scale. The questions 
afterwards that center around the motives of the marked score provide an 
opportunity to detect potential misunderstandings.  
 
In some studies the validity aspect is discussed, see, e.g., Bryson & Bromiley 
(1993) and Nutt (1989 and 2000). As the research methods used in them differ 
from mine it is not possible to adapt their validity tests. The differences are the use 
of quantitative methods and many people involved in data collection and 
categorization. I principally use qualitative methods. I have performed all the 
interviews and interpreted the verbal opinions of the respondents into scores 
avoiding that type of validity problem. Using several informants with different 
reported estimations is seen as another validity problem in the literature as the 
approach is to get a consensus. I have, instead, an ambition to map the tensions 
between respondents in a down-up perspective. Do the respondents judge the same 
thing? Does a difference depend on a real difference in opinions or on a different 
use of the “yard-stick”? I do not know, as I do not test this; it is a weakness of the 
study.  
 
Regarding reliability, the interview questions, including the scales used in Step 
II, were tested in a couple of test interviews. Small changes were made to increase 
the clarity. The questionnaire used in Step I was not formally tested beforehand 
but discussed with colleagues forcing some adjustments. A risk of interviewer bias 
occurs when doing all the interviews myself in Step II. The risk consists of 
displaced emphasis on the importance of certain questions, the interviewer feeling 
fed-up during the last interviews, leading questions when a lot is known from the 
first interview, and probably more. Relying on Trost (1997) I have done my best 
to be on the guard but also to “debrief” myself after the interviews by mentally 
repeating the course of the interview looking for my mistakes. I have not dropped 
any interview or case.   
 
I try to estimate the reliability of the respondent scoring. As described in 4.2.1 
the respondent is asked to place a score on a scale at the end of each section of the 
interview. The scoring is often done with comments and body language but also 
with the respondent verbal statements as a background. When the respondent 
gives me the paper back with the score, I immediately estimate the reliability of 
her/his scoring using a scale 0 to 6. The estimation criteria are a combination of 
how well the respondent has picked up the question and the correspondence 
between the verbal description and the mark on the scale after the follow-up 
questions. I use this method not only for implementation efficiency but for all 
respondent’s judgments. 
 
In all, my knowledge of the validity and reliability problems in this research 
partly minimizes the risk of failure, but a systematic evaluation is not carried out. 
However, as discussed above, some tests are carried out both during the 
preparatory phase of the empirical study and when the interviews are completed in 
order to improve the data quality.    
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The discussion above has dealt with the methods and tools for information 
collection. The analysis tools used in this study are presented in 4.4 and the 
validity/reliability questions are discussed in Chapter 6 on the presentation of the 
analysis results but also in 7.5.1. The generalization question is discussed in 7.5.2.  
 
4.3.2 Gender aspects 
I am going to study business life, an arena traditionally dominated by men. The 
main strategy is to select interesting decisions to study in complex, profit-driven 
companies. The people to be met will be the people, men or women, involved in 
selected decisions. This is the Doris Day syndrome: que sera, sera, What shall be, 
shall be. I have considered investigating a gender perspective, i.e., a variable itself 
in the model, as it is not improbable that there could be gender-related differences 
in making commitments, handling conflicts, etc. The final decision is however to 
disregard the gender aspect as there are very few women to interview when 
randomizing the decisions to study, and this issue would further complicate the 
implementation model when there is already a poor understanding of the 
implementation process. A gender perspective may hopefully be possible to apply 
when we know more about implementation and its conditions.  
 
There is however another gender aspect regarding the role of the researcher, see, 
e.g., Lundgren (1994) and Trost (1997). The researcher must be aware of her/his 
gender bias, which is often an unconscious bias, when interviewing people but 
also when selecting, describing and analyzing information. There are no rules of 
thumb or simple guidelines. The awareness of the problem and a self-critical 
distance to the role as researcher are my help to avoid the most dangerous 
mistakes.  
 
4.3.3 Ethical aspects 
The qualitative approach as it is designed so far implies there is a selection of 
people as respondents and there are close associations with the people selected. 
The ethical dimension is therefore important to manage in a conscious and 
accounted way. Approaching people and asking them to tell their stories and to 
give me their private opinions has ethical implications. How do I treat the 
provided information? May outspoken opinions in conflict with established culture 
or guidelines hurt them? Can they trust me? Demanding secret business 
information from executives is also a crucial thing. The following presentation of 
the ethical research behavior is mainly inspired by Forsman (1997) and Hermerén 
(1996). 
 
The basic ethical rule for me is to keep what I promise and not to promise more 
than I am able to keep. How do I put that in action? In the research Step I (see 
4.2.1) I state in the introduction letter “No answer will be published in such a way 
that it will be possible to identify the company or the CEO” (translated from 
Swedish, see appendix B1). In Step II (see 4.2.1) I confirm in a letter to the CEO: 
“I undertake to treat all information with complete secrecy which means that no 
answers will be published in such a way that it will be possible to identify the 
company or the CEO. The information received, or written down by me as papers   
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or in electronic shape, may not be handed over to anyone outside the company 
except my supervisor and the opponent at the disputation if they ask for them” 
(translated from Swedish).  
 
When planning an interview with an individual staff member I first phone, make 
an introduction about the scope and conditions and ask if it is possible to meet. If 
this is OK, an interview is scheduled. I start the interview by confirming that it is 
known by the top management that we meet, as the respondents must know the 
conditions of the interview. I clarify orally that all information given is treated 
confidentially: I tell nobody about what I learn and the publishing is done in such 
a way that it is impossible to identify the company and the respondent. - In certain 
cases there are additional agreements according to the requirements of the CEO of 
the studied companies as well as interviewees in special positions.  
 
4.4 Analysis tools  
As concluded in 4.2.1, case studies are the primary information base. Data 
collection is done through interviews and documented in minutes. They contain 
verbal expressions as well as responses given on a scale. Therefore both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses are possible to carry out. The combination of 
qualitative and quantitative tools provides opportunities to cross-check the 
findings. 
 
In this sub-chapter I present the tools I use to process, analyze and base 
conclusions on the information. The presentation is held short with one exception, 
the Quantitative Comparative Analysis, as I have not found a previous use of it in 
this type of research.  
 
4.4.1 Description of qualitative analysis of respondent stories  
The documented story told by a respondent has subsections for each factor group. 
It is the lowest level on which the qualitative analysis starts. The analysis approach 
is mainly inspired by Merriam (1994). I start reading the minutes from the specific 
decision case to find similarities and differences in the assertions in terms of 
chronology, structure, content, etc. Each case is analyzed and concluded 
individually. Then I classify the decisions in a couple of different dimensions 
using the same analyzing technique. The conclusions from the alternative 
approaches are put together with conclusions from other analyses and cross-
checked. 
  
  It is difficult to describe the analysis technique more precisely than given above, 
as it is an intellectual process where the tool is mainly reflection. Furthermore, the 
reflection process and its results are influenced by my experience and even by 
prejudices.  
 
4.4.2 Description of Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA 
The presentation of QCA follows Ragin (1987) and Agevall (2004). Ragin 
developed QCA which is a very suitable technique used in the social sciences.   
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QCA makes it possible to analyze the presence of potential multiple and 
“conjunctural causation” (the term introduced by Ragin) also in small populations. 
“Multiple” means that there is more than one solution for a definite outcome and 
“conjunctural” means that one single factor of two factors does not give an 
outcome but both together do. 
 
The use of QCA in its basic form has two important conditions: 
•  there must be a specific outcome to explain 
•  the variables must be dichotomous  
The measurement of the variables used in QCA analysis is a special subject, but 
the understanding of the QCA analysis does not demand further explanation. We 
just conclude that there is for each dichotomous variable a YES or NO answer or a 
characteristic, which can adopt just two values, e.g., Rich/Poor.  
 
QCA is built on Boolean algebra, developed by George Boole in the mid-
nineteenth century. There are ten basic features but I concentrate here on a few. 
Boolean algebra uses binary data. A characteristic is true or false, present or 
absent and can consequently be transformed to 1 or 0. In the world of this study, a 
decision is implemented or not, goal satisfaction is true or false. A truth table is a 
complete matrix of all possible combinations of the actual independent x-
variables. If we have three variables labeled M, F and C, the truth table has this 
shape: 
            
M   F     C      
1    1    1     
1    1    0     
1    0    0     
1    0    1     
0    1    1    
0    0    1    
0     1     0        
0     0     0       
 
The size of the truth table growths rapidly as the number of rows is 2
n 
(n=number of x-variables); five variables give 32 rows and seven variables give 
128 rows. 
 
Let us now complete the truth table with the dependent variable y, here labeled 
I, and the outcome of I for each row:  
 
M   F     C     I     
1    1    1    1 
1    1    0    0 
1    0    0    1 
1    0    1    1 
0    1    1    0 
0    0    1    1 
0    1    0    0    
0    0    0    0   
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We transform the matrix to an equation describing alternative ways to get 
outcome I>1 where capital letters stand for 1, e.g., M=1, and lower-case letters 
stand for 0, e.g., m=0:  
 
M F C   +   M f c   +   M f C   +   m f C   >   I            ( 1 )  
 
In this equation, capital letters (M, F, C) stand for 1 (present, true …) and lower-
case letters (m, f, c) stand for 0 (absent, false). The equation (1) is just another 
way to say the same thing as the truth table: there are four situations where the 
outcome is I>1. Is it possible to simplify the equation (1)? Yes there is by using 
the minimizing technique, which means comparing the four situations with each 
other to find common elements: 
 
Equation  variables        Common  element(s) 
MFC   compared  with Mfc     -   
             M f C    M C  
             m f C    -  
M f c             M f C    M f  
             m f C    -  
M f C           m f C    f C   
 
The equation (1) may be written as 
 
M C   +   M f   +   f C   >   I                  ( 2 )  
 
There is one more technique for simplification, applicable on the minimized 
equation, called prime implicants; it is not presented here but it can be found in 
Ragin (1987).  
 
What does equation (2) tell us? If M and C are present at the same time, F/f does 
not matter, I>1. For M to be present, f needs to be absent and C/c does not matter 
for outcome I>1. Finally, if C is present, then f needs to be absent and M/m does 
not matter for I>1. These generalizations may be tested in the truth table. MC 
covers row 111 and row 101. Mf covers row 100 and fC covers row 001. All rows 
I>1 are covered but no others.  
 
But reality is normally more complex than this example. Let us assume that we 
study the implementation efficiency in a company. We have selected information 
about: 
x1     implementer  in  charge  is  a  manager        M  
x2    f o l l o w - u p   p l a n   c r e a t e d               F  
x3     c o s t   c u t t i n g   d e c i s i o n                  C  
y     s u c c e s s f u l   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n             I  
 
Our investigation gives us the following truth table supplemented with the 
information of the number of cases with 1 or 0 as an outcome:  
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          Number of  
cases when I> 
M   F     C      1    0  
1    1    1     4   0 
1    1    0     3   1 
1    0    0     1   1 
1    0    1     2   0 
0    1    1     3   0 
0    0    1     0   2 
0    1    0     0   0 
0    0    0     0   3 
 
There are situations (rows) where we have both outcome and no outcome, 
contradictory row results, i.e., 100, but also situations (rows) where we lack cases, 
limited diversity, i.e., 010. Contradictory row results and limited diversity must be 
managed in some way. There are no given rules how to do this. Regarding 
contradictory row results a simple majority technique can be used: if there are 3 
cases giving I>1 and 1 case giving I>0, the row is set I>1. Another technique is to 
compare rows and search for a systematic structure. In the truth table above it 
seems as M has an impact giving I>1. So row 100 is tested as I>1. The same 
technique used for row 010 (no information > limited diversity) sets I>0. The 
tradition of using QCA in the scientific discipline and common sense may help to 
solve the problems of contradictory row results and limited diversity. However, it 
is necessary to observe the risk of circular reasoning: the assumptions are to be 
proven. The analysis results may be repeated with different assumptions and the 
results tested against existing knowledge.  
 
The table above can be adapted in a first analysis trial putting row 110 > I>1, 
row 100 > I>0 and 010 > I>0:                    
 
M   F     C     I  
1    1    1    1 
1    1    0    1 
1    0    0    0 
1    0    1    1 
0    1    1    1 
0    0    1    0 
0    1    0    0 
0    0    0    0 
 
We get an equation as 
 
M F C   +   M F c   +   M f C   +   m F C   >   I             ( 3 )  
 
Minimizing equation (3) gives 
 
M F   +   M C   +   F C   >   I                 ( 4 )    
 
There are three situations giving successful implementation. If the implementer is 
a manager and she/he has a follow-up plan the decision type C/c does not matter. 
If the implementer is a manager and there is no follow-up plan it must be a cost   
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cutting decision, C. In the third situation, a follow-up plan, F, and a cost cutting 
decision, C, ensure a successful implementation and M/m does not matter. 
  
Alternative assumptions may show if there is stability in the solutions. Let us 
therefore alternatively set row 100 I>1: 
 
M   F     C     I  
1    1    1    1 
1    1    0    1 
1    0    0    1 
1    0    1    1 
0    1    1    1 
0    0    1    0 
0    1    0    0 
0    0    0    0 
 
We get an equation as 
 
MFC + MFc + Mfc + MfC + mFC > I               (5) 
 
Minimizing equation (5) gives 
 
M   +   F C   >   I                      ( 6 )    
 
In this solution we get successful implementation if the implementation task is 
given to a manager. A follow-up plan and the type of decision do not matter. If a 
non-manager is responsible for implementation there must be a follow-up plan and 
the decision must be a cost cutting type if the implementation shall be successful.  
  
Even more alternative assumptions may be tested but as a demonstration of the 
technique, I stop here. Finally, it may be noted that the results in equations (4) and 
(6) are both realistic but they must be tested against existing knowledge and the 
investigation may probably be repeated to confirm any of the results.  
 
This short introduction to QCA hopefully helps in understanding the strength 
and weakness of the method, which I am using in the analysis. The calculations 
are made with the computer program fs/QCA 2.0. 
 
4.4.3 Description of LISREL 
An analysis of the fitness of the preliminary model (see figure 3) is a possible 
approach even if the quantitative data are limited. Furthermore, the application of 
simultaneous equation models, in the software package LISREL, is 
advantageously used in similar situations (Lunneryd, 2003). Therefore I have 
decided to use LISREL as the quantitative analysis tool. It is described from a 
user’s point of view by Lunneryd (2003). Diamantopoulos (1994) adds even more 
useful information for the user of LISREL. This introduction relies on these 
presentations with the focus on application conditions and possibilities in my 
research.  
 
LISREL is short for LInear Structural RELationships and it is a commercial 
computer program; I have used version 8.50 for the calculations in the study. 
LISREL is basically a covariance structure analysis aimed for solving structural   
  72
equation systems with latent variables. The use of LISREL has some conditions. A 
model must be designed beforehand on which LISREL is applied, so as to test if 
the used dataset confirms relationships. The data are preferably presented as 
interval or quota scale categories.  
 
The quantitative data are produced on a quota scale. Factor groups in figure 3 
are the latent variables in the LISREL analysis. As the study has a limited number 
of quantitatively measured observations, I have problems with the number of 
degrees of freedom. One way to solve this problem is to test parts of the model in 
sequences.  
 
The LISREL analysis produces a solution as a path diagram. Correlations in the 
path diagram are tested with the student t-test. The P-value (the relation between 
chi-square value and degrees of freedom) and RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation) estimate the model fitness. A P-value above 0.05 indicates a 
good fitness as well as a RMSEA value below 0.05. If the RMSEA value is 
between 0.05 and 0.09, it is an indication of an acceptable fitness. A value above 
0.09 says that data processed could be explained by any other model.  
 
4.4.4 Treating missing values 
Missing values in a dataset are often a severe problem. Suppose that each dataset 
consists of 30 rows (respondents) and 15 columns (variables). If one variable has a 
missing value (a specific respondent has not given an answer) the whole row is 
rejected; 14 measurements are missed. Repeated missing values for more rows can 
heavily down-size the entire data volume to treat. In LISREL there are techniques 
to treat this situation (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). Originally two types were used, 
pair wise and list wise deletion. However, “In many situations, particularly when 
values are missing not completely at random, these procedures are far from 
satisfactory” (Appendix B, p. 153). In LISREL version 8:50 the imputation 
technique is available; it is a “… substitution of real values for the missing values. 
The value to be substituted for the missing value for a case is obtained from 
another case that has a similar response pattern over a set of matching variables” 
(Appendix B, p. 153). After imputation there may still be missing values but 
normally you get an increase in completeness, which improves the statistical 
computing.  
 
The datasets in this study used in QCA analysis are essentially the same as in 
LISREL analysis, which is a minor volume of all the data collected (see figure 7). 
Grayed dots in the figure represent missing values in the originally collected data. 
LISREL offers the imputation technique; QCA does not offer, as far as I know, a 
similar method to handle missing values. Therefore I use the imputed dataset from 
LISREL when carrying out QCA analysis instead of the limited non-imputed 
dataset. The completeness of the dataset increases, which improves the validity of 
the QCA. As far as I know this method of missing value treatment for QCA has 
not been reported earlier.  
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Collected data
Data used in LISREL
Data used in QCA
x
x
x
x
x
Figure 7. A principal outline of the dissertation datasets (grey dots are originally missing 
values and some of them are eliminated though LISREL imputation, here marked with x)  
 
The variables in LISREL are categorized as ordinal or continious. Imputed 
values are connected to the variable categorization. The transformation of 
continious variables into dichotomous values in QCA takes place within the 
imputed dataset.    
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5 Collection and presentation of field data 
 
 
The preliminary implementation model (see 3.3 and figure 3) is the starting point 
for the empirical section of the study. In this chapter, I briefly describe how 
information was collected in practice according to the methods and tools presented 
in Chapter 4. As already stated, the data collection has been carried out in two 
steps. The presentation in this chapter follows this track. A summary of collected 
information including non-response analyses is also presented but the complete 
data presentation regarding Step II is found in Appendix C.  
 
5.1 Presentation of Step I 
5.1.1 Data collection in Step I 
The specific aims of Step I are 
-  to confirm the existence of the research problem in a Swedish context 
-  to select companies suitable for further qualitative studies 
-  to obtain data to evaluate in the implementation model  
Therefore, the data collection has been carried out in two ways: a questionnaire 
was sent out and annual report figures were acquired. The questionnaire has been 
designed to meet the aims and it is presented in Appendix B. The questionnaire 
has not been tested beforehand as the CEOs are very occupied people, but it has 
been discussed with colleagues, two of them former CEOs, resulting in some 
improvements. 
 
The database, to be exact, is the list of 229 companies on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange O-list on the January 19
th, 2003. I used the printed list in the newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter on the January 20
th, arranged in alphabetic order; I selected every 
4
th company. The sample consisted of 57 companies. Two companies were 
excluded as their HQs were located abroad and it was estimated to result in too 
high costs for me to visit them if necessary.  
 
It was possible to get basic information about the companies from their 
presentation on the web site of Stockholm Stock Exchange, including the name of 
the President and addresses. The information was downloaded. 55 questionnaires 
(Appendix B) were sent at the end of January 2003 to the Presidents of the 
sampled companies. In the introduction letter, it was said that it was possible to 
answer the questionnaire by visiting the web site (address given).  
 
A week later, 9 completed questionnaires were returned along with two 
envelopes due to wrong addresses! I started using the telephone to control that the 
questionnaire had arrived and remind the Presidents about the importance of 
answering. I spoke mainly with their secretaries, an excellent way to create a 
contact. I underlined the possibility of using internet to answer and I also sent the 
introduction letter once more by e-mail to a personal address of the President 
given me by the secretary. I continued to remind the President by phone, in certain 
cases up to six times, and in the beginning of March I had received 29 useful 
answers. One of the questionnaires was answered by a secretary on the telephone   
  75
when I had started the collection of some data about non-answers, which gave one 
more answer. The complete picture of the collection results is shown here: 
 
   U s e f u l   a n s w e r s                     3 0  
   H Q   a b r o a d                            2    
   E n g l i s h   s p e a k i n g   P r e s i d e n t                   1  
   Company  without  functional  postal  address               1 
   President  fired  during  investigation  period              1 
   Presidents  appointed  before  2002,  no  answers          14 
Presidents appointed during 2002, no answers            8  
   T O T A L     ( = s a m p l e )                      5 7  
 
There could be different opinions about the real sample size. 6 appointed 
Presidents 2002 have answered, 8 have not. The latter have all said by phone 
contact that they could not answer the questions, as they were too new on their 
job. If I accept this, the sample size is 44 (57-5-8) and the response rate 68%. If 
the sample size is set to 52 (57-2-1-1-1), the response rate is 58%. The non-
response analysis is presented in 5.1.2. As promised in the introduction letter, the 
30 answering companies received a feed back letter sent out March 25
th with 
information about mean implementation efficiency and also the implementation 
efficiency of their own company. At last, it is to be noted that all Presidents are 
male with one exception and she is leading one of the excluded companies. 
 
The information in the questionnaires was completed and combined with the 
figures from the last five annual reports. Summaries of the figures were available 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange web site. I needed more details. Instead of 
going to the web site of each company, I contacted the supplier of figures to the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange web site. They sent me an Excel-file without any cost. 
The figures for book-keeping year 2003 were received in the same way in the 
beginning of 2004.  
 
5.1.2 Non-response analysis of Step I  
In an early stage of the data collection, I observed that a reason to decline 
participation in the investigation was a variation on the theme, “I have been here 
just a short time so I cannot answer your questions”. Nevertheless many did so 
even if they were “new on the job”. Therefore I present basic data in this non-
response analysis using “year of appointment as CEO” as a common criterion for 
giving me 4 sub-groups to evaluate (see table 4). 
 
As the number of companies in each sub-group is small, I have chosen to 
describe the data in quartiles; for the definition of growth and profit, see Appendix 
A. First, it was noticed that 28% of the Presidents were changed in 2002! 
Secondly, there is an unsurprising difference in profit between companies shifting 
the President in 2002 and those not, independent if they have answered or not. As 
the shifting sub-group in the non-responding group weighs heavier than in the 
responding group, this is valuable information to have in mind when trying to 
generalize the results.  
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The variables Total assets, Shareholders’ equity, Turn over, Number of 
employees (all for 2002), Number of years as CEO, Growth and Profit (three year 
average for the last two) have been tested according to a t-test between the 
response and non-response group. All values of t are <1 and thus non-significant.  
 
Table 4. Basic data about companies in Step I 
 
-2001 2002 SUM -2001 2002 SUM
Number of companies > 52 24 6 30 14 8 22
1st quart 239 201 267 202
median 629 515 559 623
3rd quart 1232 830 2411 1468
1st quart 1% 3% -4% -11%
median 6% 6% 3% -2%
3rd quart 12% 10% 24% 20%
1st quart 0% -20% -8% -70%
median 5% -11% 1% -9%
3rd quart 8% 3% 13% -3%
1st quart 136 194 124 152
median 424 599 320 277
3rd quart 1050 773 1461 1240
Characteristics Sample
Response Non-response
Year of appointment as President
Turnover 2002   MSEK
Growth 2000-2002  
yearly
Profit margin     2000-
2002  average per year
Employees 2002  
Number
 
A LISREL analysis has been carried out (for more information about LISREL, 
see 4.4.3) and a LISREL non-response analysis has been presented in a 
unpublished paper (Göransson, 2004) that was an examination task in a LISREL 
doctoral course. The model was basically designed with a latent variable 
ANSWER measured by the y-variable Presidents’ answer/no answer appearance 
and the measuring variables in table 4 as x-variables constituting latent variables 
ECONOMY and PROFILE. If the model shows that ANSWER is depending on 
ECONOMY and PROFILE, the two groups do not represent the original sample of 
52 companies in the same way. However, it has been difficult to find a model of 
sufficient fitness. The best solution has P=0.064 and RMSEA=0.138. Therefore, 
no conclusions can be drawn.  
 
The general conclusion of non-response analysis is that no systematic 
differences have been observed regarding the structure between the responding 
and non-responding groups. The results of the analysis of 30 answering companies 
therefore represent the total sample of 52 companies. 
 
5.1.3 Presentation of dataset from 30 companies in Step I 
As mentioned earlier, the information was collected through a questionnaire sent 
to the presidents of the sample group companies and through the annual reports. 
 
The presidents were asked to estimate the implementation efficiency of TMT 
decisions over the last year in their company. They were instructed to take into 
account both goal achievement and implementation process efficiency, the two 
dimensions of implementation efficiency, when answering the question, weighing   
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both equally. They were also asked to distribute the decision implementation 
efficiency as a percentage in each of seven possible categories (a sum column 
“100%” was pre-printed, see Appendix B2). In table 5 the distribution of the over 
all answers is presented, transforming the %-figure, whatever it’s size, into “a 
mark”.  
 
Table 5. Distribution of implemented decisions according to the implementation efficiency 
 
Not at all Very bad Bad
Accept- 
able Good 
Very 
good
Comp- 
letly
Mark 91 11 42 22 72 31
No mark 21 19 16 8 3 7 17
SUM 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
3% 2% 6% 22% 37% 22% 8%
Average distribution of all decicions
Number of marks in each category
3
 
  It is to be understood that 9 respondents have indicated that a certain percentage 
(from 2 to 25%) of their decisions have not been implemented at all and 17 
respondents say that there is no decision completely implemented at all. The last 
row in table 5 shows that 11% (3+2+6%) of the decisions are poorly implemented 
or not at all implemented and 2/3 (37+22+8 = 67%) are well implemented (good 
or better)! 
 
How well the respondents used the scale of seven categories is shown in table 6. 
The 5 respondents with just 1 mark each have marked 100% in Acceptable (3) and 
Good (2); the only one with 2 marks has divided the marks between Not at all 
(25%) and Good (75%). All other respondents have used three to seven categories 
to describe the implementation efficiency in their company.  
 
Table 6. Distribution of marks according to the use of categories (see table 5) of the 
individual company  
 
1234567
Nb of resp 5174724 30
SUM
Number of categories used
 
I have transformed the distribution of implementation efficiency of the 
individual company to a company index by weighing the answers with 0 for “Not 
at all”, 1 for “Very bad”, etc., up to 6 for “Completely”. That means that the 
theoretical company index has a maximum of 100 and minimum of 0. The 
calculations give a variation width of 45 to 85, 1
st quartile 57, median 67 and 3
rd 
quartile 73. 
 
In table 7 an overview of collected data is presented using the calculated 
implementation efficiency index as a pivot. The variables are grouped under the 
model factor group heading (i.e., corporate profile, corporate culture and 
leadership style). I did not intend to map the corporate culture during Step I. It is 
to be discussed if the heading “corporate culture” has relevance for the shown up 
variables. The thinking behind is that size and CEO characteristics are elements of 
corporate culture.  
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Table 7. Presentation of data collected in Step I 
 
Sort 1st q med 3rd q 1st q med 3rd q 1st q med 3rd q
Total assets 2002 MSEK 219 937 1222 450 1014 1062 250 311 545
Equity 2002 MSEK 126 291 610 192 381 466 95 158 221
Turn over 2002 MSEK 213 376 1429 344 761 1120 236 629 1035
Profit 2002 MSEK 0 71 122 -5 26 109 -53 -12 25
Growth per year, 3 year % -1% 6% 9% 2% 6% 10% 4% 7% 14%
Profit, 3 year average % 6% 8% 16% -3% 3% 7% -17% -6% 3%
Employees Numb 133 325 991 124 678 1050 305 654 990
CEO born year 1943 1945 1954 1955 1960 1966 1948 1950 1953
CEO appointment year 1994 1998 2000 1998 2001 2002 1997 2000 2001
CEO age at appoint year 41 50 53 36 40 41 47 49 53
TMT members Numb 355557568
Directive Numb
Value driven Numb
Political Numb
No answer Numb
Number of companies >
Implementation efficiency index
≤60
10 10 10
 >70 61-70
2
3
6
4
6
0
q = quartile, med = median
00
Corporate profile
Corporate culture
Leadership style
3
5
10
 
In table 8 the CEO estimation of company implementation efficiency related to 
his period as acting executive is presented. Correlation is only r=0.2.  
  
Table 8. Distribution of implementation efficiency index due to CEO acting period, number 
of companies 
 
3 - - 3 SUM
>80 202
71-80 628
61-70 46 1 0
51-60 303
≤50 257
S U M 1 71 33 0
Years as acting CEO 
IE index
 
The respondents were also asked to motivate their distribution of 
implementation efficiency. 26 CEOs responded. First, they were asked about 
comments to their distribution. 7 respondents answered, six of them on the theme 
“We are managing very well” in an explicit top-down perspective; their 
implementation efficiency index varied from 57 to 74. Thus the CEOs scoring 
high or low on implementation efficiency did not motivate their answers. The 
seventh said he was new on the job and not quite sure about the distribution (index 
45).  
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9
3
The respondents were then asked about their opinions on reasons for good and 
poor implementation in their company. In table 9 similar answers are categorized 
and grouped. The answers are distributed according to implementation efficiency 
index to detect potential systematic tendencies. 
 
Table 9. CEO opinions about reasons for good and poor implementation (the answers 
grouped and translated by the author) 
 
>70 61-70 ≤60 SUM
10 10 10 30
A Organisational advantages 2114
B Formulated and (shared) values and needs 345 12
C Participation in Decision Making Process 1 1
D Communication and clarity 1337
E Systematic follow up 213
F Low complexity of decision 1 1
G Resources and authority 1 1
Number of opinions > 71 01 22
H Organisational disadvantages 213
I Internal resistance movement, culture conflicts 2518
J Bad anchoring/communication of decision 11 2
L No follow up 112
M TMT understand it is a wrong decision 1 1
N New priority during implementation phase 1 1
O Lacking resources incl unrealistic time schedule 2226
Number of opinions > 51 1 72
Which are the reasons that some of the TMT decisions will be well implemented                                    
(= high implementation efficiency) in your company?
Which are the reasons that some of the TMT decisions will be badly implemented                                  
(= low implementation efficiency) in your company?
Number of companies >
ImpIementation efficiency index
 
Some comments and clarifications are necessary about the answers, using the 
row letter as indicator: 
A. Examples are given as smallness, short order or communication ways in a flat 
organization and simplicity. 
B. The brackets around (shared) are put there as some respondents have just 
written about formulation, communication, etc., but not about understood, 
accepted or shared 
D. “Information” is also included, as I do not know if this is one-way-
communication or not 
H. Examples are company under re-organization, no competence of change 
 
5.1.4 Comments on the validity and reliability of the information in Step I  
The figures picked up from annual reports give no problems in this respect. 
Asking people by using a questionnaire is more problematic, especially around 
attitudes and historical behaviors (Trost, 1997). Trost says that “… the correlation   
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between what a person did on a given occasion and how the person later looks at 
the same behavior is extremely weak” (p 77, my translation). In spite of this 
powerful statement I have not found a better way to approach this issue, but have 
kept the premonition in mind when using the collected information. 
  
As a general comment, I have received much positive feed back about the 
relevance of the research, even from the CEOs who did not answer of any reason. 
I interpret this as a will of the respondents to understand the questions and answer 
them as well as possible. Furthermore, the CEOs have not expressed any doubts 
about how the questions should be understood when I have spoken directly with 
them on the phone.  
 
I have kept an eye on the variations in CEO acting period and its influence on 
the answers. Looking at the collected information, I have asked myself “Are newly 
appointed CEOs, or at least some of them, estimating the implementation 
efficiency as a judgment of the performance of the former CEO?” I have no 
evidence to support “yes”, but I suspect this is true in certain cases, consciously or 
unconsciously. A new CEO is focused on mal-functions in the organization and 
will find things to change. That is why she/he is there!  
 
I have received answers that put the implementation efficiency at 100 % in the 
category “Acceptable implementation” (3 cases) and “Good implementation” (2 
cases). I believe that the instructions in these cases have been misunderstood but 
the information is nevertheless OK to use, as I have understood it as an “average 
estimation” of the respondent. 
 
As the main aim in Step I is not to explain the variation in implementation 
efficiency, but just to confirm its existence, I do not think that the observed 
problems with some answers will cause me any severe problem in the analysis. 
 
5.2 Presentation of Step II 
5.2.1 Data collection in Step II 
I selected a couple of companies as potential study objects as a result of Step I. I 
looked for answers with an impact of honesty but also an implementation 
efficiency well spread over the seven alternatives. Also, substantial comments to 
the answers were important in the selection as they indicated that the respondent 
had given his answers some thought. I have chosen these criteria, as this gives me 
a variety of companies gaining the qualitative approach. 
 
A preliminary list of eleven companies was designed in three priority groups. 
The main criterion for prioritizing was my impression of frankness and 
completeness in the CEO answers on my Step I questionnaire. To test the “in-
selling” arguments I first phoned one priority group 3 company. The CEO 
“bought” the arguments, without any objections, and invited me for further 
discussions. I continued the phone calls, now with priority group 1 companies. 
Each of them accepted the proposed intention to use their company as a study 
object. Surprisingly all five including the priority 3 company invited me to a first 
talk at their office. We met and I was very well treated at all these five meetings.   
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We closed the meeting with my proposal to think about our discussions with me 
phoning within ten days. Calling back, three CEOs declined to participate, all of 
them with the main reason “lack of time”.  
 
The other two CEOs were ready. The first one, which I call Company A, could 
start immediately. The first interviews were carried out in June 2003 and 
continued during the autumn with some complementary interviews during 2004. 
The other one, Company B, was not ready for take off until autumn 2003. In the 
meantime, a process started leading to a stock buy-out by a private investor. The 
CEO shifted to the position as Chairman of the Board of Directors and an internal 
recruiting of a new CEO was done. I kept in touch with the former CEO who still 
was very positive. But it took time until autumn 2004 before the new CEO was 
ready for a meeting, which was the starting point for the studies in Company B. 
The interviews were done around the end of 2004. 
 
In springtime 2004, I needed more decision case information in a down-up 
perspective. I went back to one of the declining CEOs asking for a new possibility 
to study the company. I got a positive answer and a set of interviews was 
conducted with the trade union chairmen and the CEO himself in springtime 2004 
in this company, Company C.  
 
I had beforehand decided quite vaguely that I wanted to study decisions in a few 
companies. The purpose is to get enough information from a set of decision 
implementation situations to test the implementation model. So, ending up with 
three companies to study was more a coincidence than a planned achievement. 
Nevertheless I have studied three companies with quite different profiles: trading, 
consulting and manufacturing/selling. This contributes to diminish the risk of 
being trapped in a specific segment or anything like that. And after all, this is a 
case study approach with bounded generalization possibilities beforehand.  
 
All potential respondents agreed to be interviewed. In all, 41 interviews with 27 
individuals have been carried out regarding 18 original decisions, which is what I 
had expected. Just one of the respondents is female. The interviews were carried 
out using the developed list of questions. I made notes directly on my PC. In an 
earlier stage of the studies I had tested the use of tape recorder. When writing from 
recorded tapes afterwards I found that the body language was not caught – it was 
something I put in. The result was a mix of a direct account and my comments. 
Besides I found myself sometimes more occupied by the tape recorder function 
during the interview than listening. There are pros and cons with both procedures 
(Trost, 1997). As I have tried both I abandoned tape recording in favor of the 
procedure used, which suits me best. 
 
There are some more details about the interviews that need to be reported. The 
opening of the interview was designed to be broad by asking a very common 
question like “If you would describe the corporate culture in your own words, 
what will you tell me?”. Then I was ready to follow the track of the respondent 
asking follow-up questions which linked them to the prepared list of questions. I 
also asked some essential questions later in the interview to cover some issues if 
they did not come up spontaneously. But I tried all the time to keep the original 
respondent approach, not trying to lead her/him in a direction according to the   
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“model thinking”. The reason I did this is that I want to catch as much information 
as possible about implementation. Over all, I estimate that the intentions of 
interview performance came out very well. 
 
The first interviews were completed afterwards on my PC with information that 
had not been written down in a proper form during the interview. Then I found it 
easier to catch the nuances in Swedish, as they were fresh and I could reformulate 
them immediately into English and could write an interview summary directly in 
the dissertation.  
 
My over all opinion is that the instruments and the creation of a good interview 
environment have worked quite well. There has not been any interview with 
severe disturbances of any kind.  
 
Book-keeping information was already collected in Step I but completed with 
up-dated figures covering the interview periods. 
 
5.2.2 Non-response analysis of Step II 
I intended to get a couple of companies in which I could carry out the interviews. 
Two out of five declined to participate due to lack of time. A presentation is made 
in table 10 of the five companies. 
 
Table 10. Presentation of five selected companies aimed for Step II 
 
Years a) LS b) Growth Profit
Participating
A 5 Value -3.0% 5.3% 1072 57%
B 1 Value 5.0% 0.0% 990 50%
C 2 Value -4.2% 4.6% 309 62%
Selected but not participating
D 16 Value 9.0% 0.0% 226 75%
E 2 Value 6.0% -1.6% 305 50%
a) years in action   b) Leadership style, self-estimation 
Company
Implement 
Efficiency
Numb of 
employees
Three years' average CEO
 
The presented variables are selected according to the model giving indicators of 
the three corporate factor groups (corporate culture, corporate profile and 
leadership style). There are some smaller differences mainly in growth and profit.  
 
A strict non-response analysis is not applicable given the aim of Step II to study 
individual decisions in a mirror of corporate context. The selected companies 
represent nothing more than themselves. But it is valuable if they are not too 
extreme compared to the companies O-listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
The sampled 57 companies in Step I are thereby available for comparison. The 
coefficients presented in table 10 are well within the variation width of these 
companies 
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5.2.3 Presentation of companies in Step II 
The complete presentation of data from Step II is to be found in Appendix C. Here 
is just a short presentation of the companies studied. 
 
The three companies are briefly presented in table 11. Figures are collected from 
annual book-keeping reports from year 2004. Company A has a broken book-
keeping year ending the 31
st of March. Therefore their figures are taken from the 
annual report of 2003/04. This is very suitable for the period of carrying out the 
interviews, as it does for Company B and C too when using the full year 2004. It is 
observed that some figures in tables 10 and 11 differ. The figures in table 10 are a 
presentation of the situations when companies for the study were selected. The 
figures in table 11 are updated with one year. The differences reflect the changes; 
company B has in the meantime sold out parts of their business. 
 
Table 11. Some basic information about the three studied companies 
 
A BC
Education High school Academic Academic
Recruitment Internal Internal External
Year(s) of action 512
Age 55 40 45
Business type Trading Consulting Manufacturing
Marketplaces Nordic area Sweden Europa
Profit 5.3% 0.0% 4.6%
Growth -3.0% 5.0% -4.2%
Turn over, MSEK 2300 700 500
Numb of empl 1100 1000 300
Complexity a) ~40 5 5
Trade union b)  No Yes Yes
a) Number of subsidiaries  b) members of the board of directors
Company
CEO
Variables
Company
 
There are many differences between the companies. They operate in different 
market segments. Profit and growth, measured as the last three year average, vary. 
The size and complexity differ. The CEO profiles are different. Company A and C 
are listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange O-list but Company B was bought out 
during the study period. There are also similarities in two dimensions: all three are 
in business-to-business and the CEOs are males.  
 
5.2.4 The validity and reliability of the information in Step II 
The principal aspects of validity and reliability of the selected tools used for 
information collection are discussed in 4.3.1. How well have I succeeded meeting 
the requirements in practice? In the following section, I give an evaluation based 
on my own observations during the collection of information.  
 
Information from annual reports meets high demands on reliability. The listed 
companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange follow the rules of economic 
presentation established by the Swedish Accounting Standards Board. The figures   
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used from annual reports are therefore comparable both between companies and 
over time as the rules have not changed during the period studied.  
 
Information from minutes of meetings and other written internal documents has 
varying quality. Descriptions may be precise or imprecise; the background to a 
decision made may be there or not, etc. I have asked for complementary oral 
information and comments in order to get a picture as complete and “true” as 
possible. These discussions have led to the cancellation of some potentially 
interesting decisions to study, as they did not meet such requirements as people 
involved, accuracy, etc. Information used for the selection of a decision to study 
has been just a part of all information in a case. Therefore the primary decision 
information does not play a more important role than information from the 
interviews. 
  
Different numbers of interviews have been carried out for each decision with a 
variation in the combination of decision maker and implementer roles (see table 
12). In one case it happened to be just decision makers as the implementation role 
was played by one of the decision maker. This situation was not clear when the 
decision was selected. Eight decisions have only been revealed by the 
implementers. As I wanted to keep a special down-up perspective I do not see this 
as a weakness even if I cannot compare in these cases the opinions of decision 
makers versus implementers.  
 
Table 12. Distribution of decision cases according to role and number of respondents 
(Note! Decision 2302 and 5407 are divided in two sub-cases each giving in total 20 cases) 
 
012 -
0 1
1 741
2- 151
Decision Maker
Imple  
menter
 
No one appointed to be interviewed has denied participation. No interview has 
been interrupted for a shorter time or been interrupted completely. One interview 
had to be carried out for a shorter time than planned. The conditions were known 
when the interview started and the available time was enough to catch the opinions 
of the respondent. In two cases complementary information was gathered through 
a phone call when the interview was written and gaps were detected in the 
information. 
 
The chosen method to collect information – interviews built up around a retro-
perspective evaluation of a specific decision – contains a risk of respondent 
rationalization, see 4.2.1. The potential rationalization is however a part of the 
individual opinions and therefore not a problem as I am not after a ”true picture”. 
Furthermore, in most decision cases more than one respondent is interviewed and 
the opinions are matched against each other throughout the analysis. 
 
It is difficult to objectively examine which role my personal profile has played 
in the interview situations, as I am one of the two actors. The interviews have 
started with a mutual presentation. After that the respondent knows that I have 
been acting CEO for many years. She/he also may conclude that I am older than   
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her/himself. The combination of these two facts has at least two potential effects 
on the interview situation of an implementer: we use the same business language, 
which facilitates understanding, but there is a risk that the implementer 
experiences a feeling of subordination. Both reactions are individual; they can be 
almost absent but may also be very strong. In many interview situations I have 
received comments such as “you should know, you have been a CEO”, “You 
understand what I mean, you have been so long in business” and “I do not think it 
is necessary to explain, you understand with your background”. In most cases I 
have tried to stimulate the respondent to continue, to express in their own words, 
to go deeper, etc., but I must confess that I sometimes have accepted the 
statements by saying yes or just nodding. 
 
In an interview situation with a CEO it is a bit different. There it is more a 
mutual feeling to be equal parts, “we belong to the same fraternity”. This is to 
some extent positive, e.g., we understand the underlying conditions of a certain 
item, but also negative, e.g., taking a statement for self-explanatory without 
follow-up questions. I have tried in these situations to be observant of my own 
appearance and be professional in my interviewer role.  
 
In table 13 I have presented my own estimation of respondent answer reliability 
(for method discussion, see 4.3.1). When the paper with the scale and the question 
was handed over, no further information was given. In cases when the respondent 
asked me anything, I provided an answer or explanation. I tried to avoid any risk 
of leading the respondent into an answer in accordance to what she/he earlier has 
said. I have judged their scoring reliability according to their possible questions 
and comments. If an unsatisfactory reliability is assigned a score of 3 or lower, 
then just 7.2 % of the answers fall in this category. The figure decreases to 2.4 % 
if the limit is assigned to 2 and lower. The distribution does not differ between the 
three companies. According to these observations it is my opinion that there is not 
a reliability problem. Therefore I have not shown the individual scores linked to 
each answer, as that does not add any essential information. The scores given by 
the respondent are used in the analysis without any further treatment.  
 
Table 13. Results from author’s estimation of respondent answer reliability 
 
0123456 S U M
% 01253 2 1 6 9 1 0
Distribution
Scores on the scale
  
A problem occurred regarding the estimation of implementation process 
efficiency and goal satisfaction. When is a decision really implemented? There are 
many possible answers. Is it when someone says, “it is implemented whatsoever 
the result is”, when the goal is achieved (who decides?) or when a follow-up is 
carried out? During the interviews it became quite clear that many decisions were 
in a state of incomplete implementation according to the opinion of the 
respondent. Initially I was not prepared well enough to meet such a situation, but 
the first time it occurred I asked the respondent to make a prognosis. It worked 
well and then the same procedure was repeated when necessary. In just a few 
cases it was impossible for the respondent to make a prognosis and therefore there   
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was no scoring. I have accepted all given scores as relevant estimations as they in 
any case are subjective opinions. 
  
In summary, there are some weaknesses in information reliability in Step II but I 
do not identify any severe problem using the information for the analysis. The 
main reason is that the occurring weaknesses have a more random than systematic 
character, as I have tried to handle the interview situation with awareness of the 
problem, but this has probably failed on occasion.    
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6 Analysis 
 
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on collected information described in Chapter 
5 and in Appendix C. It is separated in two echelons in accordance with the two 
steps of data collecting, as the data cover the implementation model to different 
extent and come from different sources.  
 
6.1 Structure of the analysis approach  
The tools used in the analysis are described in 4.4. The results from each analysis 
approach are summarized in a verbal conclusion, which is uniquely identified by a 
running number preceded by CC (stands for ConClusion), CCx. These conclusions 
are used in the final discussion in Chapter 7.  
 
  The verbal conclusions differ in strength depending on the scope of the data 
analyzed and the solidity of relations observed. For instance, a conclusion from a 
single case is based on a very specific situation but may be estimated and 
concluded in a dimension of generality according to the context (“this is or is not a 
typical situation”) and the case itself (“this is or is not a typical case”), both 
statements mirrored in the total database. Another conclusion may be drawn from 
a set of cases, sometimes quantitatively evaluated, and therefore the conclusion is 
based on a bigger dataset. I have not found a tool in the literature for systematic 
grading of the verbal conclusions made in an analysis on a general level; specific 
analysis tools such as a t-test of a statistical correlation is another thing. Therefore 
I use the criteria scope and solidity to estimate the value of the conclusions made 
as  
•  W e a k       W  
•  Medium   M 
•  Strong     S 
The estimation follows directly after the conclusion, placed within parentheses 
(X). Very limited information has sometimes been the ground for a conclusion as I 
have estimated its potential value placed in another context; such a conclusion is 
marked (-).  
 
  Observation, reflection and conclusion are three words used frequently in the 
analysis. I use observation when I just lift up something interesting and stop there; 
sometimes the word finding is used as a synonym. The word reflection is used 
when going a bit further with the observations/findings, often in a more 
experience-based and speculative direction. Finally, conclusion is reserved for a 
reasonable causality and other connections derived from the analyzed information. 
The specific use of observation, reflection and conclusion is limited to this 
chapter.  
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6.2 Analysis of data from Step I 
The data in Step I are limited. Despite this, I carry out not only a general analysis 
but also apply both qualitative (QCA) and quantitative (LISREL) tools to the 
available data.  
 
6.2.1 General analysis of Step I information  
The existence of implementation problems is confirmed by the executives (see 
tables 5 and 6 in 5.1.3). The varying implementation success in individual 
companies is also obvious according to the information in these tables. The picture 
is not very positive. Seven companies of 30 (24 %) have an implementation index 
≤50 and the median is only 67. Unfortunately, there are few open comments 
linked directly to the individual distribution, which could help to understand the 
reasons for the low implementation index. So far it seems that there is an 
important improvement potential in implementation efficiency. 
 
The implementation index varies between companies. In table 7, the companies 
have been arranged in three groups according to implementation efficiency level. 
It is not possible to observe any evident or systematic tendencies regarding 
different variables. However, the profit situation is certainly interesting (see 
3.4.2.1). Figure 8 gives a hint about a U-curve. Regression analysis on the data 
including all information (NB! In figure 8, some extreme values are excluded) 
produces a significant equation solution 
 
INDEX  =  63.7  +  0.32*PROFIT            (7)   
 
with R
2=0.20. Adding PROFIT
2 to the equation does not improve R
2 and gives 
furthermore a non-significant solution: the U-curve is not confirmed. As already 
discussed in 5.1.2 there seems to be a slight correlation between poor profit and a 
newly appointed CEO, confirmed by computation results in table 8. The 
combination of these observations is analyzed with QCA in 6.2.2.  
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Figure 8. Plotting implementation efficiency and company profitability (three year average; 
some extreme profit values have been excluded due to diagram layout reasons) 
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Does size of company influence implementation efficiency? Some economic 
variables are listed under the corporate profile headline in table 7, which may be 
used as a measurement of the size of a company as well as the number of 
employees under the headline corporate culture in the same table. In this study, 
“people” is focused. Therefore it seems reasonable to use number of employees as 
a measurement of the size of company.  
 
In figure 9 the relation between implementation efficiency and size of company 
measured as number of employees is plotted excluding the four biggest companies 
with a range of 3000 to 14000 employees. The correlation is r=-0.18 and the 
average implementation efficiency index is 64. The four largest companies have 
an index range of 63 to 85, the later for the biggest one. However, all these figures 
together indicate that size does not matter regarding implementation efficiency. 
The picture is unchanged if other variables are used as measurements of size. 
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Figure 9. The relation between implementation efficiency and size of company 
  
The CEO answers to the open questions about reasons for good versus poor 
implementation efficiency contain much interesting information (table 9). It seems 
that corporate culture factors play an important role; 12 CEOs say that formulated 
and shared values and needs are important for good implementation and 8 CEOs 
claim that internal resistance and cultural conflicts have the opposite effect. Also, 
communication and clarity are important for good implementation, as well as 
lacking resources have relevance for poor implementation. Contrarily, 
participating in the decision making process and a low complexity of the decision 
do not matter in terms of successful implementation; the follow-up system and 
insufficient anchoring are also not of importance.  
 
There are no evident differences in CEO opinions when looking at different 
implementation efficiency levels. That means that even if the CEO estimates quite 
a poor status of implementation efficiency in his own company, he shares the 
opinions of his colleagues in more successful companies about reasons for good 
versus poor implementation efficiency.  
 
A provocative reflection is that “well implemented” seems to be explained 
mainly in words of good top management and “poorly implemented” by problems   
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related to subordinates! It is, however, not possible to analyze this observation 
further due to shortage of information. 
 
To summarize, I make the following conclusions based on the general analysis 
of Step I: 
  CC1. There is a potential for important improvements in implementation 
efficiency (S)  
  CC2. Corporate factors as formulated and shared values and needs as 
well as internal resistance and culture conflicts have impacts of good and 
poor implementation respectively (M) 
  CC3. Decision factors such as communication and clarity as well as 
available resources have impacts of good and poor implementation 
respectively (M) 
  CC4. Size of company does not matter with regard to implementation 
efficiency (M) 
  CC5. Extreme profit situations (very poor or very good) do not lead to 
high implementation efficiency (W) 
  CC6. Executives estimate that successful implementation mainly depends 
on themselves and unsuccessful implementation mainly depends on 
subordinates (-) 
 
6.2.2 Step I QCA  
The purpose of the QCA approach is to find causal relations between corporate 
factors and implementation efficiency in the preliminary model. The QCA 
technique is briefly described in 4.4.2.  
 
The dataset includes almost 40 variables, of which six are economic variables 
from each of the last five years (that is 30 of the total 40). They are continuous 
with two exceptions: leadership style, which is trichotomous, and the presence of 
minutes of Top Management Team meetings, which is dichotomous. Evaluated 
variables such as turn over pro employee, profit margin and years as CEO in the 
company have been calculated from the original variables (see table 14). 
 
Table 14. Transformation of the continuous variables into dichotomous variables in Step I 
 
Estimation proposal Abbr 1 0
CEO's self-estimation of leadership style L Value Directive
Presence of minutes of meetings M YES NO
Year(s) as CEO Y >4 years <4 years
Age of CEO A <40 years >40 years
Turn over last year T >500 MSEK <500 MSEK
Solidity   S <30% >30%
Number of employees last year E >1000 <1000
Profit, three year average  P <0 alt >10% 0-10%
Growth, three year average  G <0 alt >10% 0-10%
CEO's estimation of IE, evaluated I >66% <66%
Pivot value Selected variables
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I have selected both original and evaluated variables, suitable for a QCA 
analysis. The criteria for selection are mainly the formulated research questions 
but my personal experiences have also been taken into account. The selection and 
the transformation from the original variable value into a dichotomous variable are 
shown in table 14. I have not grouped the variables under factor groups of the 
preliminary implementation model (see figure 3) as I have no direct information 
about corporate culture. However, the variables T, S, E, P and G constitute 
corporate profile. 
 
The developed truth table is shown in table 15.  
 
Table 15. Truth table of selected variables in Step I  (abbreviations see table 14)  
 
LMYA TSEPGI
1 0110111010
2 1110101011
3 1110111011
4 1001110111
5 1110101010
6 0111100001
7 0100000110
8 0101000111
9 1110010111
10 0100100010
11 1110100000
12 1100010100
13 1111000101
14 0111100010
15 1010010101
16 0000111001
17 0000100011
18 1101000101
19 0110000101
20 1110000011
21 1110000110
22 1100100100
23 0010000100
24 0100111100
25 1101100111
26 1100101101
27 1100101101
28 1100100010
29 0101000010
30 0111010000
Nb of 1 17 25 15 9 17 9 8 16 16 16
Nb of 0 1 3 51 52 11 32 12 2 14 14 14
Transformed variables
Row
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1
The pivot values have been decided with one eye on the dataset (“reasonable 1/0 
distribution”) and the other eye on the research questions. L was easy to manage 
as no respondent has characterized himself as a political leader. P has been treated 
according to RQ6 (see 3.4.2.1). The transformation contains some subjectivity. I 
have tested different pivot values before coming to the results in table 14. The 
main problem is that some variables are unbalanced in 1/0 cases even for small 
changes in pivot values. 
 
When creating a truth table (see 4.4.2), there can be a problem with missing 
values. This occurs in my data. The matrix generated by the selected variables is 
10x30. There are 9 missing values of the total potential of 300 observations, 
giving 24 rows to compute instead of 30. To solve this problem I have applied the 
imputation method described in 4.4.4. All missing values are imputed and the 
matrix is complete with 30 rows as shown in table 15. 
 
The first analysis is carried out with three variables as this approach permits me 
to select one variable from each factor group. L(eadership style) is undisputable. 
For corporate profile, P(rofit) is selected according to RQ6. Corporate culture was 
not covered by any questions to the CEOs. In table 14 I propose years as acting 
CEO, Y, even if it is discussed in 4.2.2.3 how far the CEO influence reaches on 
corporate culture. Alternatively the age of CEO, A, is a possible estimation of 
corporate culture. I choose Y, as Y has indicated some influence on the estimation 
of implementation efficiency (see tables 7 and 8). If the CEO has acted 4 years or 
more, he has had time to affect the corporate culture if possible at all. Therefore 
the QCA is carried out with L, P and Y as independent variables and 
I(mplementation efficiency) as dependent. 
 
For all rows except 000 I use the technique of majority. That means that all 
cases are put into the outcome column, where the majority is already found (see 
table 16). Row 000 has two cases in each 1/0 column. All rows including 00 have 
a majority of 0-cases. Therefore it seems relevant to start the analysis by putting 
row 000 into outcome 0.  
 
The truth table from the first analysis step is shown in table 17. All rows are 
covered by cases. But the contradictory row results are obvious. It is, however, 
possible to see a structure, which I use when handling the problem. 
 
Table 16. Original truth table of L Y P > I in Step I 
 
LYP10
11121
11042
10152
100
0111
01014
00112
00022
I cases Independent var
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3
6
7
1
1
5
3
4
The next step in the analysis is to formulate the equation. From table 17, the 
following equation is designed 
 
L Y P   +   L Y p   +   L y P   +   l Y P   >   I              ( 8 )  
 
Minimizing gives: 
 
L Y   +   L P   +   Y P   >   I                   ( 9 )  
 
Equation (9) says that value leadership in combination with either a long period of 
CEO regime (at least four years) or a challenging economic situation (negative 
profit or above 10 %) cause high implementation efficiency, as well as a long 
period of CEO regime in combination with a challenging economic situation. 
There are three pathways to high implementation efficiency and they are all a 
combination of two of the three variables.  
 
Table 17. Adapted truth table of L Y P > I  in Step I 
 
LYP
1111
1101
1011
1000
0111
0100
0010
0000
Cases I
Independent var
 
How robust is the presented solution? I answer this question by addressing three 
aspects. First, does adding more independent variables improve the explanation? 
The model contains three corporate factor groups. If I use two variables of each 
instead of one, the number of rows increases from 8 to 64. The data has 30 sets. 
Adding variables is obviously impossible. Picking up just one more variable, 
giving 16 rows, is technically possible. But doing so, the weight of a certain factor 
group is doubled giving a risk of misleading conclusions. Nevertheless I have 
tried. It is simplest to look at corporate profile. Adding growth, G, causes one 
empty row (no case observed) and a very high degree of contradictory row results. 
So adding one more variable does not contribute to a better solution and thus G is 
unlikely to affect the outcome. 
 
A second aspect is the choice of variables. I have separately tested age of CEO, 
A, instead of Y and growth, G, instead of P. A gives approximately the same truth 
table but with slightly higher contradictory row results. G gives higher 
contradictory row results. If I manage the contradictory row results with the same 
technique as earlier, G gives the following equation: 
 
L Y G   +   L Y g   +   L y G   +   L y g   >   I            ( 1 0 )  
 
which can be minimized to 
 
L   >   I                         ( 1 1 )  
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That means that value-driven leadership would be necessary and enough for high 
implementation efficiency, which does not seem convincing. 
 
Finally I have tested changing the pivot values of Y and P. Y has been changed 
from 4 to 3 years. P has been changed to <3%/>3% for 1/0. The truth table is 
changed very little not forcing any changes in basic equation (9) if I manage the 
contradictory row results as before. 
 
Row 000 is initially regarded as a 0-outcome. If it is managed as a 1-outcome, 
we get the following solution: 
 
LYP + LYp + LyP + lYP + lyp > I                  (12) 
 
Minimizing gives 
 
L Y   +   L P   +   Y P   +   l y p   >   I                ( 1 3 )  
 
Equation (13) assigns a fourth pathway to high implementation efficiency 
compared with equation (9): a combination of directive leadership, short CEO 
regime and no profit challenge. The result shows the solution sensitivity of 
calculation conditions rather than a convincing fourth way to high implementation 
efficiency  
 
In total, the sensitivity analysis indicates that solution (9) is reasonably 
consistent to changed conditions. 
 
Tentative QCA-tests with alternative trichotomous combinations of variables in 
table 15 have not given any promising results. 
  
  CC7. Value-driven leadership, a long period of CEO regime and a 
challenging economic situation in pair-wise combinations lead to a high 
implementation efficiency (W) 
 
The purpose of the QCA approach is achieved resulting in some interesting 
findings.  
 
6.2.3 LISREL analysis of Step I 
The purpose of the LISREL analysis is to find causal relations between corporate 
factors and implementation efficiency in the preliminary model. The LISREL tool 
is shortly described in 4.4.3. The variables used in the LISREL analysis here are 
the same as in table 14 (of course in their original form as continuous variables) 
completed with age of CEO when appointed and size of TMT (corporate culture). 
Some of the variables have been transformed to logarithms before computing in 
order to approximate normal distribution characteristics of the variables (Jöreskog 
& Sörbom, 1996). 
 
I have made several computations but have not been successful in finding model 
fitness. The main reason seems to be a limitation of the dataset. However, some 
observations are made. It seems that profit, growth, solidity, number of employees 
and turn over in different combinations are useful variables for measuring 
corporate profile. Contrarily, it does not seem as CEO characteristics as age, years   
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of action as CEO and age at appointment are good estimations of corporate 
culture. 
 
The purpose of the LISREL modeling approach to find causality in Step I 
information failed.  
 
6.3 Analysis of data from Step II 
Presented information in Appendix C is used in this analysis but also information 
from other sources. The analysis is carried out on different levels. The 
combination of sources and levels differ between variables in the implementation 
model. In table 18 an overview is presented in order to facilitate the analysis 
understanding.  
 
Table 18. Overview of information sources and analysis levels in Step II  
 
Corporate Corporate profile 
Corporate culture   
Leadership style
Decision case
Type                      
Target group                
Decision demanded 
and recognised            
Follow up situation
Decision case 
components
Decision making 
process  
Implementation context 
Implementation profile  
Goal satisfaction   
Process efficiency
Decision making 
process
Level
Written 
documentation
Respondent opinons 
and estimations Author's estimations
Information sources
 
As table 18 shows, the analysis deals not only with model variables. The first 
screening of the data indicated that my interpretation of the interviews went in the 
direction of specific decision case conditions. Therefore, the cell Decision 
case/Author’s estimations contains analysis approaches completing the analyses 
derived from the implementation model and the research questions.  
 
The analysis is carried out in steps starting with corporate factors followed by 
analysis of individual decisions. Then, I apply an organizational perspective and 
continue with an analysis of decisions categorized in different dimensions (labeled 
“categorized decisions”, see row “Decision case” in table 18). QCA and LISREL 
analyses follow and they are used in order to estimate relations in the preliminary 
model. I carry out these different analyses in order to squeeze the data for as much 
information as possible. The results may be contradictory or congruent. What-so-  
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ever, they form thereby a ground for nuanced conclusions and an evaluation of the 
implementation model.  
 
6.3.1 Analysis of corporate factors 
The main purpose of this first analysis step is to create a mirror in which the 
upcoming decision analysis could be reflected. The mirror is an aggregation of the 
opinions of the respondents on the corporate level. The Company Asub (see C.2.1) 
is excluded in this sub-chapter as there are just two observations. 
 
6.3.1.1 Analysis of corporate profile 
In tables 10 and 11, information is given about company profiles. Three years are 
shown. The interviews are carried out during the last two years of this period. 
Therefore corporate profiles are an important background for understanding the 
answers of the respondents. Corporate profile itself is also a part of the 
implementation model.  
 
Company A has had negative growth but has been able to keep black profit 
figures. Firing people has been one way to adapt to a weak market. As Company 
A has a broken financial year ending in March, there is information about the 
entire 2004 when writing these comments. This information indicates positive 
growth under improved profitability. Company A has had a hard period but has 
been running well both then and now. 
 
Company B has gone through a trial by fire. It was introduced on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange but bought out after a few years. It has been re-organized under a 
very pressed market situation. Over three year the turn over has decreased with 
20% and the accumulated deficits are 100 MSEK. 30 % of the employees have 
been fired. The situation has remarkably improved the latest year of the three-year 
period even if there was a small deficit.  
 
Company C has had a historical situation parallel to Company A but 
experienced a huge lift in sales figures 2004 which gives a small average growth 
over the past three years. Profit has been positive in spite of a declining market. In 
all, after some quite hard years, the company is running well the latest year of the 
three-year period.  
 
6.3.1.2 Analysis of corporate culture 
As described in 4.2.2.3, I have not used an objective tool to measure corporate 
culture. I have used the term and the respondents have told me how they interpret 
the concept. However, I have made some observations regarding organization and 
TMT routines which in some meaning may be said to be objective.  
  
Company A has a consistently structured, decentralized organization. The 
corporate culture shows, over all, a high degree of concordance. All respondents 
mention responsibility and freedom, and business and human relations, as essential 
parts of the culture even if they use different words. The repeated words but also 
their own words for the same concept indicate a high degree of cultural 
penetration and cultural homogeneity. There are subtle differences. Some   
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respondents say that business is more important than people. Responsibility and 
freedom have disadvantages, which are indistinctness and mistakes. But when they 
conclude, the advantages are bigger than the disadvantages. 
 
I find that some respondents are critical to shortage in systems and routines. 
Some respondents mean that there is too much short-sightedness. Communication 
and dialogue are appreciated. The response on acting is good. The trade unions 
play a hidden role, which is also demonstrated by the respondents as they do not 
mention anything about them.  
 
All together, the respondents provide a picture of corporate culture in Company 
A signalizing concordance, confidence and “human satisfaction” but not avoiding 
to mention shortcomings. 
 
Company B is a small group, balancing between decentralization of business 
and centralization of support activities. Corporate culture can be characterized as 
splayed and under change. The respondents say in different words that there is an 
on-going process of changing corporate culture with the CEO as the engine. Many 
respondents mention that the main change will be from subsidiary independence to 
group cooperation with a focus on consultant coverage rate. There is basically a 
positive attitude to the change even if some people are unsure about the form of 
the new corporate culture. Many respondents express their satisfaction with 
working for Company B. Most respondents share some elements with the 
corporate culture as openness, communication and customer focus. CEO has 
launched the four core values, the “E’s” (evolution, ethics, engagement, emotion). 
They are so far not well known in the group. The role of the trade unions is played 
both formally (members of the Board of Directors) and informally (good relations 
to CEO). Their impact seems to be enormous.  
 
Even if there are many shared opinions and values in Company B, there are also 
many individual opinions about history and the future. This is not surprising. The 
staff members are, as consultants per se, individual in their approaches and the 
CEO is working hard to change the corporate culture into a more cooperative 
climate. Tension is not surprising.  
 
Company C has a traditional organization of manufacturing, marketing and 
economy departments, but it is under change after having acquired a foreign 
company. The corporate culture is under change, and it is almost reaching a new 
state. The respondents both complain about the disappearance of the old culture 
and appreciate the new one. It is a combination of feeling versus common sense: 
the old days were good but we have to adjust to a new market situation. In this 
change it easy to find mistakes and faults but nevertheless the respondents are 
positive. 
 
The new culture is characterized by a customer focus instead of manufacturing 
focus, by flexibility instead of manufacturing scale advantages, and by individual 
responsibility instead of group solidarity. The internationalization is a challenge 
with communication problems (business culture, language) and profit risks. The 
change itself forces opinions about scanty information and an absent CEO. The 
employees show a high loyalty to the company and the company cares for the 
employees. Good performances are not that often marked by the managers; the   
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bad ones are however observed and treated in a quite repulsive manner. The trade 
unions play a strong role in daily life mainly in a formal way of MBL negotiations.  
 
The new culture in Company C is accepted by the staff members but not yet 
fully supported. 
 
So far I have used the verbal expressions of the respondents to characterize the 
corporate culture. The picture may be completed by their scores of corporate 
culture in terms of culture penetration and culture homogeneity (table 19). 
  
Company A and C show over all a high degree of homogeneity of culture 
strength and penetration while Company B shows the opposite on a much lower 
average level. This picture strengthens the verbal statements. There is, in all three 
companies, a more positive picture of corporate culture strength among TMT 
members than among staff members. The CEOs of Company A and B come closer 
to staff members than their own TMT. Note that the CEO is the only interviewed 
TMT member of Company C.  
 
Table 19. The corporate culture scores in companies A, B and C  
 
ABC
Numb of respondents 91 05 2 4
Numb of TMT members 341 8
Numb of staff members 664 1 6
Scores
Average 5.1 3.5 4.7 4.4
Median 5.0 3.5 4.5
Minimum 4.5 2.0 4.5
Maximum 6.0 6.0 5.0
CEO 5.0 3.5 5.0
TMT members 5.5 4.0 5.0 4.7
Staff members 4.9 3.2 4.6 4.2
Company
Variable
Sum or 
Weighed 
average
 
 
6.3.1.3 Analysis of leadership style 
In table 20, the leadership style estimation is summarized for each company. The 
congruence between the CEO and respondents about leadership style is high in 
Company A and C. Also, the homogeneity is quite good.  
 
Table 20. The CEO leadership style in companies A, B and C  
 
self-estim years Political Directive Value
A V a l u e 5 026
B V a l u e 1 153
C V a l u e 2 013
Company
Numb of respond estim CEO 
 
However, Company B shows another picture. The estimations of the 
respondents are spread over the entire scale. 67% of the respondents have another   
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opinion about the leadership style of the CEO than he has himself. The 
congruence and homogeneity are low. One reason is probably the short period of 
CEO hegemony even if he has been with the group for many years (internally 
recruited as CEO); people do not know him well enough to estimate his leadership 
style. Another reason is his approach to change the culture: for subordinates it is 
hard to understand if CEO is bird or fish. 
 
6.3.1.4 Integration of corporate profile, corporate culture and leadership style – a 
summary 
Corporate profile, corporate culture and CEO leadership style are three corporate 
factor groups in the implementation model. If they are combined in an integrated 
dimension, what do they say about the three studied companies?  
Company A  
has a strong, human leader trusted by the staff members. The culture is well 
established and well balanced with a strong focus on business and caring for 
people supported by consequent decentralization. The business track record shows 
a skill to achieve acceptable profit under negative growth. The company has 
reached a harmonious culture status of permitting and permeating where people 
are proud and feel good. Company A has a decision climate of “think, dare and 
do”.    
Company B 
has a new leader for whom the staff members have positive expectations. The 
culture is changing from independence to cooperation. The financial situation has 
been severe but is now under control and developing well. Company B has a 
decision climate of “customer, consultant coverage rate and internal cooperation”. 
Company C  
has a strong, decisive leader respected by the staff members. The organizational 
structure is under development and the culture has been exhaustively changed to a 
strong customer focus and internationalization but keeps good care of staff 
members, which are accepting the change but not yet fully supportive. The 
business figures are improving after some hard years. Company C has a decision 
climate of “must and go”. 
 
Table 21 attempts to translate and complete the verbal company summary above 
into scores. My estimates are shown, using the same scale that has been used in 
the interviews, 0 to 6.  
 
Table 21. A map of company situation during interview period (scores given by the author) 
 
A BC
CEO position 6 4 5
Corporate profile 4 2 4
Corporate culture 5 4 4
S U M 1 51 01 3
Company
Variable
 
The row CEO position is estimated in a down-up perspective including both the 
estimations of leadership style and the verbal answers. I have seen few CEOs with 
such a good reputation in the organization as the CEO of Company A; therefore a   
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“full 6”. The low score 2 of Company B regarding corporate profile depends on 
the rucksack. The figures for Company B and C in row corporate culture differ a 
bit from the averages based on respondent answers (see table 19). I have taken into 
account the verbal opinions. They show that the culture change in Company B is 
not as huge as the respondents score. Even more, the verbal opinions of the 
respondents are quite positive regarding penetration and support. The situation is 
the reverse in Company C.  
 
A simple addition of scores per company in table 21, as a measurement of 
consolidation/stability, gives the ranking A, C and B with quite a big difference 
between the companies A and B. The sum is labeled mega corporate culture (see 
Appendix A). 
 
The findings expressed both in verbal statements and scores above are a 
foundation useful for understanding the results from the up-coming analysis; they 
are used as a mirror of these results. Therefore the purpose of 6.3.1 is achieved. 
 
6.3.2 Analysis of individual decisions 
The purpose of this first approach is to find relations between implementation 
efficiency and the explanatory variables, according to the preliminary model 
through analyzing each individual decision.  
 
The interview minutes in Appendix C is the information used, but I also pay 
attention to their scores. I am analyzing not only what the respondents said but 
also the way they said it. Their opinions about corporate culture and leadership 
style of the CEO are also taken into account.  
 
An overview of the decisions to analyze is presented in table 22; see Appendix 
C, sub-chapter C.1 for the explanation of the connections between company and 
decision. Two decisions, 2302 and 5407, are divided in two decision cases as the 
interviews showed that the selected single decision to study was a twin. The 
original 18 decisions are therefore increased to 20.  
 
The decisions are categorized in table 22. I have made the categorization on the 
following premises. Decision type is judged according to the definition presented 
in Appendix A in the perspective of the decision maker. That produces a problem: 
a decision judged as “operational” may be perceived as “strategic” by the 
implementer according to the definition. There is no simple solution and therefore 
the existence of this dual interpretation of the “strategic” dimension must be 
observed when interpreting the analysis results.  
 
Target group categorization is made from information in the minutes regarding 
the group of stakeholders, internal and external, which is mostly touched by the 
decision. There may also be other groups touched. Implementation status is 
estimated from the minutes, too. The categorization indicates how far the 
implementation has gone when the interviews were carried out. Over all, there is a 
mix and multiplicity of decision characteristics, which is what I hoped to get when 
the selections were made. It supplies many dimensions in the analysis work.  
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The respondents are presented in table 22 in two groups, decision makers (DM) 
and implementers (IMP). When they are cited in the following analysis they have 
unique nicknames such as Kson and Rson (see sub-chapter C.1 in Appendix C). 
They may perform in more than one decision; the presentation of the respondents 
in each decision is found in tables C01 (company A), C06 (company B) and C07 
(company C). In these tables the respondent scores are also presented. 
 
Table 22. Categorization of investigated decisions (by the author; DM = decision maker, 
IMP = implementer)  
 
ID Title Type Target group Impl Status DM IMP
1304 Market extension Strategic Customer Going on 1 1
1308 Balanced Score Card Operational Management Realized 1 2
1310 Home PC for staff members Operational Staff members Realized 2
1313 Reports from Managing Dir Operational Management Realized 1 2
1331 Customer relation Operational Customer Going on 1 2
1333 Save money Operational Management Going on 1
2301 Customer Account Strategic Customer Realized 2 3
2302:1 Phone cost cut (company) Operational Management Realized 1 3
2302:2 Phone cost cut (private) Operational Staff members Varying 2
2303 Group Q system Strategic Customer Not started 2 1
2304 Human resource committee Operational Management Realized 1 2
2305 Accounting of working hours Operational Management Realized 1 1
5401 New quality system Strategic Customer Going on 1
5402 Outsourcing Strategic Manufacturing Going on 1 1
5403 Dismissing people Operational Staff members Realized 1
5404 Laser cutter Operational Manufacturing Going on 1 1
5405 Factory staff member reduct Operational Manufacturing Realized 1
5406 Painting investment Operational Manufacturing Realized 1
5407:1 Product development, phase 1 Operational Customer Realized 1
5407:2 Product development, phase 2 Operational Customer Realized 1
a) Number of respondents
Decision identification Decision categorization Numb a)
 
 
6.3.2.1 Decision 1304 Market extension 
The decision scope: a geographical market extension based on established 
products. 
 
This strategic decision, identified by me as a single decision, appears to be a set 
of consecutive decisions. Hson says “Which decision are we speaking about? 
What was the aim? What were we going to implement”? The basic decision was to 
change the Business Idea followed by the decision to find business possibilities in 
Europe. Or was it in reality in the opposite order? What-so-ever, the third decision 
was to carry out an investigation supported by an external partner. Here, if not 
earlier, the picture of what is going on differs between the decision maker and the 
implementer. It seems that some sub-decisions are contradictory.  
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Speaking about implementation context and profile is complicated, as there are 
so many decisions to take into account. This is also true about implementation 
efficiency. When interviewing, the implementation is going on but it is not clear if 
it is buying a company or anything else. It seems that the original strategic 
decision has been replaced by normal operational business but on a new market. 
The period from first strategic decision to the actual interviewing situation is also 
characterized by internal re-organization, which complicates the picture.  
 
The goal satisfaction is estimated to be high in spite of confusion about what the 
goal was – or the goals were! But implementation efficiency is estimated to be 
quite low. 
 
I find that the corporate culture is saving this indistinct set of decisions and the 
fragmented actions from implementation collapse; Hson says “There was no plan. 
But to meet the unknown is not unique for me”. There is action from the 
implementer even if he does not know the whole story. The decision maker is 
satisfied when things happen. The price to be paid is low implementation 
efficiency.  
 
Basically, the two respondents have the same opinions but they express 
themselves in different ways according to their positions. Dson, decision maker, 
does not deny the problems now and then but he finds that the project is over all 
quite successful even if he is not sure about the future commercial success of the 
project. Hson, implementer, also trusts the future but more or less accuses the 
TMT of being unclear and un-determinative. Even these opinions must be 
understood in a corporate culture background. 
 
  CC8. An indistinct decision in a turbulent context may be well 
implemented in terms of goal satisfaction if the corporate culture is 
business- and action-oriented, supported by an attitude of “you are 
permitted to do mistakes”, but the price is low process efficiency (W) 
 
6.3.2.2 Decision 1308 Balanced Score Card 
The decision scope: a trial to introduce the tool Balanced Score Card (BSC). 
 
This decision is not a decision event, it has been growing up. At a certain point, 
the responsible TMT member (=the decision maker) feels he has enough support 
in order to launch the concept. However, the coordination and timing of the 
purpose, the prepared BSC manual, and the handing over the implementation task 
are poor. The implementers are confused.  
 
The implementers do not participate in the decision making process. Therefore 
they are not motivated when they get an order, more or less, to report in a new 
concept, as they do not know the purpose. Information will later be available and 
then they are very positive to the concept.  
 
All three respondents are almost concordant in their opinions. It does not matter 
if they are a decision maker or an implementer. 
 
  CC9. An implementation task without an expressed purpose causes 
frustration and even resistance among the implementers. The   
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implementation is delayed, even if supplementary information clarify the 
purpose and other vital conditions, leading to low implementation 
efficiency  (W) 
 
6.3.2.3 Decision 1310 Home PC for staff members 
The decision scope: a renewal of the home PC concept which was offered some 
years earlier.  
 
The decision can be seen as a repetitive one as the same decision was made 
some years ago. Already then, there were a lot of practical troubles when 
implementing. A systematic evaluation was not done; the organization has not 
picked up the possibility to learn from mistakes. So the new decision is caught in 
the same trap. Even more, the implementers, the MDs, have not taken part in the 
decision making process. If so, the agreement and implementation process should 
probably have been designed in different manners.  
 
The goal satisfaction is low. That is severe, as satisfied staff members are a key 
for business success. The process implementation efficiency is even lower as the 
implementation context (i.e., frame agreement, technical solutions, freedom to 
satisfy individual demands) was complicated and the implementation profile was 
unclear even if the responsibility was unambiguous. 
 
  CC10. A decision made on false or insufficient premises causes poor goal 
satisfaction and low implementation process efficiency (W) 
 
6.3.2.4 Decision 1313 Reports from Managing Directors 
The decision scope: a development of BSC improving the content of the internal 
reports. 
 
The label of this decision has been from the very beginning “Reports from 
Managing Directors” as an effect of the discussions with the CEO. I have kept the 
label through out. However, I discovered many other aspects when collecting and 
processing written comments. The case appeared to be even more complex when I 
had done three interviews. Therefore the case is very useful as it is complex and it 
contrasts with “single event decisions”.  
 
The defined decision to analyze is “improve the capital turnover rate” in order to 
improve the group profitability. The definition was made when the written reports 
were read the first time. The decision does not contain a fixed goal; it is a direction 
decision involving all 50 MDs in the group. There must be contributions from all 
for success. 
  
The implementation will be done under market pressure giving decreasing net 
revenues. That makes it even more difficult to reduce fixed capital: you must not 
only create improvements in efficiency but at the same time control inventory 
capital due to decreasing sales figures. The implementation context is difficult. 
 
The implementation is not formalized in an official, communicated plan. The 
CEO decides to use many tools. MD conferences, MD bonus system, subsidiary   
  104
competitions are used to sell in and follow-up. Leadership is focused in a special 
approach linked to elite sport activities.  
 
The routine of written quarterly comments is established but there are no 
manuals on how or what to write. The CEO gives no explicit instructions 
regarding how “improve the capital turnover rate” is to be incorporated in them.  
 
What have I found when studying the written comments? In the beginning of the 
period (see table C02 Appendix C), the scope level of comments on capital is low 
and it decreases into even lower at the end. The MDs formulate goals to a limited 
extent: in the beginning 13% of the Managing Directors are doing so and at the 
end just 7 %. I have looked at the comments given by the MDs for all four 
quarters studied. They are not consistent in their comments over the period. Eight 
of 22 miss or jump over at least once!  
 
At the MD conferences the results of the “improve the capital turnover rate” 
competition are manifested. No formal feedback is given to the written quarterly 
comments. Instead, the CEO acts: personal phone calls are made or meetings are 
held when an MD does not comment or achieves insufficient results. Everything 
seems well and CEO focuses on deviations and problems. 
 
Has the implementation been successful? Looking at goal satisfaction, even if it 
is not explicitly expressed, the data from annual reports (see table C04), indicates 
no improvement. But the CEO says in the interview that there has been a switch to 
focus on inventory capital. Measured in that manner, there has been a favorable 
development. Regarding implementation process efficiency, the written comments 
have not given much useful feed back to top management about how the 
individual subsidiary succeeds in improving the capital turnover rate. Just one 
respondent has scored; his scores are in the middle (see table C01). 
 
The analysis shows that the CEO leadership style and the strong corporate 
culture is the fundament on which “improve the capital turnover rate” is built. The 
reason for the lack of relevant, written comments is probably an absence of a 
manual or a form for comments but also no feed back on delivered comments. The 
quarterly comments are not the main tool to manage, but they contribute, certainly 
when they are absent or giving feed back on deviations. The MDs, which have 
written comments on all four studied occasions, are not consistent in their 
structure or content. It strengthens the picture of an informal, deviation-oriented 
culture. It seems as the key figure of “improve the capital turnover rate” was not 
defined from the beginning. When I present the data (see table C04), CEO reports 
positive key figures of inventory capital. So it is difficult to estimate if the 
improvement really has taken place. 
 
So far I have done the analysis in a traditional top-down perspective. What 
about the reverse? It seems at first that the two implementers are not familiar with 
the Time out concept. But they do, even if the name itself is unknown. A reason 
may be that they have no bonus agreement, as they are newly appointed. 
Nevertheless, the content is well understood. Interesting enough, they use the 
compulsory task as something useful for themselves and their companies. This 
contributes to corporate culture of a learning organization.  
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It is not that easy to summarize this decision in terms of relations between 
implementation efficiency and contextual factors. There are many indistinctions 
related to the decision and its implementation. Leadership and corporate culture 
come out from the fog as elements to manage unclear goals and procedures. The 
success of the implementation is also unclear.  
 
  CC11. A leadership, which builds on and utilizes a strong corporate 
culture and which focuses on human beings and result deviations, is more 
important than formal follow-up tools to manage a complicated 
implementation situation (W) 
 
6.3.2.5 Decision 1331 Customer relations 
The decision scope: how to strengthen customer relations between the studied 
company and its most important customer. 
 
The case is a conventional, operational market decision close to being repetitive. 
There has been a long journey before making the decision. The problem is a low 
supply share for the most important customer but the management had not found 
the approach to increase the supply share. However, a quite open decision is now 
made to improve the personal relations with the customer staff on different levels. 
The goal is set but it is not communicated so well or broken down. A well-
designed implementation plan is put into action including extra resources for a 
special task force. Implementation problems occur regarding the use of selling 
forces and how to use extra resources efficient. 
 
The appointed project manager has participated in decision making process and 
he is also very positive both to the implementation context and the implementation 
profile. He feels he is managing a well-run project. The member of the special task 
force is less positive the whole way through. He has not participated in decision 
making process and seems not to have enough information. 
 
The MD, the decision maker, has a cool attitude to the project raising more 
questions than giving opinions about the state of the art. It seems that he is split: 
the role of the staff members outside the special task force is unclear, he has to 
point out sometimes with his whole hand and he thinks that the project develops 
too slow. He is not discussing his own management or leadership role. 
 
The structure and the tactics of the project are exhaustively designed but the 
details and the daily work is prepared and managed insufficiently. In all, it seems 
that there is an organizational focus on the project but both managers and sale 
force are still seeking the right approaches in spite of explicit goals and formulated 
plans. It is a leadership challenge to improve this situation that is not fully met by 
the MD and, probably, the project manager. This situation occurs, as the MD has 
not given the total responsibility to the project manager. Instead of doing so, and 
then concentrating on follow-up, he wants to have a finger in the play. The 
interpretation may be strengthened when it is mirrored in the different opinions 
about the leadership style of the MD; he himself saying value and the project 
manager saying political. I also think that the corporate culture, which is said to be 
very intimate and strong by all three involved, is at a disadvantage when coming   
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to a situation where tasks in the organization are differentiated. The staff members 
do not feel familiar with the situation.  
 
  CC12. Even if a decision has an evident goal and associated 
implementation plans, it is necessary to have defined roles and 
responsibilities supported by a coaching leadership during the 
implementation; this must be done in order to avoid poor implementation 
process efficiency, and not the least, a delay in the time schedule (W) 
 
6.3.2.6 Decision 1333 Save money 
The decision scope: an e-mail arrives from the managing director to a subordinate 
as an perceived order to save money due to poor profit. 
 
What we have seen of this decision is just a glimpse, but I have taken care of the 
opinions as they are given in a down-up perspective. 
 
There are two points to the reactions to the e-mail: the content and the 
communication of the decision. The implementer interprets the content in his own 
perspective and finds it going against his opinions about his business. Irrespective 
of if this opinion is right or not in a group perspective, it causes trouble with 
implementation. 
 
The communication is also criticized. No dialogue, just an order. Even here, the 
reaction of the implementer will obstruct the implementation, irrespective of if his 
reaction is relevant or not. As Fson says “I find it very difficult to implement such 
a decision”.  
 
  CC13. A decision with content in conflict with the opinion of the 
implementer may have many difficulties to be overcome in order to be 
implemented (W) 
 
6.3.2.7 Decision 2301 Customer Account 
The decision scope: introducing a Customer Account Concept, CAC, as a new 
element of the corporate culture. This concept supports internal group cooperation 
in order to satisfy the customer’s consulting demand by using the competence of 
the entire group.  
 
The organization wanted this decision to be made. The table is set. But not 
completely as there is no manual for uniform handling when the implementation 
task is given. It comes as yield after the dough into the oven. This is, however, not 
a big problem since the implementers act. They do so in the studied case as the 
implementers had a double role: they were also decision makers in TMT. 
 
It is possible to see two implementation levels. The first one is the MD level, the 
double role player level. The second one is the consultant level, the staff members, 
which are appointed CAC managers by the first level. They have to handle the 
customer relation job. There are no large differences between the two levels 
regarding the implementation process. 
 
Two implementers have been involved in the decision making process, three 
have not. There are not any big differences between the two groups in their   
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descriptions and estimations of the implementation. There is a fairly unanimous 
opinion about poor goal satisfaction. The main reason is that the purpose – to 
increase consultant coverage rate – has been achieved by an increase in customer 
demand. Another reason, linked to the first, is the pricing when looking at cross-
selling in the group. Selling more consultant time on the margin to big customers 
with price advantages will be less profitable than selling to your own customers, 
given a consultant coverage rate of almost 100 %. The majority of the respondents 
say that the test of the CAC will come in next recession. Therefore the goal 
satisfaction may be better later on.  
 
The respondents also estimate implementation process efficiency as low. The 
absence of a manual, mentioned above, and “job on top” are the main reasons. It 
depends on weak leadership. It has taken a long time to get through as the CAC 
has not been in leader focus. However, a side effect of bringing staff members 
closer to cooperation can be observed. 
 
The assessment of the case starts in the corporate culture. The CEO has a very 
strong focus on the consultant coverage rate. He is looking for actions in order to 
improve it. One thing is to increase cross-selling within the group. The companies 
shall support each other by telling about customer needs. The CEO decides about 
a Customer Account Concept. Coming to the implementation of the decision, the 
market situation has changed and is quite good with a high consultant coverage 
rate as an effect. The internal need of cross-selling has disappeared in the short 
run. It is well known in the consulting business that selling activities must be 
intense when you are on the positive side of the conjectural cycle. It takes many 
months from a first selling attempt to a customer decision. At that time, you have 
much to do and prioritize the immediate need of your customer. Therefore, a CAC 
launched under the stated market conditions is a leadership challenge. It will not 
be shown if the CAC is achieving the original goal or purpose until the market 
situation is harsher. So far, this case has not come.  
 
The focus on consultant coverage rate is demonstrated when launching a new 
concept “short take off 2005”. There is a risk in the short run that this cannibalizes 
on the CAC efforts and in the long run that it tires out staff members; the 
syndrome of “crying wolf” is evident.  
 
It is a strength in this case that five respondents have given opinions. Therefore 
the weight of the conclusion is put to M.  
 
  CC14. A decision with goal achievement at a unpredictable future point 
of time, but with a need of immediate implementation, meets resistance 
and down-prioritizing among the implementers challenging the executive 
leadership (M) 
 
6.3.2.8 Decision 2302 Phone cost reduction 
The decision scope: to benefit from a new phone cost group agreement with a 
supplier and to separate business and private mobile phone calls.  
 
The two-headed decision seems at first to be uncomplicated to implement. But 
the interviews give a picture with many subtleties. The decision is noted in the   
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minutes of meetings with details about applications, with the exception of Top 
Management fringe of private calls. There is also a follow-up some months later 
but after that it seems as if the TMT let the whole thing fade away. No follow up 
about whether the cost cut goal is achieved or whether the prefix, the first two 
digits to be dialed on the telephone to separate business and private conversations, 
is implemented. These are the two most important parts of the decision. 
 
If that had been done, the CEO and his TMT would have observed that the 
prefix had not been implemented. It is to be noted that one of the TMT members, 
Tson, has not implemented the prefix in his company. His staff member Yson says 
furthermore that the prefix was not mandatory, just a recommendation. It seems 
that the troublesome prefix case in this company is swept under the carpet, as the 
prefix decision was not wanted by staff members. A more positive interpretation is 
that the behavior is an effect of the switch in corporate culture from 
decentralization to cooperation. A third explanation may be that the holders of 
mobile telephones were neither involved in the decision making process, nor were 
the consequences of the prefix decision evaluated. 
 
The case must be divided into two parts: the supplier cost cut agreement and the 
prefix event. The former has been implemented in all companies but not evaluated. 
The later is still floating around. The CEO has not played a prominent role. In the 
short run it is still possible to turn the prefix event right but so far he has no 
information about the situation. In the long term there is a risk that the 
organizational obstruction to implement a TMT decision will influence the 
corporate culture; “remain seated in the boat until the wind has calmed”. 
Furthermore, the executive exception to pay for private calls is a risk of breaking 
down important elements of corporate culture such as openness and internal 
cooperation (see 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.4). 
  
  CC15. Even if a decision is detailed with evident tasks and 
responsibilities, the implementation may be insufficient if there are direct 
effects on the private economy of the subordinates, and if the follow-up 
does not work (W) 
 
6.3.2.9 Decision 2303 Group Q-system 
The decision scope: to harmonize several existing, quality systems (Q-systems) 
into a group joint Q-system. 
 
When I decided to study the decision I thought that the final decision was close 
at hand, so I could follow the implementation process. This was not the case. The 
definitive decision to implement a joint group Q-system is not yet made, more 
than a year after the first interviews. In spite of this, or perhaps due to this, there 
are observations of great interest so far. 
 
The case contains at least three problems to analyze. One is the need or desire to 
have a group uniform Q-system. This is not undisputable. The second is which Q-
system to choose: a new one which every company has to adapt to, or one of the 
company run Q-systems. There are different opinions. The third problem is if 
every company must have a Q-system, which is a question linked to the corporate   
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culture of balancing group cooperation and company business independence. Here 
the opinions differ as well. 
 
The TMT has chosen to involve all consultants in the decision making process. 
They obtained an opportunity to discuss and to announce their opinions at a sales 
conference. The opinions were non-concordant. Therefore, a vote was organized. 
A majority for a joint group Q-system was obtained. The first problem seems now 
to be well exposed.  
 
Another investigation is dealing with the question of which Q-system to choose. 
That will probably produce information to decide about the second problem. 
Neither the interviews, nor my own research, obtained an answer about 
information on the third problem, the compulsory or voluntary decision of a Q-
system on the whole when the interviews were carried out. A year later the picture 
is that there is a decision made about which Q-system to use. It is under 
implementation in just the parent company, which indicates that the need in the 
subsidiaries is still disputed. In all, not that much has happened during a year.  
 
It is possible to follow the process in terms of decision making. The CEO 
presented his idea of a joint group Q-system to the TMT. The TMT decided to 
introduce such a system. It is to be understood as a strategic decision based on a 
top management perspective of cost effectiveness, but without an understanding of 
the business-related needs in the subsidiaries. However, the strategic decision was 
completed with an operational decision to investigate “how to do”, and here the 
problems and obstacles occurred. A very optimistic time schedule (“next sale 
conference”) has been extended by more than one year and the original strategic 
decision is now in doubt, both with regard to “one system for everyone” and the 
subsidiary business needs. The partial implementation of a Q-system in the parent 
company looks like an emergency exit to keep TMT prestige unstained.  
 
The case shows how much trouble, and costs, a poorly prepared strategic 
decision causes; it is uncertain, 1½ years after the decision was made, if the 
decision will be implemented, at least in its original concept. 
 
  CC16. A poorly prepared strategic decision built on perceived false 
premises and touching the entire, differentiated businesses causes 
resistance among implementers with consequences such as high 
implementation costs and even a risk of non-implementation (W) 
 
6.3.2.10 Decision 2304 Human resource committee  
The decision scope: to establish a Human Resource Committee, HRC, with 
legitimacy as a discussion forum between the trade union members and the CEO.  
 
The decision is expected, demanded and desired in the organization even if this 
is not explicitly expressed. The starting point of the decision making process is 
disputable – the respondents have some differences in their pictures – but the 
representatives of staff members are co-workers when the design of HRC is 
created.  
 
The formal decision is made early by the TMT. Then it is more or less a case 
between the CEO and the representatives. During the implementation process, the   
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CEO gives up one standpoint, the MBL status of HRC. This is not a detail, it is a 
strategic question and he dares to give on this point. If HRC had obtained a formal 
status where the MBL could be carried out, the power would have been moved 
from the subsidiaries to the CEO and the HRC would have been representing, in 
certain situations, just trade union members (about 2/3 are members).  
 
The CEO plays a role as a pusher when establishing the HRC but the 
representatives design form and structure. Everybody is pleased with the role the 
HRC has taken. The case radiates harmony, “we did it together”. The 
establishment of the HRC is a part of creating a new corporate culture. It also 
contributes to the profile of the CEO and his leadership. It has definitely long term 
effects. 
 
  CC17. It is possible to make quite important changes in a decision during 
the implementation process if the decision is expected, demanded and 
desired by both the decision maker and implementers (decision target 
group), and the decision maker is involved in implementation; however, 
the changed decision causes a prolonged implementation period and 
therefore costs more than necessary, but gives an excellent goal 
satisfaction (W) 
 
6.3.2.11 Decision 2305 Accounting for working hours 
The decision scope: to implement a new system of accounting for consultant 
working hours on a weekly basis.  
 
The consultants demanded the decision. It builds on their ability to use the 
company IT system. They find that it is unnecessary to report once a week but this 
is another question. However, this decision tied them together, which forced some 
resistance during implementation. 
 
The IT system was completed with a new module building on the existing 
system. The consultants neither took part in the original decision making process, 
nor in the subsequent choice of module. No training was offered, just an order to 
fill in from a stated day. There have been small problems to implement the 
decision. Some consultants refrained from registering in the beginning due to their 
opinions about frequency. They were convinced by good management with focus 
on communication of the aim rather than forced to register weekly. Some critical 
opinions remain about the lack of continuous feed back from management. In all, 
decision maker and implementer agree about a successful decision 
implementation.  
 
  CC18. A simple, operational decision, demanded by the organization and 
touching just internal routines, is successfully implemented even if the 
employees are not involved in the decision making process (W)  
 
6.3.2.12 Decision 5401 New quality system 
The decision scope: to replace existing quality system with a new system  
 
There is just one interview around this case so it is not possible to make a 
serious conclusion.   
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The decision of changing Q system is customer-driven. Professional people in 
the organization prepared the decision. It is the same people that have to 
implement the decision. As the decision about changing is demanded it does not 
matter much, that another Q system was desired. The implementation is also 
smooth and easy as the decision is demanded. In total, everything seems to go very 
well. 
 
  CC19. If the implementers take part in the decision making process and 
the decision is demanded, the implementation goes smooth and easy even 
if the content of the decision is not exactly what was desired (-) 
 
6.3.2.13 Decision 5402 Outsourcing 
The decision scope: the original decision was to outsource manufacturing facilities 
but during implementation the decision was changed to a total re-structuring of the 
manufacturing process.  
 
The chairman of the trade union picked up the decision case as an example of 
“poor implementation”. This strategic decision case is however complicated in 
several dimensions containing many aspects of implementation complexity. It is 
not one decision but a set of decisions, partly contradictory. I have identified three 
decisions (“outsourcing people and equipments”, “manufacturing in China” and 
“re-structuring the production”).  
 
The trade unions in Sweden will support their colleagues abroad but have not 
yet established relations. They criticize the decision making process but they do 
not criticize the actual decision as such or the implementation. They are hung up 
on the procedure and their own role. 
 
The implementation situation is complex. The Swedish CEO, representing the 
new owners, has made a new decision to re-structure the production, which is 
another solution compared to first decision, outsourcing. The decision will be 
implemented in this newly acquired foreign company with its own corporate 
culture. A Swedish manager has replaced the local management. Finally, the local 
labor force market is hit by industrial shutdowns.  
 
The CEO shows strong leadership. He cancels the first decision and he replaces 
it with a new one. He acts with a long-term perspective and he designs an 
implementation plan, which will be implemented by a Swedish manager. The 
implementation seems to be successful even if the costs will be higher than 
planned and the time schedule delayed. It is easy to see the important role of the 
CEO in this complicated decision case.  
  
  CC20. In a complex context, a strategic decision containing another 
solution for solving the same problem needs a detailed implementation 
plan with top management engagement in the execution phase and 
frequent follow-up for successful implementation (W) 
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6.3.2.14 Decision 5403 Dismissing people 
The decision scope: to dismiss blue collar employees in the manufacturing 
department as an effect of a decrease in sales volume.  
 
There is only one interview around this case limiting the outcome of the 
analysis. The respondent has given his opinions in a down-up perspective.  
 
There are at least two main approaches in Swedish companies when dealing 
with overcapacity: early informal trade union contacts “to discuss the situation” or 
a decision, often with a tactical margin for haggling, presented to the trade union. 
Over time, the players on each side learn and know the rules of the game and they 
act from historical positions. This is a part of the corporate culture.  
 
In this case I have not been able to determine the historical positions. It looks 
like mostly as a decision with margin for haggling. But it also seems that it is a 
period of unrest, when the trade union chairman gives the CEO credits for his 
(unexpected?) action.  
 
However, the trade union has to negotiate around a decision of dismissing 
people. The chairman is irritated over insufficient basic data but he seems to be 
satisfied with the results in the short run. But the implementation was disturbed by 
market renewal increasing the manufacturing volumes quite soon. A 
reorganization of the production line was also carried out. It is difficult to judge if 
halving the number of people dismissed, increasing volumes and reorganization 
are three independent or (causal) dependent events. It seems as the action of the 
CEO over all has facilitated the handling of the situation. 
 
The trade union, at least, has learned a lot from the case. The chairman 
summarizes that in the future a careful examination of available information will 
take place from the beginning in order to make the right decision. He does not say 
anything about corporate costs but the implementation must have been 
unnecessarily expensive due to both severance pay and production disturbances.  
 
  CC21. An operational decision, which is modified/changed during 
implementation due to new circumstances, causes decreases in 
implementation process efficiency and results in long term effects on 
corporate culture (-) 
 
6.3.2.15 Decision 5404 Laser cutter 
The decision scope: to replace the laser cutter in the manufacturing department in 
order to improve productivity  
 
The chairman of the trade union picked up the decision case as an example of 
“good implementation”. Investment decisions are frequent in the factory. 
Therefore this decision is well recognized; all actors are playing on home ground. 
The decision is made after years of discussions. To some extent the decision is 
desired in the organization as it secures the future manufacturing in the Swedish 
factory. There have been doubts about that after acquiring the foreign company. 
On the other side, the new equipment needs fewer operators and changes the 
shifts. The decision is good for the future when balancing the pros and cons in a 
trade union perspective. This atmosphere mobilizes all persons involved to do   
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their best not only for a successful implementation but also for an efficient 
production line. The situation benefits from years of built up loyalty as a part of 
corporate culture. The designed plan for implementation is a well-known, often 
used tool in the factory environment. Even if there is a delay, you know where you 
are! But the delay is repeated from project to project according to the opinion of 
the implementer. That means that the organization does not learn from earlier 
experiences. 
 
The opinions about goal satisfaction are predictions as it is not possible to 
measure goal achievement until the laser cutter has been in action some months. 
Nevertheless, the predictions are on top as the laser technique already is used and 
the upgrading by the investment is well proven by other factories. 
 
  CC22. A decision, which the implementers recognize by its type and 
characteristics, is well implemented even if the implementers have not 
participated in the decision making process  (W) 
 
6.3.2.16 Decision 5405 Factory staff member reduction  
The decision scope: to reduce the over-sized employee force in the manufacturing 
department as a result of investment in new technology. 
  
This case is in total a very good example of decision implementation when a 
legal structure is managing. The decision makers and the implementers – both 
managers and representatives of the trade unions – are well aware of the rules of 
the game. When you follow them, the complications are easier to control. Putting 
in money makes it even easier; you buy a solution and loyalty. In this case all 
these ingredients are present. The chairman of the trade union has no objections 
about the decision making process. He shares the necessity of reducing the number 
of factory staff members. The most important thing is negotiation. The CEO, or 
his delegate, offers economic compensation to fired people. The negotiation 
quickly comes to an end agreement. The implementation also goes promptly. 
Everybody is satisfied: the management (no manufacturing disturbances and 
adjusted number of staff members), the chairmen of the trade unions (good 
negotiation results) and the dismissed employees (good economic compensation 
and some golden leisure years). 
 
In the short run, the successful implementation costs a bit but in the long run the 
corporate culture gets a contribution (“we take care of our staff members even if 
they have to go”). The CEO in person plays a decisive and important role of 
reaching this state of the art. His action strengthens his leadership profile. Future 
challenges will benefit thereof.  
 
The case contains at least two decision events. The first one is made by top 
management (“what to do”), the second is made in negotiations (“how to do”). 
The latter is a part of implementation. The avoidance of limiting details in the first 
decision makes it possible to negotiate actions in the implementation phase.  
 
  The decision has one outspoken goal, to reduce staff numbers. It cannot be 
excluded that the CEO has a hidden goal of buying long term loyality and trust of 
the subordinates by economic compensation in a tough situation. 
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  CC23. A decision with a target group of subordinates achieves rapid goal 
satisfaction by putting more resources than strictly necessary into the 
implementation process (=lower efficiency), which in the long term may 
facilitate the implementation of a repetitive decision (W) 
 
6.3.2.17 Decision 5406 Painting investment 
The decision scope: to install new painting equipment in order to better meet 
customer quality requirements.  
 
The chairman of the trade union selected the decision as an example of 
successful implementation. His opinions are the only ones.  
 
Originally, the case was a customer problem. A worker welfare problem was 
added. The Production Manager, acting on behalf of the CEO, took care of the 
multi-sized problem and he engaged key people in different departments in the 
decision making process. The team found a solution solving the problems. The 
decision data and solution were well anchored among affected people. The 
investment plan was presented to the CEO. When the formal decision was made 
by the Board of Directors it was just a confirmation.  
 
Investment in a production line is a well-known activity in the factory. An 
implementation plan was designed. The implementation was a simple task when 
key people had been engaged from the beginning and the decision/solution was 
desired. 
 
 Goals (improved quality and better worker welfare) were achieved and 
implementation process followed the plans. This was a successful case.  
 
  CC24. When a decision is prepared by the implementers and it is a 
confirmation of what they desire, the probability of both full goal 
satisfaction and excellent implementation process efficiency is high (-) 
 
6.3.2.18 Decision 5407 Product development 
The decision scope: to develop a modified product aimed for a specific customer.  
 
In this case, too, just one respondent is interviewed. The case follows a 
completely normal schedule according to the internal rules and guidelines of a 
development project. A decision is made to start the project, it is running normally 
but in a late phase the CEO unexpectedly enters the arena. He decides to launch 
the new product even if it is not finished according to professional standards. The 
reason is a customer request. The CEO is ready to do business and he takes the 
risk of launching a product not tested. He breaks through, not only routines and 
culture, but also professional codes. Everything goes well. The CEO decision 
gives net revenues and margins but his action plants a long term internal risk that 
standards and routines may be abandoned with an urgent order. Managers at a 
lower level may make a similar decision with reference to the CEO decision. What 
happens if things go wrong then? Now there is another CEO in charge and the 
implementer means that it would not happen today! So, old events are forgotten. 
The case illustrates the long term aspects of situational action. It has an impact on   
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corporate culture but so has the change of the CEO, too. Therefore, it will only be 
speculations about the future.  
 
The case raises the question of the definition of implementation. Is 
implementation in this case the development process or the launching of the 
developed product? It is an entwining of decision and implementation a couple of 
times (decision to start development > process of development the product, 
decision to launch the product > selling process). The answer in this special case is 
that it is one case, at least according to the opinion of the implementer. My 
analysis has therefore had the same scope. In future studies it makes sense to 
carefully demarcate the scope of decision and its implementation.  
 
  CC25. A top management intervention in an on-going implementation 
process can sharpen the implementation efficiency in the actual case but 
the long term effects on other implementation processes are difficult to 
predict (-) 
 
6.3.2.19 Summing up the analysis of individual decisions 
Firstly, how do the verbal statements and the scores of the respondents 
correspond? A method to compare these is to transform the verbal statements into 
scores (see, e.g., Bryson & Bromiley, 1993); normally, the transformation is done 
by outsiders. However, I have done it myself, with a risk of bias, as I have 
information from the interviews also about body language and intonation. The 
transformations were done at the beginning of the analysis work and before 
analyzing the individual decisions. Therefore I was not updated about the 
respondent scoring.  
 
I have focused on implementation efficiency as it has such a central place in the 
model. The scale 0-6 (see 4.2.2.1) has been used. I have interpreted and 
transformed the verbal statements into scores on this scale, where completely 
different is 0 and completely similar is 6. Only integers have been used. Next step 
is to compare pair-wise the scores of the respondent and my scoring, creating a 
calculated absolute value. An absolute deviation of ≥ 2 defines a notable 
difference; the chosen pivot point reflects considerations of scoring exactness. To 
check the effects, an alternative pivot point of ≥ 1 is also tested. The results are 
shown in table 23. At level ≥ 2 the correspondence is quite good and level ≥ 1 is 
not alarming. There is a tendency of better correspondence for process efficiency 
than for goal satisfaction. I summarize that there is an acceptable correspondence 
between verbal statements and scoring. 
 
Table 23. Distribution of absolute deviations between the scores of the respondents and the 
scores judged by the author when examining the verbal comments of the respondents (37 
observations; GS=Goal Satisfaction, PE= Process Efficiency)  
 
GS PE
>1 27% 16%
>2 11% 3%
Cases
Absolute 
deviations
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Secondly, is the purpose of the analysis, to find relations between 
implementation efficiency and the explanatory variables, achieved? I find the 
answer to be “quite well”, even if many of the conclusions perhaps can be deemed 
as trivial. They may be finally evaluated when they are put together with other 
analysis results in Chapter 7. 
 
A general observation is that the conclusions are linked to situational conditions. 
Just a few common characteristics have been found at this stage of analysis. It is 
an effect of the qualitative method where each single case just represents itself. It 
is also an indication that the studied decisions are covering many situations 
occurring in business life. 
  
Another general observation is that an apparently “individual decision” is just 
the first step in a trend of events. The decision is in most cases selected from the 
minutes of TMT meeting and picked up for the study. According to selection 
criteria (see 4.2.1), the decision is reasonably defined. During the interviews a 
more complicated picture evolves. Things happen when time goes by. The initial 
decision may be followed by new TMT decisions or signals, which compared to 
the original decision, may be consistent and explanatory or changing and 
confusing. In the latter situation the implementer feels indistinctness and 
frustration. But they may also look upon the sub-decisions as a manifestation of 
indecisiveness of the TMT and understand the sub-decisions as contradictory, 
wasted resources, etc. These situations seem to arise for two reasons: the necessity 
to adjust the decision due to changed context for the actual decision (planned 
action) and unforeseen consequences for the actual decision of other decisions 
made or similar events (unplanned action). Decision 1331 Customer relation and 
2304 Human resource committee are examples of planned action and decision 
1304 Market extension and 2303 Group Q-system of unplanned action (see 
comments to these decisions above).  
  
These circumstances raise questions about research approaches as well as 
method implications (i.e., Which decision(s) do the respondent really mean when 
estimating the implementation efficiency?). Both reflections are discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
 
A third general observation is that a decision and its implementation cannot be 
seen as an isolated event. The cases contain both observations of the advantages of 
an existing implementation culture and elements of building up or destroying an 
implementation culture: “How we act in this case means something for the future”. 
Furthermore, putting more resources in the implementation process than necessary 
in the short term (the case) can be a strategy for future implementation efficiency, 
e.g., an investment in competence and routines. 
 
These reflections have multiplicity and complexity in common. These factors 
make it difficult to relate specific explanations to the degree of the implementation 
efficiency. However, they are combined with other findings in the final discussion 
in Chapter 7. 
 
  CC26. A decision and its implementation is often a story of complexity 
and multiplicity in a retrospective examination where the conditions and 
the results are situational (M)    
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6.3.3 Analysis of implementation of decisions in a corporate culture 
perspective 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate if corporate culture as such has any 
influence on the implementation efficiency of decisions. The approach is two-
headed, partly to examine the group of decisions in their respective corporate 
culture, partly to identify specific elements of corporate culture, consistent with 
the three companies studied. The corporate culture is described in 6.3.1.2. 
 
6.3.3.1 Does corporate culture matter regarding implementation efficiency? 
As concluded in the comments connected to table 21, the mega corporate culture is 
strongest in company A and weakest in company B with company C in between. It 
is the mega corporate culture which is used here as the mirror in which the 
decisions and their implementation efficiency are reflected. 
 
Company A 
Decision 1304 Market extension (see C.2.7 and 6.3.2.1), which is a set of 
decisions over time with changing content, is “saved” by corporate culture in an 
implementation perspective. The outcome is sufficient in terms of goal satisfaction 
but the process efficiency is low. It seems that corporate culture also plays a role 
in decision 1308 Balanced Score Card (see C.2.8 and 6.3.2.2). The initial 
implementation situation, a task considered as an order and bad communication, is 
turned into a fulfillment of the task even if the implementation costs more than 
necessary. Decision 1310 Home PC for staff members (see C.2.9 and 6.3.2.3) has 
low implementation efficiency and it is not to any extent dependent on corporate 
culture. Finally, the implementation of decision 1313 Reports from Managing 
Directors (see C.2.10 and 6.3.2.4) plays on all corporate culture assets. The initial 
decision is developed in a dialogue between the CEO and the Managing Directors 
into subsidiary situational actions giving a sufficient goal satisfaction with regard 
to the initial decision.  
 
In company A, the corporate culture in three cases of four seems to have been 
important for implementation efficiency even if it has been low. However, the 
alternative is even worse: the decisions may not have been implemented at all. 
Would the decisions then have been made in the same way if the corporate culture 
had been of another kind? It is just a speculation.  
 
Company B 
In decision 2301 Customer Account (see C.4.7 and 6.3.2.7) corporate culture does 
not play any important role as the decision is desired by the implementers. 
Mediocre implementation efficiency has other reasons. The changing corporate 
culture – from subsidiary independence into cooperation – seems on the other 
hand to explain the turbulence in the implementation of decision 2302 Phone cost 
reduction (see C.4.8 and 6.3.2.8), causing low implementation efficiency. In 
decision 2303 Group Q-system (see C.4.9 and 6.3.2.9) it is possible to imagine 
that corporate culture under change urges a careful executive action both in the 
decision making process and the up-coming implementation, giving a desired 
implementation efficiency. Decision 2304 Human resource committee, HRC (see 
C.4.10 and 6.3.2.10) and the implementation thereof are building stones in the   
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new, changed corporate culture as the whole case is a mutual project of the CEO 
and union leaders; the implementation efficiency is very good. Finally, decision 
2305 Accounting for working hours (see C.4.11 and 6.3.2.11) does not seem 
touched by corporate culture. 
 
In company B the corporate culture in three cases of five shows influence on 
implementation efficiency. In one case the corporate culture has been a disturbing 
factor, in two cases it has been an element taken into account when acting.  
 
Company C 
Implementation of decision 5401 New quality system (see C.5.7 and 6.3.2.12) is 
not affected by corporate culture. In decision 5402 Outsourcing (see C.5.8 and 
6.3.2.13) the leadership role as a part of corporate culture is important for good 
implementation efficiency. The four decisions 5403-6 (see C.5.9-12 and 6.3.2.14-
17) all benefit from existing corporate culture, certainly the element “we strictly 
follow the rules”, for successful implementation but also putting new experiences 
from the cases into corporate culture, a learning organization. The decision 5407 
Product development (see C.5.13 and 6.3.2.18) shows the opposite: a perceived 
break against established routines causes uncertainty about the corporate culture 
even if the implementation efficiency is OK.  
 
In company C, it is possible to trace effects of corporate culture on 
implementation efficiency in six of seven cases. In five cases the corporate culture 
has contributed positively to the implementation efficiency. 
 
The findings in the three companies are the basis for the reflection that the 
implementation efficiency of a decision is positively influenced if the decision and 
its implementation are built on existing mega corporate culture. Observations are 
also made that some decisions are not influenced at all by corporate culture and 
others are contributing to the future corporate culture by the manner they are 
carried out. A final observation is that the scope and corporate penetration of the 
mega corporate culture itself (see table 21) does not matter much; it is the 
situational behavior of both the decision maker and the implementer that is 
important.  
 
Let us also have a look at the two roles, decision maker and implementer, in a 
corporate culture and implementation efficiency perspective. The database is too 
small to permit an analysis including company level. For all three companies, it is 
not possible to find a correlation between corporate culture and goal 
satisfaction/process efficiency for neither the decision makers nor the 
implementers. They seem to estimate the implementation efficiency (GS and PE) 
situationally and independently of their estimations of corporate culture.  
 
  CC27. An implementation of a decision built on the specific mega 
corporate culture (leadership style, corporate culture, corporate profile) 
improves the implementation efficiency in some but not all decision 
cases; the significance of the mega corporate culture lies in the existence 
(scope and penetration) sooner than in its content (M)    
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  CC28. Both decision makers and implementers estimate the 
implementation efficiency (GS and PE) situationally and independently 
of their estimations of corporate culture (M) 
 
6.3.3.2 Are there specific elements of corporate culture affecting implementation 
efficiency? 
I have been able to identify just one individual and common element of the three 
corporate cultures studied, leadership, when analyzing the interviews. And it is not 
a specific leadership style but the performance of the CEO in actual situations. If 
the CEO is acting in line with his perceived and expected style (from the 
perspective of implementers) and if he shows engagement and staying power, the 
decision is well implemented even if there are hesitations and resistance among 
implementers; this is a situational leadership.  
 
  CC29. A situational leadership characterized by engagement and staying 
power overcomes hesitations and resistance among implementers and 
therefore it increases the implementation efficiency (W) 
 
6.3.4 Analysis of decisions in an organizational perspective 
The purpose of this approach is to find similarities and differences between the 
opinions of decision makers and implementers in their estimations of variables in 
the preliminary implementation model. The relations in the model are analyzed in 
6.3.6 and 6.3.7. 
 
During the interviews the respondent did not get an opportunity to score his/her 
participation in the decision making process – it was a mistake from my side due 
to insufficient foresight. I have tried to repair this mistake as much as possible by 
translating the verbal communications into scores on the scale 0-6. It must be 
noted that this scoring is not immediately comparable with the scoring of the 
respondents on other variables. However, there is much information from the 
interviews, which makes it possible to estimate. In many cases it is just a question 
of if they participated or not, Yes or No. 
  
In the following, the analysis focus is set on average figures when presenting the 
results. The pictures do not change if medians are used instead of averages. The 
variance is not presented but a comment is done in the text if there are remarkable 
differences between the two groups. No t-tests are carried out, as the number of 
cases is too small. 
 
6.3.4.1 Participation of implementers in decision making process  
Let us first have a look at the two main groups of respondents, decision makers 
and implementers. Their scores on implementation model variables are shown in 
table 24. There are no systematic or evident differences between the two groups.  
 
The analysis has continued by combining the scores of participation in the 
decision making process and the scores of the respondents on model variables (see 
table 25). The approach makes it possible to divide implementers in two groups 
according to their participation in decision making process. I have chosen the   
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pivot point to be 2: below 2, the participation is almost absent but above they have 
at least got some information about what is going on. 11 of 13 implementer cases 
(NB! one implementer may have been interviewed about more than one decision) 
in row IMP -2 did not participate at all (=0). In row IMP 2- the implementer cases 
cover the scale from 2 to 6. 
 
Table 24. The average scores of model variables estimated by decision makers (DM) and 
implementers (IMP) 
 
DM 12 3.4 4.5 4.3 3.0
IMP 26 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.5
Numb Position
Proc 
Efficien
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
 
As seen in table 25, differences related to participation in the decision making 
process are revealed. If the implementers have participated in the decision making 
process (IMP 2-), they have over all much higher scores than the implementers, 
which did not participate. They find the implementation context less complex and 
the implementation profile more clear which led to better goal satisfaction and 
higher process efficiency. They were very close to the decision makers in their 
estimations and had an even higher score of process efficiency.  
 
Table 25. Positional average scores of model variables (decision makers, DM, 
implementers, IMP, and Trade Union Representatives, TUR) 
 
DM 12 5.9 3.4 4.5 4.3 3.0
IMP -2 13 0.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0
IMP 2- 13 4.0 4.6 4.9 4.4 4.1
TUR 11 3.1 5.1 5.5 4.5 4.6
Numb
Particip 
in DMP
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien
Position
 
A third approach is the trade union dimension. Among the 26 implementer 
cases, 11 have a position as trade union representative (TUR), but just two of them 
have not participated in the decision making process. Therefore it is not possible 
to divide them into two groups. However, seen as a group they connect well to the 
IMP 2- group, which is not surprising as they too have participated in the decision 
making process to a substantial degree (3.1 versus 4.0).  
 
The analyses of the implementer perspective detect that participation in the 
decision making process matters in terms of implementation efficiency according 
to their own estimations. As we have seen in table 24, there is no difference 
between the two groups of decision makers and implementers regarding 
implementation model variables; such a difference detects only if the implementer 
group is categorized by the participation in the decision making process (see table 
25). How do decision makers estimate model variables when the implementers 
have participated in decision making or not? Firstly, cases with both decision 
maker and implementer respondents were identified. These cases have been 
categorized by the participation of implementer respondent in the decision making 
process using the same pivot point as earlier (that is score 2, YES/NO). Thereafter 
the averages of the scores of decision makers and implementers are calculated for   
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the model variables. The results are shown in table 26. There are few cases in each 
group giving a risk of case effects. There is a high consistency in the table both 
regarding variables and groups. Going back to the underlying cases it is not 
possible to find a potential explanation based on type of decision, decision 
complexity, company, etc. A reasonable explanation so far may be that 
participation of implementers in the decision making process gives higher 
implementation efficiency according to both the opinions of executives and the 
implementers. They also agree in their low scoring on other variables. All 
together, it seems as if there is a consensus between decision makers and 
implementers about the positive effects of the implementers´ participation in the 
decision making process regarding conditions (implementation context and 
implementation profile) as well as goal satisfaction and process efficiency. As the 
number of cases is limited, the conclusion must be handled with prudence. 
 
Table 26. The average scores of model variables given by decision makers (DM) and 
implementers (IMP) in cases where the implementers have or have not participated in the 
decision making process (DMP) 
 
DM 65 . 83 . 85 . 25 . 23
IMP 83 . 34 . 65 . 15 . 24
DM 56 . 02 . 33 . 43 . 01
IMP 60 . 23 . 22 . 82 . 73
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien Numb
Particip 
in DMP
YES
NO
IMP part 
of DMP
Posi 
tion
 
The verbal communications do not explain similarities and differences shown by 
the scoring, but I find that the tone and the expressed opinions support the 
numerical evaluations.  
 
  CC30. The participation of implementers in the decision making process, 
even if just to a limited extent, improves the implementation efficiency 
according to the estimations of both decision makers and implementers 
(W)  
 
6.3.4.2 Concordance of goal satisfaction opinions between decision makers and 
implementers  
A decision is made to change something and often the new state is expressed as a 
goal (or an aim, a purpose, etc., see discussion in 3.3). It is therefore a challenge to 
achieve the goal. In this study the actors estimate goal satisfaction: do the decision 
makers and the implementers agree in their estimations? This is the question to 
answer here.  
 
 The analysis starts with a pair-wise (decision maker and implementer) 
comparison of scores on goal satisfaction for each relevant decision. The absolute 
difference (≥ 2 scores) have been calculated, giving two groups, concordance 
exists (YES) or not (NO) (see table 27). The same type of calculation has been 
made for the other variables except for leadership style where complete 
concordance has been the condition. There are some missing values and therefore 
the added numbers on variable level are not always equal to goal satisfaction 
number level.   
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In two thirds of the cases, decision makers and implementers agree about goal 
satisfaction. When doing so there is a huge concordance in other model variables 
except leadership style where the opposite situation occurs. If the decision makers 
and the implementers do not agree about goal satisfaction, the opinions about the 
variables are very scattered. There is possibly a tendency to concordance 
(NO>NO). Over all, the decision makers and the implementers are more often 
concordant than divided in their opinions, with leadership style as the pronounced 
exception; a possible explanation may be that the decision makers estimate their 
intended style and the implementer estimate their performance.  
 
Are there any different characteristics of decisions in the groups YES and NO? 
There is no decision from Company A, with the strongest corporate culture (see 
6.3.1.4) in NO-group of goal satisfaction. The Company A decisions occur in all 
YES/YES-groups with one exception. Otherwise it is not possible to find 
differences. 
 
Table 27. Goal satisfaction concordances (NO if the difference in scoring ≥ 2 scores) 
between decision makers and implementers and its relation to other model variables (the 
difference pivot point is NO ≥ 2 scores)  
 
YES NO YES NO
Process efficiency 1 0 324
Implementation context 1 1 123
Implementation profile 1 1 114
Corporate culture 1 1 242
Leadership style 21 01 5
Goal Satisfaction
YES  13 cases NO  6 cases
Model variables
 
  CC31. Decision makers and implementers are essentially concordant in 
their estimations of goal satisfaction as well as other model variables 
except leadership style (W) 
  CC32. A strong corporate culture forces a high number of concordant 
opinions between decision makers and implementers of all model 
variables except leadership style (-)   
 
6.3.4.3 Analysis of implementer action when implementation mission is given 
What is happening when an implementation mission is received? The question is 
discussed as a black box in 2.4 and also in 3.3, where it is stated that we do not 
know much. This analysis is trying to find elements in respondent answers in 
order to build up a picture of a potential process.  
 
As discussed in 2.4, the implementation process may be seen as a challenge of 
change. Robbins & Coulter (1999) define change as “an alteration in people, 
structure or technology” (p. 380). But Change Management has a definitive 
character of top-down approach problemized in terms of resistance according to 
Robbins & Coulter (1999). Given the aim to understand what is happening when 
the mission is received, it seems more fruitful to keep a strict down-up 
perspective. The analysis starting point is thus to approach the implementer 
situation as a decision making case: how will I solve the mission?    
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An analysis tool to use is the decision making model presented by Lunneryd 
(2003, table 1, p. 11) but simplified to three step phases labeled evaluation 
(=”problem detection and problem definition”), planning (=”analysis and choice”) 
and acting (=”implementation”). The analysis is demarcated to only taking into 
account answers of the implementers as they have inside information about how 
they behaved while getting the mission. Starting with evaluation, there are many 
testimonies,  e.g., “I understood the task as to identify market segments and 
customers …” (1304), “What is the purpose?” (1308), “I do not like the 
distribution of the decision.” (1333), “It was just an order” (2305) and “Also in 
this aspect a routine case” (5407). Activity planning also gets many confirmations 
as “The implementation task was divided between …” (2302), “There is a project 
plan …” (5402) and “There is a clear plan …” (5404).   Acting has, with very few 
exceptions, been carried out and documented in the interviews. At the latest, the 
documentation was completed when scoring the process efficiency.  
 
So, the interviews indicate that the implementer has a moment of evaluation 
when the implementation mission is received: “what does this task mean for me?” 
What are the reasons when no evaluation is detected? One reason may be that it is 
perceived as an order: “DO IT!” Another reason may be that the mission includes 
a plan, more or less detailed: there is nothing to evaluate. However, if no 
evaluation is made and no plan is attached, acting starts directly with a risk of 
“ready, fire, aim”. This situation can be observed in decision 2305. 
 
The issue of an implementation plan is worth some more comments. A formal, 
written plan has been available in just a few cases. Decision cases, which may be 
judged as strategic, important and/or of large scope, are not always associated with 
implementation plans for the mission to implement. As there are so few cases with 
a formal implementation plan, it is not possible to analyze if the presence versus 
absence of a plan has any influence on implementation efficiency.  
 
In 6.3.5.1, a categorization of decisions as demanded and recognized is made in 
an implementer perspective. These labels tell themselves that the implementer has 
conducted a form of evaluation. As it has been possible to classify all decisions as 
demanded and recognized, there is an indication that the implementers have done 
an evaluation of the implementation mission. Even if there are no directly 
outspoken ideas, it is very likely that the experiences from earlier implementations 
are used to design a more or less conscious plan.  
 
In summary, it is possible to find support in my field data that an evaluation 
activity takes place when the implementer gets the mission. In some cases it is also 
possible to find traces of planning, certainly when the decision maker has not 
given a plan tied up with the implementation mission. The acting step has been 
taken in almost all decision cases (see 6.3.5.11). The analysis cannot detect, 
however, if acting is a consequence of evaluation and planning or of any other 
reasons such as decision maker power or corporate culture. At last, most 
observations are situational and it is not possible to bear out a repeated stepwise 
implementation process, but there are indications of such steps. 
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  CC33. The implementer evaluates regularily the implementation mission 
and sometimes does informal or formal planning, which is certainly the 
case if the decision is demanded or recognized (W) 
  CC34.   The implementer behavior seems to be situational in terms of 
evaluation, planning and acting without any stepwise process detected 
(M) 
 
6.3.4.4 Analysis of how to measure implementation efficiency  
The dependent variable in the preliminary implementation model, implementation 
efficiency, consists of goal satisfaction and process efficiency (see 3.3). Their 
relationship is illustrated in table 28 and figure 10.  
  
Table 28. The distribution of differences in estimations of goal satisfaction (GS) and 
process efficiency (PE) for decision makers (DM) and implementers (IMP)  
 
2.0 - 1.0 - 1.9 -0.9 - 0.9 -1.0 - -1.9 -2.0 - SUM
DM 53400
IMP 54862
Number of cases with differences between GS and PE
 
The database contains 37 pairs of estimations. The correlation is 0.64. The 37 
pairs may be separated into estimations of decision makers and implementers, as 
done in table 28. Over all, the decision makers estimate goal satisfaction to be 
equal to, or in most cases better than, process efficiency while the implementers 
seem to have a more complex picture where any of the two variables may be 
scored higher than the other. However, the difference in r is small (DM r=0.74 and 
IMP r=0.66). In 10 cases (DM = 4 and IMP = 6), the respondent has scored 
equally for GS and PE. 
 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
GS
PE
 
Figure 10. The relation between the case-wise estimations of goal satisfaction (GS) and 
process efficiency (PE). (NB! Some dots represent more than one observation!) 
 
It seems reasonable to say that the respondents have estimated GS and PE 
separately from their different bases. The difference between decision makers and 
implementers regarding the relation goal satisfaction versus process efficiency is 
interesting (see table 28); there are no cases among the decision makers where 
process efficiency is scored higher than goal satisfaction but among implementers   
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the distribution of positive/negative differences of GS/PE is balanced. It is not 
possible to find relations between these differences and the estimations of 
implementation context and implementation profile. Perhaps the decision makers 
underestimate the need for implementation resources and therefore score low on 
process efficiency?  
 
It is possible to calculate an artificial implementation efficiency index for the 
companies in Step II using the scores given. First, an average is calculated for goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency, for each decision. The calculated figure is 
transformed into an index by relating to the scale maximum 6, e.g., if the 
calculated figure is 3.6 the index is 60. The individual case indices may then be 
calculated as an average in company and respondent dimensions. The results are 
presented in table 29 where the CEO estimation in Step I are included. The results 
are not immediately comparable as the CEOs in the companies A, B and C have 
estimated the company implementation efficiency in an over all judgment 
including both goal satisfaction and process efficiency in Step I (see 5.1.3); the 
methods to get the indices differ. Taking into account that the Step II indices 
represent a non-randomized sample of decisions, the impression that there are 
potential improvements in implementation efficiency is reinforced. The variations 
between steps, companies and respondents are limited but without evident 
structure. However, an observed improvement of the index for company B 
between Step I and II can be evaluated as an effect of changing top management 
and a company turn around taking place when the interviews were carried out.  
 
Table 29. Comparison between implementation efficiency index estimations for companies 
A, B and C in Step I and II (decision makers, DM, and implementers, IMP) 
 
Step I
CEO DM+IMP DM IMP 
A 57 59 52 63
B 50 58 67 54
C 62 68 69 68
a) Estimations in Step II of individual decisions
Implementation efficiency index
Company
Step II a)
 
  CC35. Goal satisfaction and process efficiency are estimated 
independently of each other (-) 
 
6.3.4.5 Summing up comments on organizational perspective 
The purpose of this analysis is well achieved: I have found similarities in opinion 
between decision makers and implementers regarding the effect on the 
implementation efficiency of participation in the decision making process. I have 
also observed that a concordance between decision makers and implementers 
about goal satisfaction corresponds to the same concordance regarding the other 
implementation model variables. This is not the case if there is a non-concordance 
in goal satisfaction.  
 
At last, there is probably an implementer evaluation of the implementation 
mission regularly leading to any form of planning, but the action cannot be tied up 
directly to these two initial steps.    
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6.3.5 Analysis of categorized decisions  
The purpose of this approach is to find similarities and differences between the 
opinions of decision makers and implementers in their estimations of variables in a 
preliminary implementation model when categorizing the decisions. The causal 
relations in the model are analyzed in 6.3.6 and 6.3.7. 
 
The categorization of decisions is done by me (see 6.3.5.1). The categorized 
decision analysis is then concentrated on the variables scored by the respondents. 
It means that the variable “participating in decision making process”, DMP, is 
excluded as it is estimated by me. The analysis keeps an absolute respondent 
perspective and it is consequently presented in the dimension of decision maker 
and implementer. The statistical presentation is focused on calculated averages.  
 
The decision transmission event, the decision purpose and the non-implemented 
decision are three specific aspects of decision implementation. They are also 
discussed in the chapter but in another way than the others. The purpose of the 
analysis of these decisions is to detect contextual conditions leading to different 
implementer behavior and consequences for implementation efficiency.  
 
6.3.5.1 Categorization of the decisions 
The categorization of the decisions has been made in a couple of dimensions. 
First, the company category is given by the collected information itself. A 
qualitative estimation has been made for the two categories Type and Target group 
and a quantitative scale 0-6 is used for the other three categories, the same scale as 
earlier has been used (see 6.3.4). A summary of the categorization is presented in 
table 30.  
 
In which dimensions is it meaningful to categorize the decisions? The main 
inspiration has been the literature review. The selected categories are discussed in 
different papers but not all together in a single publication. However, they have 
had some degree of importance somewhere. Unique and repetitive decisions 
(definition, see Appendix A) are discussed in the literature as a category (see, e.g., 
Lunneryd, 2003). The distinction between unique and repetitive decisions is 
difficult to apply to the data. From the minutes of interviews a picture has evolved 
with the elements of decisions demanded and/or recognized as typical or “seen 
before”. The categories Demanded and Recognized therefore were easier to apply 
and they were selected instead of unique/repetitive. They also have a definite 
implementation perspective. As the follow-up plans in some papers indicate an 
importance for implementation success a category Follow-up was selected. 
Finally, a Scope category was chosen as the selection criterion of decisions to 
study was not beforehand decided and scope in any meaning may be postulated as 
important for implementation success. It is to be noted that scope is a measurement 
of the decision extent but implementation profile and context are estimations of 
implementation circumstances. 
 
How to conduct the categorization? My starting point is to apply a selected 
definition to each category. The attempt to make an “objective” approach means 
that the information from different respondents in a specific case is balanced, even   
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if to some extent contradictory, into a categorization based on the selected 
definition. The results are found in table 30. 
 
Type of decision has been categorized according to the definitions in Appendix 
A. Regarding Target group it has been a question to extract the main stakeholders 
affected by the decision. Sometimes there are also other groups affected by the 
actual decision but the focus is on the main target group.  
 
The implementers said explicitly in many interviews that the decision was 
desired or demanded, in others it was implicitly expressed. Therefore the 
information is quite complete and the categorization is based upon the opinions of 
the implementers. The degree of demand is estimated by a transformation of the 
verbal expressions into scores using scale steps from “not demanded at all” (0) to 
“highly demanded” (6). 
 
Table 30. Decision categorization (.. marks that categorization has not been possible due to 
lack of information)  
 
ID Title
Com-
pany Type
Target 
Group
De-
mand
Regog-
nition
Follow 
up Scope
1304 Market extension S Cust 1 0 5 4
1308 Balanced Score Card O Mgm 0 3 4 3
1310 Home PC for staff members O SM 5 6 1 5
1313 Reports from Managing Dir O Mgm 0 3 4 4
1331 Customer relation O Cust 4 3 5 3
1333 Save money O Mgm 0 4 .. 1
2301 Customer Account S Cust 3 1 5 6
2302:1 Phone cost cut (company) O Mgm 5 5 2 1
2302:2 Phone cost cut (private) O SM 0 4 0 2
2303 Group Q system S Cust 3 .. .. 4
2304 Human resource committee O Mgm 6 3 6 1
2305 Accounting of working hours O Mgm 6 4 6 3
5401 New quality system S Cust 5 2 .. 3
5402 Outsourcing S M 0 2 5 4
5403 Dismissing people O SM 0 6 6 5
5404 Laser cutter O M 4 5 6 3
5405 Factory staff member reduct O SM 0 5 6 4
5406 Painting investment O M 4 5 6 2
5407:1 Product development, phase  O Cust 4 6 6 1
5407:2 Product development, phase  O Cust 0 0 6 1
Abbreviations
Type: Strategic, Operational
Target group: Customer, Management (tools for use), 
                    Staff Members (as individuals), Manufacturing
A sub
B
C
Decision categorization Decision identification
A
 
The implementers expressed themselves sometimes as “we have seen something 
similar before” or “the decision was quite a new challenge” and many other 
statements between these two poles. So the decisions to implement were more or   
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less recognized and the information was sufficiently complete in all decisions 
except one. The estimation of recognition followed the scale procedure from 
“totally unrecognized” (0) to “very well recognized” (6). It must be emphasized 
that “recognition” says nothing if the experiences from history are positive or 
negative. Given a specific decision case, two implementers recognize the decision 
but their experience may be positive or negative. My estimation does not take this 
into account, as there is no direct information making sense of such a judgment. 
The demand and recognition estimation described is done exclusively from the 
perspective of the implementers using their expressed opinions.  
 
The following categorizations have taken all opinions of the respondents into 
account. Regarding the follow-up situation, the scale procedure is from “no 
follow-up” (0), “follow-up planned or partly done” (1-3) to “going on or 
completed” (4-6). I have tried to estimate how far the implementation has gone. 
When the implementation is not finished, the predictions have been used. There 
have been no problems in terms of different opinions about the existence of the 
follow-up plans between decision makers and implementers.  
 
The scope of decision is influenced by complexity in a general meaning but also 
the impact on business and employees. The complexity and the potential impacts 
have both a qualitative and quantitative dimension. All these aspects have been 
taken into account when I have estimated the scope of the individual decision on 
the scale 0-6, where 1 is a very small scope (0 is not used) and 6 is very large, 
principally changing basic elements in the actual business or touching almost 
every subordinate. This is an attempt to measure the decision complexity and its 
potential impacts on organization. The attempt is completing the respondents’ 
estimation of implementation context and implementation profile as they 
subjectively perceived the decision implementation mission (see 4.2.2.3). The two 
approaches are interrelated but are not the same.  
  
The estimations have weaknesses. My estimations are an over all calculation of 
all available information. There are differences in information scope on the 
respondent level as the interviews turned in different directions with different 
focus. Another weakness is the transformation of verbal expressions into scores. A 
respondent score had been more adequate. On the other hand, a strict average 
calculation of these scores does not take into account the different insights of the 
respondents.  
 
6.3.5.2 Analysis of decisions in a company dimension 
The decision makers in Company B systematically score higher than implementers 
on all implementation model variables, contrary to company A and C as shown in 
table 31 (Asub is cancelled due to limited number of cases). Company B has a 
corporate culture in change (see 6.3.1.2), and the lowest score of mega corporate 
culture (see 6.3.1.4). A speculative understanding of the results is that the top 
management over all is more positive than the staff members in a situation like 
company B; “everything is going the right way”.  
 
The decision makers estimate goal satisfaction to be higher than process 
efficiency, which has been observed earlier on an aggregated level (see, e.g.,   
  129
tables 24 and 26). The consistency for companies with different cultures may lead 
to a potential conclusion of an existing “CEO syndrome”: “we achieved the goals 
but it cost too much”. It is an unsurprising executive standpoint since the focus in 
business is normally on cost efficiency. 
 
Company C has the highest artificial implementation efficiency, art IE, index. 
There are only two cases in the decision maker group so it is the sum (DM+IMP) 
that matters. Implementation context and, even more, implementation profile are 
scored high and superior compared to companies A and B, which have lower art 
IE indices. It seems that this is an evident relation, and probably a causality, 
between implementation conditions (IC and IP) and implementation efficiency. 
The issue is developed in the QCA and LISREL analyses (see 6.3.6 and 6.3.7). 
 
Table 31. Average estimations of implementation model variables on company level 
(Artificial IE index from table 29 and Mega corporate culture from table 21)  
 
DM 53 . 04 . 54 . 22 . 2 5 2
IMP 64 . 13 . 84 . 13 . 6 6 3
DM+IMP 11 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.0 59
DM 53 . 74 . 04 . 23 . 8 6 7
IMP 11 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2 54
DM+IMP 16 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.4 58
DM 23 . 35 . 85 . 03 . 3 6 9
IMP 75 . 05 . 64 . 24 . 0 6 8
DM+IMP 94 . 65 . 64 . 33 . 8 6 8
A
Art IE 
index
Proc 
Efficien
Mega 
culture 
15
Company Position Numb
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
B 10
13 C 
 
  CC36. In a corporate culture in change the decision makers have a more 
positive picture than implementers regarding decision factors as well as 
implementation efficiency (W) 
  CC37. Executives estimate in general goal satisfaction to be more 
successful than process efficiency (-) 
 
6.3.5.3 Analysis of strategic versus operational decisions 
There are only five strategic decisions of which four have a customer target group. 
All three companies are represented in both groups. These facts must be kept in 
mind when looking at table 32.  
 
Table 32. Average estimations of implementation model variables on decision type level  
 
DM 8 3.9 5.1 4.6 3.4
IMP 20 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.6
DM 4 2.4 3.4 3.8 2.4
IMP 6 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.3
Numb
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien
Position
Decision 
type
Opera 
tional
Strategic
 
Strategic decision cases are systematically scored lower than operational cases. 
The picture is confirmed and strengthened when looking at decision makers and   
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implementers separately. The five strategic decisions are all complex, both with 
regard to their contents and the implementation contexts and profiles, which the 
scores tell us. The complexity may also be seen as the main reason for lower 
scoring regarding goal satisfaction and process efficiency. But “complexity” itself 
does not per se explain poor implementation; complexity can be identified in the 
decision making process and treated more carefully to avoid implementation 
failure. The strategic cases studied have probably not passed through such a 
procedure, as the scores of implementation profiles are low.  
 
  CC38. Strategic decisions are perceived as more complex than 
operational decisions, which causes lower goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency compared to operational decisions (W) 
 
6.3.5.4 Analysis of decisions related to target groups 
In table 33, the four main target groups touched by the decisions are shown. The 
groups are small, between three and seven cases in each. In Manufacturing group 
only Company C is represented, while in the other groups all three companies are 
represented.  
 
Table 33. Average estimations of implementation model variables on decision target group 
level  
 
DM 4 2.8 3.4 3.5 2.8
IMP 9 4.2 4.4 2.9 3.2
DM 2 3.3 5.8 5.0 3.3
IMP 3 4.6 5.6 5.6 3.8
DM 4 4.4 4.8 5.1 4.0
IMP 9 3.7 3.4 3.8 3.9
DM 2 2.0 5.0 3.8 1.5
IMP 5 3.7 3.6 4.2 3.4
Target 
group
Position Numb
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien
Customer
Manufact
Manage
Staff 
members
 
It is not possible to find any structural or systematic differences between the 
groups. The manufacturing group shows however very high scores in both 
implementation profile and goal satisfaction. All three cases in the manufacturing 
group have a detailed and written implementation plan, which may explain the 
high scores of goal satisfaction. Nevertheless, the process efficiency scores are 
low, but the observations may also be pure corporate effects. However, the groups 
are small. Therefore an aggregation is made of the three internal target groups (25 
cases) leaving the external Customer group untouched (13 cases, see table 34).  
 
There seems to be the following tendency: goal satisfaction, but also to a limited 
extent process efficiency, is scored lower in the customer group than in the 
internal group. The reason cannot be a simple implementation profile effect as the 
implementers score slightly lower for this variable in internal than in customer 
group, opposite to the decision makers. Why is it so? A reason may be that 
decisions directly affecting my own job situation are emotionally perceived to be 
more difficult to handle, a statement supported by the estimations of the   
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implementation profile on the target group rows “Manage” and “Staff members” 
in table 33. 
 
Table 34. Average estimations of implementation model variables on decision target group 
aggregated level 
 
DM 42 . 8 3 . 43 . 52
IMP 94 . 2 4 . 42 . 93
DM 83 . 7 5 . 14 . 83
IMP 17 3.8 3.7 4.1 3.7
Internal
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien
Customer
Target 
group
Position Numb
Impl 
Context
 
  CC39. Decisions aimed for internal target groups are implemented more 
efficiently than decisions aimed for customers (W) 
 
6.3.5.5 Analysis of decisions demanded or not 
As seen in table 30, the basic scoring is done in a continuous scale using only 
integers. The number of cases is however too small in each group for an analysis. 
Therefore an aggregation is made grouping the demand in YES or NO. The pivot 
point used is 2 giving 9 YES cases and 11 NO cases (see table 35).  
 
Table 35. Average estimations of implementation model variables on decision demanded 
level (pivot point YES/NO set to 2, see table 30) 
 
DM 93 . 64 . 64 . 23
IMP 16 3.8 4.1 3.6 3.8
DM 32 . 84 . 24 . 82
IMP 10 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.1
YES
NO
Proc 
Efficien
Decision 
demanded
Positi
on
Numb
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
. 3
. 2
 
There could hardly be found any differences or tendencies, not even among the 
implementers. It is a bit surprising, since the demanded decisions would be 
appreciated by the implementers and therefore easier to implement; the results 
would be better. However, the data do not support such a description. 
 
  CC40. The implementation efficiency is not affected by whether a 
decision is demanded or not (M) 
 
6.3.5.6 Analysis of decisions recognized or not 
The same problem as above, too small groups, makes it necessary to regroup. The 
procedure carried out is the same as in 6.3.5.5 but the initial pivot point used was 3 
giving 10 YES cases and 9 NO cases (one missing value). However, there were no 
systematic differences and the variance of implementer in the NO-group was high 
and above the other subgroups for all variables. Changing the pivot point to 2 
gives 14 YES and only 5 NO cases. The variance was equal for all subgroups and 
variables. The results for implementers changed quite a bit but did not change for 
decision makers. The results, shown in table 36, are obviously very sensitive to 
selection of pivot point.  
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There are some interesting observations. Both decision makers and 
implementers score goal satisfaction and process efficiency higher when the 
decision is recognized. The decision makers also score higher for context and 
profile when the implementers recognize the decision, which the implementers do 
not. It is not easy to explain these observations; a proposal is that a decision 
recognized by the implementers has “a built in factor” supporting the 
implementers to do a good job even if the context and profile according to their 
opinions are not simple and clear. The result of the good job is estimated 
sufficiently or successfully from both parts; it is the result that is considered.  
 
Table 36. Average estimations of implementation model variables on decision recognized 
level (pivot point YES/NO set to 2, see table 30) 
 
DM 83 . 95 . 14 . 63
IMP 19 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.8
DM 42 . 43 . 43 . 82
IMP 73 . 94 . 12 . 32
NO
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien
YES
Decision 
recognized
Position Numb
Impl 
Context
 
  CC41. Decisions recognized by the implementers are implemented with a 
better result than decisions that are not recognized (-) 
 
6.3.5.7 Analysis of decisions with and without follow-up 
The same problem as above, too small groups, makes it necessary to regroup the 
scores of the follow-up plans in YES and NO groups. The procedure carried out is 
the same as in 6.3.5.5 with the pivot point put to 2. It gives only 3 NO-cases and 
14 YES cases (3 missing values). The three NO cases have however nine 
respondents as seen in table 37. Company C is not represented in the NO-group. 
Changing the pivot point to 3 does not help as no case has been scored 3. These 
circumstances make the analysis results uncertain. 
 
Table 37. Average estimations of implementation model variables on decision follow-up 
level (pivot point YES/NO set to 2, see table 30) 
 
DM 9 3.3 4.2 4.3 3.1
IMP 20 4.5 4.7 4.0 4.0
DM 3 3.8 5.3 4.5 3.0
IMP 6 2.3 1.9 2.8 2.2
Follow up  Position Numb
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
YES
NO
Proc 
Efficien
 
The scores in table 37 indicate that the existence of a follow-up plan is 
important regarding goal satisfaction and process efficiency from the 
implementers’ point of view; for the decision maker it does not matter. A proposed 
explanation may be that implementers perceive a greater importance of a decision 
with an implementation mission that includes a follow-up plan. Such an 
explanation is supported by the scores of implementers on implementation context 
and profile compared between YES and NO situations. The paradox is that the 
decision makers estimate goal satisfaction and process efficiency much higher   
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than implementers, when a follow-up plan does not exist, and equal to situations 
where a plan exists.  
 
  CC42. An implementation follow-up plan gives increased goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency according to the opinions of 
implementers, in contrast to the opinions of decision makers (-) 
 
6.3.5.8 Analysis of decision scope 
The pivot point small/large is set to 2. The same problem, too small groups, occurs 
once more (see table 38). There are only three DM cases in the Small scope group. 
These three decision makers stand out alone, giving higher scores on all variables 
compared to large scope decisions. Among implementers, no parallel observations 
are made.  
 
Table 38. Average estimations of implementation model variables on decision 
scope level (pivot point Small/Large set to 2, see table 30) 
 
DM 34 . 55 . 25 . 84
IMP 11 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.1
DM 92 . 94 . 33 . 82
IMP 15 4.1 4.5 4.0 3.9
Proc 
Efficien
Small
Large
Numb
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Scope Position
 
  CC43. Small decision scope gives increased goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency according to the opinions of decision makers, in contrast to the 
opinions of implementers (-) 
 
6.3.5.9 Analysis of decisions in a transmission event perspective 
The transmission event has been discussed earlier (see 2.4, 3.1 and 3.3) as a 
critical step in the implementation process. The transmission is supposed to be of 
importance for further action of the implementer. Therefore, in this analysis a 
strict implementer perspective has been maintained.  
 
  The type of transmission has been estimated from the interviews. Initially four 
different types could be identified as  
•  via phone-call, letter or e-mail (order)  
•  at a meeting face to face (task) 
•  a result of participating in decision making process (participation)  
•  not transmitted 
17 implementer cases (excluding not transmitted) could be identified with a 
skewed distribution of types. The data was regrouped in types of personal 
transmission (task + participation) and order transmission cases giving 13 and 4 
cases respectively. The number in the order group is still too few but the 
difference between personal and non-personal transmission seems to be the most 
interesting approach so any other regrouping is cancelled. However, there are no 
differences between the two groups regarding goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency.  
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Comparing decision makers’ and implementers’ goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency estimations reduced the dataset even more as there is a lack of 
comparable pairs. However, in table 39, the analysis results are shown. The 
differences show that implementers have a lower scoring of both goal satisfaction 
and process efficiency compared to decision makers regarding personally 
transmitted decisions to implement. The reverse appears when a decision is 
ordered to be implemented.  
 
Table 39. Differences in implementation efficiency estimations between decision makers 
(DM) and implementers (IMP) regarding decision transmission type  
 
GS PE
Personal 10 0.95 0.60
Order 3 -0.17 -2.17
Trans 
type
Numb of 
cases
Difference DM vs IMP
 
Looking at only implementers, there are 19 cases to analyze. If they are grouped 
according to the initial categorization, but excluding non-implemented decisions, 
it is not possible to find any systematic tendencies (see table 40). Even if 
participating in the decision making process gives the highest goal satisfaction 
score, it is not followed by a corresponding process efficiency score where, 
instead, the highest score is for personal transmission of the decision to 
implement. If “participation” and “personal” are added, the mean scores of goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency are slightly higher than for “Order” but there 
are just four cases in the later group.  
 
Table 40. Implementers’ estimations of implementation efficiency regarding decision 
transmission type  
 
Participate 10 4.56 3.50
Task 5 3.20 4.00
Order 4 3.50 3.25
PE Trans type
Numb of 
cases GS
 
These results do not directly support the idea that a personal transmission should 
facilitate the implementation; as said before I have not found anything in the 
literature about the transmission event per se. The findings are detected from a 
limited dataset. The type “Order” contains only operational cases. In a strict 
implementer perspective there is a tendency in favor of personal transmission. 
However, it is difficult to draw any confident conclusion.  
 
  CC44. A personally transmitted decision to implement does not 
confidently lead to a higher goal satisfaction and process efficiency, 
compared to a non-personally transmission (-) 
 
6.3.5.10 Decision purpose and implementation efficiency 
The purpose of the decision may be a part of the implementation profile as it is 
defined (see 3.3). It is included in the respondent instruction to estimate the 
implementation profile on the scale (see 4.2.2.3). However, the word purpose (in 
Swedish syfte) was not used explicitly in the instruction but imbedded in the word   
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task (in Swedish uppdrag). This lack of clarity makes it impossible to classify the 
decisions in my database in terms of a communicated and understood purpose for 
the decision to be implemented. In some interviews, the respondent spoke about 
the purpose: as an example, Ason says in decision 1308 “What is the purpose?” 
and supported by Bson “I did not know the purpose …”.  
 
I have a feeling that in some cases, when analyzing the individual decisions (see 
6.3.2), and recalling the interview situations, the decision purpose influences the 
attitudes, and even the behavior, of the implementers. It is reactions like resistance 
that are in line with the corporate culture and not understood. They have an effect 
on the implementation efficiency. For reasons described above, it is not possible to 
support the statement with direct proofs; it is so far just a general observation to 
bring into the discussions in Chapter 7.  
  
  CC45. The perceived and interpreted purpose of the decision to 
implement influences the attitudes and behavior of the implementer 
causing effects on implementation efficiency (-)  
 
6.3.5.11 Analysis of decisions disappeared into an implementation grey zone 
In 6.3.2, every decision has been analyzed with comments on the implementation 
process uncovering different respondent opinions but they are integrated in the 
total decision analysis. No decision in this study has been completely non-
implemented but some have not been implemented in parts of the organization or 
within reasonable time; these cases were identified by me relating to respondent 
answers. Evident respondent attitudes towards the implementation task are 
discussed a bit closer here with three case examples.  
 
In the decision case 1313, the respondent Rson denies knowledge about a new 
ordered manner of reporting. He does it the same as he always has done. Rson acts 
perhaps with good intents, even if I doubt this, but he will probably adapt to the 
new system even if he is delayed. The company loss is negligible.  
 
Fson in decision case 1333 got an order to cut costs, but he chooses to “wait and 
see” as he does not like the decision. This attitude is a form of resistance causing a 
smaller, or under severe conditions higher, company cost level.  
 
In decision case 5402 Mson, confronted with a unwanted decision, keeps his 
fingers away as he is not necessarily involved. His passivity does not cause added 
costs but an active support could have facilitated the implementation.  
  
There are three different observed ways of behavior regarding the implementers’ 
reaction to the implementation task: continue as earlier, wait and see, passivity. 
Are there any similarities in their situations? Yes, at first, the decisions are 
categorized as aimed for an internal target group. Rson and Fson are personally 
affected by the decisions, Mson just partly. Their behavior causes no severe 
problem for others but includes a personal risk that they will be looked upon as 
“bad guys”. Therefore, a conclusion may be that an adjusted implementation 
resistance is worth showing if it does not cause troubles for others and a small 
associated risk of “punishment” for the implementer her/himself. 
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  CC46. An implementer’s resistance against the implementation of a 
decision may occur if the effects do not affect others and the personal risk 
of sanctions is small (W)  
 
6.3.5.12 Summary comments on categorized decision analysis  
Could there have been more useful categories than those selected? I have made 
some more attempts. The goal (or related words as aim, purpose, objective, 
intention, motive, and end) is an interesting dimension. Two aspects are to be 
considered: the desired effect of the decision and the activities generated by the 
decision, the implementation process.  
 
The effect of the decision is very rare spoken of in the data in terms of goals, 
given that a goal must fulfill the requirement of being measurable, fixed in time 
and realistic. The main impression is the presence of vague formulations as aim, 
intention, etc. Therefore it is also difficult to follow up the decision effects and 
that is probably one reason that follow-ups, too, are not precisely planned. As the 
effect aspect is difficult to catch in the data, it has not been used as a 
categorization approach.  
 
Regarding the implementation process, the situation is more structured. It does 
not necessarily mean a formal written plan but oral communications. Here too, 
there are often vague formulations; the time schedule is not planned, reports are 
anecdotic, resources not budgeted, etc. This aspect, however, has been estimated 
directly by the respondents during the interviews and therefore it is not used as a 
categorization approach. 
 
The decisions demanded or not and decisions recognized or not are related. Do 
they highlight the same thing? I do not think so. “Demanded” expresses a desire in 
the organization that a specific decision is to be made by top management. 
“Recognized” is a reaction in the organization when a decision is made and put in 
action. As said earlier, the recognition evokes both positive and negative feelings 
but “demanded” just positive feelings. So even if they are related, they illustrate 
different dimensions.  
 
Manufacturing decisions in the study are all made with implementation plans. It 
could be a corporate effect as all such cases were found in Company C. A question 
for further investigations is if companies with a culture dominated or heavily 
influenced by manufacturing/engineering plan more than other types of 
companies.  
 
Even if the analysis carried out here is dominated by figures, it is a qualitative 
approach. The verbal opinions have been translated into figures in order to 
categorize the decisions for better understanding. The scoring may therefore not 
be used as real figures, just as indicators of opinions of the respondents.  
 
The data is limited. There is a risk when analyzing the data that I find the same 
things but under different labels. That is like a small village in the countryside. 
Looking at the village from different surrounding hills gives a glimpse of the 
church and the schoolhouse. But from a specific hill, you see Mr Pearson’s house, 
from another hill the Post Office. I hope the analysis approach has shown a couple   
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of different houses covered in the village. Saying this, I mean that the purpose of 
the analysis approach in this sub-chapter – to find similarities and differences in 
the opinions of decision makers and implementers when decisions are categorized 
– is achieved.  
 
Regarding the two special types of decision categorization, transmission event 
and grey zone implementation, the purpose to detect contextual conditions leading 
to different implementer behavior and its consequences for implementation 
efficiency, is achieved. 
 
6.3.6 QCA analysis  
The purpose of the QCA approach is to find causal relations between the variables 
in the preliminary implementation model. The QCA technique is briefly described 
in 4.4.2. The implementation model (see figure 3) is the starting point of QCA 
analysis. 
 
6.3.6.1 The QCA analysis approach 
If one variable is selected from each factor group, giving six variables, a truth 
table contains 2
6 (64) rows. As the number of dataset rows under optimal 
conditions,  i.e., no missing values, is 43, it is impossible to treat the 
implementation model in one single step. That immediately suggests that it takes 
two steps, the corporate and the decision factor groups. The analysis of 
categorized decisions (see 6.3.5) gave some interesting findings. Therefore, a third 
QCA step is carried out combining the categorized decisions (see table 30), in sets 
of three and/or four (due to a limited dataset) to detect potential causality. A 
specific calculation is done to test if the transmission event in combination with 
other variables indicates causality. 
 
  The implementation efficiency in the model is measured in two ways, goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency. The calculations are made for implementation 
efficiency as well as goal satisfaction and process efficiency separately. As the 
implementer perspective is important (see 3.2), the analysis is carried out on each 
step both totally and for implementers separately; there are too few cases to do the 
same for decision makers. 
 
  The stability of solutions is regularly tested (see 4.4.2). 
 
6.3.6.2 Preparation of data for QCA analysis 
The data has been prepared to fit the QCA analysis. A summary is presented in 
table 41. The corporate profile factor group has been estimated in two ways, 
Growth and Profit excluding Size and Solidity as they show minor variance; it is 
to be remembered that there are only three observations for each variable! All 
other variables are respondent estimations from the interviews (see Appendix C) 
or estimations made by the author (see 6.3.5).  
 
The transformation of continious variables has been done with respect to the 
desire for a balanced number of cases. (The following text uses the abbreviations 
in table 41). Therefore the pivot point is alternatively 2 or 3 with the exception of   
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CC where it is necessary to use 3.5 due to a skewed distribution. POS is not used 
as a variable in the analysis, just as a selection filter. For LSTY Value and 
Political styles are closer than any other combinations based on the discussions in 
Badaracco & Ellsworth (1989). GROW and PROFIT are transformed with zero 
(0) as the pivot point giving as it is both “natural” and give balanced distribution 
of cases. TYPE has just two possibilities initially and, finally, TARG is 
transformed in accordance with categorizations in table 30 giving External 
(Customer) and Internal (Management, Staff Members and Manufacturing). 
 
The original data matrix contains missing values. All of them are covered, when 
using the technique of imputation in LISREL (see 4.4.4). Consequently there are 
43 complete dataset rows to use in the analysis (see 6.3.7.1). 
 
Table 41. Summary of data used in QCA analysis in Step II 
 
Description Abbrev By Original Transformed
Company position POS Author Decision Maker, Implementer DM=0, IMPL=1
Leadership style LSTY Resp Directive 1, Value 2, Political 3 D=0, V+P=1
Corporate culture CC Resp Scale 0-6
<=3,5=0,  
>3,5=1
Growth GROW An Rep 3 year average, % -=0,  +=1
Profit PROFIT An Rep 3 year average, % -=0,  +=1
Participation in DMP PDMP Resp Scale 0-6 <=2=0, >2=1
Implementation Context IC Resp Scale 0-6 <=3=0, >3=1
Implementation Profile IP Resp Scale 0-6 <=3=0, >3=1
Goal Satisfaction GS Resp Scale 0-6 <=3=0, >3=1
Process Efficiency PE Resp Scale 0-6 <=3=0, >3=1
GS+PE IE Resp Scale 0-6 <=3=0, >3=1
Type of decision TYPE Author Strategic, Operational S=0, O=1
Target Group TARG Author External, Internal E=0, I=1
Decision Demanded DEM Author Scale 0-6 <=2=0, >2=1
Decision Recogniced REC Author Scale 0-6 <=3=0, >3=1
Follow up plan FOL Author Scale 0-6 <=3=0, >3=1
Decision Scope SCOPE Author Scale 0-6 <=2=0, >2=1
Estimation Variable
 
 
6.3.6.3 QCA analysis of the influence of corporate factors on implementation 
efficiency  
The initial analysis starts with four independent variables, LSTY, CC, GROW and 
PROFIT with IE as a dependent variable (see table 41). The truth table is shown in 
table 42: 9 rows with outcome cases, which is 7 rows without cases.  
 
There are 29 positive outcomes of IE and 14 negatives. 6 rows have 
contradictory outcomes and 3 rows, all with 3 or less total cases each, are one-
sided. If contradictory rows are treated as positive outcome, when there is a clear 
positive bias from the beginning, and the case number condition of a single row is 
set to at least 4 (rows with smaller number of cases are ignored in the 
calculations), the equation is   
  139
 
L S T Y * C C * P R O F I T   >   I E              ( 1 4 )  
 
saying that a contemporary presence of non-directive leadership style, a strong 
corporate culture and a profitable company situation give high implementation 
efficiency. The equation covers rows with 19 cases of which 3 however are 
contradictory. As there are in total 29 positive outcomes, there are 13 positive 
cases distributed on other rows. One row with 3 cases has just positive outcomes. 
If the case number condition is set to 3 instead of 4, the equation is 
 
p r o f i t +   L S T Y * C C   >   I E               ( 1 5 )    
 
showing a dramatic change of solution: a non-directive leadership style in 
combination with a strong corporate culture give a high implementation efficiency 
but this is also the case for a negative company profit situation! Even other 
changes in the calculation conditions show that the initial equation (14) is not 
robust.  
 
Table 42. Truth table of corporate factors in Step II (rows without outcome are eliminated)  
 
LSTY   CC  GROW  PROFIT  1 0
1101 > 1 0 1
1111 > 6 2
1100 > 3 1
1000 > 3 2
0100 > 3 0
0000 > 2 4
0111 > 1 1
0010 > 1 0
0101 > 0 3
Numb of IE 
cases Independent variables
 
If the original calculation conditions are used, the change of IE to GS or PE 
results in the same equation (14) as well as a calculation for only implementers. As 
GROW does not occur in solutions a test calculation is done with only LSTY, CC 
and PROFIT as independent variables. Equation (14) is still the solution. 
  
  CC47. A contemporary presence of non-directive leadership style, a 
strong corporate culture and a profitable company situation give high 
implementation efficiency; the conclusion is valid also for separated goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency as well as for just implementers (W)  
 
6.3.6.4 QCA analysis of the influence of decision factors on implementation 
efficiency  
The analysis is carried out initially with PDMP, IC, IP as independent and IE as 
dependent variables (see table 41). The truth table (see table 43) has 7 rows with 
case(s) and 2 without. There are 29 positive outcome cases. Four rows have 
contradictory outcomes. 
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If contradictory rows are treated as positive outcome, when there is a clear 
positive bias from the beginning, and the case number condition of a single row is 
set to at least 4 (rows with a smaller number of cases are ignored in the 
calculations), the equation is 
 
I C   >   I E                        ( 1 6 )  
 
saying that if a simple implementation context is present, the implementation 
efficiency is high. The equation covers 3 rows with 30 cases of which 3 however 
are contradictory on 2 rows. The solution is quite robust under different 
conditions.  
 
Replacing the dependent variable IE with GS, under the same calculation 
conditions, gives an equation  
 
P D M P * I P +   I C * I P   >   G S                ( 1 7 )  
 
which is more complex: there are two pathways to success (a high goal 
satisfaction), and they are implementer participation in the decision making 
process in combination with a clear implementation profile or an easy 
implementation context in combination with a clear implementation profile. 
Replacing IE with PE gives 
 
I C * I P   >   P E                      ( 1 8 )  
 
which indicates one way to success, the combination of a simple implementation 
context and a clear implementation profile. 
 
Table 43. Truth table of decision factors in Step II (rows without outcome are eliminated) 
 
PDMP IC IP 1 0
111 > 1 4 2
011 > 9 1
100 > 0 4
000 > 1 3
101 > 1 3
010 > 4 0
001 > 0 1
Numb of IE  Independent variables
  
Equations (17) and (18) are seemingly robust under different conditions. The 
shared element in the equations (16)-(18) is IC. The solutions are more complex 
for each of the elements, GS and PE, constituting IE with a common characteristic 
in IP. The main reason for this complex picture is probably the method of 
calculation of IE. There are 29 IE 1-cases. In 17 of them both GS and PE also 
have a 1-case but in 12 cases one of them has a 0-case. The corresponding figures 
for the 14 IE 0-cases are 9 and 5 respectively. I conclude that the results of GS and 
PE are worth the most attention.  
 
Equations (16)-(18) are repeated when the calculations under the same 
conditions are made for implementers exclusively. 
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  CC48. If the implementation context is simple, it is a sufficient condition 
for high implementation efficiency; the conclusion is valid also for just 
implementers (-)  
  CC49. A combination of clear implementation profile and simple 
implementation context is one way to high goal satisfaction as well as 
high process efficiency; for the latter, there is also another way, namely 
the implementers’ participation in the decision making process; the 
conclusions are valid also for just implementers (W)  
 
6.3.6.5 QCA analysis of the influence of categorized decisions on implementation 
efficiency  
Categorized decisions contain five variables, giving 2
6 (64 rows), making it 
impossible to treat them at the same time with only 43 cases available. A great 
number of tentative calculations with 4 or less variables in combinations, with 
different settings, do not give stable solutions for either IE, or for GS or PE. 
Therefore it is not possible to make any conclusions from this analysis approach.  
 
6.3.6.6 Analysis of the transmission of the decision to be implemented 
The transmission event has been discussed (see 2.4, 3.1 and 3.3) as a critical step 
in the implementation process. A first analysis has been carried out in 6.3.5.9. The 
same dataset used there, is used in this QCA analysis in combination with other 
variables presented in table 41.  
 
The transformation of the two transmission types described in 6.3.5.9, see table 
39, is done putting Order to 0 and Personal to 1, labeled as the variable TRANS. 
Still it is a question of implementer perspective giving 17 cases. Goal satisfaction 
and process efficiency are tested separately. The model is built up by the variable 
TRANS in combinations with IC, IP, TYPE, TARG, DEM, REC, FOL and 
SCOPE (see table 41). A combination pair-wise with two other variables gives in 
most situations a solution like IC*TRANS > GS (PE) and DEM*TRANS > GS 
(PE). It means that a personally transmitted task in combination with a simple 
implementation context (IC) or a demanded decision (DEM) gives a high 
implementation efficiency (GS or PE). However, the model is very sensitive to 
changed conditions (see 4.4.2), meaning that handling contradictory rows and 
number of cases plays a big role in the solution. The dataset contains just 3 order 
cases (trans). So, in all, the QCA analysis does not contribute to the understanding 
of the importance of transmission type, as the dataset is too small.  
 
6.3.7 LISREL analysis  
The purpose of the LISREL analysis is to find causal relations between the 
variables in the preliminary implementation model (see figure 3). The LISREL 
method is presented in 4.4.3. 
 
6.3.7.1 LISREL analysis approach 
The LISREL analysis is done on the respondent level, giving 43 potential dataset 
rows incorporating variables as shown in table 44; the columns “best solution” are   
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commented in 6.3.7.2 and 6.3.7.3. The analysis, however, uses information from 
different sources and levels. Economic figures about the three companies are 
available at the company level. That means that there are only three unique figures 
for each variable, as profit or growth (see table 11), and they are repeatedly used 
in each related dataset row. The DECI2 observed variables are my categorization 
and scoring of the decisions (see table 30), and they are also repeatedly used in 
each related dataset row. The degree of participation in the decision making 
process of the implementers, DMP, is my estimation, too. All other observed 
variables are represented by the respondent scores. The scores of participating in 
decision making process, corporate culture and the estimation of CEO leadership 
style (one of three alternatives) are repeatedly used in each related dataset row if 
the respondents have been interviewed about more than one decision.  
 
Each dataset row therefore contains information from these three different levels 
originating from four sources. As said, there are 43 potential dataset rows. 
However, missing values occur mainly as non-complete respondent answers. The 
imputation routine in LISREL was used to replace the missing values. The 
imputation covered all of them and there are 43 complete dataset rows for 
analysis.  
 
Table 44. Variables used in the LISREL model (in ”best solution”, (x) stands for non-
significance but necessity for model fitness) 
 
Description Abbr All Implem
ξ-variable CORP x( x )
Sale figures, 3-years average SALE x
Profit, 3-years average PRO x
Growth over last 3 years GRO
Nb of employees, 3-years average EMPL
Leadership style LS (x) x
Corporate culture CC xx
ξ-variable DECI1 xx
Participating in decision making process DMP x
Implem context IC xx
Implem profile IP xx
ξ-variable DECI2 (x) (x)
Type of decision TYP  x
Decision target group TAR xx
Recognition of decision REC xx
Decision demanded DEM
Follow up plan FOL
Scope of decision SCO (x)
η-variable IMPL xx
Goal Satisfaction GS xx
Process Efficiency PE xx
Implementation model variables Best solution
 
Company position is coded ordinal 1 (decision maker) and 2 (implementer) but 
the variable is not used in the model, only to select sub-datasets. All other   
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variables are treated as continuous. Leadership style is coded 1 (directive), 2 
(value) and 3 (political). The degree of freedom for the implementers to act is the 
underlying reason to estimate the variable as continuous. The type of decision is 
coded 1 (operational) and 2 (strategic), the target groups as 1 (internal) and 2 
(external). For both of them, the underlying reason to classify them as continuous 
variables is the degree of complexity. 
 
As there are too few observations (see 6.3.5.9), the transmission event is not 
included as a model variable in table 44. However, an analysis attempt is made 
and the results are presented in 6.3.7.3.  
 
The ξ-variables CORP and DECI1 are derived from the original preliminary 
implementation model. In 3.3 it is proposed to use the preliminary implementation 
model to test different decision types separately. The LISREL modeling approach 
has however not been successful. Therefore the ξ-variable DECI2 is constructed to 
catch the complexity of the decision, inspired by the previous analyses already 
made. 
 
The analysis is carried out in two echelons: first for all respondents, then in the 
perspective of implementers. As the decision maker sub-dataset is too small (14 
dataset rows), it is not possible to do same analysis regarding them.  
 
6.3.7.2 LISREL analysis results of all respondents (decision makers and 
implementers)  
All variables in table 44 have been tested in different combinations in the model. 
The best solution in terms of model fitness is presented in figure 11. The structural 
equation is  
 
IMPL = - 0.34*CORP + 0.97*DECI1 - 0.081*DECI2      (19) 
 
with an error variance = 0.17 and R² = 0.83. The fitness of the model is acceptable 
according to P-value 0.19 and RMSEA value 0.065; the critical fitness values are 
>0.05 and <0.9 respectively. The t-values are mainly >1.96 (i.e., significant). 
However, DECI2 has a low t-value (-0.73). If excluded from the model, the fitness 
declines substantially.  
 
All observed variables estimated by respondents are present in the best solution 
but LS is not significant. Also, the economic variables SALE and PRO are 
integrated. CORP and DECI1 give substantial contributions to IMPL, the 
implementation efficiency. DECI2, built up by observed variables estimated by 
me, has a non-significant value (t-value=-0.73). However, if DECI2 is excluded 
from the model, there is no model fitness.   
 
The negative contribution of CORP to IMPL may be understood in the 
following way. LS is neglected as it is non-significant. A strong corporate culture, 
CC, is an obstacle for change; it is difficult to change a situation, i.e., to 
implement, before the corporate culture is changed. SALE, bigness, is a 
measurement of complexity: a big SALE is an indicator of many employees and 
many customers (N.B. that EMPL does not occur in the best solution but SALE 
does), which makes implementation more complex and less successful. PRO, the 
actual profit of the business, at a high level may force the implementer to be more   
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careful in the implementation process, loosing time and spending more resources 
giving lower implementation efficiency, IMPL. However, it must be kept in mind 
that SALE and PRO contain just three observations each, which may disturb the 
analysis results. 
  
 
 
Figure 11. The best LISREL over all solution of implementation model (t-values)  
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DMP, the implementers’ participation in decision making process, does not fit in 
the model building up DECI1 but implementation context, IC, and implementation 
profile, IP, do. Simple conditions, IC, and clear task, IP, cause unsurprisingly high 
implementation efficiency, IMPL.  
 
DECI2 is measured in four ways (regarding the categorization and estimations 
of the variables, see 6.3.5.1 and table 30) but it does not contribute to explain 
IMPL (t-value<1.96). If excluded, however, the model fitness is not acceptable; 
this is the situation also for SCO (t-value = 0.59). 
 
The model has also been tested regarding GS and PE as separate, single 
observed variables on IMPL. No model fitness solution is found. The best solution 
shows that corporate factors and decision factors both contribute substantially to 
the explanation of implementation efficiency in spite of a limited database. 
Observed variables with non-significant values in the best solution may be tested 
in a larger database in the future. 
 
6.3.7.3 LISREL analysis results of implementers 
The implementers were selected giving a potential of 29 dataset rows. The 
imputation routine in LISREL was run separately for these datasets as there has 
been observed some differences between decision makers and implementers in 
earlier analyses (see 6.3.4) giving in all 28 dataset rows that are useful for 
analysis.  
 
An ambition was to test the over all best solution (see figure 11) for 
implementers, but exactly the same solution could not be produced. One reason is 
the limited dataset, which makes it necessary to test alternative combinations. A 
justified best solution (see figure 12) occurs as a simplification but is quite close: it 
has excluded TYP and SCO (DECI2) and PRO and SALE (CORP) but added 
DMP (DECI1). The structural equation is 
 
IMPL = - 0.25*CORP + 0.82*DECI1 - 0.31*DECI2   (20) 
 
with an error variance = 0.43 and R² = 0.57. The fitness of the model is acceptable 
according to P-value 0.4 and RMSEA value 0.04. However, there are problems 
with non-significant t-values regarding CORP and DECI2 (<1.96). The limited 
dataset is probably a reason. 
 
DMP, implementers’ participating in decision making process, takes place in the 
implementer best solution but not in the over all model. This seems quite natural: 
the implementer puts more importance than CEOs in her/his participating in the 
decision making process as a part of smooth implementation.  
 
A couple of alternative calculations, changing observed variables as an effect of 
a too limited database, give solutions with acceptable model fitness but with the 
remaining problem of non-significant t-values.  
 
Finally, in 6.3.5.9 an analysis of the transmission event is carried out and the 
same data, 17 implementer cases, is used in a LISREL analysis approach. As the 
total implementer data set contains 29 cases, there are 12 missing values of the   
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variable transmission, TRANS. The situation is unsatisfactory and it would be 
wise to stop.  
 
Figure 12. The best LISREL implementer solution of implementation model (t-
values) 
 
But in spite of these limitations a test is done: an imputation is performed giving 
22 cases for calculations. These show that, even if model fitness is attained, the 
contribution of TRANS remains on an evidently non-significant level. An attempt   
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to use only the 17 TRANS cases causes problem as the imputation of missing 
values of other variables gives only 13 cases, which is a too small number to build 
a purposeful model. Therefore it has not been possible to include the transmission 
event in the model. The main reason is weakness in the database.  
 
6.3.7.4 Summing up the LISREL analysis 
The LISREL analysis results essentially confirm the preliminary implementation 
model. However, some variables are not confirmed, either by significant t-tests or 
by model fitness coefficients; the reason may be limited datasets. Given these 
limitations of the results, the most interesting conclusion is that the LISREL 
calculation exclusively for implementers gives partly another picture of model 
relationships compared to the model with all respondents. The down-up 
perspective matters regarding implementation conditions and results. The “down-
up perspective” implies that the implementer position generates a specific agenda 
of perceived implementation conditions and results. Irrespective of the underlying 
causes, which this study does not investigate, it is an important conclusion to be 
taken into account both in future research design and in the decision 
implementation mission in business life.  
 
The LISREL model solutions contain all the variables estimated by the 
respondents (Leadership style, LS, however insignificantly in all respondent 
solution). The variables estimated by me both fit in (TYP, TAR and REC) and do 
not (FOL, SCO and TRANS). It is not possible to estimate my effect on this 
picture but it seems undisputed that a consistent respondent estimation is preferred 
in order to standardize the tools used.  
 
  CC50. The preliminary implementation model is not falsified by 
multivariate estimations but has a weakness regarding the significance of 
some variables (S) 
  CC51. The preliminary implementation model for implementers is more 
simple than for decision makers: it excludes the measurement variables 
sales, profit, decision type and scope but includes participating in 
decision making process; weakness regarding significance of some 
variables has been observed (S)   
  148
7 Discussion and final conclusions 
 
 
In this chapter, the conclusions from the analysis made in Chapter 6 are used to 
answer the research questions and to test the main hypothesis (see 3.4). A general 
discussion follows. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to reflections on 
generalizations and methods but also on future research.  
 
7.1 List of conclusions 
In order to facilitate the overview and the understanding of the up-coming 
discussion all conclusions made during the analyses in Chapter 6 are listed. The 
conclusions are repeated with their weights in brackets (see 6.1: S=Strong, 
M=Medium, W=Weak and -= fragile). 
  CC1. There is a potential for important improvements in implementation 
efficiency (S)  
  CC2. Corporate factors as formulated and shared values and needs as 
well as internal resistance and culture conflicts have impacts of good and 
poor implementation respectively (M) 
  CC3. Decision factors such as communication and clarity as well as 
available resources have impacts of good and poor implementation 
respectively (M) 
  CC4. Size of company does not matter with regard to implementation 
efficiency (M) 
  CC5. Extreme profit situations (very poor or very good) do not lead to 
high implementation efficiency (W) 
  CC6. Executives estimate that successful implementation mainly depends 
on themselves and unsuccessful implementation mainly depends on 
subordinates (-) 
  CC7. Value-driven leadership, a long period of CEO regime and a 
challenging economic situation in pair-wise combinations lead to a high 
implementation efficiency (W) 
  CC8. An indistinct decision in a turbulent context may be well 
implemented in terms of goal satisfaction if the corporate culture is 
business- and action-oriented, supported by an attitude of “you are 
permitted to do mistakes”, but the price is low process efficiency (W) 
  CC9. An implementation task without an expressed purpose causes 
frustration and even resistance among the implementers. The 
implementation is delayed, even if supplementary information clarify the 
purpose and other vital conditions, leading to low implementation 
efficiency  (W) 
  CC10. A decision made on false or insufficient premises causes poor goal 
satisfaction and low implementation process efficiency (W) 
  CC11. A leadership, which builds on and utilizes a strong corporate 
culture and which focuses on human beings and result deviations, is more 
important than formal follow-up tools to manage a complicated 
implementation situation (W)   
  149
  CC12. Even if a decision has an evident goal and associated 
implementation plans, it is necessary to have defined roles and 
responsibilities supported by a coaching leadership during the 
implementation; this must be done in order to avoid poor implementation 
process efficiency, and not the least, a delay in the time schedule (W) 
  CC13. A decision with content in conflict with the opinion of the 
implementer may have many difficulties to be overcome in order to be 
implemented (W) 
  CC14. A decision with goal achievement at a unpredictable future point 
of time, but with a need of immediate implementation, meets resistance 
and down-prioritizing among the implementers challenging the executive 
leadership (M) 
  CC15. Even if a decision is detailed with evident tasks and 
responsibilities, the implementation may be insufficient if there are direct 
effects on the private economy of the subordinates, and if the follow-up 
does not work (W) 
  CC16. A poorly prepared strategic decision built on perceived false 
premises and touching the entire, differentiated businesses causes 
resistance among implementers with consequences such as high 
implementation costs and even a risk of non-implementation (W) 
  CC17. It is possible to make quite important changes in a decision during 
the implementation process if the decision is expected, demanded and 
desired by both the decision maker and implementers (decision target 
group), and the decision maker is involved in implementation; however, 
the changed decision causes a prolonged implementation period and 
therefore costs more than necessary, but gives an excellent goal 
satisfaction (W) 
  CC18. A simple, operational decision, demanded by the organization and 
touching just internal routines, is successfully implemented even if the 
employees are not involved in the decision making process  (W)  
  CC19. If the implementers take part in the decision making process and 
the decision is demanded, the implementation goes smooth and easy even 
if the content of the decision is not exactly what was desired (-) 
  CC20. In a complex context, a strategic decision containing another 
solution for solving the same problem needs a detailed implementation 
plan with top management engagement in the execution phase and 
frequent follow-up for successful implementation (W) 
  CC21. An operational decision, which is modified/changed during 
implementation due to new circumstances, causes decreases in 
implementation process efficiency and results in long term effects on 
corporate culture (-) 
  CC22. A decision, which the implementers recognize by its type and 
characteristics, is well implemented even if the implementers have not 
participated in the decision making process  (W) 
  CC23. A decision with a target group of subordinates achieves rapid goal 
satisfaction by putting more resources than strictly necessary into the 
implementation process (=lower efficiency), which in the long term may 
facilitate the implementation of a repetitive decision (W)   
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  CC24. When a decision is prepared by the implementers and it is a 
confirmation of what they desire, the probability of both full goal 
satisfaction and excellent implementation process efficiency is high (-) 
  CC25. A top management intervention in an on-going implementation 
process can sharpen the implementation efficiency in the actual case but 
the long term effects on other implementation processes are difficult to 
predict (-) 
  CC26. A decision and its implementation is often a story of complexity 
and multiplicity in a retrospective examination where the conditions and 
the results are situational (M)  
  CC27. An implementation of a decision built on the specific mega 
corporate culture (leadership style, corporate culture, corporate profile) 
improves the implementation efficiency in some but not all decision 
cases; the significance of the mega corporate culture lies in the existence 
(scope and penetration) sooner than in its content (M)  
  CC28. Both decision makers and implementers estimate the 
implementation efficiency (GS and PE) situationally and independently 
of their estimations of corporate culture (M) 
  CC29. A situational leadership characterized by engagement and staying 
power overcomes hesitations and resistance among implementers and 
therefore it increases the implementation efficiency (W) 
  CC30. The participation of implementers in the decision making process, 
even if just to a limited extent, improves the implementation efficiency 
according to the estimations of both decision makers and implementers 
(W) 
  CC31. Decision makers and implementers are essentially concordant in 
their estimations of goal satisfaction as well as other model variables 
except leadership style (W) 
  CC32. A strong corporate culture forces a high number of concordant 
opinions between decision makers and implementers of all model 
variables except leadership style (-)   
  CC33. The implementer evaluates regularily the implementation mission 
and sometimes does informal or formal planning, which is certainly the 
case if the decision is demanded or recognized (W) 
  CC34.   The implementer behavior seems to be situational in terms of 
evaluation, planning and acting without any stepwise process detected 
(M) 
  CC35. Goal satisfaction and process efficiency are estimated 
independently of each other (-) 
  CC36. In a corporate culture in change the decision makers have a more 
positive picture than implementers regarding decision factors as well as 
implementation efficiency (W) 
  CC37. Executives estimates in general goal satisfaction to be more 
successful than process efficiency (-) 
  CC38. Strategic decisions are perceived as more complex than 
operational decisions, which causes lower goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency compared to operational decisions (W)   
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  CC39. Decisions aimed for internal target groups are implemented more 
efficiently than decisions aimed for customers (W) 
  CC40. The implementation efficiency is not affected by whether a 
decision is demanded or not (M) 
  CC41. Decisions recognized by the implementers are implemented with a 
better result than decisions that are not recognized (-) 
  CC42. An implementation follow-up plan gives increased goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency according to the opinions of 
implementers, in contrast to the opinions of decision makers (-) 
  CC43. Small decision scope gives increased goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency according to the opinions of decision makers, in contrast to the 
opinions of implementers (-) 
  CC44. A personally transmitted decision to implement does not 
confidently lead to a higher goal satisfaction and process efficiency, 
compared to a non-personally transmission (-) 
  CC45. The perceived and interpreted purpose of the decision to 
implement influences the attitudes and behavior of the implementer 
causing effects on implementation efficiency (-)  
  CC46. An implementer’s resistance against the implementation of a 
decision may occur if the effects do not affect others and the personal risk 
of sanctions is small (W)  
  CC47. A contemporary presence of non-directive leadership style, a 
strong corporate culture and a profitable company situation give high 
implementation efficiency; the conclusion is valid also for separated goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency as well as for just implementers (W)  
  CC48. If the implementation context is simple, it is a sufficient condition 
for high implementation efficiency; the conclusion is valid also for just 
implementers (-)  
  CC49. A combination of clear implementation profile and simple 
implementation context is one way to high goal satisfaction as well as 
high process efficiency; for the latter, there is also another way, namely 
the implementers’ participation in the decision making process; the 
conclusions are valid also for just implementers (W) 
  CC50. The preliminary implementation model is not falsified by 
multivariate estimations but has a weakness regarding the significance of 
some variables (S) 
  CC51. The preliminary implementation model for implementers is more 
simple than for decision makers: it excludes the measurement variables 
sales, profit, decision type and scope but includes participating in 
decision making process; weakness regarding significance of some 
variables has been observed (S) 
 
The first seven conclusions come from Step I; the others are from Step II with 
CC8 to CC26 from the qualitative analysis of individual decisions, CC27 to CC29 
from the qualitative analysis of decision context, and CC30 to CC51 from the 
quantitative analysis. 
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7.2 Research questions and their answers derived from the 
analysis  
The research questions, RQ, are formulated in 3.4 and the conclusions from the 
analysis, CC, listed in 7.1, are used to answer them. An overview of the 
combinations is presented in table 45 as a structural help for the following 
discussions.  
 
In the following, each research question is repeated with an individual heading. 
The last digit in the headline number corresponds to RQx to be found in 3.4, e.g., 
7.2.6 to RQ6, and therefore the identification RQx is not shown. 
 
Many but not all of the research questions are linked to the measurement 
variables in the implementation model. As discussed in 3.3 the measurement 
variables may be interrelated. If so, there are also connections between the 
research questions. However, overlapping, conditional assumptions, etc., between 
the research questions are not discussed in this chapter. The interrelations and the 
complexity are instead discussed in 7.3, using the LISREL analysis results, and in 
7.4 using all available information from the study. 
  
From the beginning of the discussion, it must be emphasized that the answers to 
the research questions are based on conclusions from few observations, and in a 
couple of cases just a single observation, as this is mainly a qualitative study (see 
4.2.1). Furthermore, the number of conclusions and their weights support the 
research questions answers to a varying extent. Therefore the answers to the 
research questions are not definitive or absolute but indicating paths to follow in 
future research approaches; they are hypotheses.  
 
The answers to the research questions are initially given as a differentiated 
YES/NO/DON’T KNOW, if relevant, followed by a discussion supported or 
contradicted by the literature. In order to facilitate the reading as well as 
understanding and evaluating the discussion, the supporting conclusions are 
supplemented with the weight (see 6.1 S=Strong, M=Medium, W=Weak and -
=fragile) in brackets, e.g., CC6(-). A consistent theme in the study is the down-up 
perspective. The literature review has not indicated any reports with such an 
explicit approach (see 2.4). Accordingly it is not possible to find pros and cons to 
my findings in literature regarding the down-up perspective, which therefore 
generally may be looked upon as new knowledge.  
 
7.2.1 Are there essential differences in implementation efficiency between 
complex profit-driven Swedish organizations? 
A tentative answer is YES, which is investigated in 6.2.1 and conclusion CC1(S). 
However, there are some comments to do regarding the analysis results in order to 
value the answer as the results are calculated and compared from the estimations 
made by CEOs regarding the decision implementation efficiency of their own 
organization. Therefore, these estimations are not an objective measurement. The 
reasons are discussed here. 
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Table 45. How the conclusions, CCx, (see 7.1) have been used to answer the research 
questions, RQx, (see 3.4); conclusion weight (S, M, W, -, see 6.1) 
 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2
CC1 S x
CC2 M x xx
CC3 M x
CC4 M x
CC5 Wx
CC6 -x x
CC7 Wx
CC8 Wx
CC9 Wx
CC10 W x
CC11 Wx x x
CC12 Wx
CC13 Wx x
CC14 Mx
CC15 Wx x x
CC16 Wx
CC17 W
CC18 W x
CC19 - xx
CC20 W xx x
CC21 -
CC22 W x
CC23 W
CC24 - xx
CC25 - xx
CC26 M x
CC27 M xx
CC28 M x
CC29 W xx x
CC30 W xx x
CC31 W x
CC32 - x
CC33 W x
CC34 M x
CC35 - x
CC36 W x
CC37 - x
CC38 W x
CC39 W x
CC40 M x
CC41 - xx
CC42 - xx
CC43 - xx
CC44 - x
CC45 - x
CC46 W xx
CC47 W x xxx
CC48 - xx
CC49 W xx x
CC50 S
CC51 S
Conclu-
sions
Research questions 
 
The estimation tool could have been used differently and, even if it is used 
correctly, they could have measured different things. At last, the implementation   
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efficiency is measured in Step I as an aggregation of goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency. On the other side, the estimation range of implementation efficiency 
among 30 companies goes from 45 to 85 (100 is maximum) with 80% of the 
companies below index 75. So in total, the result is an indication of existing 
differences between complex profit-driven Swedish organizations and, 
furthermore, there is a potential for improvement. Even if this statement takes into 
account both strategic and operational TMT decisions, it is in accordance with the 
research results for the implementation of strategic decisions, reported by Nutt 
(1997) and Nutt (2002), saying “…decisions that were put to full use only half of 
the time”. Hickson et al. (2003) report an implementation success average 
(measured as achievement) of 3.7 on a six-grade scale (that corresponds to an 
index of 62) with a standard deviation of 1.5 regarding 55 decisions in 14 
companies; the standard deviation indicates that 67% of the decisions range 
between index values 37 and 87. Dean & Sharfman (1996) report a similar picture: 
the implementation success average (measured as decision effectiveness) of 4.32 
on a seven-graded Likert scale (that corresponds to an index of 62) with a standard 
deviation of 1.69 regarding 52 decisions in 24 companies; the standard deviation 
indicates that 67% of the decisions range between index values 38 and 86. 
Altogether, even if the discussed report results are obtained from different 
approaches, they support my results that there are important variations in 
implementation efficiency between companies.  
 
Finally, the implementation inefficiency detected in this study may be reflected 
in similar observations regarding product development (Strannegård, 2003). He 
has found that just two of ten product development projects results in a launched 
product. The project costs exceed the budget in most cases between 40% and 
200%. The failure is mostly explained by the hopelessness of the original product 
idea. He concludes (p. 159, my translation) that “If too many actors are skeptical 
to the trend of events, the project runs the risk of breakdown”. It seems that there 
are many parallel results and explanations in Strannegård’s study and mine even if 
the two studies have different purposes.  
 
7.2.2 Do decision makers and implementers differ in their opinions on 
implementation conditions and results?  
YES, to a certain extent. In 6.3.4.2 the question is analyzed resulting in conclusion 
CC31(W). If decision makers and implementers agree upon the estimation of goal 
satisfaction (that is the fact in 2/3 of the cases) they also agree quite well on other 
variables. However, if they do not, they are also disunited about the estimations of 
other variables. Conclusions such as CC32(-), CC36(W), CC42(-), CC43(-), 
CC47(W), CC48(-) and CC49(W) confirm the picture: there is to a certain degree 
consensus but also situations where decision makers and implementers disagree. 
The latter is most evident in table 31, CC37(-), regarding implementation 
efficiency: the decision makers estimate goal satisfaction to be much less achieved 
compared to process efficiency in contrast to implementers. In total, even if many 
of the conclusions are based on few observations, the sum of them gives support to 
the YES answer.  
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When the CEOs in Step I were asked about reasons for good and poor 
implementation, they generally answered, that successful implementation mainly 
depends on themselves and non-successful implementation mainly depends on 
subordinates, CC6(-). Even if support for the statement is weak I dare to make an 
interpretation. It seems as the decisions generally are OK but in some cases they 
fail in the implementation phase due to implementer shortcomings. Such an 
understanding is supported theoretically (see, e.g., Hogarth, 1994). People make 
value judgments by which they express preferences. The judgments are mainly 
done intuitively. In the actual case it is to be understood that the CEO judgments 
of implementation success express their preference that they have made reasonable 
decisions but some of them failed for reasons out of their control. If the 
implementers had been asked the same question about reasons for variation in 
implementation success, a prediction of their explanation may be that less 
successful implementation depends on wrong decisions! Braga Rodrigues & 
Hickson (1995) discuss a similar aspect saying “An attempt was made to cover 
unsuccessful as well as successful decisions, and therefore executives were also 
asked to suggest examples of each. Not surprisingly, there were more successful 
cases than unsuccessful. Perhaps the less successful decisions are more readily 
forgotten; or perhaps organizations in which the majority of decisions are 
unsuccessful are no longer around to be studied” (p. 658). It may be only 
speculations of the reasons for this situation but they seem to support the CEO 
opinions in my study.  
 
The results show that a specific implementation situation is sometimes not 
perceived in the same way by the actors. The conclusion is discussed in an 
overview of management and leadership literature (Sjöstrand et al., 1999). They 
conclude that “… people perceive ‘the reality’ from their individual starting-
points” (p. 18, my translation). Anyhow, this study underlines that there are 
different pictures of what is going on in a complex profit-driven company 
regarding decision implementation. The database is too small to say something 
about what the differences consist of or potential causality between concordance 
and degree of implementation efficiency. But it seems as the finding, supported by 
existing knowledge, is a critical aspect to focus on in future research in order to 
obtain the key to improved implementation efficiency.  
 
7.2.3 How are goal satisfaction and implementation process efficiency, 
constituting implementation efficiency, connected? 
It should be noted that the measurements of the two variables in this study are 
done as estimations of the respondents (see 4.2.2.2). They have been asked to 
score on a scale given oral information about what to estimate. However, there 
could be a risk that if goal satisfaction, GS, is scored a certain figure (indicating 
good/poor), process efficiency, PE, would also be estimated with the same value: 
good is good, poor is poor. A look at individual decision cases shows that there 
are GS><PE relations as 2.5><6 and 5.5><0.5 saying that the decision goal was 
not quite reached but the implementation was very successful (first example) and 
vice versa (second example). In 73% of the cases the respondents have given non-
equal scores on the two variables. The implementers show a very sensitive picture   
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(see table 28) with well distributed combinations of scores for the two variables. 
The decision makers on the contrary have never scored PE higher than GS within 
the same case. The analysis also shows, however, a correlation of r=0.64 between 
GS and PE. In summary, my conclusion is that GS and PE are estimated 
independently of each other CC35(-). This statement is partly supported by 
conclusion CC6(-), which says that poor implementation depends on subordinates!  
 
The QCA analysis of Step II (see 6.3.6.3/4) has detected separated conditions 
for successful GS and PE (see CC48(-) and CC49(W), respectively), but also 
indicated that in some situations the conditions for success are the same for both as 
shown for CC47(W).  
 
A specific question is if and how the decision goal may change during the 
implementation phase due to new information, changed context or implementation 
influence. When the respondents are estimating GS, they have not been asked their 
opinion about which goal they are judging. This is a weakness related to 
reliability, which may be taken into account in further studies. The question is 
further discussed in 7.4.1.1.  
 
All these findings support the statement that the respondents have estimated the 
two variables separately but that there is a positive correlation between them. 
Implementation efficiency related to decision making efficiency as a part of 
organizational efficiency is discussed in 3.1. Irrespective of if the decision is 
“clever” or not, the implementation must aim in reaching the decision purpose 
using just the necessary resources. Looking at implementation in this way, the 
results show that it is relevant to measure implementation efficiency as both GS 
and IE but also to keep them separated.  
 
The studies that are referred in table 3 all focus on goal satisfaction of the 
implemented decision or similar measurements. The implementation costs to reach 
the decision aim (or not!) are not estimated. Therefore it is difficult to compare my 
results with results from other studies. However, Bryson & Bromiley (1993) tested 
seven different measurements of implementation success (p. 321) where Success 
accounted for 59% of total variance and Learning for 16%. The correlation in 
between is not reported. Braga Rodrigues & Hickson (1995) report that the four 
implementation success variables Realization, Propitiousness, Non-Disturbance 
and Perceived Success “… do catch at least something of the general managerial 
appraisal of a decision, grounded in managerial experience of what happened. 
They do enable some comparability between the performances of different kinds 
of decision in different kinds of organization”. It seems as these two studies 
support the idea that implementation efficiency must be estimated in different 
dimensions.  
 
In summary, the answer to the research question is that GS and PE are estimated 
separately as two different things. It means in the individual case, as an example, 
that the decision goal may be well achieved (high GS) but at the price of an 
insufficient degree of resource consumption (low PE); both variables seem to be 
necessary to measure in order to get an acceptable estimation of implementation 
efficiency. The process efficiency results from the study are also a contribution to   
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our understanding about the implementation scope as there are no findings of this 
approach in the literature, so far as indicated by the results of the literature review.  
 
7.2.4 Does the type of decision (strategic vs operational) matter regarding 
the implementation efficiency? 
YES, but not without reservations. Strategic vs operational decisions are analyzed 
in 6.3.5.3 with the conclusion formulated in CC38(W).  
 
Strategic and operational decisions are kept apart in the decision making 
literature (see, e.g., Cooke & Slack, 1991, p. 21). The studies found in the 
literature are dealing with implementation of “strategic” decisions even if the 
definitions of the term “strategic” is unclear (see discussion in 2.4). Irrespective of 
the definition, there is no comparison between strategic and operational decisions 
in terms of implementation conditions and efficiency. In my study, however, the 
analysis results of such a categorization detect differences: strategic decisions are 
perceived as more complex than operational decisions, which causes lower goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency compared to operational decisions. The 
decision makers and the implementers are agreed, which indicates that the 
differences in the “strategic” definition (see 2.4) are not a problem here.  
 
The differences in implementation efficiency may be explained by a higher 
degree of uncertainty regarding strategic decisions, since they may occur as 
decisions forcing a higher degree of change. Uncertainty is discussed in the 
literature in terms of a decision maker dilemma (see, e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977). 
Strategies are formulated to handle uncertainty. Uncertainty in the implementation 
phase, when a specific decision is made, is a similar thing: the implementer has to 
make decisions how to act. This uncertainty may be decreased if the mission to 
implement includes a detailed, accurate implementation plan and executive 
coaching. Such an action will have positive effects if uncertainty is a potential 
factor causing lower implementation efficiency of the strategic decision. The 
reported literature has dealt with this concept and has presented successful action 
solutions (see, e.g., Hickson et al., 2003, and Nutt, 1986) discussed in 2.2.1. The 
proposed theory in table 1 supports the discussion above; there is a combination of 
conditions and executive action giving reasonable possibility to a successful 
implementation. Nutt reports a similar approach in his many papers. In other 
terms, a specific executive action selected from a range of four different 
management tactics (see 2.2.1) with a given situational decision/implementation 
context, influences the implementation success.  
 
As it has been said, no reports are found where strategic decisions are compared 
to operational decisions per se. But it has been observed that the theory in table 1 
is commented with “As far as the evidence presented here goes, it would appear to 
be the same for any kind of decision in any kind of organization” (Hickson et al., 
2003, p. 1822). Nutt (1986) says “this study found no relationship between 
implementation tactics and type of change. Managers do not appear to favor 
particular tactics to implement program, equipment or construction changes” (p. 
255). The two citations do not directly support my answer on the research question 
but the implicit meaning is, as far as I understand, that there are no principal   
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reasons why different types of decisions would be implemented with different 
degrees of success. It is instead a question of the relevant implementation 
approach depending on not only the type of decision but also on the other 
situational conditions, as discussed above, regarding the aim to decrease 
uncertainty.  
  
May there be other potential explanations for the implementation efficiency 
differences between strategic and operational decisions? Yes, I suppose so. One is 
of psychological nature: if a thing to do is perceived to be difficult, it will be 
difficult to do (see Robbins & Coulter, 1999, chapter Motivating Employees, p. 
483). The shortages in implementation and follow-up plans, executive coaching, 
etc., uncovered in the analysis and discussed in 7.2.5/13/19/20 and 7.4.1.3, support 
a psychological explanation to a certain degree. “Scope” and “demanded” and/or 
“recognized” are decision characteristics close to decision type. These 
categorizations are discussed in 7.2.15-17 and 7.2.20. It seems reasonable that 
they may be seen as background variables contributing to the explanation of the 
observed differences in implementation efficiency between decision types. 
  
In summary, the strategic decisions seem not to be treated in the implementation 
phase according to their conditions (needs of plans and executive coaching, etc.) 
leading to less implementation efficiency compared to operational decisions.  
 
7.2.5 What are the reasons explaining implementer attitudes towards 
implementation action? 
The implementers present negative or expectant attitudes to some decisions to 
implement, CC45(-). Such examples are antagonism between the existing culture 
and the content of the actual decision, CC13(W), a decision goal in a non-
predictable future, CC14(M), and lack of a follow-up plan, CC15(W). Further 
more, an implementation mission without a communicated purpose causes 
resistance, CC9(W), as well as a perceived “wrong” decision, CC16(W). The 
attitudes are positive if the implementers have been involved in the decision 
making process, CC19(-), CC24(-) and CC30(W), or if the decision is recognized, 
CC41(-). It seems that the implementer resistance to implementation of a decision 
may occur in specific situations identified in the study. CC46(W) point out 
loyality to job fellows and sanctions as critical criteria for potential resistance to 
individual decisions. However, in many other decision cases the initial hesitation 
or resistance has been overcome.  
 
The conclusions show the implementers’ perceived reality, not an objective 
reality or the perceived reality of the decision maker (see discussion in 7.2.2). The 
implementer attitudes are influenced by the situational performance of the leaders. 
This aspect is discussed in 2.2.2; Thompson & Strickland (1992) list six principal 
tasks for successful implementation whereof “Exercising strategic leadership” is 
the sixth. A further step in leadership performance is presented by Brundin (2002): 
the emotions of the leader “… can be related directly to the change process where 
they serve as driving forces or restraining forces …”; see also citation in 2.2.1. 
The importance of leader action in order to influence the attitudes of subordinates 
is discussed in textbooks about leadership (see, e.g., Robbins & Coulter, 1999),   
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but testimonies are also given by leaders of industry such as Carlzon (1985) and 
Iacocca (1984). They all underline key elements in leader action as creating 
motivation through presence, as figureheads, or by example and dialogue. 
Brunsson (1985) sets up three conditions of organizational action: expectation, 
motivation and commitment (p. 176). They are interrelated. Each of them may be a 
starting point for executive action, e.g.,motivation in a rationalistic decision 
procedure. In this study, the coaching of the implementation process by the leader 
is however limited (see 7.2.13). Therefore advice and prescriptions are not directly 
applicable in order to understand the reasons for the implementer attitudes as they 
per se presume leader action. These different literature references support strongly 
the observations in the study that there are positive and negative attitudes towards 
the decision to implement. The question, however, remains: Which are the reasons 
causing them?  
 
One way to attempt to understand the implementer attitudes is to look at them in 
two dimensions: how they are created and how they are manifested. The 
importance of active leadership according to the literature stands in contrast to the 
actual executive coaching in the implementation process observed in this study. 
This absence of leadership is probably the common and main reason for the 
negative attitudes of the implementers and the reverse in observed positive cases. 
The statement does not neglect the influence on the attitudes of the implementers 
from decision complexity, existence of a follow-up plan, coaching, etc., their 
competence and personal conditions (decision recognition, perceived corporate 
culture,  etc.) but emphasizes the role of executive coaching. This is not new 
knowledge but it contributes to our understanding of the importance of the soft 
side of the leadership in change management including implementation of top 
management decisions in complex profit-driven organizations. Future research 
may not only map the implementer attitudes on the scale resistance-acceptance-
commitment but also explain the procedures leading to the established attitudes in 
different implementation situations.  
 
7.2.6 Do extreme corporate situations such as a very successful running 
business or a business in deep crisis improve the implementation 
efficiency?  
The answer is NO, CC5(W). Even if the conclusion is based on the 30 companies 
in Step I, the NO-answer needs modification. The extreme profit situation itself 
does not lead to high implementation efficiency but the implementation efficiency 
is higher in combination with either a value-driven leadership or a long period of 
CEO regime, CC7(W). In the latter case, it is impossible to elucidate the impact of 
an extreme profit situation. So in all, this study indicates that extreme profit 
situations do not promote high implementation efficiency.  
 
As I have not found reports directly dealing with the implementation process 
efficiency, it is not possible to compare my results with other studies. However, 
executives have discussed the topic in their books (see Wallander, 1990; Carlzon, 
1985; Peters & Waterman Jr, 1982; Iacocca, 1984; see also 3.3). They emphasize 
that well running business as well as crises are complicated contexts for change. 
Sometimes decisions go the right way according to the implementer opinion,   
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sometimes the opposite. In the first case the implementation goes smooth and in 
the second case resistance occurs. These reactions of implementers are not 
typically for extreme profit situations but they may be more evident as the 
decisions in this context often are forced by the executives and need rapid 
implementation for change. It seems, as the successful implementation of 
decisions in a complicated context is situational to a large extent; other conditions 
than “crises” mean more. If so, the result from my study connects to this 
statement. This knowledge is therefore valuable for further development of the 
down-up perspective in order to improve implementation efficiency.  
 
7.2.7 Does the size of an organization itself influence the implementation 
efficiency? 
The answer is NO based on the analysis of companies in Step I, where the size 
goes from 3 to 1250 employees, as shown in 6.2.1 with CC4(M). The QCA 
analysis (6.2.2) of data from Step I support this conclusion as no solutions 
including size were found. It should be noticed that the analysis is based only on 
the CEO’s opinion and therefore lacks an implementer perspective. From Step II 
no company size effects can be analyzed directly, as information is available from 
just three companies and they are all of a certain degree of complexity (300, 1000 
and 1100 employees). However, single case information is interesting in an 
implementer perspective, given the complex organization situation: participating 
in decision making process may overcome complexity, CC30(W) and CC49(W), 
as well as situational leadership, CC29(W), and a strong corporate culture, 
CC27(M).  
 
The reason to look at size is based on the idea that a bigger organization size, 
such as an organization with many employees, forces a growing complexity in 
terms of communication, contacts, and overview leading to an individual 
uncertainty on how to act, as discussed in 2.1 (see, e.g., Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 
1998, and Bolman & Deal, 1981); uncertainty is partly linked to company size. 
However, the results in this study have not detected any direct influence of 
company size on implementation efficiency. A possible explanation is that size 
itself does not matter but size may be a context factor with an indirect influence on 
implementation efficiency through variables such as coaching, resources, 
competence,  etc. The literature review supports such a standpoint: the size of 
studied organizations is reported but not investigated per se (see, e.g., Braga 
Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995; Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Nutt, 1998). To conclude, 
there seem to be findings in the study, confirmed in the literature, that look at size 
as a part of “complex” in co-variation with other factors such as technology, 
business scope, etc., as discussed in 2.1.  
 
7.2.8 Does strong, pervasive and committed corporate culture improve the 
implementation efficiency? 
The answer is YES, which is supported by the conclusions CC2(M) and CC27(M) 
derived from analyses of data from Step I (6.2.1) as well as from Step II (6.3.3.1). 
The answer is also supported by conclusions CC11(W) (see 6.3.2.4) and CC47(W)   
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(see 6.3.6.3) where the idea “corporate culture” is broadened to include leadership 
and corporate profile.  
 
The YES answer is supported by a review (Alvesson, 1997) of corporate culture 
dimensions with an important condition: the strong and pervasive corporate 
culture must be perceived as positive. Braga Rodrigues & Hickson (1995) have 
studied business and non-business organizations. Their organizational cultures 
matter as “the conditions for the success or otherwise of a decision, in the terms 
defined here, differed markedly between the non-commercial and commercial 
worlds … In the non-commercial world … it seems how things are done can 
matter more than what is to be done or even whether it is feasible … in the 
commercial world of the business firms. There it is relatively means-oriented. The 
wherewithal for deciding and implementing is comparatively important, and what 
is more, top management plays a larger part with better effect” (p. 665/6). Nutt 
(1989) says “To act the strategic manager must deal with resistance to change that 
has political and social roots in the organization …” (p. 146). Even if the first 
citation touches an organizational type (non-business) without appearance in my 
study, both of them support the finding that culture matters. It is however a 
question how to estimate the culture: may specificity complete or substitute 
penetration and commitment? It is a future research challenge to find the answer in 
order to improve the implementation model.  
 
7.2.9 Do differences in the individually perceived corporate culture of 
executives and subordinates affect their opinion about implementation 
efficiency? 
The answer is NO. The analysis in 6.3.3.1, leading to conclusion CC28(M), shows 
no correlations between the estimations of corporate culture and implementation 
efficiency for neither decision makers nor for implementers. The conclusion must 
be understood that, given a specific perceived corporate culture, the 
implementation case is estimated individually. It does not contradict what is said 
in 7.2.8; in total, a strong, pervasive and positively perceived corporate culture 
improves the implementation efficiency in general but in the individual 
implementation case it is not a guarantee as situational factors may take over. This 
standpoint is supported by the LISREL analysis, where corporate culture in 
interplay with other independent variables influence the implementation efficiency 
(see table 44 but also figures 11 and 12). 
 
The findings may not be compared to other implementation studies, as they do 
not have a double perspective (down-up and top-down; see Chapter 2). In 
cognitive psychology (see, e.g., Eysenck & Keane, 1995), it is possible to find 
support both for the NO answer given above and a potential YES answer. If two 
persons have different perceived pictures of one issue, it is not necessarily the 
same as they also will have different pictures of another issue. It depends on how 
similar the issues are, how close the issues are in time and room, and other 
circumstances. A YES answer to the research question would have been more 
expected as the two issues – corporate culture and implementation efficiency – are 
related. Therefore it seems clever to be suspicious of the result; it may be 
influenced by other factors that are not controlled in this study.    
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7.2.10 Do implementers in general have a readiness to implement top 
management decisions even if they are perceived as controversial? 
The answer is DON’T KNOW. The term readiness is picked up from the literature 
(Hickson et al., 2003) and used when formulating the research question. Readiness 
may be seen both as a part of corporate culture and an individual characteristic. 
However, there is no available conclusion to provide an answer. It has not been 
possible to extract attitudes or opinions from the interviews to such an extent that 
an analysis could be done. Two citations, both from implementers, illuminate the 
topic. Ason says regarding corporate culture “Will and readiness to change for 
efficiency are also essential parts of culture” and Aberg says “We are ready to 
change as the world changes”. To express such opinions is something else than to 
be confronted with a controversial decision to implement; it is only in such a 
situation that readiness is tested.  
 
The Readiness-based approach (Hickson et al., 2003, see presentation 2.2.1), is 
“… to occur where the climate is receptive but experience relatively lacking. It 
seems highly likely that this is the most promising alternative where managers ‘do 
not know what they are doing’. For it means clearing the way by seeing that 
departmental structure and authority are not obstacles, and by ensuring focused 
priority for this implementation so that other issues do not intrude too much and it 
holds managerial attention” (p. 1814). So even if the study has not answered the 
research question it is an important issue for further studies with a specific down-
up perspective giving an answer to the managerial question “Are the subordinates 
ready for take off”?  
 
7.2.11 Does an action-oriented corporate culture improve implementation 
efficiency? 
The answer is DON’T KNOW as it has not been possible to detect such a 
correlation, positive or negative, in the data. However, there is one conclusion, 
CC8(W), from decision 1304 indicating that an indistinct decision is possible to 
implement successfully in terms of goal satisfaction, if the corporate culture is 
“action-oriented”, but the process efficiency will be low.  
 
The discussion in 7.2.8 is relevant here too. Action-oriented corporate culture is 
an example of specificity. So even if the research questions are not answered in the 
study, the topic is relevant for future research according to the argumentation in 
7.2.8.  
 
7.2.12 Does a CEO leadership style, characterized by engagement and 
confidence in people, improve the implementation efficiency? 
The answer to the question is divided between a careful and tentative YES for 
“engagement” and DON’T KNOW for “confidence in people”. 
 
The question contains two parts. The first, “engagement”, is supported by 
conclusions from three individual decision cases, CC20(W), CC25(-) and 
CC29(W). Proof for the second, “confidence in people”, is more difficult to 
uncover in the interviews. It seems as “engagement” is more characterized by   
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intervention, power and follow-up than “confidence in people” even if situational 
leadership is observed, CC12(W), as a tool to improve process efficiency. 
However, this is to a certain degree an effect of the limitation of the data in the 
study. – Additional comments are given in 7.2.13. 
 
7.2.13 Does the quantitative input of executive time and engagement in the 
implementation process improve the implementation efficiency? 
The answer is YES, supported principally by conclusion CC29(W) saying that “A 
situational leadership characterized by engagement and staying power overcomes 
hesitations and resistance among implementers and therefore it increases the 
implementation efficiency”. The answer is also supported explicitly or implicitly 
by conclusions CC11(W), CC20(W), CC25(-) and CC47(W).  
 
In spite of five conclusions, it is a important observation that the executive 
activities in the implementation process have been rare in the study; the theme is 
discussed in 7.4.1.3. The following discussion must therefore be understood with 
that background. The answers to research questions RQ12 and RQ13 are based on 
few observations of the decision maker acting in the implementation process. The 
observation raises the question about the decision maker role in the 
implementation process. From the implementer perspective it is about guiding, 
managing and pushing, which can be summarized as coaching. The demand seems 
to be situational depending on decision complexity, implementer competence, etc. 
There is also a decision maker perspective, e.g., how important is the issue related 
to other things the decision maker has to do (the margin value). In this study, as 
said, the decision maker is infrequently present in the implementation phase. The 
effects of this absence on the implementation efficiency are just partly detected as 
I was not prepared to pick up the issue during the interviews; it was not until the 
analysis was carried out that this important aspect came true. So it is not possible 
to estimate the effects of the absence in other ways than has been done in the 
conclusions used above. 
 
Some of the reports in the literature have detailed information of case selection 
for their study. Hickson et al., 2003 have an aim of the study to identify “… a 
number of features that characterize the way implementation is managed which 
appear to enhance the chance of success”. The primary criterion for decision 
selection was that their implementation was traceable, but in eight per cent of the 
decision cases the implementation was not traceable. This information is 
interesting if it is compared with my findings of the absent decision maker during 
the implementation process. As the detailed reasons are not reported, it is open to 
speculations: may one reason be that the decision makers did not act during the 
implementation and, consequently, the implementation of the decision is not 
traceable? However, the literature (see, e.g., Hickson et al., 2003; Miller, 1997; 
Nutt, 1989) is very clear about the importance of decision maker coaching in the 
implementation phase and the choice of coaching strategies. So we know a bit 
about relevant leader action, when action is taken, but not what happens if the 
leader does not act. My findings are therefore a contribution to the understanding 
of this situation, so far mostly by pointing out a necessary research area for better 
understanding of the conditions for implementation efficiency. Leadership matters.   
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7.2.14 Does the participation of implementers in the decision making 
process improve the implementation efficiency? 
The answer is a careful YES. The main analysis to answer the question is carried 
out in 6.3.4.1 with the conclusion CC30(W) as a result. In two decisions, 5401 and 
5406, there is explicit support in conclusions CC19(-) and CC24(-). But there are 
also cases where non-participation does not matter regarding implementation 
efficiency given the conditions operational, demanded and aimed for internal 
target groups, CC18(W), or recognized target groups, CC22(W). A single 
decision, 2305, gives a good example of co-operating situational conditions: an 
operational decision, demanded by the implementers and just affecting internal 
routines, is successfully implemented even if the implementers are not involved in 
the decision making process. It seems as participating value is dependent on 
implementer-perceived decision complexity. 
 
The aspect of the implementer participating in decision making process has been 
found in just a few reports. One reason may be that implementation of strategic 
decisions has been investigated, a decision area for top management to which 
subordinates may not be invited to participate. However, Braga Rodrigues & 
Hickson (1995) found that participation in the decision making process by those 
affected by the decision was positive regarding implementation success, but only 
in public organizations. Brunsson (1985) deals with a very big strategic case, 
where the decision making process proceeded for almost half a year. The union 
representatives were involved on full time. Nevertheless, when the decision was 
made there were different opinions on its implementation causing demonstrations 
and a demand for a change in the decision. I understand the case that in spite of 
participating in the decision making process, the implementation was troublesome 
causing delays and also adding implementation costs, which with my terminology 
is low implementation process efficiency. Nutt (1997) concludes that 
implementation success was better “… when participation was used to involve 
people in shaping the decision” (Abstract). Robbins & Coulter (1999) prescribe 
participating as positive for successful implementation: “If the people who must 
carry out a decision participate in the process, they’re more likely to 
enthusiastically support the outcome than if they are just told what to do”. Another 
textbook (Cooke & Slack, 1991) advises group decision making in relevant 
situations as day-to-day issues but also when the decision will be preferably made 
at a lower organizational level than intended.  
 
The participation seems to have several dimensions. One is the short run 
cost/benefit calculation; are the costs of participation balanced by lower 
implementation costs or better achievement of the decision goal? Another is the 
learning dimension: may the participation be looked upon as an investment in 
competency or motivation for future yield? And a third dimension is the long run 
corporate culture effect: does participation create expectations of regular 
participation in decision making processes at the top level? The answers to the 
questions are a future research field. A preliminary hypothesis is that the value of 
participation is situational depending on corporate culture, potential decision 
complexity, etc., supported both by literature and my findings.  
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7.2.15 Does the type of decision target group influence the implementation 
efficiency?  
The answer is a careful YES relying on the analysis in 6.3.5.4, giving conclusion 
CC39(W). One reason is indicated to be “complexity”. Another may be that 
decisions affecting customers cause uncertainty about their loyality and future 
liaisons affecting the future sales. – More comments are made in 7.2.18.  
 
7.2.16 Does the scope of the decision influence implementation efficiency? 
YES and NO! It depends on whom you ask: the decision makers say YES, the 
implementers NO according to CC43(-) from 6.3.5.8. It is a bit surprising; the 
reverse had instead been expected. However, as seen, the basis for the answer is 
very limited. Secondly, the estimation of scope is made not by the respondents but 
by the author (see 6.3.5). – More comments are made in 7.2.18. 
 
7.2.17 Does implementers’ recognition of the decision or a demanded 
decision improve the implementation efficiency? 
The answer is contradictory: demanded NO, recognized YES. The two terms 
recognized and demanded are treated at the same time as they are to a certain 
extent overlapping. In this study, a demanded decision is not better implemented 
than a non-demanded (see CC40(M) from analysis in 6.3.5.5), in contrast to a 
recognized decision, which is better implemented than a non-recognized decision 
(see CC41(-) from analysis in 6.3.5.6). It is not what I have expected as both ought 
to have the same direction: the more recognized and demanded, the higher the 
implementation efficiency. 
 
 Hickson et al. (2003) have studied implementation success as an effect of eight 
variables including familiarity, acceptability, etc., (see 2.2.1), factors close to 
recognized and demanded. They have collected data through interviews with top 
executives and managers, which is a complication when compared with my 
results, as I have had an implementer perspective in my estimation of the variable 
coefficients. However, their reported results support that the experience and 
readiness in the organization matters regarding implementation success. In my 
study I got a comparable result for recognized decisions but not for demanded. 
Therefore it seems reasonable to continue to study both aspects in future research. 
 
Why may recognition facilitate implementation? An interesting explanation may 
be found in the theory about the tacit system (Hogarth, 2001) as an explanation of 
intuitive behavior based on learning. The tacit system is broadly described as the 
information processing that “… covers all thought processes that are neither 
deliberate nor conscious” (p. 191). People learn from their experiences. When 
confronted with a strange, new situation people react in an immediate and “un-
thought” way, intuitively. This understanding of the potential implementer 
reaction, when receiving an implementation mission, may improve the situational 
leadership, the coaching, discussed in 7.2.13. – More comments are made in 
7.2.18. 
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7.2.18 How does implementers’ perceived conflict between actual decision 
to implement and existing goals, guidelines, etc., influence the 
implementation efficiency?  
The implementer perceived conflicts are negatively effecting the implementation 
efficiency as indicated in conclusions CC2(M), CC10(W), CC13(W) and 
CC46(W). The conclusions come from both Step I and II, which strengthens the 
statement.  
 
The research questions RQ15-18 have a common element, a “decision 
characteristic”. The implementer perceives the “decision characteristic”, both 
regarding the categorization and the scoring on the scale, given her/his personality, 
competence and job context. In this study, it is a complication, as already 
mentioned a couple of times, that I and not the respondents have made some of the 
categorizations and estimations; I have made interpretation of their interview 
answers, where a direct respondent score estimation had been more correct. It 
creates at least an uncertainty regarding understanding of the implementation 
process. This is a method problem to be solved in further investigations.  
 
Many of the implementation studies (Nutt, 1997; Roberto, 2004; Skivington & 
Daft, 1991; Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Miller, 1997; Nutt, 1998; Hickson et al., 
2003) have detailed presentations of the decisions and their characteristics. 
Speaking just about business companies, the decision characteristics have a broad 
range covering the strategic and operational, the service and product, the internal 
and external dimensions etc. both within most of the studies and between the 
studies. However, the impact on implementation success of the decision 
characteristics has not been analyzed directly. However, from the comments, some 
useful information may be picked up. Nutt (1997) concludes that “Managers use a 
variety of tactics … Some of these tactics were found to be far more successful 
than others. … These findings hold for both public and private organizations, 
different types of decisions, degrees of urgency, and similar situational factors” 
(Abstract). Miller (1997) says, “In other words, a computer installation is no more 
and no less likely to do well than is a merger, and neither will, of itself, do better 
than new buildings, for instance. This would mirror the lack of significance of 
topics as such during decision-making …” (p. 592). Nutt (1998) discusses four 
implementation approaches (see 2.2.1), and finds that decision characteristics 
matter in terms of the successful choice of managerial implementation approach. 
Skivington & Daft (1991) say that generic strategic decisions (definition according 
to Porter, 1980) characterized as either low cost or differentiation need different 
managerial approaches for successful implementation. In the remaining studies I 
have not found any comments to the decision characteristics and implementation 
success. It seems that the importance of the decision characteristics, at least in the 
referred studies, is subordinated to other variables regarding their impact on 
implementation efficiency. Such variables are managerial implementation 
approaches, contextual factors as existing guidelines, and teamwork.  
  
Given the condition under which my study is carried out, it is obvious that the 
characteristics of a decision matters regarding the implementation efficiency. It is 
a complex picture, which growths up, when all characteristics are put together.   
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The complexity involves overlapping, interrelations and influences on goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency. This complexity is better handled in the 
LISREL analysis (see 6.3.7), and the results thereof are discussed in 7.3. However, 
from the analysis of each categorization of the decisions it seems reasonable to 
handle the complexity in two groups. It is a question of the implementation 
context how the decision to implement is evaluated but it is also an individual 
interpretation of the implementation mission, including decision characteristics, 
that matters. Both groups may induce uncertainty among the implementers. 
Uncertainty among them is a leadership challenge to be treated. The discussion in 
7.2.4 is therefore applicable here too.  
 
To summarize, my conclusions are partly in contrast to literature findings. One 
main reason may be the difference between the presence and action of executives 
or managers. If they are not coaching the implementers during the implementation 
process, which is the situation in most cases in my study, the implementers are 
exposed to a higher degree of their own considerations. In such situations it is 
likely that decision characteristics mirrored in their potentially limited experience 
and competence will play a larger role. Therefore the future research may continue 
to evaluate the importance of decision characteristics on implementation efficiency 
taking into account the implementation coaching aspect.  
 
7.2.19 Does an implementation plan attached to the mission improve the 
implementation efficiency? 
When designing the study I assumed the presence of an implementation plan in 
any forms. It was based on the findings in literature discussed in 3.4.2.6. But as 
concluded in 6.3.4.3, there is a shortage of implementation cases with an 
implementation plan presented by the decision makers. Therefore it is not possible 
to provide an answer to the question. However, the presence of an implementation 
plan, its relation to decision category, its place as an element in decision maker 
coaching and its potential influence on implementation efficiency are interesting 
aspects to study in future investigations. 
 
7.2.20 Does a follow-up plan improve the implementation efficiency?  
A DON’T KNOW answer is most correct, but further explanation is required. A 
follow-up plan may be seen as a part of an implementation plan, but it is looked 
upon in this study as a phenomenon that stands for itself, as it is not necessary that 
the follow-up plan is either formal or presented when mission given. In the 
analysis in 6.3.5.7 it is not the existence of a plan but the management follow-up, 
which is analyzed. The absence of an implementation plan (see 7.2.19), including 
a formal follow-up plan, is nevertheless in many cases concluded with a follow-
up. Therefore it is rather the follow-up than the plan that is discussed here. 
 
  It is possible to understand the arguments in table 9 as that the CEOs in Step I 
do not pay much attention to the follow-up: only about 10% of CEOs relate 
“follow-up” as an argument for good and poor implementation.  
   
  168
Some conclusions, CC20(W) and CC42(-), from the analyses of Step II data 
promote the importance of follow-up but others, CC11(W) and CC15(W), are at 
least partly contradictory. These observations in summary (that follow-up is not 
very important) stand in contrast to the CEO’s arguments in Step I (table 9) that 
shared values and needs are factors for successful implementation where cultural 
conflicts and internal resistance are factors for poor implementation (CC2(M) and 
CC3(M)). The contrast is intensified by conclusion CC26(M): a decision and its 
implementation are often a story of complexity and multiplicity in a retrospective 
examination. Some decision cases indicate that the occurrence of the plan matters: 
is the plan available at the moment the mission is transmitted or later? A specific 
corporate culture, as in Company C, implicitly includes follow-up as a routine. 
Furthermore, it has been discussed that in this study, a decision maker is 
infrequently present in the implementation phase (see 7.2.13).  
 
The textbooks underline the importance of follow-up. Simons (2000), as 
mentioned in 3.4.2.6, says “diagnostic control systems are the essential 
management tools …”. Robbins & Coulter (1999) has the Evaluation of Decision 
Effectiveness as the last of eight steps in the decision making process needing a 
control function. In my study, a systematic follow-up has occurred only in 50% of 
the decisions (see table 30; systematic means score 5 and 6). There is a gap 
between practice and management guidelines. Why? Perhaps the answer is found 
in the following citation (Yates, 2003): “Sometimes when people make a decision, 
they have a free hand to do as they wish and, once they have decided, the deed is 
done and they can move on” (p. 176).  
 
In summary, pro and con observations are made in the study regarding the 
importance of follow-up and its influence on implementation efficiency, but it has 
not been possible to identify a structure. There are indications of the positive 
influence of the existence of a follow-up plan on implementation efficiency but so 
far the answer to the research question is DON’T KNOW. The follow-up issue is 
treated in the LISREL analysis (see 6.3.7), and the results are discussed in 7.3. So 
far, the contribution of my study to a greater understanding of this process seems 
to be that follow-up does not necessarily influence the implementation efficiency 
in a positive way, but may play a role under specific circumstances. Which they 
are is a future research task including the question if a formal follow-up plan as a 
part of the implementation mission is more successful than a sooner potentially 
less structured follow-up.  
 
7.2.21 Is it possible to identify an implementation process and some of its 
elements? 
The answer is a YES. In 6.3.4.3 the analysis results in two conclusions, CC33(W) 
and CC34(M), saying that the implementer evaluates regularly the implementation 
mission and sometimes does informal or formal planning. In addition, and even 
more evident, the implementer seems to be situational in terms of evaluation, 
planning and acting, further on called mission adoption process.  
 
 Since the implementation literature (see Chapter 2) has dealt with 
implementation in a top-down perspective it is not possible to calibrate my 
findings with other studies in an implementer perspective. It seems however   
  169
possible to confirm my findings with the help of the knowledge of cognitive 
psychology. Alternative actions are possible when a person is meeting a new 
problem (see figure 13), where the figure text explains the possible actions. An 
important aspect is that the degree of familiarity with the new problem initiates 
different behavior. “Old problems solved” matters, as presented in the discussion 
of the tacit system in 7.2.17. Applying the concepts in figure 13 to my findings, 
the evaluation step corresponds to four possible actions (a-d) in the figure. The 
step planning corresponds with the specific and general plans in the figure. The 
third step action is not involved in the figure but it is implied. This knowledge 
from cognitive psychology supports further efforts to describe and understand the 
implementer behavior when receiving the implementation mission, mission 
adoption process.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. An attempt to understand the mission adoption process as a basic problem 
solving approach involving the following: (a) instantiating specific plans, (b) using 
analogical transformation to a known solution of a similar problem, (c) applying general 
plans to reduce the problem, (d) applying weak methods to search heuristically for a 
possible solution, or (e) using a combination of these approaches. Source: Carbonell (1986), 
p. 373. 
 
The potential connection between the mission adoption process and the 
transmission event, 7.2.22, is not detected in the study. The issue is discussed 
further in 7.4.4.  
 
7.2.22 Does it matter how the decision to implement is transmitted? 
There are indications for a potential YES-answer based on conclusion CC44(-), 
which is very weak as the data available for analysis has a very limited distribution 
(see 6.3.5.9 and 6.3.6.6). The results do not clearly support my idea that a personal 
transmission should facilitate the implementation; as said before I have not found 
anything in the literature about the transmission event and its significance for 
implementation efficiency. Support, that the manner of transmission matters, may 
however be found in general leadership literature. Both executives (see, e.g., 
Carlzon, 1985 and Wallander, 1990), and researchers (see, e.g., Brundin, 2002;   
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Robbins & Coulter, 1999; Sjöstrand et al., 1999), not to forget Peters & Waterman 
Jr (1982) who introduced MBWA, stress the importance of personal meetings. 
Therefore it seems reasonable to continue to study the transmission event and its 
potential impact on implementation efficiency under different conditions in future 
research. Doing so, the interaction between an implementer participating in the 
decision making process and the manner of transmission is an interesting research 
question. Participation may be a manner of transmission (Brunsson, 1985).  
 
The transmission event and the mission adoption process (evaluation, planning, 
acting) have been held apart so far. There is however a relationship: the 
transmission event is the starting point of the entire implementation process where 
the mission adoption process is the first sub-process. It has not yet been explained 
if the manner of transmission has an influence on implementation efficiency, via 
the execution of the implementation process. The observation that the manner of 
transmission matters is however new knowledge according to my understanding. 
This hypothesis is worth a detailed investigation in future research. The findings 
are also a contribution to the development of the implementation model. 
 
7.3 The fitness of the preliminary implementation model 
The hypothesis for this study is formulated in 3.4.1 as  
   The implementation model satisfactorily explains differences in the 
implementation efficiency of top management decisions in complex 
profit-driven Swedish organizations  
 
The implementation model is presented in figure 3. From the LISREL analysis 
in 6.3.7, two important conclusions are made, CC50(S) and CC51(S). Firstly, the 
hypothesis is not falsified by the results. The non-falsification of the hypothesis is 
therefore the basis for the development of the implementation model (see 7.4.4.3). 
Secondly, there are differences in the set up of independent variables in the 
preliminary implementation model between decision makers and implementers. 
The LISREL results are confirmed in the answers of a couple of research 
questions as shown in table 46 in 7.4.2.  
 
In both model variations, there is a reasonable causality between the 
independent and the dependent variables as discussed in 6.3.7. In spite of the fact 
that the study is essentially qualitative, giving a limited database for quantitative 
analysis, the degree of explanation is rather high, 83% and 57% respectively, for 
the two model variations (see 6.3.7.2/3). The difference in the degree of 
explanation is however important information, which in combination with the 
difference in the sets of independent variables in the two model variations calls for 
prudence when drawing conclusions; it is too early to establish the presence and 
importance of different independent variables in the over all model and the 
implementer model. Further studies must confirm the differences but so far it 
seems reasonable to conclude that there is an important message: the decision 
makers must detect and understand the implementer competence, opinions, 
attitudes and behavior in order to improve implementation efficiency. This 
requires a coaching leadership, which in most of the implementation situations has 
been absent in this study (see 7.2.13 and 7.4.1.3).    
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It is confirmed that there is a potential for the improvement of implementation 
efficiency in Swedish profit-driven organizations (see 7.2.1, CC1(S)). How will 
companies make use of this potential? The preliminary conclusion above contains 
a promising answer: with a top management engagement in the implementation of 
their decision, characterized by a coaching leadership based on an understanding 
of implementer-specific situational behavior. Such an approach harmonizes well 
with established knowledge about Change Management discussed in 2.4.  
 
7.4 General discussion 
In this chapter all analyses, conclusions and discussions in 7.2 and 7.3 are 
combined, summarizing what has been found in the study. It means that both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis results are put together.  
 
7.4.1 Decision and implementation situations – complexity and multiplicity 
The study is carried out mainly as a qualitative approach built on interviews with 
the actors (decision makers and implementers) involved in decision making and 
implementation. The analyses of these interviews leave, on an aggregated level, 
three strong impressions, which may be formulated as two questions (“What is a 
decision?” and “How is an implementation situation perceived?”) and a statement 
(“The decision makers’ abdication of implementation process”). They are not 
independent but they are commented separately in the following in an implementer 
perspective. 
 
7.4.1.1 What is a decision? 
As a background to my attempt to answer the question, I point out some issues. 
Most of the decisions studied have been picked up from the minutes of TMT 
meetings. In the beginning of the interviews, I have presented the actual decision 
with words from the minutes. In some implementer interview situations, the 
respondent has made clear, through verbal statements or body language, that 
she/he is not immediately aware of what I am presenting. Therefore a dialogue has 
taken place to make clear which decision we are going to discuss. In other 
situations, a faceted decision picture has evolved during the interview.  
 
As a researcher, I use the term decision according to the definition in Appendix 
A. When I am searching decisions to study in the minutes of the TMT meeting this 
is not a problem: a decision is a decision, formulated in the minutes to meet my 
demand. But when the selected decision is analyzed many months later during the 
interviews, it is not longer just a decision but a package of experiences. The 
decision may have gone through a complex set of consecutive sub-decisions 
during the implementation phase forced by new information, changed context, 
implementer attitudes and actions, etc. The decision may be openly changed a bit 
by the decision makers, the decision may be misunderstood by the implementers, 
the decision may become obsolete. It appears that the original decision was not 
always “a single event”. It was just a departure station for a long journey during 
which things happen. 
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This description leads to some reflections. The original decision is not always 
the decision that is estimated in terms of implementation efficiency. It is instead 
the “final” decision. Does this matter? Yes, I think so. If many things have been 
changed during the “journey”, this will probably be taken into account when 
process efficiency is estimated. Also, if the goal of the original decision has been 
changed or modified, it will probably be the “latest” goal that is the basis for the 
final evaluation and estimation. If the conditions for the implementation efficiency 
estimations are not clear, it is a problem to interpret and understand the estimation 
and its connections to the independent variables, the conditions. This complexity 
may be a future research area to chart and understand.  
 
Another reflection is related to the conflict as such. Conflicts during the 
“journey” may occur for at least two reasons: the changed decision environment 
and the implementer more or less self-willed action. Janis & Mann (1977) confirm 
the existence of post-decisional conflicts and they address a specific chapter to the 
issue. They say: “There is a surprising lack of empirical evidence on 
postdecisional buck passing, although the phenomenon is popularly regarded as an 
occupational hazard in many large institutions, such as the military, government 
agencies, hospitals, and corporate business firms” (p. 313). They prescribe 
however three modes of resolution: reversing, reaffirming and curtailing 
implementation. The alternative modes presume an executive presence in order to 
get relevant information from the implementers as a basis for their action. The 
results in my study have shown absent executives in many implementation 
situations, which is the opposite. Top management decisions left to their fates are 
therefore an interesting future research area.  
 
In summary, the study has shown that “decision” is a complex issue to handle in 
an implementation perspective in complex profit-driven organizations, both from a 
methodological point of view (which decision is on the agenda?) and as a 
postdecisional conflict area.  
 
7.4.1.2 How is an implementation situation perceived? 
The preliminary implementation model (figure 3) shows a high degree of 
complexity. It is applied individually but many decisions are implemented by 
many implementers. Each of them has a unique set of personalities, competences, 
positions, etc. These factors are so far not integrated in the model (see 3.3). All 
together, the interviews and the analyses evidently exhibit that the individual 
implementer perceives a decision implementation case as situational: examples are 
the type of decision, if it is recognized, the decision target group as well as the 
mission content with regard to planning. Furthermore, the decision makers and the 
implementers are not always unanimous. The observations are not surprising. 
They are confirmed both on a basic knowledge level of cognitive psychology 
(Eysenck & Keane, 1995) and in field management studies, e.g., Yates (2003) 
saying “… when deciders have mishandled the acceptability issue, it is often 
because they have mishandled prior cardinal decision issues in particular ways” (p. 
177).  
 
The observations lead to at least two reflections. Firstly, an implementer profile 
in terms of personality, competence, etc., may be incorporated in the   
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implementation model in order to improve the understanding of implementation 
efficiency in an implementer perspective. But this may not be done until we know 
more about other variables (see 7.4.4). Secondly, future guidelines for smooth and 
successful implementation must much more systematically and vigorously take 
into account that human beings are involved; it is to push at open doors but 
nevertheless an important statement supported by established management 
theories as they are presented in textbooks, see Chapter 2. 
 
7.4.1.3 The decision makers’ abdication of implementation process 
The interviews with decision makers expose in many cases a low information level 
about what is going on in the implementation process of their decisions. It is not 
only a question about the lack of plans (resources, time schedules, follow-up, etc.), 
which is severe enough and discussed in 7.3 and 7.4.2, but also the absence of 
engagement and supportive and driving leadership. As the picture has evolved 
during my analysis, it has not been possible to dig deeper into the issue; there has 
not been enough information as I did not in the individual interview cases observe 
the issue and therefore did not ask follow-up questions. But some comments are 
possible to express.   
 
A continuous theme in prescriptive literature regarding successful leadership is 
executive presence in terms of dialogue, figurehead, attendance etc. (see, e.g., 
Robbins & Coulter, 1999). The leader’s time is under competition from many 
demands from subordinates, customers, suppliers, media and family. One reason 
for the observed absence may therefore be a leader feeling that she/he has done 
her/his part of the work (Yates, 2003; see citation in 7.2.20).  
 
In all reports discussed in 2.2.1, the effects of different executive actions, such 
as use of tactics, planning and backing, have been studied. It is an underlying 
condition that the executives are present in the implementation phase, at least to a 
certain degree. The opposite, the total absence of executive implementation 
leadership, has not been studied so far as I know. My detection of this state of 
things is therefore important to follow-up in future research in order to understand 
both the reasons for the executive (non)-action and the effects thereof on 
implementation efficiency. 
 
Situational executive coaching is discussed in 7.2.12 and 7.2.13. The 
implementers have estimated the leadership style of the CEO. Even if the decision, 
as in the study, is made in the TMT, it does not follow that the CEO is directly 
involved in the implementation; another team member may have the task. 
Therefore it is not explicitly relevant to use CEO leadership style as an 
independent variable if she/he has not been involved; it is better to estimate the 
coaching of the responsible executive. Such an approach catches also the absence 
of a leadership in a specific situation. This is a contribution to the improvement of 
the preliminary implementation model laid out in more detail in 7.4.4.  
 
7.4.2 The preliminary implementation model 
The preliminary implementation model is presented in figure 3 and commented 
upon in 3.3. The model has been tested in a LISREL analysis using the limited   
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quantitative data in the study (see 6.3.7). The basic structure of the model is 
confirmed with some notable differences between decision makers and 
implementers (see discussion in 6.3.7.4 and table 44).  
 
How do research question answers support the LISREL analysis results? The 
two approaches are combined in table 46. The database is essentially the same for 
both approaches but there are some analysis conclusions from Step I, providing 
answers to research questions, giving additional information. The picture given in 
table 46 shows quite good conformity between the two analysis results with two 
exceptions: SALE (sales figures) and PRO (profit). SALE and PROFIT appear 
only in the LISREL model for all respondents, but they are not supported by 
answers to research questions RQ6 and RQ7. It is interesting as RQ6 is answered 
with information only from Step I and RQ7 is answered with information mainly 
from Step I. It seems that corporate profile, at least measured as sales and profit, 
has a secondary importance in the model keeping in mind that there are only three 
observations in Step II as grounds for the LISREL modeling. 
  
Furthermore, a simple addition of numbers of analysis cases in the study, where 
decision makers and implementers agree and disagree, respectively, regarding 
relevant aspects of the implementation model, shows that there is an approximate 
balance between agree and disagree. This observation supports the LISREL model 
result: there are opinion differences between the two groups of actors resulting in 
the relevance of the same basic model but with partly different content.  
 
The preliminary implementation model has been designed with the findings in 
the literature survey (see Chapter 2) as an important source. How may the results, 
generated using the model, be understood compared to earlier research approaches 
and results? The dependent variable has many definitions in terms of 
“implementation success”, as shown in table 3, but none has had a focus on goal 
satisfaction and process efficiency at the same time. In this study the use of them, 
both separate and in combination, has shown that they take place in the model as 
measurements of implementation efficiency but also that they are estimated partly 
differently by decision makers and implementers. The conclusion is therefore that 
the findings add new knowledge to our understanding of the constitution of 
“implementation success”.  
 
The independent variables differ between the reported studies (see table 3), as 
well as between them and my study. The most interesting findings in my study 
seems to be that the consequent down-up perspective has underlined the necessity 
to understand and utilize the implementer situation for a successful 
implementation. This is not new knowledge per se but has not been emphasized in 
the implementation research so far as I understand.  
 
Looking at details regarding the independent variables it is possible to see 
similarities between my results and the findings in Hickson et al. (2003). They 
found that implementation success, measured as achievement, was explained by 
acceptability (interrelated with assessability, specificity, resourcing) and priority 
(interrelated with receptivity and structural facilitation), as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Some of the independent variables in my model (implementation context, 
implementation profile, type of decision, target groups and recognition of   
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decision) seem to a certain extent have the same characteristics. Miller (1997) 
elucidated leadership aspects (backing, clear aims and planning) as well as a 
conducive climate as reasons for success or failure in the implementation of 
strategic decisions, which is in accordance with the independent variables 
leadership and corporate culture in my model. Pinto & Prescott (1990) underline 
the importance of planning in the beginning of the implementation phase, a 
variable close to implementation profile in my model.  
 
Table 46. Answers to relevant research questions and their applications to the LISREL 
model 
 
2* 3* 4 6* 7* 8* 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 20*
SALE x NO
PRO x NO -
GRO
EMPL NO
LS (x) x YES? YES
CC xx YES ??
DMP x YES
IC xx
IP xx
TYP  x YES -
TAR xx YES
REC xx
DEM
FOL DK
SCO (x) ??
GS xx NO
PE xx
a) Abbreviations, see table 44; x marks variable in solution for all respondents and 
    implementers (grey cells) respectively
b) Research question answers supported by conclusions from Step I marked with *
c) - and ? after YES/NO indicate "with reservation" and "uncertainty" respectively 
d) DK stands for DON'T KNOW
Research question chapter 7.2.x b) c) d)
YES -
Part 
ly
LISREL 
model a)
YES 
NO
 
To summarize, the preliminary implementation model has given promising 
contributions, in terms of the measurement of implementation efficiency and the 
different impacts of influencing independent variables, to the understanding of the 
concept of implementation of top management decisions in profit-driven 
organizations. Since the reported studies in the literature have been designed in 
different ways compared to my study, the implementation model is not directly 
comparable with them. However, the impact of the independent variables in my 
implementation model has been supported in a couple of other studies.  
 
7.4.3 Analysis conclusions not used to answer research questions  
The analysis has been carried out not only with the formulated research questions 
in mind but also with inspiration from the data itself. Therefore, it is not surprising   
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that some of the analysis conclusions have not been used in 7.2 where the research 
questions have been answered. The remaining, unused conclusions (see table 45) 
are CC17(W), CC21(-) and CC23(W). (NB! CC50 and CC51 are LISREL-related 
and not directly useful for answering research questions). All three unused 
conclusions occur from the analyses of individual decisions and therefore they are 
situational. However, they all together give an indication of an adjustment of 
action by the implementer during the implementation process, but also a moment 
of learning for the future. The observation is supported to a limited extent in the 
conclusions CC25(-) and CC41(-). As an example Qson says (in decision case 
5402): “I involved myself quite a lot in this project to show how a change will be 
implemented in a systematic way in the future”. Furthermore, the implementers 
express themselves, when confronted with a decision to implement, using words 
such as complex, new, scope and recognition. These words describe an attitude 
related to their competence, which is a sum of their earlier experiences. The 
learning aspect has been discussed by Bryson & Bromiley (1993), Lunneryd 
(2003) and Pressman & Wildavsky (1979) as an effect of the implementation 
process. My study confirms these previous findings. Therefore I propose that 
learning is included as a third measurement variable to test in the estimation of 
implementation efficiency (see discussion in 7.4.4.3).  
 
7.4.4 Analysis of potential contributions to the development of the 
implementation model  
7.4.4.1 Introductory reflections 
The preliminary implementation model is designed to handle empirical data, 
which are essentially opinions of the decision makers and implementers but 
completed with economic variables. The down-up perspective of the implementers 
has been the main thread through the study. The preliminary implementation 
model has not been falsified in any of these dimensions even if the limitations of 
the database cause some problems with the significance of observed correlations. 
The results, to be seen as hypotheses rather than answers, have evolved in a 
qualitative study of only three companies but from 43 interviews giving a variation 
also in variables as perceived corporate culture as it is estimated by the 
respondents. The results from the qualitative part of the study in Step II are to a 
certain degree also supported by results from Step I, which consists of 30 
companies. The preliminary model is therefore an acceptable ground for 
development.  
 
The analysis of single decisions (see 6.3.2) as well as the analysis of corporate 
culture (see 6.3.1) has revealed many elements as potential contributors to the 
understanding of implementation efficiency and, therefore, to a development of 
the preliminary implementation model. A list of elements regarding decision 
factors contains communication, clarity, available resources, decision 
indistinctness and purpose, decision premises, implementer role, responsibility and 
resistance, goal fulfillment in an uncertain future, existence of implementation 
plan, top management intervention in implementation process, situational 
leadership and implementers’ participation in the decision making process. A 
corresponding list of elements regarding corporate factors includes formulated and   
  177
shared values, cultural conflicts, leadership style, CEO regime period, and a 
challenging economic situation. The lists do not claim to be complete but reflect 
observations and conclusions from the studied decisions. There are confirming as 
well as contradictory mutual observations. However, the observations inspire a 
development of the implementation model for further studies.  
 
The potential improvements of the model emerge from the analyses in Chapter 6 
and the discussions in 7.4.1-3, as well as from the observations listed above. They 
are concentrated to the following statements: 
   What’s a decision?  
   Situational attitudes and behavior of the implementer when the 
implementation mission is received, and the relationships with  
o  transmission event 
o  communicated, understood and supported decision purpose 
o  decision types 
o  corporate culture 
o  mission adoption (evaluation, planning and action) 
   Decision makers’ abdication from the implementation process 
It is necessary to focus these statements at this stage of knowledge development, 
so as not to get lost in a jungle of details. – Besides these potential improvements 
of the implementation model there is also an important method issue to take care 
of:  
   Focus on actor opinions regarding scaled variable estimations 
The consequent application of respondent judgments gives first of all a possibility 
to identify differences between decision makers and implementers but it also 
ensures an improved validity.  
 
7.4.4.2 The black box problem: How does the implementer evaluate and plan for 
acting when an implementation mission is received?  
There are promising observations in the study supporting a sequential behavior 
(see CC34(M)) involving the steps evaluation, planning and action. These steps 
are activities in a mission adoption process, which in future research may be 
verified, developed and understood. It is a question about how the 
presence/absence of implementation and follow-up plans, resource allocation, goal 
and resource conflicts, decision type, etc., are treated and which results the 
mission adoption process will evoke in terms of, e.g., attitudes and behavior of the 
implementer. The potential connection between the mission adoption process and 
the transmission event (see 7.2.22) is discussed further in 7.4.4.4. 
 
7.4.4.3 A developed implementation model 
The analysis results do not support a cancellation of any variables at this stage of 
our understanding. However, the results have contributed in different ways to the 
explanation of the implementation efficiency but we must know more before we 
make any approaches to estimate their relative importance. The study has 
furthermore indicated that there are good reasons to consider adding 
complementary variables to the implementation model. The discussions and 
conclusions made in 7.4.4.1-2 have therefore been used to design a developed   
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implementation model, which is depicted in figure 14. The structure of the model 
is changed a bit: a third factor group is added, Human factors. The reason is that 
the study has detected a situational behavior of the implementer and an abdication 
of the decision maker in the implementation process, both of which speak for a 
specific focus on human forces in the implementation situation. The issue is 
discussed in 3.3 with the conclusion that my planned study would be too complex 
if the implementer’s personality was incorporated. However, the study result is 
convincing that the human dimension must be a part of the model in order to 
understand variations in implementation efficiency. The Human factor group 
“takes over” CEO leadership style from Corporate factor group (see figure 3) and 
a new Implementership performance is added (definition see Appendix A).  
  
CEO Leadership Style
Leadership
performance
Coaching
 Corporate Profile
 Corporate Culture
Action evaluted
Implementation Context
Implementation Profile
Transmission manner
Mission adoption
Decision Making
Process
Decision stability
Goal Satisfaction
Process Efficency
Corporate Factors
Decision Factors
Implementation
Efficency
Degree of Learning
Implementership
performance
Attitudes & behavior
Human Factors
 
Figure 14. A proposal of a developed implementation model (excluded elements struck 
through), new elements in italics, labels underlined, and, if relevant, with dotted lines and 
frames)  
 
Taking the developed implementation model in figure 14 as a starting point, I 
discuss the potential improvements of the model in terms of factor groups. It is to 
be observed that all proposed improvements of the model presented under each 
factor group are designed to meet the condition to be estimated by the actors using 
the same six degree scale, in relevant cases, as in this study (see 4.2.2.1). 
 
Corporate Profile 
Business variables (sale, profit, growth, number of employees) have had limited 
influence in the LISREL model solutions. However, it is too early to remove the 
corporate profile from the model. A more quantitative design in future research 
may uncover its importance. 
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Corporate Culture 
The respondents have estimated the variable in terms of “Non-existent” to “Strong 
and penetrating” on a corporate level. The variable has a strong position in the 
LISREL model solutions; the influence on implementation efficiency is however 
negatively related to its strength.  
 
Decisions are made for change. The change may influence private (job content, 
salary), internal (managing system, organizational change) and external (customer 
relations, new markets) conditions (see, e.g.,  Boddy, 2005), causing resistance 
among implementers. A strong corporate culture is per se more difficult to change 
than a weak. A decision will be implemented given the corporate culture, which 
itself may be influenced, changed to a certain degree, by the decision to 
implement. Looking at the LISREL model solutions this way, I understand them 
not as a paradox but as the evaluation of the actors: a weak and non-distributed 
corporate culture may be positively appreciated by an individual giving many 
degrees of freedom for action and also the reverse. A strong and pervasive 
corporate culture may be negatively perceived as it provides limited possibilities 
for free action. Therefore, in an implementer perspective, it is not only a question 
of the strength of corporate culture but also its evaluation in a specific 
implementation situation. Thus, a sub-variable, Action evaluated, is introduced to 
catch the situational estimation, given the implementation mission. 
 
Decision Making Process 
In the preliminary implementation model, the variable was intended to estimate the 
implementer’s degree of participation. Unfortunately the respondents did not get 
the opportunity to make a scale estimate; I did it afterwards. This may be one 
reason for a weak position of the variable in the LISREL model solutions. 
Therefore the variable remains in the model but is estimated by the respondents in 
the future. 
 
The problem to define the treated decision is discussed in 7.4.1.1. The decision 
making process continues in some cases even after the implementation has started 
up. Confirming or contradictory sub-decisions may occur, correcting, supporting 
or disturbing the implementation process. It is necessary to uncover such situations 
during data collection in a descriptive way, which in the future should be done 
better than in this study. It is also possible to get an implementer scale estimation 
in terms of if the original decision to implement has passed through the 
implementation process unaffected, the decision stability. The idea is that decision 
stability may have an influence on implementation efficiency, i.e., low decision 
stability causes a low process efficiency, as indicated in the study, CC17(W), but 
also probably causes problems regarding the measurement of goal satisfaction; 
which of the goals is to be achieved and measured? 
 
Implementation Context 
The variable, estimated by the respondents, has a strong position in the LISREL 
model solutions. The variable is aggregated including internal and external factors 
giving a great space for the respondents to estimate the variable importance taking 
into account their individual perceived conditions. There are, however, no findings 
in the study to form a basis for a more detailed approach. 
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Implementation Profile  
The variable, estimated by the respondents, has a strong position in the LISREL 
model solutions. It is an aggregated variable (time schedule, responsibility, 
resources, etc.). These sub-variables may be categorized as conditions more or less 
decided upon by the decision makers. The study has shown, however, that it is 
possible to approach implementation profile in a more process-oriented direction 
with the implementer as a process actor. Most interesting is perhaps how the 
transmission event of the decision to implement is happening (see 7.2.22). 
Observations of the topic “communicated, understood and supported decision 
purpose” also stimulate curiosity. The analysis results indicate that decision type 
matters. There are also observations supporting the values of implementation and 
follow-up plans in some situations, not least when implementers perceive 
competition between time and other resources when implementing. In all, a more 
detailed approach to the content of the implementation profile in a strict 
implementer perspective may provide an improved understanding of the 
implementation process and its conditions and results.  
 
The implementation efficiency is not evidently influenced by the manner of 
transmission of the decision to implement, CC44(-). However, in order to 
contribute to the understanding of implementers’ resistance, commitment, 
acceptability, etc., which may be called the implementer performance, the findings 
in the study motivate the introduction of this sub-variable in the model. The 
transmission event linked to a specific person is related to the possible 
participating in the decision making process of the person in question; if the 
person has participated it is probably less critical how the transmission is done. 
However, at this stage of constructing the implementation model, it seems 
reasonable to measure both the transmission manner and the participation in the 
decision making process in order to understand their potential correlations.  
 
The study indicates (see CC9(W) and CC45(-)) that the implementers may 
perceive decision goal, purpose or aim in a conditional way. The perceived 
decision goal is a step in Mission adoption, which is commented in 7.4.4.4. 
 
As mentioned above a process-oriented approach seems interesting. This aspect 
is developed in figure 15 with comments in 7.4.4.4. Furthermore, the 
Implementation profile has something to do with the new factor group 
Implementership performance, which is discussed later on.  
 
Leadership performance 
The respondents have estimated this variable using three alternatives. The person 
to judge has been the CEO of the company. Therefore the variable has been 
labeled “CEO Leadership style”. The variable does not have a strong position in 
the LISREL model solutions. The implementer behavior has been revealed to be 
quite situational. The decision makers have been observed to abdicate from the 
implementation process, to a certain degree, when coming to implementation of 
their decisions. These observations make it reasonable to change leadership focus 
in the model from the CEO to the actual decision maker, which in any meaning is 
responsible for the implementation. The observations also call for changing the 
method in order to catch the variable essence from leadership style to leadership 
performance, coaching. But who is the decision maker? It may be a single person   
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as well as a TMT, and in some cases it may be a person that is not present. What-
so-ever, there is a possibility to estimate the coaching in both a quantitative and 
qualitative dimension. 
 
Implementership performance 
In congruence with the term leadership, I launch the term implementership to 
cover the implementer attitudes and behavior in the implementation situation. It 
strengthens the keeping of the down-up perspective. As a preliminary proposal, 
the implementer may estimate her/his attitudes to the decision to implement (the 
mission) on a scale from “denial” to “joyful support” and behavior on a scale from 
“searching for more information to “direct acting”. Implementership is integrated 
in the process-oriented approach (see figure 15 and 7.4.4.4). A further step not 
taken so far in the development of the implementation model is to explore the 
underlying reasons to the attitudes and behavior of the implementers. Such a step 
is probably necessary to take in order to understand how to improve the 
implementation efficiency.  
 
Implementation Efficiency 
Other studies (see table 3) have used estimations of learning, culture development, 
long term effects, etc., to estimate implementation efficiency. In this study the 
respondents have estimated goal satisfaction and process efficiency. However, 
there have been observations that pay attention to the learning dimension (see 
discussion in 7.4.3). Learning has several dimensions, e.g., creating new 
competence (generated by the profile of the decision to implement or generated by 
process experiences) among implementers and creating new insights (generated by 
implementers’ reactions and behavior) among decision makers. It is to a large 
extent “learning by doing (making mistakes)”. Therefore, a future challenge 
includes designing a tool to catch the multiplicity of the learning dimension based 
on existing knowledge (for an overview, see, e.g., Morgan, 1997, pp. 95-113). 
This tool may be used for measurement if there is something relevant to learn from 
the implementation and also to what degree we have actually learned.  
 
7.4.4.4 A proposal for a “Decision making and implementation link”  
The following presentation is inspired by the conclusions in the study and the 
discussions around the developed implementation model in 7.4.4.3. Figure 15 is a 
preliminary design of an analytic approach, labeled by Hogarth (2001) as the 
deliberate system. The tacit system, supplementing the deliberate system, is 
discussed in the end of this sub-chapter. The comments in the following sub-
chapter focus on an implementer perspective. 
 
A deliberate system implies a person’s processing of information through 
deliberate, conscious mechanisms. The starting point for designing a Decision 
making and implementation link is the condition that the decision made by top 
management shall be implemented by subordinates in a complex profit-driven 
organization. The decision is the end product from the decision making process.  
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Figure 15. The Decision making and implementation link as a bridge between decision 
making process and the implementation process 
 
The decision, associated to varying degree with information about goals, time 
schedules, resources, appointed responsibility, follow-up plans, etc., is transmitted 
to the implementer(s). The transmission event may be done as an e-mail order, a 
personal meeting, etc. The implementer starts up a mission adoption process in a 
conscious manner in three steps using the transmitted, available information 
(decision +++ in figure 15 indicates the possible, situational presence of decision 
goal, plans, resources etc.) within a personalized framework of personality, 
experience, etc. The black box syndrome, discussed in 7.4.4.2, corresponds to the 
grey area in figure 15. The perceived decision goal, discussed in 7.4.4.3 (under 
Implementation Profile), is evaluated in the Evaluation step. Each step, including 
the transmission event, evokes situational attitudes and behaviors resulting in an   
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implementer relation with the implementation mission, which influences the 
activities in the implementation process.  
 
The model in figure 15 is described in an individual perspective. The main idea 
is that the implementer, receiving an implementation mission, takes her/him 
through an intellectual and emotional, conscious process leading to a specific, 
situational act. In addition, the model may also be applied in a multi-implementer 
situation. Such a situation may occur in at least two forms: a decision to 
implement individually but by many actors and a decision to implement by a team. 
The first situation is parallel to a single implementer situation but with the 
possibility that the decision will be implemented differently by each actor. In the 
second situation existing theories about team-building and teamwork are 
applicable (see, e.g., Robbins & Coulter, 1999). 
 
The mission may include useful information as decision goal, guidelines, 
resources, responsibility, follow-up, etc., (+++ in figure 15). However, as seen in 
the study, that is not always the case. The absence of executive coaching in many 
cases has also been uncovered in the study. This means that in many situations the 
decision making and implementation link may be carried out with lack of 
information and without active executive support. How the implementer, 
individually or in a team, will solve such a situation is a challenge for future 
research to uncover. An idea is presented in 7.4.5. 
 
The decision making and implementation link completes and does not replace 
the implementation model in order to understand what is happening between the 
decision and its implementation. When empirical data is available, confirming and 
adjusting the proposed process in figure 15, it is possible to develop the 
implementation model even more, perhaps also by integrating the process model 
inside the implementation model. The introduction of new or extended sub-
variables in the implementation model (see 7.4.4.3) must so far be seen as 
preliminary. 
 
The tacit system shortly discussed in 7.2.17 and 7.2.21 is always “turned on 
ready to go”, so to say, and will therefore supplement the proposed analytical 
process in figure 15. Öhlmér et al. (1998) and Lunneryd (2003) have shown that 
intuitive behavior is common in the decision making process including 
implementation. In future research, it is therefore not only a question of describing 
the existence of the analytical (deliberate) process outlined in figure 15, but also of 
detecting the alternative behavior if the existence is not possible to verify. The 
reported findings in other studies predict an implementation field where the two 
alternative behaviors may be present side by side, a leadership challenge to handle.  
 
7.4.5 A proposal of an extended decision making model 
The decision making model described in 2.3, see table 2, is designed for situations 
where the decision maker and the implementer are the same person. But its 
principal outline is applicable also on complex organizations, where decision 
maker and implementer are not the same person. In 7.4.4.4 the critical phase of 
transmission of the decision to implement and the following mission adoption 
process are discussed in the light of study results. The proposal in figure 15 will   
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also be possible to introduce as a phase between Analysis & Choice and 
Implementation (see table 47). This grey-marked phase, Implementation Mission, 
will also connect to the idea of sub-processes as presented in the table.  
 
Öhlmér et al. (1998) conclude, that their revised model “… identified important 
implications for changes in managerial assistance” (p. 288). The conclusion is to 
be understood under the condition that their empirical approach is one-man-
business or at least small organizations. However, given the results of this study of 
complex profit-driven organizations, the conclusion seems even more valid for 
such organizations when it is about the implementation phase. The soft side of 
leadership, discussed in 7.2.13 and 7.4.4.4, must be supplemented by relevant 
management tools, in a down-up perspective, in terms of thoroughly designed 
plans and systematic routines in order to optimize the conditions for high 
implementation efficiency. In all, the executive dialogue seems to be an important 
element in the model. Future research may uncover who starts, the executive or 
the implementer – or no-one! 
 
Table 47. An extended decision making model. Developed from Öhlmér, Olson & Bremer 
(1998), p. 285 
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7.4.6 Summary 
The study has contributed to an improved understanding of implementation 
conditions and efficiency in complex profit-driven, Swedish companies. The study 
has also pointed out areas where we need to know more in order to better 
understand the implementation concept. The following aggregated statements are   
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an attempt to summarize the contributions of this study with the characteristics of 
contributions compared to the state of our knowledge in parentheses 
(Con=Confirmation of current knowledge, New=New knowledge): 
  S1. The decision maker and implementer perspective exhibit differences 
in perceived implementation conditions and implementation efficiency 
(Con) 
  S2. The preliminary implementation model satisfactorily explains basic 
causal correlations between implementation conditions and 
implementation efficiency (New)  
  S3.  It makes sense to measure both goal satisfaction and process 
efficiency when estimating implementation efficiency; furthermore, 
observations support adding a third variable, learning (New) 
  S4. The implementation efficiency is positively correlated with a simple 
implementation context, an evident implementation profile, as well as 
decision factors as decisions aimed for internal groups, operational 
decisions and recognized decisions (Con) 
  S5. The implementation efficiency is complexly yet weakly correlated to 
leadership and corporate culture (corporate factors) (Con) 
  S6. The implementation efficiency may be influenced by the transmission 
event and the purpose of decision to implement perceived by the 
implementer, according to observations (New) 
  S7.  The attitudes and behavior of the implementer are influenced by 
external conditions such as decision category, decision purpose (goal) 
and decision transmission manner (Con and New /transmission manner/) 
  S8. The implementer attitudes and behavior are influenced by individual 
factors such as personality and competence (Con) 
  S9. A mission adoption process by the implementer is possible to observe 
in the three steps evaluation, planning and acting (New)  
  S10. Decision makers engage themselves to a very limited extent in the 
implementation of their decision (New)  
  S11. The implementation model may be developed if findings according 
to mainly S6 – S9 are verified in a future empirical study (New)  
 
The summary above is made in a scientific perspective. Are there implications 
that have been uncovered for complex profit-driven organizations and their actors 
in order to utilize the potential of implementation efficiency improvements? It is 
my opinion that some of the findings may be used in business life directly even if 
much more is to be known. The following recommendations are therefore given 
with reasonable confidence, meaning that they are not in conflict with established 
management theory or practice. In order to ensure and to improve the 
implementation efficiency 
Executives must 
  R1.  Evaluate the potential reactions of the implementer to decision 
alternatives that are considered during the decision making process and 
use the information when the final decision is made  
  R2.  Evaluate the need of a detailed implementation plan in an 
implementer perspective and create such a plan if necessary   
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  R3. Transmit the decision to implement at preferably a meeting (face-to-
face, conference, MBWA, etc.) between the decision maker (her/his 
representatives) and the implementers instead of using impersonal 
channels like e-mail, memos, etc.  
  R4. Evaluate the need of executive coaching in an implementer 
perspective and use if necessary support coaching during the entire 
implementation process 
Subordinates must 
  R5. Evaluate the implementation mission and start a dialogue with the 
principal if necessary 
  R6. Report plan deviations for further instructions 
The recommendations are written in a down-up perspective emphasizing the 
importance of leadership, which takes its starting point in the need of the 
implementers. 
 
7.5 Generalization possibilities 
Two dimensions of generalization are discussed in this chapter, the 
validity/reliability and the broadening of the results to organizations and situations 
outside the empirical database used in the study.  
 
7.5.1 Validity and reliability of the study  
A basic method discussion is presented in 4.3.1. The occurring general validity 
and reliability problems in Step I and II are discussed in 5.1.4 and 5.2.4, 
respectively. Specific problems are discussed, when present, in the sub-chapters of 
Chapter 6. Some weaknesses are demonstrated. The most serious validity problem 
seems to be the categorizations and estimations of some variables made by the 
author instead of the respondents. However, this is a part of the analysis so that the 
interview information is used as well as possible. In all, the validity and reliability 
of the study do not present any obstacles for the further discussion of the 
generalization of the results.  
 
7.5.2 To which organizations and situations are the study results 
applicable? 
The study is carried out using data from a sample of complex profit-driven, 
Swedish companies, selected from the Stockholm Stock Exchange O-list. The 
study is mainly qualitative. The first question to ask is, therefore, if the results can 
be generalized to all 229 companies listed there in January 2003. My answer is 
yes, as the sample in the first step of the study is representative and no problem 
has occurred when comparing the companies that answered the questionnaire and 
those that did not. Step II, with just three companies, is a qualitative study. The 
accordance between Step I and II is good on the issues, where comparison has 
been possible. So in all, I judge that the results in this study are to a reasonable 
degree representative for the companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
O-list. 
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A second question is if the results may be generalized for all complex profit-
driven, Swedish companies. An issue that arises is the dimension ownership. My 
database contains companies owned through the special legal form share, sold and 
bought on Stockholm Stock Exchange. But there are also private owned profit-
driven, Swedish companies in other, different legal forms. And co-operatives 
strive to achieve profit-competing goals such as owner benefit. However, given an 
organizational complexity (see 2.1), these types of organizations may be included 
in the group for which the study results are applicable, but with carefulness due to 
the small empirical sample.  
 
Thirdly, how specific is the concept of a profit-driven enterprise compared to 
other types of organizations? The implementation efficiency depends in the study 
to a certain degree on corporate culture and corporate profile. The literature 
indicates (see, e.g., Nutt, 2000, and Braga Rodrigues & Hickson, 1995), that there 
are differences between profit and non-profit-driven organizations in terms of 
organizational goals, financing, customer focus, etc., variables constituting 
corporate culture and profile. Therefore it is not so far possible to generalize the 
results to such organizations. 
 
Close to this question is the demarcation Swedish. This is also a cultural 
dimension. Business cultures differ between countries (see discussion in 2.3, e.g., 
Hickson, 1987, and Papadakis & Barvise, 1997). The conclusion is therefore 
similar: it is so far not possible to generalize the results to non-Swedish 
organizations. 
 
A fifth question deals with the complex dimension. As discussed in 2.1, it is not 
only a question about size but branches, technology, etc. Complex has after all not 
a very precise definition in the study. Therefore, I dare to generalize the results to 
implementation situations where the decision maker and the implementers are 
different persons but still only in a business organization. 
 
The generalization of the results is, after this discussion, limited to be applicable 
to Swedish business organizations where a profit goal has a strong position in the 
corporate culture and the organization itself is complex or the implementation 
situation is perceived complex by the implementers. However, so far, the results 
are more likely to be well-based hypotheses for future research than definite 
truths. 
 
7.5.3 An epilogue 
As an introduction to my research approach, I present in 1.2 three implementation 
cases. I comment on each case in terms of potential explanations as to why it 
happened as it did. Even if the results from this study confirm results from earlier 
studies, it also contains new knowledge (see 7.4.6 S1-S11). Furthermore, the 
proposed model in figure 15 is so far a hypothesis, which is to be tested in future 
research. However, it would be of some interest to explain the implementation 
model and other results with the aid of the three cases.  
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7.5.3.1 Case A (see 1.2.1) 
I have concluded that the reasons for a high level of implementation efficiency are 
“… that the key people were involved in the decision making process committing 
them to implement the decision successfully. Even more, the adaptation of the 
tools and the training program were important for success”. The study results 
show that the value of the implementers’ participation in the decision making 
process is situational; “It seems as participating value is dependent on 
implementer-perceived decision complexity” (7.2.14). In this case, we have 
“complexity” in the meaning that a new culture or manner of coaching was 
introduced. The adaptation of tools and the training program have a definitive 
down-up perspective, which is important according to results shown in figure 12; 
not only is the participation of the implementers in the decision making process 
(DMP) positively correlated to implementation efficiency, but the perceived 
simple implementation context (IC, in this case a decision with only internal 
consequences and based on existing corporate knowledge) and clear 
implementation profile (IP, in this case goal, implementation plan and follow-up) 
are also correlated. So far, my suggested conclusions are in congruence with the 
study results. But the study may contribute further. In this case, the CEO and/or 
the TMT have been present and engaged, which improves the implementation 
efficiency according to study results (see 7.2.12 and 7.2.13). To summarize, the 
case is an example of what has been found in the study about the importance of 
CEO planned action in a down-up perspective and an engagement in 
implementation in order to ensure a high implementation efficiency of a top 
management decision.  
 
7.5.3.2 Case B (see 1.2.2) 
It was not possible to find direct explanations for the decision implementation 
outcome. I more or less speculated: “… the Marketing Director has not involved 
the Sales Manager in the entire process of decision making. It is possible that the 
Marketing Director has a hidden agenda as the Sales Manager thinks that the real 
objective of the Managing Director is that he will manage the sales force more or 
less directly. Perhaps the set goals are unrealistic. The actors perhaps have 
different pictures of reality. Is there a complex set of conflicts that continue 
because of bad personal relations?”  
 
  We do not know that much about the details in this case. The fact is, however, 
that the responsible implementer, the Sales Manger, is not a member of the TMT 
and she has only been able to give her opinions through the Managing Director, 
who is a member of the TMT and who introduced the decision about the discount 
item. After the decision making process, the decision is handled in the operational 
organization which means that the Sales Manger received a task to cut down the 
discounts with 7%-units. This picture may be understood in light of summary S7 
(see 7.4.6): “The attitudes and behavior of the implementer are influenced by 
external conditions such as decision category, decision purpose (goal) and 
decision transmission manner”. This will lead to a situation discussed in 7.2.18: 
“The implementer perceived conflicts between the content of actual decision to 
implement and existing goals and guidelines … are negatively effecting the 
implementation efficiency …”. Furthermore, the non-participation of the Sales   
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Manager in the decision making process will give the effects already discussed in 
case A above (7.5.3.1): “It seems as participating value is dependent on 
implementer-perceived decision complexity” (7.2.14). In this case it is clear that 
the Sales Manager perceives the situation as complex. In summary, it seems as the 
implementation model will explain the non-achievement of goal satisfaction in 
case B quite well. It is not my proposed explanations, when I presented the case, 
that are directly the reasons for poor goal satisfaction but rather the effects thereof 
on implementer attitudes and behavior that cause poor implementation efficiency 
as is shown in figure 15. 
 
 7.5.3.3 Case C (see 1.2.3) 
In this case, the background to the non-implementation is not well known. 
Therefore the proposed explanations are more or less inferences: “… the absence 
of a time-fixed goal … the case ‘was not important’ … the non-involvement of the 
Purchasing Manager in the decision making process … the President and the TMT 
did not have an up-dated picture of the supplier market ... the relations between the 
Purchasing Manager and the existing suppliers were very good”. 
 
The study has not detected any completely non-implemented decision. Therefore 
I must be extraordinary careful when I mirror the decision case in the preliminary 
implementation model. If we accept that the case outcome is an implementation 
efficiency equal to 0 (zero), it is interesting to test the explaining factors. If the 
variables in the case are introduced into the implementer model (see figure 12) we 
may establish that the Purchasing Manager has not participated in the decision 
making process (DMP), the implementation context is complex as the decision 
initiates a new purchasing policy (IC), the target group is external (TAR) and the 
decision is not recognized (REC). All these parameters are decreasing the 
implementation efficiency. However, the implementation profile is at least clear in 
one dimension, the task to acquire complementary suppliers, which will influence 
the implementation efficiency in a positive way. We have no information about the 
remaining model variables, LS and CC. As a summary, the model seems to explain 
the case in a logical manner. Even more, the transmission of the task is a short 
paper which is not positive for the implementation efficiency (see 7.2.22). Finally, 
figure 15 will explain how both the transmission event and the mission adoption 
have created attitudes which are manifested in implementer non-action, the 
behavior. All together, a non-implemented decision as in case C seems to be well 
understood by using the study results even if they to a certain extent are 
preliminary.  
 
7.6 Experiences from methods and tools – reflections  
In Chapter 4, the research approach and the selection of methods have been 
discussed beforehand. Here afterwards follows some short, general reflections: 
how did methods and tools work and what can be improved? To a certain degree 
some topics overlap the validity and reliability discussions in 7.5.1. 
 
The interviews were planned to find their own tracks after my first question in 
order to obtain as much spontaneous information as possible, as our state of   
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knowledge was estimated to be limited. I had prepared follow-up questions. 
However, I sometimes missed to ask them what in some cases limited the data 
available for analysis. The reason is a combination of an ambition not to manage 
the interview too much and my insufficient attention. The use of scales for the 
respondent estimation has been successful without any observed problems. The 
conformity between verbal opinions and scoring was acceptable (see 6.3.2.19). 
During the analysis, I decided to make scale estimations of some variables using 
the minutes from the interviews. They occurred in the LISREL model solutions in 
different ways, as discussed in 6.3.7.4. In future research, when using the same 
approach as in this study, respondent estimation is to be preferred.  
 
The technique of writing down short notes on my PC directly during the 
interview, and afterwards concluding these notes by taking into account an over all 
impression of what the respondent has told me, has worked well.  
 
To summarize the interview experiences, the general approach has worked well, 
to the best of my knowledge. However, in future research (see 7.7), it will be 
better to use more semi-structured interviews based on what we now know in 
order to get more precise information about, for example, the transmission event 
and the implementation process.  
  
There is another aspect of a shortage in data. My initial planning did not predict 
the need of respondent scores for some variables (implementer’s participation in 
decision making process, their recognition of the decision to implement, and if the 
decision was demanded); these missing values were covered in the analysis by my 
estimations based on the respondent verbal opinion. Future research may take into 
account the necessity of respondent scoring of more variables than done in this 
study. 
 
The analysis tools have worked well. The QCA analysis has contributed to a 
limited extent, however, but it has demonstrated a value in situations where the 
variable has a YES/NO characteristic. Future research design may take into 
account this aspect and utilize the possibility of asking YES/NO questions, if 
feasible.  
  
The QCA datasets, almost identical to the datasets used in LISREL, have been 
treated with the LISREL imputation technique in order to minimize the negative 
effects of missing values; as I understand, the approach has worked 
methodological well. 
 
The study has shown that the methods used have, in general, worked well but 
also uncovered possible, and sometimes necessary, improvements. 
 
7.7 Future research approaches  
The future research ideas are presented in connection with the discussions earlier 
in this chapter. The ideas are summarized in a research program formulated as 
three Future Research Question, FRQ, in priority based on a logical time schedule:   
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FRQ1. Create a better understanding of the link between Decision making 
and Implementation, according to the proposed design in figure 15, in order to 
improve the implementation model 
FRQ2. Test the developed implementation model including already proposed 
improvements in figure 14  
FRQ3. Carry out a longitudinal study for the confirmation of research results 
 
The background to the Future Research Questions is described, as said, in earlier 
sections of this chapter. Therefore, short comments just follow here. The Decision 
making and implementation link puts the implementer in focus. It is still a question 
of creating basic knowledge about how the implementer reacts and acts, given a 
decision to implement, the mission of implementation. The challenge is to find if 
there is any repeated structure or common elements in different situations. The 
contemporary presence of an analytical and a tacit system is certainly interesting to 
investigate. Therefore, it seems suitable to repeat a qualitative method of 
information collection but to carry out the interviews in a semi-structured form 
based on the figure 15.  
 
The test of the developed implementation model follows thereafter. The purpose 
is to confirm and broaden the results from my study. Therefore, a quantitative 
research approach seems most suitable using the LISREL as the analyzing method.  
 
FRQ1 and FRQ2 include many detailed research questions of which some are 
mentioned in 7.4.2, 7.4.4 and 7.4.5 but an extended design must be done when the 
research starts up.  
 
So far, the studies are retrospective that have been carried out and those that are 
planned for the future. The advantages and disadvantages of this research method 
are discussed in 4.2. An additional longitudinal study will give the possibility to 
apply the implementation model as a prediction tool and then follow-up the real 
outcome. 
 
A list of Future Detailed Research Questions, FDRQ, included in the research 
program, follow here with the origin in brackets: 
FDRQ1.  Why do decision makers and implementers differ in their opinions 
on implementation conditions and results? (7.2.2) 
FDRQ2. Does strong, pervasive and committed corporate culture improve the 
implementation efficiency? (7.2.8) 
FDRQ3. “Are the subordinates ready for take off”? (7.2.10) 
FDRQ4.  Does a specific corporate culture improve implementation 
efficiency? (7.2.11) 
FDRQ5. What are the reasons of executive non-engagement in the decision 
implementation process? (7.2.13) 
FDRQ6. What are the reasons for the variation in the value of implementation 
efficiency to the implementer participating in decision making process? 
(7.2.14) 
FDRQ7. What are the reasons for the variation in the value of implementation 
efficiency for decision characteristics? (7.2.18) 
FDRQ8. What are the reasons for the variation in the value of implementation 
efficiency for the presence of an implementation plan? (7.2.19)   
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FDRQ9.  What are the reasons to the value variation in implementation 
efficiency of follow-up plans? (7.2.20) 
FDRQ10.  Does the manner of transmission of the decision to implement 
matter? (7.2.22) 
FDRQ11. What are the consequences of a decision changed during the time 
from the moment of decision made until implementation is completed? 
(7.4.1.1) 
 
At last, the designing of a future research approach must focus on keeping a 
down-up perspective where respondents as far as possible estimate on scales in 
order to avoid the combination of respondent and researcher estimations. This is 
an important experience from this study. 
 
7.8 Is the dissertation aim achieved? 
The aim is formulated in 3.2 as “… to contribute to the understanding of the main 
conditions that affect the implementation efficiency of top management decisions 
in complex profit-driven Swedish organizations”. Besides the aim, two other main 
aspects of the study are outlined: a specific down-up (implementer) perspective 
and to catch and analyze non-implemented decisions. 
 
As summarized in 7.4.6, the state of current knowledge is confirmed and new 
knowledge discovered. Therefore I consider that this is proof of the statement that 
the aim is achieved. Furthermore, the specific implementer perspective has been 
kept consistent throughout the study leaving contributions to the understanding of 
the decision>implementation process. However, completely non-implemented 
decisions have not been studied; on the other hand, some partly implemented 
decisions have been possible to analyze. My intention was to explain why a 
decision is not implemented, but that has not been possible. 
 
Thus, the aim of the study is essentially achieved according to my opinion.   
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Appendix A. Definitions and abbreviations  
 
 
The management vocabulary is not always used in a common and shared meaning. 
Therefore I present some definitions to be sure that a reader and me have the same 
understanding of terms used in the thesis. If no reference (x) is given it is my own 
definition based on “a common use”. 
 
General management terms  
Complex  organization      an organization becomes complex when no one can 
sensibly and comprehensibly account for all of it 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992, p. 36) 
Decision                a choice made from two or more alternatives  
(Robbins & Coulter, 1999, p. 182) 
Effectiveness         Goal  attainment   
(Robbins & Coulter, 1999)  
Efficiency               The relationship between inputs and outputs, the goal of  
which is to minimize resource costs  
(Robbins & Coulter, 1999) 
(Business) group    the word group is often used alone but in the meaning 
“business group” (in Swedish “koncern”)  
(FARs engelska ordbok, 1997) 
Implementation  Conveying a decision to those affected and getting their 
commitment to it  
(Robbins & Coulter, 1999, p. 187)   
Implementership    the implementer attitudes and behavior in the 
implementation situation  
(the term launched by the author, see 7.4.4.3) 
Leadership the  ability  to influence a group toward the achievement 
of goals  
(Robbins & Coulter, 1999, p. 520)             
Management  “… is viewed as those activities relating to the 
organization and operation of a firm for the attainment of 
specific ends. It directs recourses use after interpreting 
the goals of those controlling the firm”  
(Osburn & Schneeberger, 1978) 
Organization    a deliberate arrangement of people to accomplish some 
specific purpose  
(Robbins & Coulter, 1999)  
Problem solving         decision making and implementation  
(Cooke & Slack, 1991, p. 4) 
Strategic vs Operational    strategic decisions differ from operational decisions in 
(decision)  that they relate the organization to its environment and  
  involve a  large part of the organization; the definition of 
“organization” is deciding  
(Cooke & Slack, 1991, p. 22)      
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Unique (decision)     “those decisions, which have not been faced before by 
the farmer/decision maker; usually unique decisions are 
strategic, but they could be operational”  
(Öhlmér et al., 1993)  
 
Abbreviations of organizational terms 
B A             B u s i n e s s   A r e a   ( A f f ä r s o m r å d e   i n   S w e d i s h )  
B A D            B u s i n e s s   A r e a   D i r ector (Affärsområdeschef in Swedish) 
B A S            B u s i n e s s   A d m i n i s t r a t i v e   S y s t e m  
B S C              B a l a n c e d   S c o r e   C a r d  
CAC             Customer  Account  Concept 
C / B   a n a l y s i s         Cost/Benefit  analysis 
C E               C a p i t a l   E m p l o y e d  
C E O            C h i e f   E x e c u t i v e   Officer (Koncernchef in Swedish) 
CFO           Chief  Financial  Officer  (Finanschef  in  Swedish) 
DHR           Director  of  Human  Resources  (Personalchef  in  Swedish) 
Growth    Change (+-) in net revenues between two consecutive 
years, % 
H R C            H u m a n   R e s o u r c e   C o m m i t t e e  
HQ            Head  Quarter  (Huvudkontor  in  Swedish) 
MBL  “MedBestämmandeLagen” in Swedish; Law on co-
determination at work (FARs engelska ordbok, 1997)  
MBWA    Management By Wandering Around, launched by Peters 
& Waterman Jr (1982) 
MD            Managing  Director  (Verkställande  Direktör  in  Swedish) 
MtD          Marketing  Director  (Marknadsdirektör  in  Swedish)   
Profit    Income after financial items (often expressed as % of net 
revenues)  
PuM           Purchasing  Manager  (Inköpschef  in  Swedish) 
SEC          Swedish  Export  Council  (Exportrådet  in  Swedish) 
SM            Sales  Manager  (Försäljningschef  in  Swedish) 
TM            Top  Management  (Toppledning  in  Swedish) 
TMT           Top  Management  Team  (Ledningsgrupp  in  Swedish) 
 
Other definitions 
Latent variable          unobserved or theoretical variable  
(Diamantopoulos, 1994) 
Measurement  or        manifest empirically measured/observed  
observed variable        used to estimate the latent variable  
(Diamantopoulos, 1994)  
Mega corporate culture    a sum of scores pro company of CEO regime duration, 
corporate profile and corporate culture (defined and 
calculated by the author for this study) 
 
Abbreviations in the preliminary implementation model  
C C             C o r p o r a t e   C u l t u r e  
C P             C o r p o r a t e   P r o f i l e  
D M             D e c i s i o n   M a k e r  
D M P            D e c i s i o n   M a k i n g   P r o c e s s    
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G S             G o a l   S a t i s f a c t i o n  
I C            I m p l e m e n t a t i o n   C o n t e x t  
I E            I m p l e m e n t a t i o n   E f f i c i e n c y  
I M P           I m p l e m e n t e r  
I P            I m p l e m e n t a t i o n   P r o f i l e  
L S             L e a d e r s h i p   S t y l e  
PE            Process  Efficiency  (regarding  implementation  process) 
TUR             Trade  Union  Representative 
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Appendix B1. Introduction letter of 
questionnaire sent in Step I to Presidents  
 
 
                    Forskningsenkät 
 
 
Hur effektivt genomförs Företagsledningens beslut?  
 
Att finna svaret på denna och närliggande frågor är den utmaning jag antagit i min 
doktorsavhandling!  
 
Vem är ”jag”?  
Jo, en doktorand som heter Bengt Göransson vid Institutionen för ekonomi, 
Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet. Jag har hunnit bli 61 år med en 15-årig egen 
erfarenhet som VD i olika företag i skilda branscher och med varierande 
ägarförhållanden. Därtill konsultupplevelser i ledningssammanhang under nästan 
10 år. Och ett tredje perspektiv är arbete i ett flertal företagsstyrelser. – På min 
hemsida http://w1.442.telia.com/~u44200011/ finns mer om mig! 
 
Ska Du läsa vidare? 
Det anser jag bestämt att Du ska göra! Jag vill att Du skall deltaga i en enkel 
undersökning. Materialet som jag samlar in skall utgöra en del av min 
doktorsavhandling. Men omedelbart efter avslutad insamling kommer jag att 
bearbeta det i ett VD-perspektiv för praktisk tillämpning. Du kommer alltså att få 
snabb och praktiskt användbar information tillbaka om hur 
genomförandeeffektiviteten av företagsledningsbeslut kan förbättras. Du kan alltså 
ha direkt egen praktisk nytta av att deltaga i min undersökning! 
  
Vad vill jag?  
Mina samlade praktiska erfarenheter indikerar att Företagsledningens beslut 
uppvisar stora skillnader i genomförandet. Detta har gjort mig nyfiken på att 
vetenskapligt studera beslutsfattandets implementeringsfas. Min forskning handlar 
alltså om att beskriva, förklara och förstå genomförandeeffektiviteten av 
företagsledningsbeslut så att genomförande-effektiviteten kan förbättras i 
praktiken. – Med Företagsledning menar jag VD och Ledningsgrupp (eller 
motsvarande).  
 
Varför skriver jag till Dig?  
Jag vill studera komplexa, vinststyrda företag. Med komplexa menar jag företag 
där många av de beslut, som fattas av Företagsledningen, skall genomföras av 
andra medarbetare i organisationen. Jag har då funnit att O-listan på 
Stockholmsbörsen är en grupp företag som passar mitt syfte. Du och Ditt företag 
har slumpmässigt valts ut från O-listan. Urvalet omfattar c:a 50 företag. 
Detta är första steget i min materialinsamling. Det skall dels indikera att jag 
formulerat ett relevant problem, dels ge underlag för ett andra steg som är en   
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intensivstudie av några få företag. I ett ev tredje steg avser jag göra en enkät 
baserad på intensivstudien till de andra företagen på O-listan. 
 
Vad ber jag Dig om?  
Jag skulle verkligen uppskatta om Du kunde ta Dig tid att besvara frågorna i 
bilagda Frågeformulär Beslutsgenomförande. Det tar bara en kort stund eftersom 
jag vill ha Dina spontana reaktioner. Jag ber om Ditt svar senast den 10 februari i 
bifogat, frankerat svarskuvert. 
Skulle Du föredra att svara elektroniskt så finns frågorna på min hemsida 
http://w1.442.telia.com/~u44200011/. Observera att Du då måste ange 
företagsnamn och Ditt eget namn i formuläret! 
  
Hur använder jag Dina svar? 
Jag kommer att bearbeta och analysera Dina svar dels mot bakgrund av vissa data 
från Ditt företag (omsättning, vinstutveckling, bransch m fl hämtade från Din 
företagspresentation på Stockholmsbörsens hemsida), dels jämföra dem med vad 
andra VDar i det slumpmässiga urvalet har svarat. Jag kommer självfallet att 
försöka dra generella slutsatser. Inga svar kommer att publiceras på ett sådant sätt 
att det går att identifiera företaget eller VDn. 
 
Fler frågor? 
Jag arbetar i huvudsak hemifrån bostaden. Du får därför gärna kontakta mig på 
någon av de nedan angivna kanalerna om det skulle behövas!  
Min handledare är Professor Bo Öhlmér, 018 67 17 26. 
 
 
Med vänlig hälsning 
 
 
Bengt Göransson 
Ryttmästarebostället 
291 77 GÄRDS KÖPINGE 
tel 044 23 54 57 fax 044 23 53 40  bengt.goransson@ryttmastare.se
 
 
Gärds Köpinge den 29 januari 2003   
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Appendix B2. Questionnaire sent to Presidents 
in Step I 
 
Frågeformulär Beslutsgenomförande 
 
1.  Företagsnamn      
 
2.  VDs  namn      
 
3.  VDs  födelseår      
 
4. VDs tillträdesår som VD i undersökningsföretaget 
 
5. Finns ett VDs ledningsorgan (Ledningsgrupp, direktion eller motsv)? 
  Ja     Nej 
Om Ja: 
Hur många personer finns i ledningsorganet?  ……. 
Förs beslutsanteckningar eller motsv från ledningsorganets möten? 
  Ja     Nej 
 
6. Det finns många etablerade skolor för att beskriva ledarstilar. Jag har valt en  
teori som begränsar dem till tre. Jag ber Dig nu ange Din personliga ledarstil 
med hjälp av endera av dessa tre beskrivningar nedan! Ingen kommer att kännas 
helt perfekt för att beskriva Dig men Du måste välja! Markera den som passar 
bäst – men bara en!  
 
  POLITISKT LEDARSKAP  
Grundsyn  
•  Människan drivs främst av ett egenintresse, söker trygghet 
och avvisar förändringar 
•  Tilltagande konkurrens i marknaden och ökad intern 
komplexitet som båda leder till specialisering 
•  Avdelningar, enheter osv tenderar att ha egna uppfattningar 
om ”verkligheten” vilka divergerar från företagets bästa och 
leder till byråkrati och inflexibilitet 
•  Ledarna är lika mycket fångar som föregångsmän i 
organisationen 
Tillämpad ledning med utgångspunkt i grundsynen 
•  Ledningen sätter allmänna och flexibla mål  
•  Ledningen fäster stort avseende vid system och struktur 
eftersom det garanterar likformighet i agerandet 
•  Ledningen försöker förutse och förekomma konflikter 
genom att hitta kompromisser   
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•  Den dagliga ledningen fokuserar på att identifiera problem 
och lösa dem, ofta att fatta de beslut organisationen vill ha  
 
  DIREKTIVLEDARSKAP 
Grundsyn  
•  Människan motiveras mer av interna krafter än av yttre tryck 
•  Organisationer kräver starka signaler för att hänga ihop 
•  Sammanhållning och innehåll är viktigare än stil 
Dessa tre faktorer leder till att agerande är bättre än reagerande. 
Tillämpad ledning med utgångspunkt i grundsynen 
•  Ledningen sätter precisa och utmanande mål 
•  System och struktur är inte så viktigt, huvudsaken är att 
saker blir gjorda 
•  Ledningen är inte rädd för konflikter och försöker använda 
dem för att tydliggöra företagets mål 
•  Den dagliga ledningen innehåller många kontakter med de 
närmaste medarbetarna och ”fältet” 
 
  VÄRDERINGSLEDARSKAP 
Grundsyn 
•  Människan har olika skäl till varför hon arbetar i just min 
organisation 
•  Självförverkligande och personlig integritet är därvid 
viktiga inslag 
•  Detta tar sig uttryck i viljan att få vara kreativ och att jobba 
för ett syfte man tror på 
Tillämpad ledning med utgångspunkt i grundsynen 
•  Ledningen sätter både kvantitativa och kvalitativa mål och 
på flera olika nivåer som hänger ihop 
•  Eftersom värderingarna skall styra handlandet är system och 
strukturer underordnade dem och måste ständigt anpassas 
•  Konflikter är en del av livet och Ledningen ser till att 
vinnare blir de som bäst stödjer företagets värderingar 
•  Den dagliga ledningen karaktäriseras av informella möten, 
dialoger, etc för att sprida och befästa företagets värderingar  
 
7. Denna fråga handlar om beslutsgenomförandet i Ditt företag. 
Förutsättningar för frågans besvarande  
  Det handlar om de beslut Ledningsgruppen (motsv) och Du själv 
fattat under 2002, de som kallas Företagsledningens beslut 
  Det handlar om Företagsledningens beslut som skulle ha varit 
genomförda vid svarstillfället och där effekten kan 
bedömas/prognosticeras  
  Med genomförandeeffektiviteten menas både hur väl genomförandet 
i sig gjorts och hur väl syftet med Företagsledningens beslut har 
uppnåtts (eller i förekommande fall är på väg att uppnås) 
 
Frågan 
Jag ber Dig nu bedöma genomförandeeffektiviteten av Företagsledningens 
beslut 2002 genom att ange en procentuell fördelning:   
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Genomförandeffektiviten är … %-andel
Obefintlig
Mycket dålig
Dålig
Acceptabel 
God 
Mycket god
Fullständig
SUMMA FATTADE BESLUT 100%
 
Kommentera gärna fördelningen …………………………………. 
fortsätt på baksidan av frågeformuläret om det behövs! 
 
Vilka är skälen till att vissa av Företagsledningens beslut blir väl genomförda 
(=hög genomförandeeffektivitet) i Ditt företag? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
fortsätt på baksidan av frågeformuläret om det behövs! 
 
Vilka är skälen till att vissa av Företagsledningens beslut blir dåligt genomförda 
(=låg genomförandeeffektivitet) i Ditt företag? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
fortsätt på baksidan av frågeformuläret om det behövs! 
 
 
STORT tack för Din medverkan! Använd bifogat svarskuvert! Jag rapporterar 
tillbaka enligt löfte!   
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Appendix C. Descriptive presentation of Step II 
data  
 
 
C.1 A reader’s guide to the presentation of Step II 
The information used for analysis in Chapter 6 is presented in this appendix. Each 
studied company occurs under its own heading. I am very concise about the 
general presentation of the companies according to the guarantee of anonymity. 
Only information necessary for understanding the decision and implementation 
environment are presented. 
 
You can identify the three main elements of the presentation, the companies, the 
respondents and the decisions, in the following way wherever they occur: 
C o m p a n i e s               A ,   A s u b ,   B ,   C  
Respondents            Ason,  Bson  … 
Decisions               1313,  2305,  5402  … 
The link between the companies and the decision numbering is  
Company  A              13xx 
Company  Asub            133x 
Company  B              23xx 
Company  C              54xx 
All decisions beginning with, for example, 23 are consequently linked to company 
B. The number codes of the companies 13, 23 and 54 were given during Step I and 
I have found it useful to keep them during the entire study, mainly to avoid any 
risk of mixing the data during collection, analysis and presentation in the study.  
 
The presentation of collected information follows the implementation model 
(see 3.3), starting with the three specific corporate factor groups followed by the 
three factor groups for each individual decision. When describing corporate 
culture I have tried to pick up and translate as careful as possible special words, 
formulations and metaphors given by the respondents as they are so expressive.  
 
The following structure is used regarding the presentation of individual 
decisions. First I present the decision under the headline Background and actual 
situation of decision xxxx by referring or citing the minutes of the meetings of Top 
Management, the source of decisions to study. This is intended to be an objective 
description without evaluations. As the same respondent can play different roles 
(decision maker or implementer) in different decisions, it is important to present 
the role she/he plays in the actual decision; the role can be another in another 
decision.  
 
The opinions of each actual respondent are referred to under the headings from 
the implementation model (decision making process, implementation context, 
etc.). I normally refer to what the respondent, i.e. Gson, has said in the way I 
understood it, including body language, pauses and other expressions. Sometimes 
I cite a respondent marking it as a “citation”, when I refer exactly what she/he 
said.  
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The last heading in each decision description is C.x. Comments to…. This only 
occurs if I have anything to say that is valuable for the understanding of the 
respondents’ views.  
 
The companies are introduced in 5.2.3, so this information is not repeated here. 
 
C.2 Presentation of data from Company A 
C.2.1 Specific information collection procedure for Company A 
The starting point for finding interesting decisions to study was the TMT minutes 
of meetings. I selected 12 decisions, trying to find both complicated and simple 
ones. I received some comments from the CEO about the selection, when I 
presented him the list in order to get information about potential respondents. This 
lead to a second selection of 4 decisions to start with. They were selected because 
the CEO gave me spontaneous comments like “very interesting, a lot of internal 
resistance”, “a good example when we were successful” and “we didn’t finish!”. I 
got stories as examples of “what happens in our organization”, especially about 
corporate culture, during the interviews. I used this information to ask questions 
and picked up some interesting decisions to study. This approach led me to study 
two decisions made specifically in a Business Area, further on labeled Company 
Asub. It became apparent that it was necessary to manage corporate culture and 
leadership style associated with Company Asub and its Managing Director 
separately. Therefore I present these two decisions separately under C.3. 
 
The interviews were carried out over 6 months, followed by an additional period 
10 months later with 3 interviews for decision 1313. Nobody has denied 
participating when asked for an interview. I have met out-spoken people and they 
have all been very interested in the research, providing a lot of comments off the 
record. My presentation of the company is for the year 2004, which is the point 
from which expressions like “the last three years” are to be understood. 
 
C.2.2 Business and organizational information of Company A 
Company A operates on a mature marketplace as a trading company with a limited 
manufacturing capacity. The main geographic area is the Nordic countries. The 
products are mainly goods and commodities. Company A has a slow organic 
growth but a quite aggressive acquisition and outsourcing policy. The operating 
income has been acceptable on a sustainable level.  
 
Company A has a purely hierarchical organization. There have been a couple of 
re-organizations over the last years. Now it is organized with a group TMT of four 
persons at the top. The next level consists of several Business Areas (BA) led each 
by a Business Area Director (BAD), and the third level consists of about 40 
subsidiaries (Aktiebolag, “Ltd”) each belonging to a specific BA. The MDs of the 
subsidiaries have an ultimate responsibility for profit. Company A is consequently 
decentralized with a very small group HQ mainly populated by some executives 
and economical functions. There is, as an example, no human relations 
department. The BAs too are managed by a single BAD. From the Managing   
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Director level of subsidiaries and up in the organization, there is no female 
director but around 40 male directors. The Board of Directors consists of just 
males. The trade unions have no representation in TMT meetings or in the Board 
of Directors. Their position on the subsidiary level varies. 
 
C.2.3 Respondent profiles in Company A 
I have made a profile of each respondent in Company A in table C01. The 
respondent is categorized due to his/her role in the specific decision. Some of the 
respondents are interviewed about more than one decision. In these cases their 
estimations of CEO leadership style and corporate culture are repeated. The scores 
of their estimations are also given here but they will be referred to later on in the 
text.  
 
Table C01. Respondent profiles in Company A 
 
1304 Dson DM Value 6.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 4.0
Hson IMP Value 4.5 5.0 2.5 6.0 3.5
1308 Ason IMP Value 5.5 4.0 3.0
Cson DM Directive 5.4 3.0 3.0 3.5 1.0
Eson IMP Value 4.5 3.5 2.5 3.0 4.0
1310 Cson DM Directive 5.4 5.0 3.5 1.0
Json DM Directive 5.0 2.0 5.0 4.0 2.0
1313 Gson DM Value 5.0
Kson IMP Value 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 4.0
Rson IMP Value 5.0
Deci-
sion
Respondent
Nick-
name
Posi-
tion
CEO 
Leadership 
style
Scoring
Corp 
Culture
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien
 
There are some missing values in table C01. This depends on conditions that 
made it impossible for the respondent to set a score. More comments are to be 
found in the statements.  
 
C.2.4 Corporate profile of Company A 
Company A has existed as a listed Stock Exchange company for the last three 
years. The profit has been stable and acceptable given the business segment but 
the growth is negative, as shown in table 11. The acquisition of new companies 
has not been able to match the organic decrease in selling figures. The marketplace 
has been tough over the past five years but Company A has had a sustainable 
profit in spite of negative growth. 
 
C.2.5 Corporate culture of Company A 
C.2.5.1 Respondent views on corporate culture of Company A  
Ason 
There is a mission that you shall not implement a decision that you think is wrong. 
The chain decision > implementation is hard to understand. You get a decision and   
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then you have to find out what it really means. “The day-to-day decisions, which 
quite often are not on paper, are the hardest to implement.” Our reactions also 
depend on which of the TMT individuals that sends the message. “If X says 
something, it is negotiable; if Y should have said the same, it is an order”. The 
basic elements in our philosophy are responsibility and freedom, the balance. Will 
and readiness to change for efficiency are also essential parts of the culture. And 
simplicity. It is possible to discuss openly our business vulnerabilities and also the 
influence of private values. Corporate policy decisions will sometimes not be 
made with our delegating culture as a false excuse. But we make a lot of business 
that would not have been made in another corporate culture. 
 
The culture is well adopted by the employees, but the acquired companies cause 
problems. It takes often too long to get them in. But in a long term perspective, we 
have been successful. Incitements are mainly aimed for sale reps. Office people 
are forgotten.  
 
Cson 
Open-minded with freedom and responsibility. We have entrepreneurship with a 
very basic way of profitability thinking. But we also put emphasis on human 
values, the individual in focus. “We not only speak about it, we do it.” The formal 
information structure is not strong; it is a bit ad hoc. When something important is 
on the track, the TMT travel around with the message. Incitements are designed as 
option programs for about 50 directors and there is a bonus system for sales 
representatives. We are not that good in other forms than economic incitements. 
“We are proud to have removed the Human Relation Function at the top level – 
the responsibility of Human Relations is without a question a MD mission”. A 
weakness is that the culture creates a pressure on individuals that is too much for 
some, but there are only a few negative examples. The culture is well adopted by 
the employees.  
 
Dson  
Our business philosophy is profitability, development, responsibility and rights. 
“The nearest you can come to be a company owner is to be the CEO of our 
company”. We have an open dialogue. Ideas come often down-up, driven by 
“small platoons”. We have a culture of possibility and creativity. “Two individuals 
in the TMT know the original business in detail. That is 2 out of 3. Good or 
dangerous?” There is a risk that we will be where we should not be. We have a bit 
top-down managed culture. 
 
Ethics and morals are on a high level. We have our feet on the ground and we 
are not intoxicated by money. But if you do not share the company values you will 
be fired. Bits of the culture will be lost on its way through the organization 
because there are weak links in the chain (e.g., badly formulated messages, next 
level has not “bought” the message and will therefore not “sell” it). We are very 
aware of checking if the message has reached its target group. “Given more than 
1000 employees our organization is better up-dated than any other”.  
 
Eson 
The culture is not so strong. We have changed the TMT and the organization has 
not yet adapted to the change. “We are a centralized, non-bureaucratic   
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organization with focus on long term and human values”. But doing business is 
very decentralized. There is quick feed back after meetings and we focus on 
dialogue and problem solving. We have a stake in our employees. Profitability and 
long run ownership are strong elements. Profitability turns focus from investments 
and product development, a short term effect. That is why we acquire a company 
instead of developing our own products. When we buy companies we do not press 
our culture upon them. “We respect their culture but try to subtly introduce our 
culture upon them”. But they have to adapt and implement the accounting routines 
immediately! 
 
TMT has a soft style. The messages are often not that clear so you have to 
interpret them in your own business reality. But that also creates uncertainty. 
 
Gson 
There are three main constituting the culture. The first one is basic business 
guidelines: growth of profit, profit level and development. The second is a 
statement of philosophy: every leader is a missionary of the culture. The third one 
is a set of guidelines for markets, products and manufacturing. These are 
completed by simplicity & efficiency, will of change and freedom & 
responsibility. The culture is strong, well communicated and accepted in the 
organization.  
 
Hson 
We have an open-minded culture with a lot of communication and dialogue 
striving for consensus. Honesty and humanity form a warm human atmosphere. 
We are quite good at confirming excellent performances but not so good at taking 
care of bad ones. We are too soft which is dangerous for staff members in the long 
run. In order to obtain a consensus, too much energy is put on NO-people to 
convince them: “hallelujah and conversion”. This will also sometimes cause 
decision anxiety and delay. Even if we have a delegating principle, and it works, 
the TMT wants to know details. The delegating principle is double-edged. Our 
track record in terms of profitability is quite good so we are a bit comfortable and 
will not always make the drastic or most important decisions even if they are 
necessary.  
 
We have a high ambition level with a lot of ideas but we do not always have 
energy enough to make it happen. This is certainly the case when investments are 
necessary; we are not ready to take the risk for our ambitions. Over all, we are risk 
avoiders. The management is not focused enough on business development. Our 
decisions could be better prepared in terms of implementation process. 
 
The culture is well established and supported – “the culture is put in the walls” – 
and not tied to the President. 
 
Json 
(The interview was shortened regarding corporate culture due to unforeseen 
circumstances). There is a history about entrepreneurship, delegation and “not to 
stifle newly acquired companies”. Now it is more about identifying common areas, 
which gives the TMT a supporting role. This is appreciated by most people but not 
all. The historical essence is still there with the RESPONSIBILITY even more 
focused.    
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Kson  
We are self-deciding. So long the result is OK, we run the race. But if result goes 
wrong, we will be noticed very soon. We have a total responsibility for the 
company in all dimensions. It is easy to get in touch with the CEO. “There is no 
personal risk to be creative”. That means that if you have an idea based in clever 
business thinking you will not be banned if anything goes wrong. “But you have 
to act quickly to eliminate the mistakes”. 
 
Rson 
There is a long tradition, which goes back to the original owners. A small scale 
and managing possibilities are heritage for me from those days. That means short 
decision ways and fast actions and reactions. A small scale has a disadvantage in 
the manufacturing dimension but production is a bit odd in our group. 
 
We have clear goals, we measure and evaluate and we are business focused. We 
take care of staff members. When acquiring new companies we are looking for a 
good track record. So when we buy we respect their culture, as they have been 
successful. Then it takes time to implement our culture; we try to implement our 
core values in their culture. The atmosphere is open and we stimulate dialogue. 
Everybody is welcome to express her/his opinion.  
 
C.2.5.2 Comments to respondent opinions on the corporate culture of Company A 
Ason turned the initial question Describe corporate culture into decision making 
and implementation and said “The corporate culture decides the implementation 
efficiency”. This statement is a bit suspicious as I had briefly presented a couple of 
minutes earlier my research approach and then presented my model as a picture!  
 
C.2.6 Leadership style of Company A 
C.2.6.1 Respondent views on Leadership style of Company A 
Table C01 shows a classification of CEO leadership style. All respondents, with 
one exception, classify the leadership of the CEO as value-driven.  
 
C.2.6.2 Comments to respondent opinions on Leadership style of Company A 
My estimation of the respondents’ classification indicates some difficulties to 
decide. Every respondent has mentioned the foreseen, ”a bit of all three”. 
Nevertheless, the picture is quite clear, there is uniform opinion about the 
leadership style of CEO.  
 
C.2.7 Decision 1304 Market extension 
C.2.7.1 Background and actual situation of decision 1304 
The case is about a geographical market extension based on established products. 
A strategic decision for action in a decided direction is made by he TMT but 
operational decisions will be taken underway and they are a part of an on-going 
implementation. Dson is a decision maker and Hson an implementer. 
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C.2.7.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 1304 
Dson  
The TMT refined the Business Idea, repealing the limitation of the Nordic 
geographic area. This created an idea to expand in Europe. Germany was 
definitely interesting but the first investigation together with the Swedish Export 
Council (SEC) lead to a NO. Further on, we looked at a more narrow application 
of our product – “we are selling solutions, not volumes” – and we found a possible 
market segment. As we want to acquire a company as our tool to reach the market 
instead of creating our own subsidiary from scratch, we now have a list of 
candidate companies for acquisitions. There we are, we have not decided which 
one. Unless we buy a company or not, we have learned a lot about the Germany 
market, the cooperation with SEC and the entire process to approach a European 
marketplace. 
 
Hson  
I do not know so much about the decision process. My first contact with the case 
was a brief introduction by Dson when I was asked to meet the SEC for an 
interview. As far as I know, there was no decision made at that moment to enter 
the German market. The TMT had discussed to broaden the geographic market 
from the Nordic area to Europe, especially the Baltic area, Germany and the UK in 
order to improve growth. This was a strategic break through. 
 
After the SEC race, the TMT decided to look closer at the German market. I was 
involved in a pilot study aimed learning more about the German market. “But 
suddenly it was a question of acquiring business!”  
 
C.2.7.3 Implementation Context of decision 1304 
Dson 
A new marketplace with an unknown business culture for us was a bit risky. We 
had to build up our competence. There was no formal implementation plan created 
but we have a culture how to act when acquiring new companies or businesses.  
 
Hson 
There was no plan. But to meet the unknown is not unique for me. So even if I did 
not know very much, I think the given task was not that complicated.  
 
C.2.7.4 Implementation Profile of decision 1304 
Dson 
We involved some MDs quite early in the process and they were soon convinced 
about our possibilities doing business in Germany. They got special tasks to solve 
and in the next step they took over from the TMT according to our culture; the 
TMT will create new business possibilities but the BAD and the MD will run the 
business. As the MDs were involved on an early stage they were designing their 
implementation profile themselves and they integrated the costs in their own 
budgets as a normal business routine. 
 
Hson 
I understood the task as to identify market segments and customers in Germany 
for our products. But after a while I also was involved in more or less direct   
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(potential) business even if we were not prepared. I did not see myself as a project 
manger but as a source of knowledge. The responsibility of the project was not 
clarified. I could use the project as an advantage for my own business.  
 
C.2.7.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 1304 
Dson 
It has taken longer than we expected. I myself am convinced that we are on the 
right track. “We do not know for the moment if we will be successful”  
 
Hson 
It is not that easy to answer. It is not a well defined project. Which decision are we 
speaking about? What was the aim? What were we going to implement? From my 
position I will summarize my opinion like this. First, “that will be Germany! The 
driving force and our interest remain but we have lost tempo”. Secondly, I do not 
know the next step. It is a Business Area question; I cannot go my own way. 
Perhaps, here we will see effects of our culture: decision anxiety and risk 
avoidance. The state of the art will perhaps depend on our reorganization: has this 
case fallen between the chairs? The strategic direction is perhaps unclear: the 
growth outside the Nordic area does not seem as important today as some years 
ago. I think that the TMT does not understand that the conditions have changed. 
“Extended processes will cause lost efficiency due to a non-evident problem 
owner; that they ought to understand”. 
 
C.2.8 Decision 1308 Balanced Score Card 
C.2.8.1 Background and actual situation of decision 1308 
The case is a trial to introduce the tool Balanced Score Card (BSC). A note was 
written in the TMT’s minutes of the meeting, not a decision, “to discuss at the next 
MD meeting”. It is possible to follow the case through the TMT minutes of 
meetings changing appearance from BSC to other labels. It was cancelled after 
less than one year after implementation (trial). Cson is the decision maker in the 
TMT while Ason and Eson are implementers. 
 
C.2.8.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 1308 
Ason 
I don’t know – my first contact with the concept was an e-mail from the TMT! 
 
Cson 
I worked very hard at my former job in an affiliated company trying to introduce 
BSC. A decision was made there but never implemented. Now I wanted to try 
once more. The CEO bought my idea. The project was already on track when it 
appeared in the TMT minutes of meetings. It was not formally decided upon and 
to be honest it was at that time not a real BSC concept as it only contained 
economical information. 
 
Eson 
I met it first on an internal business conference. I do not know how the decision 
was made.   
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C.2.8.3 Implementation Context of decision 1308 
Ason 
The BSC concept was not supported by our IT system. It created a lot of extra 
work. There was a bit to do to understand how to manage the concept but once 
that was done, it was quite easy.  
 
Cson 
I assumed that we had both the culture and the IT system to match the BSC 
concept. We had not.  
 
Eson 
No problem with the implementation. 
 
C.2.8.4 Implementation Profile of decision 1308 
Ason 
It arrived as an e-mail. “What is the purpose?”. Probably because the CEO has to 
make a better prognosis for the Stock Exchange and the shareholders.  
 
Cson 
The BSC concept was distributed by e-mail. The purpose was clarified at a 
business conference: to decrease the capital employed, CE. We arranged a 
competition and we measured CE. The MDs had to report every month. 
 
Eson 
It arrived as an e-mail with a short manual and a form to fill in. I do not remember 
if the e-mail arrived before the conference but at the conference the aim of the tool 
was very clear: to improve economic prognosis, to follow-up projects and staff 
members for recruiting leaders and development needs. It was nothing new but a 
new tool. And it was quite clear: fill it in!  
 
C.2.8.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 1308 
Ason 
”Yes, not a good example of our decision making and implementation” 
 
Cson 
As I said, the conditions were misjudged so both the Goal Satisfaction and the 
Process Efficiency were poor. 
 
Eson 
… 
 
C.2.8.6 Other respondent comments of decision 1308 
Ason 
The aim was wrong. It was something extra and I had a lot to do so I put it aside. 
The Controller took over. As we did not understand its purpose we did not give it 
priority so we were late to deliver in the beginning. It would have been quite 
different if we had understood the purpose. A clear purpose is a part of our 
culture, in this case it failed. It is not only my opinion but many MDs say the 
same.    
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“I do not understand why it was cancelled. Now I miss it!” 
 
Bson 
(During an interview about another case, the discussion was sidetracked to the 
BSC case.) “The BSC case was an extremely good example of an order, pointing 
with the whole hand. I did not know the purpose. I had a lot to do so I did not do 
anything until I was asked why I did not fill it in. So I had to do so without any 
enthusiasm”.  
 
Cson 
The BSC concept was withdrawn because we had achieved the purpose to 
decrease CE and the competition was completed. Now we are preparing a real 
BSC concept, which will be matched by a new IT managing system. 
 
Eson 
“I became the champion of the competition!” It was a good tool. I did all the work 
myself to fill it in. I do not know why it was cancelled. The economic reporting is 
systematic but we have no follow-up of project and staff members. “It was 
astonishing to find out that we had so many project going on and that we finished 
them!”  
 
C.2.9 Decision 1310 Home PC for staff members 
C.2.9.1 Background and actual situation of decision 1310 
The case is about the renewal of PCs that are rented for home use, so called “home 
PC”. “Json presented a package for home PC. A decision was made to run out the 
offer to staff members in the Swedish companies. The agreement partner is every 
single subsidiary” (minutes of meetings April 2002). 
 
Cson is a member of the TMT and Json prepared the decision case. Json is the 
MD of a company when I meet him. So he also has experience with how the offer 
is treated in practice.  
 
When interviewing about other decision cases I have also asked some 
respondents about this case. Eson is the BAD. Fson and Lson are (potential) end 
users and “front soldiers”. 
 
C.2.9.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 1310 
Cson 
We introduced the home PC program during 1998. Since then we have got a 
couple of new staff members so we had a pressure from them to repeat our offer. 
Json prepared some calculations and a general agreement of purchasing PCs. 
 
Json 
There was a home PC offer for staff members for the past two years. The technical 
development called for a renewal. This was supported by the fact that we have a 
much better personal policy than others on the market. We wanted to care for 
families with children. We did not do any formal evaluation about how the first 
offer was implemented or welcomed. But we knew that there had been a lot of 
administrative troubles, which we tried to avoid this time.    
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C.2.9.3 Implementation Context of decision 1310 
Cson 
We were pressured as I said but we did not know of the use or the benefit for the 
staff members from systematic survey.  
 
Json 
Some staff members asked for a new offer but not all the MDs did. It was a quite 
simple decision as it was more of a prolongation of an earlier decision. We did not 
make any promotion for the offer.  
 
C.2.9.4 Implementation Profile of decision 1310 
Cson 
I have a coordination role but after the decision in the TMT, the implementation is 
a question for the MDs. I do not remember when the implementation shall be 
finished and I do not know the actual situation. 
 
Json 
The decision with implementation instructions was sent by e-mail to our MDs. The 
(potential) implementer (=end user) of this decision was everyone in our 
organization. We offered a set of hard ware and soft ware. Therefore, “hackers 
asked a lot of (technical) questions but Svensson did not”. A hidden agenda was 
that by offering a set of products, we stimulated the staff member to learn more 
about IT in order to make the right choice for him/her/the family. In some cases 
we also get reactions on offered prices as another member of the family had got an 
offer from her/his employer! 
 
We did not fix any quantitative or qualitative goals but we hoped to support IT 
maturity and increase our reputation as a modern employer.  
 
C.2.9.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 1310 
Cson 
We have not done a systematic evaluation for either the first decision, or for the 
actual decision. So we do not know how well we have achieved our expectations. 
We have had administrative problems. “It is not that easy to shove the 
responsibility on to the MDs”. The IT world is complex in the meaning that 
everybody has views and desires. It is not easy to cover all of them in a general 
agreement.  
 
Json 
There was just a vague aim as “good for the staff members” in the decision. We 
have not made any systematic evaluation so we do not know how well it has gone. 
There have been a lot of troubles during the implementation around technical 
questions and responsibility.  
 
We have not done any systematic evaluation of “goal satisfaction” in terms of 
asking people, not even when we now are planning a third offer. The MDs have 
been better prepared this time but it is up to everyone to fix it him/herself by using 
the website. 
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Regarding the process efficiency it is even worse as we have had to spend a lot 
of time at top level for meetings with our supplier in order to solve how to treat 
information requests and invoicing procedures. The latter has been complicated by 
the fact that our supplier has involved a financial leasing company.  
 
C.2.9.6 Other respondent comments to decision 1310 
Eson 
I cannot remember the decision. “At that time I was the BAD in the old 
organization and I was not affected by the decision. And now I do not know how 
it works in my business area. You have to ask the MDs”. 
 
Fson 
I have never heard about this offer. Maybe it depends on the fact that I have a PC 
as my job equipment and I use it also in private life “without having asked if it is 
OK”. 
 
Lson 
I have not received a personal invitation to buy, perhaps because I have a PC as 
my job tool. But I have heard about the possibility. “Yesterday, new rules arrived 
saying that private use of job PC is no longer permitted. It does not matter to me as 
I have my private PC but I wonder for the others’ sake. I think it is fine if you can 
also use your job PC privately”.  
 
C.2.10. Decision 1313 Reports from Managing Directors  
The presentation structure of this decision will be adapted to the special approach 
and therefore it will not be in accordance with other decisions. 
 
C.2.10.1 Selection background for decision 1313 
When I had carried out ten interviews, I met the CEO to select some more 
decisions to study. I was looking for something complex, affecting many people in 
the group as the organization itself is complex, but with a strong corporate culture, 
according to my understanding after the first ten interviews.  
 
I had studied the case Balanced Score Card, BSC. The CEO mentioned that 
there had been a development of BSC into a “Time out concept”. It was 
introduced in the beginning of 2002. The CEO thought that this decision was a 
broad test of implementation capacity of the organization as it affected almost 50 
Managing Directors. He had no opinion as to how well it had been implemented. 
He just knew the results. I decided to study the Time out concept.  
 
CEO told me about the implementation approach. It contained the use of 
established routines like conferences, competitions, and bonus systems but also 
specially designed activities regarding leadership by using an elite soccer team 
coach not only as a speaker, but also directly in his coaching of his team before, 
during and after a match.  
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C.2.10.2 The background for decision 1313 
As a company on the Stockholm Stock Exchange O-list, it is important to present 
key figures and comments for every past quarter but also to forecast the future. 
Therefore there is an established routine of quarterly written comments of the 
managing directors of the subsidiaries reported to CEO.  
 
One of the five corner stones in the Time out concept was to improve the capital 
turnover rate. As this key figure is an essential estimation of profitability, it was 
supposed to be a part of the quarterly comments from the Managing Directors. The 
discussion between CEO and me concluded that this issue would be possible to 
study as it is a single, well-defined key figure and it is the focus of the Time Out 
Concept. I was given the possibility to study the quarterly written comments. 
 
The time out concept was launched at a MD conference. A bonus system was 
tied to it. At the MD conferences, a champion for the quarter was appointed. Even 
more events were created to support the focus in the Time out concept.  
 
I carried out three interviews when I had processed the written quarterly 
comments. Gson is the group CEO while Kson and Rson are implementers as 
Managing Directors of subsidiaries. 
 
C.2.10.3 Case Information for decision 1313 
Prime Data 
I have access to comments from four quarters: 2002:1&3 and 2003:1&4. The 
selection criteria were 
•  the first possible set of comments (= 2002:1) 
•  the latest possible set of comments (= 2003:4) 
•  two more sets of comments between them 
I judged that using all eight possible sets of comments would not add any more 
information. The comments are written and transmitted to the CEO within 14 days 
after each quarter break. 
 
During the studied period there were organizational changes. In the first studied 
quarter 2002:1 there were 46 Managing Directors’ reports and in quarter 2003:4 
43. They represent in total 70 companies whereof 26 were exactly the same in the 
beginning and in the end. Managing Directors were also changed, four of them 
among the 26 identical companies. In conclusion, 22 companies had the same 
organizational status and the same Managing Director over the studied time 
period. 
 
Processed Results 
I started to read all the comments in Q 2002:1 and Q 2003:4 to find out how 
capital was managed; I have accepted comments about inventories as equal to 
capital. I categorized the reports according to the following criteria in two steps: 
•  Step 1: comments prepared 
-  Comments,  goal  managed >>          Step  2 
- Comments but no specific goal mentioned       YES 
-  Figures  repeated  but  no  comments       NOYES 
-   N o t h i n g   s a i d                    N O  
•  Step 2: comments on goal achievement   
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-   A n   e x p l i c i t   g o a l   a c h i e v e d              Y E S  
-  An  explicit  goal  not  achieved           NO 
 
I performed the two-step procedure as I think “goal” indicates a stronger focus 
than just comments over all.  
 
In table C02 the comments in the beginning and at the end of the studied period 
are treated according to the criteria. The comment frequency of capital/inventory 
is low both in the beginning and at the end of the period. If I remove the four 
companies where the Managing Director was changed during the studied period, 
the picture will not change. One has prepared a comment, one is commenting 
“goal achieved (NO)” and two of them are NOYES-speakers.  
 
Table C02. Type of comments of Managing Directors (46 and 43 observations  respectively) 
 
Prepared Goal Prepared Goal
YES 35% 11% 26% 2%
NOYES 4% 7%
NO 48% 2% 60% 5%
SUM 87% 13% 93% 7%
Esti- 
mation
Comments on capital/inventory
2002:1 2003:4
 
I observed a wide range of both a formal capacity to formulate the message and 
to formulate the content of the message when reading the text mass, not focusing 
on capital. Not a few Managing Directors just repeat the figures and/or complete 
them with some formulations without meanings. Just few of them present explicit 
goals in which the achievements are mirrored, as seen in table C02. Some go even 
further giving comments about what to do to achieve or to perform even better in 
the future.  
 
I have also processed the comments from the MDs of the 22 identical 
subsidiaries over the period. Only 14 MDs have given comments on all four 
selected quarters. The other 8 MDs have given oral comments (see interview with 
CEO later on). In table C03, the development of their comments during the period 
is shown. 
 
Table C03. The consistency of the comments over the studied period (subsidiaries with the 
same Managing Director) 
 
Consistent Mixed SUM
YES 369
NO 325
SUM 68 1 4
Comments over the period Comments prepared 
the first quarter
 
The Managing Directors are not consistent in their comments over the period 
irrespective if they gave a comment or not in the first quarter report.  
 
I have analyzed in all 185 reports. About 45% of them include comments of 
capital or inventory. Only five quarterly comments will meet the criteria-based   
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evaluated comments for the achievement of an explicit goal plus a comment about 
future development.  
 
What was the result of the Time out concept in hard figures? It has not been 
possible to obtain a fair key capital figure for each subsidiary, as the official 
annual reports are just formal. Therefore I have used group figures. From the 
annual reports I have processed the figures of capital employed putting them in a 
relation to net revenues as shown in table C04.  
  
Table C04. Company A capital employed (CE) in relation to net revenue  
 
2000/01 2502 588 23.5% 4.26
2001/02 2360 589 25.0% 4.01
2002/03 2275 536 23.6% 4.24
2003/04 2210 513 23.2% 4.31
Financial 
year
Sales
Capital 
Employed CE in % of 
Sales
Turnover 
rate of CE MSEK 
 
The picture does not show any essential development over the years. The net 
revenue has decreased during the period with a little more than 10 %.  
 
Gson 
I did an interview with Gson when I had processed the written comments. I did not 
mention anything about my findings beforehand but of course my questions are 
influenced by my knowledge about the case.  
 
Did the TMT formulate an explicit goal for Company A? 
“Yes, we have two goals formulated but this was done before the concept started 
up. Even more, the bonus for Managing Directors is linked to their fulfillment of 
the company goals which are the same as for the entire group. 
 
Has Company A achieved the goals? 
“Yes. Let me give you an example (a graph is handed over). We have focused on 
the development of the inventories. A special goal is ‘inventory <15% of sales’. 
When the concept started up we had a level of 16.5% and two years later we are at 
a level of 13.5%.”  
 
Are there guidelines as to how the comments will be written? 
“No there are not. We want freedom, which is one of our basic values. I do not 
read just the text but also what is between the lines. The Managing Director shows 
up, dressed or – undressed. 
 
Perhaps there are some informal guidelines. We have said ‘not more than one 
A4 page’. We also said ‘be future-oriented in your comments’. And ‘focus on 
deviations’. But these are not written down. Not everyone will write himself. They 
delegate the task. Some phone or meet me to get oral comments if they prefer that.  
In all, I get the picture of the business reality according to the opinion of the 
Managing Director when ‘everyone is free to speak’.” 
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Do you, or another person of the TMT, have a systematic dialogue or give 
feedback to the Managing Directors about their comments on economic 
performances? 
“No, not systematically. An ideal report says something I did not know. If I have 
not seen a report for some quarters from a Managing Director, I speak with him, of 
course. 
 
My impression is that there are more comments today about capital. The 
comments on deviation are more frequent over all. But some Managing Directors 
still do not understand the purpose of the comments – they are careless. But I play 
much on the individual. To use a soccer term I accept ‘flyers’ but a Managing 
Director cannot be a ‘flyer’ whenever or wherever. I tolerate much if the 
Managing Director is a businessman with a good track record in terms of profit 
and growth.” 
 
Kson 
Kson has been with the company since 1985 and was appointed Managing 
Director eight months before the interview took place. He has shifted positions 
many times in the group and he has been the MD before.  
 
Initially Kson said he has never heard about the Time out concept. When I 
mentioned something about the content, he knew quite well about that concept. 
The entire interview was then turned by my questions in the direction of the 
quarterly comments of Managing Director.  
 
Kson is writing the quarterly comments himself. There is no manual but Kson 
has obtained some oral guidelines. They say, do not repeat figures and do not 
write “the business is developing well/poorly” but answer the question WHY. 
Kson tries to write about what is happening and is focusing on straight business. 
There has not been much about the future so far (just two reports are produced) 
but it will come. Kson will also write more about development projects. As there 
are group messages about increases in the profit margin, Kson will comment on 
that aspect even more in the next report giving the situation that the company is 
losing a very profitable agency. 
 
The report concept is forcing Kson himself to think about the business more 
deeply. Therefore Kson will put even more energy in formulating his comments. 
Kson is discussing the content of the report with his chairman of the Board of 
Directors. But he has not so far got any feed back from the top. Kson had not 
thought about that until I asked the question. Nevertheless Kson has the feeling 
that his comments are useful for Top Management, as they do not know his 
business in detail.  
 
The book-keeping system is very good so he knows today the result coming up 
at the end of the month, which is the end of a quarter. Kson has already decided on 
some comments in the report that will be prepared and delivered a month ahead. 
  
As Kson has held his position for a short period, he looks at the comments as a 
“decision” he has to implement. Therefore he was ready to score on the decision. 
The relative low scores of implementation efficiency are an effect of lacking feed 
back and his looking for an appropriate manner to write his comments. 
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Rson 
Rson has been with the group for 25 years. When interviewing him he has held his 
new position as Managing Director for not yet a full year. Rson has one of the 
members of the TMT as his sounding-board. 
 
I opened the interview asking if he was familiar with the Time out concept. 
Rson was not. As I told him about the content he answered “that is not anything 
new” and said spontaneously that the R/RK goal for a long time has been 45% 
“which is what we strive to reach”. The interview continued with focus on the 
quarterly comments. Rson is writing the quarterly comments himself. He is 
concentrating on just comments, not to repeat the figures, which are already in the 
hands of the group CEO. Rson also tries to give opinions about the future. He 
thinks that his comments are used mainly by his Business Area Manager as an 
input to his market over-look. There are no manuals or guidelines about how to 
write the content or its content. As he has been so long with the company, he does 
not need a manual himself “but perhaps newly acquired company Managing 
Directors would need a manual”.  
 
Rson never gets a formal feedback on his comments from the group CEO, but 
the comments are discussed by his Board of Directors to be shared and approved. 
There is an advantage to be forced to forward quarterly reviews: Rson has to think 
over how the business is running and developing.  
 
As Rson did not observe the Time out concept, he cannot say anything about the 
effects on R/RK development. But as it is such an essential key figure and the goal 
is out-spoken, he always focuses on the achievement of 45%.  
 
Since Rson has been with the company so long he does not consider the 
quarterly comments as a “decision” but as an established routine. Therefore he 
was not ready to judge according to my scales. 
 
C.2.10.4 Comments to respondent answers for decision 1313 
Gson did not know anything about my processing results when I interviewed him. 
He had not given me any information beforehand about goals. My inspection of 
the annual reports shows just a slight increase in capital turnover. The Gson 
figures are much better. They are cleaned up in some manners to better focus on 
the business conditions of the subsidiaries. But they are of course comparable over 
time. Rson and Kson have no bonus agreement.  
 
C.3 Presentation of data from Company Asub 
C.3.1 Specific information collection procedure from Company Asub 
When dealing with a decision case in Company A, I found a side track which led 
to a contact with the MD of Company Asub. I observed quite soon that I had to 
change the corporate perspective a bit in order to understand, according to my 
implementation model, the special conditions of decision implementation 
regarding this subsidiary. The following presentation complements the 
information given about Company A and it is arrived from special interviews.  
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The approach is equal to that of Company A described above. Four interviews 
with 3 individuals have been performed, concerning 2 decisions. Nobody that was 
asked for an interview has declined participation. 
 
C.3.2 Business and organizational information of Company Asub 
Company Asub operates in Sweden on a mature market sensitive to business 
cycles. It is in business-to-business and the products of Company Asub are 
necessary parts of the “product package” to the customers. The Company Asub 
market is dominated by one actor with two others as runner-ups. Company Asub is 
one of them and it has around 50 staff members spread all over Sweden.  
 
C.3.3 Respondent profiles of Company Asub  
In table C05, the respondent profiles are shown. My comments to the table are the 
same as those found in C.2.3. I just have to add that the CEO is substituted for the 
MD (of the subsidiary). 
 
Table C05. Respondent profiles in Company Asub 
 
1331 Bson DM Value 4.0 3.0 5.5 4.0 3.0
Fson IMP Political 4.5 4.0 6.0 5.0 3.0
Lson IMP 4.0 3.5 5.0 3.5 4.0
1333 Fson IMP Political 4.5
Impl 
Context
Impl 
Profile
Goal 
Satisfac
Proc 
Efficien
Deci-
sion
Respondent MD 
Leadership 
style
Nick-
name
Posi-
tion
Scoring
Corp 
Culture
 
 
C.3.4 Corporate profile of Company Asub 
Company Asub is an old company and has had many different owners over the 
years. The profit track record is not that good. Now “we are on dry ground and we 
are able to meet a business cycle decrease, as right now, with figures in the black”. 
Book-keeping figures representing real business in Company Asub are not 
available due to group policy. Orally presented information is the basis for my 
estimation that Company Asub has a three year profit as well as growth average 
around 0%.  
 
C.3.5 Corporate culture of Company Asub 
Bson 
It is an informal and flat organization with just one manager level between the MD 
and the subordinates. It is an open climate with a lot of personal relations. 
Sometimes there are problems with respect. The subordinates experience the 
culture as “restrained and miserly”. As our owner is a company on the Stock 
Exchange, we suffer from a “quarterly economy”. 
 
The business culture is extremely customer-oriented, trying to build long-term 
relations. All subordinates are selling people. A service man will sell a new   
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product if that is a better deal for the customer than maintaining an old one. The 
rep is not involved in such a case. As a small company with people spread all over 
Sweden the phone is the normal way of communication, supported by our intranet. 
“The e-mails are almost killing us”. There are no unions, which forces a bit of 
added work. 
 
It is a sales-focused organization with traditional bonus benefits, out door kick 
offs, etc., where ALL subordinates are involved. 
 
Fson 
We are a small company with short decision tracks. We are a tight team in which 
everybody “pulls at the same direction”. Our business is tough; the product prices 
are the same as ten years ago. We are selling me-to-products so we must create 
relations with our customers. We really do. We are always available, day and 
night, working days as well as weekends. All people share the values and the 
culture. Our culture is characterized by professionalism and common sense but 
also by vulnerabilities in structural work. 
 
The normal information channel is e-mails and phone calls. We are not so 
formal; letters or information papers are not frequent. The union activity is low 
and many are not union members. We have no formal bonus system but we use 
gratifications to sale reps. We do not hesitate to give feed back on poor 
performance, often with personal talks but also by e-mails.  
 
Lson 
We are a small, well-trimmed organization where everybody is very heavily 
occupied and stressed. We can manage it but it was better ten years ago. When we 
meet a little resistance it will stop! Many of staff members have been with the 
company for years and therefore they have a lot of experiences. New-comers are 
often confused as they are heavily occupied. We have had the same culture for 
many years. We help and support each other rather than compete: everyone for 
everyone. The profitability is in focus by giving all for our customers.  
 
Our IT-system is old and often malfunctioning which obstructs the work to be 
done. We have a tough schedule to report but we do not get much feedback. 
Formal information by e-mail is overflowing, but is it relevant? Not much feed 
back from my boss regarding what he gets from the top. No problem to get 
support when you need it and ask for it. But there is a geographic and travel cost 
gap between Stockholm and Skåne. “We manage things ourselves here in Skåne”. 
 
C.3.6 Leadership style of Company Asub 
Bson 
“I think I am a value-driven leader but I also give orders. I stop for values when I 
have to select just one style”. 
 
Fson 
Very decisive that Bson is a political leader. 
 
Lson 
“I know him too little to have an opinion”.   
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C.3.7 Decision 1331 Customer relations 
C.3.7.1 Background and actual situation of decision 1331 
The biggest customer company, BATUNION, has a market share of 50%. The 
main competitor of Company Asub is very strong at BATUNION and Company 
Asub itself is weak. The case is about how to strengthen the customer relations 
between Company Asub and BATUNION.  
 
Bson is the MD and decision maker while Fson and Lson are the implementers. 
 
C.3.7.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 1331 
Bson 
I have had a clear picture for a long time: “We must improve our position at 
BATUNION, but how?” I had not found a good solution but I was informed that 
BATUNION was going to support their reps with PCs. I made a decision to create 
a CD with all technical information about the products of Company Asub. The 
information was designed exclusively from a BATUNION perspective. A special 
task force was created to “invade BATUNION from top to bottom”.  
 
Fson 
We (that is our service and sales people) observed that the staff members of 
BATUNION contacted us more and more in different cases. We did not 
understand why. A simple investigation showed that they were not satisfied with 
their suppliers. BATUNION had these suppliers because the customers of 
BATUNION demanded it. I presented the situation to our Marketing Group, 
which is very close to the TMT, and we made a decision and we created a plan of 
action. The MD got a special support of 250.000 SEK from the Board of 
Directors.  
 
Lson 
We have talked about our BATUNION relations since I joined our company in 
1985. I do not know if there is a specific decision. But we got a task to create a 
plan how to tackle BATUNION, so maybe we are a participator in the decision 
making process? 
 
C.3.7.3 Implementation Context of decision 1331 
Bson  
There is a difference between the special task force (score 4) and other 
subordinates (score 2) “so I score an average of 3”. The decision itself is simple 
but to some extent it is a complicated implementation situation. We do not know 
exactly which people we have to speak with of BATUNION. We have to 
anticipate some ripostes from our competitors when they become aware of our 
efforts. Will that be a price chicken race at BATUNION and/or at other 
customers? Remember that the market is mature with a long-term growth of just 
2% a year and potential ups and downs regarding business cycle.  
 
The special task force consists of two people. The MD manages them more or 
less daily and directly even if they are self-driven to a high degree. But other 
subordinates meet BATUNION subordinates and other customers daily, all over   
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Sweden, and how shall they act in all these different upcoming situations? 
Information must be general but action situational. “I worry about that”.  
 
Fson 
It is not a complicated decision to implement but the logistics are crucial; if we get 
a strong response from our efforts with BATUNION, we must have a safe 
provision of components from our English supplier. Our people are well prepared 
to manage the project but it is necessary to prioritize the use of individual working 
time. There is a weakness in our salary system: some people have to work with 
this project and “they will not be paid for it”, but in the long run it is good for 
everybody.  
 
The action plan has a very evident goal: 10% at the BATUNION market within 
three years. That makes it easier for everybody to understand and prioritize. The 
special support from the Board of Directors outside the budget is also a driving 
force. A problem occurred when we put the plan in action: BATUNION has 
reorganized twice since then! There is a risk that our competitors will attack our 
other customers if we are successful in our BATUNION approach. 
 
Lson 
We must build relations, it is impossible for us to take a price fight. So, we have 
always tried to do so and we have a good and fair starting point. But there is a 
high risk that our competitors will make greater efforts against our other 
customers, mainly with the price, if we will be too successful at BATUNION and 
push them out. Nevertheless I am positive to our approach. “‘Trucknissarna’ 
(nickname of BATUNION) change their overcoats with the change of the wind”. 
BATUNION has always been “big and beautiful but now they have come down to 
earth”. The changes within BATUNION have created new possibilities for us.  
 
C.3.7.4 Implementation Profile of decision 1331 
Bson 
The goal was to increase the market share of BATUNION by 5 %-units within 
two years. The Board of Directors decided to support the project with an 
additional SP budget of 0.3 MSEK. The special task force has a very specific and 
clear task. The goal is well formulated. It is up to the special task force to use all 
its competence and find the right approaches. Sometimes the MD nevertheless has 
to “point with his whole hand” with regard to what to do. It is often a question of 
allocating enough personal time; 10% is said to be put into the BATUNION 
project. Other resources, 0.3 MSEK, are enough. 
 
As said in the description of the context above, the main problem is the other 
subordinates; they do not have clear mission in the project. 
 
Fson 
The action plan is very clear with target groups, goals, resources, etc. Perhaps 
there is some weakness in the time schedule. I have responsibility for the project.  
 
Lson 
I do not know any specific goal but I have heard a figure of “some more millions”. 
“I have not got any broken-down or detailed goals”. As I am working on the after-  
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sale market, I am always available to serve them, even on Christmas Eve if 
necessary. We use the tagged 0.2 MSEK mostly for social activities in order to 
build relations. 
 
C.3.7.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 1331 
The case is not yet fully implemented according to unified statements of the three 
respondents. Their judgments and comments must be understood under these 
circumstances. 
 
Bson 
“The special task force thinks the project is running well. I find it going too slow!” 
 
Fson 
“We are on the track to reach our goal but we have not been efficient enough.” 
 
Lson 
“I do not know how to judge Goal Satisfaction correctly as I do not know the 
goal” 
 
C.3.8 Decision 1333 Save money 
C.3.8.1 Background and actual situation of decision 1333 
When the interview of decision 1331 was to be concluded, Fson spontaneously 
said: “I have an example …”. Even here he has the role as the implementer. 
 
C.3.8.2 Opinions on decision 1333 
Fson 
As no formal interview was carried out, the spontaneous opinion is just cited here. 
“If a TMT decision shall ‘go through’ people must understand the meaning of the 
decision. This is Alpha and Omega. Eson has gone out with a message that we 
must save money. As we mainly are a sales company (our manufacturing just put 
components together) the only way to save money is to fire people and sell less. 
Obviously, key figures as the net sales margin are more important than growth, 
perhaps leading to a slightly lower net sales margin on a bigger sale volume!? I do 
not understand that kind of philosophy – 6% of 60 MSEK gives 3.6 MSEK and 
5% of 80 MSEK gives 4 MSEK. I find it very difficult to implement such a 
decision. Besides, I do not like the transmission of the decision. It came as an e-
mail, like an order. If the decision had been transmitted through a personal contact, 
it had been possible to react, to have a dialogue. And my opinions given here 
could have been discussed. I do not think that the ‘order’ would have been 
withdrawn but perhaps modified.” 
 
C.3.8.3 Comments to respondent answer on decision 1333 
Fson’s body language said that he was not ready to implement the decision, at 
least not immediately. I got the impression that he was going to discuss his 
perceived consequences of the implementation of the decision with Eson.  
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C.4 Presentation of data from Company B 
C.4.1 Specific information collection procedure for Company B 
I got permission to look at the TMT minutes of meetings from which I selected 3 
decisions, using my experiences from the earlier interviews in the other 
companies. That means that I selected one decision affecting almost all staff 
members and two strategic decisions with impact on the future business. The CEO 
had no objections to my choice and helped me by pointing out staff members to 
interview.  
 
The interviews were carried out starting in November 2004 and continuing for 
three months. Nobody that asked for an interview has declined to participate. I 
have met out-spoken people that were easy to understand and ready to give the 
personal opinions. 
 
C.4.2 Business and organizational information of Company B 
Company B is operating in the consultant marketplace specializing in 
manufacturing companies with a need for advanced technical product 
development. Company B has offices all over Sweden but it has customers in the 
entire Nordic area. Company B has gone through a trial by fire during the last 18 
months due to figures in the red that were caused by overcapacity in a declining 
marketplace.  
 
The group is organized in a parent company (without any operations), a couple 
of companies and a subgroup of small companies dealing with special business 
segments. The Top Management Team consists of the CEO, the Managing 
Directors, the Specialized Business Area Manager, the CFO and a Senior without 
portfolio, in total 7 persons. Economic functions are centralized but the HQ is 
slimmed. The role of trade unions is traditional according to laws and history.  
 
C.4.3 Respondent profiles of Company B 
In table C06, the respondent profiles are shown. During the interviews about 
decision 2302, it was clear that the decision in some aspects contained two sub-
decisions. Therefore you will see it managed accordingly. Decision 2303 was 
selected as I got the information that the implementation was going to start. It was 
interesting for my research to follow a decision “just when implementation was 
happening”, which could add new aspects to the study. However, the 
implementation decision was not made, so it was impossible for the potential 
implementers to score. Nevertheless, I received valuable orally information.  
 
C.4.4 Corporate profile of Company B 
Company B was bought out from the Stock exchange during the autumn of 2003, 
when my Step I was passed, after some years there. The three years before leaving 
the Stock exchange, the profit average has been 0% but the average growth is 13% 
a year. The profit the last 18 months after the buy-out has been negative but not   
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communicated as it is privately owned. Company B has now overcome the 
capacity problems and is looking forward to profitable business. 
 
Table C06. Respondent profiles in Company B 
 
2301 Sson DM Political 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Tson DM Value 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Xson IMP Directive 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Yson IMP Directive 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
Zson IMP Directive 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
2302:1 Tson DM Value 4.0 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.0
Vson IMP Value 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.0 3.0
Yson IMP Directive 3.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
Zson IMP Directive 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2302:2 Vson IMP Value 3.5 4.0 3.5 5.0 3.0
Yson IMP Directive 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
2303 Sson DM Political 2.5
Uson DM Value 6.0
Aberg IMP Directive 4.0
2304 Aberg IMP Directive 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
Bberg IMP Directive 2.5 6.0 6.0 5.0 6.0
Cberg DM Value 3.5 4.0 5.5 5.5 4.5
2305 Uson DM Value 6.0 5.0 4.5 5.5 4.5
Bberg IMP Directive 2.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
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C.4.5 Corporate culture of Company B 
Sson 
The companies are allowed to develop their own cultures. It means that there is a 
wide range of sub-cultures from a group perspective. The CEO tries to implement 
a “collective compass heading” among the set of motley sub-cultures. One key 
word is “cutting-edge competence”, another, linked thereby, is “specific value for 
individual customers”. During the last years, we have had a tough journey: figures 
in the red, fired staff members, re-organization of business and companies. But 
now the puzzle pieces are falling in place. We have seen, through investigations, 
an increased staff member satisfaction index. 
  
The communication climate is good. Our intranet gives possibilities to exchange 
information within the entire group. It is used frequently. We have a positive 
attitude to trade unions. The staff members are organized in a majority but they 
have not created a local organization. We hope they will do this.  
 
Tson 
The group is just now between two cultures, the old one characterized by 
decentralization and the new one characterized by cooperation. There are pros and 
cons for both but the biggest risk is that it takes too much time to establish the new   
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culture. There is an internal resistance against the shift and the customers feel this: 
“sometimes we do not make decisions as quickly as we did before”. The group is 
going from an entrepreneur-driven to a staff member-driven organization. The past 
years with a profit problem have lead to short term decisions and the avoidance of 
inconvenient decisions. 
 
“10 to 15 years ago the individual was in focus. Now a lot of potential staff 
members are knocking on the doors so we are more focused on competence from a 
customer perspective.” There have been low salary increases, so it is easier for the 
customers to buy out a consultant with the lower salary. The consultants have an 
excellent tool in intranet for dialogues and problem solving.  
 
Uson 
We have a culture under change. Earlier, every single company did their own 
business. Now we have a focus on cooperation, but decision making is still where 
the business takes place. Cooperation is essential in order to improve the optimal 
covering rate of the consultants (the benefit side) and to be as cost effective as 
possible (the cost side) with, for instance, information and book-keeping systems. 
 
The new culture demands a higher degree of close follow-up. This control is 
sometimes experienced as if the bosses are poking in details. Communication is 
quite top-down and the reverse, but less intensive, side to side. “As a metaphor, 
we have come about 30 meters in a 100 meters race; that is, up to the long jump 
pit”. 
 
Vson 
The climate is open both now and historically. It is OK to raise controversial 
questions and we are stimulated to dialogue. But there are differences between the 
companies, depending mainly on leadership styles. So far, the single company has 
operated on one’s own record, but now we are trying to create a cooperative 
culture based on our four E core values: entrepreneurship, ethics, engagement and 
evolution. One aim of this culture is to catch a potential customer even if “my 
company” is not the right one. “We are a few steps on the way”. Everyone 
understands and to a certain extent supports the culture but everyone does not 
“buy” decisions made in this spirit. 
 
The well-working intranet is an important part of exchanging information. The 
TMT is not yet a team but on the track to be a team. The position of trade unions is 
not strong but it differs among the companies. 
  
Xson 
A characteristic of Company B is decentralization. This means guidelines and 
directives from the top but business decisions made by them who know the 
marketplace. The other side of the coin is a weekly reporting of charged time and 
available but not used time. The Top Management knows therefore exactly how 
successful the business is running.  
 
The climate is open. We try always to be straight and clear. Our consultants look 
at the customers as “they, and only they, are paying our salaries”. Therefore the 
consultants are aware of the importance of our customers giving us “long ears”.  
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The intranet is our main and almost only communication channel. It is an arena 
for both business communications and social dialogues as far they are not too 
extensive. So far, we have not been drowned in the information flow; putting a 
technical question on the intranet results in immediate response.  
 
The strength of trade unions differs between the companies but over all we have 
good connections. There is a group forum of trade unions’ representatives where 
Top Management can discuss common group items. Economic incitements are 
used but they are double-edged so we try to avoid them. Poor performance is 
managed immediately by correcting the individual in question in order to prevent a 
repetition. The decision making close to the customers is the strength of our 
culture. The individual company is well known by the customers but the group is 
not. That is a weakness.  
 
Yson 
The staff members are committed and competent. We are ready to make quick 
decisions regarding structure, customers, etc., but we often discuss the small 
things, not the important! Many things fizzle out. And we are often too short-
sighted in our decisions: the covering rate of the consultants is always in focus and 
that casts a shadow on everything else. 
 
We are geographically spread in small units, which causes “a culture of we do it 
our way”. The advantage of this culture is a close handling of all customer-related 
possibilities and problems. But we are changing now into a culture of cooperation 
without losing the closeness.  
 
Zson 
Over all, we have a culture that is changing. We have started in a position where 
we had a company culture but not a group culture. Our new CEO is implementing 
a group culture of openness and cooperation between top bosses and group 
companies as well as internally in the companies. We are on the track but there is 
yet much to do. We have gone farthest at the top level. 
 
The openness has at least two dimensions, geography and competence. It will 
also lead to a higher degree of mobility among the staff members: there will be a 
new, interesting job to find in another company when someone leaves that 
company. We have some basic beliefs, the four Es. “I can just remember one of 
them which indicates that they are not a part of our working days”. We also have a 
new concept, TEMPO, which is living its own life without links to the four Es. 
 
The communication in the group is growing depending both on the openness 
and the intranet and the IT system “perspektiv”. 60% of the staff members log in 
every day on “perspektiv” but the goal is 90%. Some people are confused about 
some elements in “perspektiv”, mainly the personal declarations of how you feel 
today. “What is the purpose of answering such questions?” Many staff members 
still think that communication is a managerial responsibility but the attitude is 
changing.  
 
We are not very good at paying attention to good performances, but the opposite 
applies. 
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Aberg 
The culture of our company has changed a lot since we got a new CEO. Earlier we 
were a cluster of companies, now we are a group characterized by analytical 
thinking: this is the market and what can we do to explore it? We decide on big 
issues when we have done our homework. That does not mean that we do not 
make quick decisions, too. 
 
We are ready to change as the world changes. We are flexible. Our CEO is 
charismatic in a positive way but there is no runner up. So we live a bit 
dangerously; what happens if our CEO is not there? We are so dependent in him. 
“We have four basic beliefs. They are ethics, emotions … and, yes, I do not 
remember the other two.” But what we are most aware of is “How do we earn 
money?” The four Es are used now and then but they do not influence daily work.  
 
TMT cares about the staff members. On lower levels we also take care of each 
other. On every 4
th or 5
th month, we conduct a staff satisfaction survey so we 
always have a good indication of the mood of the staff. We have an open 
communication supported by our intranet. It is harmless to say what you think. 
 
Bberg 
Our business climate is ”from hand to mouth”. We work so much at the offices of 
our customers and in their culture that we almost forget our own culture. That 
sometimes causes loyalty conflicts like coinciding meetings. Some staff members 
say that they feel more for the customer than for our company: “remember who is 
paying my salary”. 
 
The individual consultant, not the company, is demanded by the customer. That 
means that two competitors will use the same person. Therefore we have high 
ethical standard saying that we must be very careful not to bring secret knowledge 
among competitors. The climate is very open. A consultant can always search for 
support and solutions in our intranet. Everyone is ready to contribute. Our new 
CEO has an open door policy. Nevertheless, only a few take the opportunity to 
communicate directly with him. 
 
Since we left the Stock Exchange, we focus on what we are here to do and not 
on satisfying of the needs of stock market analysts (“prognosis, moving comma 
signs and flashing presentations”). Our culture is to create relations with our 
customers, to deliver on time and what we have promised. This is disturbed when 
the profit is under pressure; we get directives from the top how to act.  
 
Cberg 
I have constituted four key culture elements, the four Es. Expertise stands for not 
only a competent (theoretical and practical) person but also a person with 
capability to implement and to cooperate with others. Engaged is the second: 
taking responsibility not only for her/himself but also taking care of job fellows 
and customers. Evolution means an ambition to make things better, not to be 
satisfied with “this is good” but to improve. Ethics is the fourth element and it 
means to stand up for what we are saying, a handshake is an agreement. 
 
We have gone a bit along the road. “I try to be a figurehead, to live as I learn. 
My job is to promote our culture”. The new culture is a break from independence   
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(in a subsidiary perspective) to customer-driven action and internal cooperation. It 
is possible and allowed to build subcultures in the subsidiaries but they must be a 
subset of the group culture. 
 
“I hope that the new culture will create a sales and winner climate. I also hope 
that the staff members will look at themselves as cathedral builders and not as 
stone-cutters.”  
 
C.4.6 Leadership style of Company B 
C.4.6.1 Respondent views on Leadership style of Company B 
The evaluation of leadership styles is shown in table C06.  
 
C.4.6.2 Comments to respondent opinions on Leadership style of Company B  
There have often been “pros and cons” when the respondents have had to decide. 
But they have come to conclusions without too much hesitation. I have not scored 
lower than 5 when judging the credibility. 
 
C.4.7 Decision 2301 Customer Account  
C.4.7.1 Background and actual situation of decision 2301 
The TMT decided to introduce a Customer Account Concept (CAC) as a new 
element of the corporate culture supporting internal group cooperation. A single 
staff member of any company takes responsibility for a specific customer. The 
goal is to satisfy the customer’s consulting demand by using the competence of the 
entire group.  
 
The implementation has gone on for more than one year when the interviews are 
carried out. Sson and Tson are members of the TMT but also as Managing 
Directors of companies responsible for the implementation in their companies. 
Xson is deputy Managing Director of a company and he has the executive 
responsibility for the implementation. Yson and Zson are consultants and 
implementers, “front soldiers”. 
 
C.4.7.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 2301 
Sson 
The idea has been on the agenda for a long time. When trying to find the answer 
of the question “Why will we be a group?” we found that we could offer our 
customers more than what the individual company is able to do. Therefore there is 
a need for a systematic approach, an organization. “The ring was raked” (direct 
translation from the Swedish sentence Manegen var krattad; that is everything was 
ready). Even before the decision in the TMT, the process was going on. “I cannot 
remember who the initiator was but it does not matter, we were prepared and the 
decision was made unanimously”.  
 
Tson 
The concept had been discussed now and then. The TMT made a decision to 
introduce the concept. We had no investigation, just the idea. Before   
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implementation it was necessary to develop a manual. It was done by an external 
supplier. The manual became very complicated and bureaucratic.  
 
Xson 
“I was not involved at all in the decision making process” 
 
Yson 
There has been a discussion during the past two or three years. I have not been 
involved. Then there suddenly was a decision.  
 
Zson 
“I was not involved until we had a sales conference where we were briefly 
informed about the concept. Perhaps I had gotten a hint before about what was 
going on.” 
 
C.4.7.3 Implementation Context of decision 2301 
Sson 
“The concept fulfils two functions, clarity to the customer and internally to 
develop and maximize the individual customer business”. As we have been in the 
process of implementing CAC, it was just to continue. We have a few so to say 
VIP customers and they were selected easily. But to collect supplementary 
information about and from them was a protracted job as the task was “another 
one upon all others” according to CAC opinions. But we met the time schedule 
and we are on track. 
 
Tson 
It was very easy to identify a set of customers as a target group. The responsible 
consultants were also easy to point out. But as the manual was not that well suited, 
the implementation context over all became complex.  
 
Xson 
The customers often did not know the entire range of our group consultant 
services. Therefore they have used other consultants. Our consultant service users 
are normally people in “the middle of the organization”. Some of them were 
disturbed when we approached the Managing Directors in our selling efforts.  
 
I think that the customers have not been affected that much by our concept. 
They have always been provoked by our efforts to sell even more consultant 
services. The customers like having just one group contact person, the CAC. The 
consultants got the CAC task on top of other tasks. We received a few reactions 
but most of them are positive. 
 
Yson 
When we started there was no manual available so far as I know. However, my 
boss knew the aim of the concept so we started to select customers and decided 
jointly on the appointment of persons responsible for the CAC. I got the two 
customers I wanted. I was also appointed member of two CAC teams. The manual 
arrived later and it is instructive but we have not followed it.  
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Zson 
My appointment as responsible for the CAC of a big customer was not surprising. 
We had already a close relation. My customer used other consultants in areas 
where we have competence so there was a possibility. But the main problem was, 
and is, that the CAC task was on top of all other jobs. Nevertheless, I thought it 
was an appropriate concept and I did my best.  
 
C.4.7.4 Implementation Profile of decision 2301 
Sson 
I took care of the implementation in my company. Initially 7 of 15 team managers 
were appointed as CAC managers. No bad feelings were demonstrated by those 
not appointed, as the selection was done due to existing customer relations. No 
special benefits were given to CAC managers. 
 
Tson 
The consultants got their customer but the original idea of an individual benefit 
incitement was never put in action. The manual was also hard to understand and 
follow.  
 
Xson 
I got the task from my boss and written directives from the HQ. We had discussed 
the concept at a sales conference so I was aware of it. We identified a set of 
customers and the CAC consultants got one to three customers each. Today the 
number of customers had declined to nine distributed among five consultants. The 
reason for the decline is that we have learned something during 1½ years. The 
goals were formulated in the directives and I myself am responsible in our 
company. 
 
Yson 
No goals were formulated but over all the concept should increase the consultant 
coverage rate. I got my task and I knew what to do.  
 
Zson 
After the sales conference my boss and I sat down and discussed the approach. It 
was obvious that I would take care of “my customer”. But we were not agreed on 
the tools as we lacked guidelines. They arrived later. But instead of waiting for 
instructions, we started work. I did not formulate a specific goal but I was 
convinced of the benefit of CAC.  
 
C.4.7.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 2301 
Sson 
The results are so far not that impressive. We have to be patient. In a year the 
CAC will give us competition advantages and, as a result, increased sales figures. 
 
The implementation process has gone quite well. It depends mainly on the fact 
that the concept was not new to us and even requested by some of our customers. 
But nevertheless it has taken some manpower from other tasks. 
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Tson 
Starting up, there were about 40 customers. Today they have decreased to 20. The 
concept is still OK but the market has come loose which means that the concept is 
not so important any more for volume growth. The staff members were not that 
well managed in the concept. “You cannot climb a ladder in one step”. That 
caused some bad feelings. So far there is no evaluation of volume effects. 
 
Xson 
We are on the track to achieve the goals but we are not yet there. It is very hard to 
convince a customer to abandon a well performing consultant of a competitor in 
favor of us even if we also are doing a good job. Our company has not put 
unimportant resources in CAC but has received just a few jobs linked to it. The 
entire group is coming out better. I think that it is necessary to evaluate CAC 
within a year.  
 
Yson 
“It is rolling on”. I have got some cross-selling to one of my two CAC customers. 
In the CAC teams nothing has happened. The follow-up is not that good. We have 
a list of persons responsible for CAC and customers. It is not up-dated: staff 
members have left and offices are closed. There is no feed back about goal 
achievement. “If it depends on CAC or anything else, I do not know, but the 
internal cooperation has improved.” We are tardy so I think it will take another 
year to focus on CAC. Just now we have a new campaign (“short take off 2005”). 
“We act like a fire brigade on quenching fire.” “CAC takes efforts but is not 
cannibalizing.”  
 
Zson 
We have so far not received any cross-selling. One reason is the price level. Big 
customers have price advantages in our agreement. Therefore other group 
companies get higher incomes from other customers when the consultants are fully 
occupied. But my customer today knows the entire group competency very well 
and my customer now asks me first of all when something is coming up. 
Nevertheless there is cloud in the sky: my customer has signed a frame agreement 
with one of our competitors. To conclude, even if we so far have not get that much 
out of the concept, we are well prepared for next demand decrease which will 
come now or then.  
 
C.4.7.6 Comments to respondent opinions on decision 2301 
Tson was very decisive in his judgments but I felt that he was low-rating all-over 
because he had a preconceived opinion based on the design of the manual.  
 
C.4.8 Decision 2302 Phone cost reduction 
C.4.8.1Background and actual situation of decision 2302 
There exist three sister-groups of companies since the buy-out from the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange O-list. One of them had negotiated and implemented a new phone 
cost agreement with a supplier. The TMT in Company C made a decision to hang 
on the existing agreement. Some elements of the decision are cited here in 
translation:   
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•  the agreement with the supplier is signed immediately (a) 
•  the prefix to be used when dialing private phone calls and the private 
invoices will be sent to home address (b) 
•  the decision is implemented as soon as possible with an individual 
company time schedule (c) 
•  the MD appoints a phone coordinator of his each company as soon as 
possible but not later than May 6 (d) 
•  Vson designs a phone policy, dead-line May 31 (e) 
Three months later Vson reports (a) and (d) are completed and (e) on track in 
cooperation with the supplier. No more reports are to be found up to the end of the 
interviews 12 months after the initial decision was made.  
 
The agreement has two parts. The technical solution to reduce company phone 
costs is easy to implement. The other part aims to differentiate business and 
private phone calls on mobile phones. The solution is to use a prefix for private 
calls. This arrangement is motivated by a personal tax risk for private calls paid by 
the company but also because the company strives to cut costs over all.  
 
Tson is decision maker in TMT and implementer in his company. Vson is 
investigator in the decision making process and coordinator during the 
implementation. Yson and Xson are implementers affected by the prefix solution 
as they are mobile phone holders. 
 
C.4.8.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 2302 
Tson 
The push to make the decision came from the owner’s side. When we put the 
question on the TMT agenda there was well prepared basic data showing a 
potential cost cut of at least 10%. So it was easy to make the decision.  
 
Vson 
Our sister groups had got a cost cutting agreement with the same supplier as we 
had already. They contacted us and we together conducted an investigation 
showing a potential 17% cost cut. The solution was presented in the TMT and the 
decision was made according to the proposal with one exception: the TMT 
members were not included in the division between business and private mobile 
phone calls by using a prefix. All their calls should be managed as business calls. 
The exception was not written down in the minutes. The change of practice 
regarding private calls was not anchored among the staff members beforehand, 
neither directly nor through trade union negotiations. 
 
Yson 
I have heard about the discussions but I was not involved in the decision making 
process. 
 
Zson 
“I have not heard about the decision.” 
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C.4.8.3 Implementation Context of decision 2302 
Tson 
I think it is an easy decision to implement. It is well defined. 
 
Vson 
The decision itself is not complex. But our supplier is involved in the 
implementation. And the decision affects the private sphere, the staff member will 
receive an invoice to their home address. Not all of them are happy with that as 
they will have to explain certain phone calls to their husband/wife.  
 
Yson 
No problem to implement the company part of the new deal. We have only two 
personal mobile phones here, just me and another consultant. The rest of the team 
uses a phone from the pool when they have a need. So regarding the prefix part of 
the decision, it is not a big deal for us.  
 
Zson 
“I have not been in touch with the decision, not even the prefix case when you ask 
me specifically about that.” 
 
C.4.8.4 Implementation Profile of decision 2302 
Tson 
There is a person responsible for IT matters in every company that takes care of 
the task. In our company I have appointed a staff member. 
 
Vson 
The implementation task was divided between the supplier and the company. The 
implementation took place during the summer, which caused some disturbances in 
the coordination of the activities. As an example, the supplier addressed a letter to 
the home of staff members without the company knowing about it. 
 
Yson 
We had a quite intensive discussion about the prefix. We had the impression that it 
was a proposal, not an order. We did not find the motives strong enough to 
introduce the prefix. We have not received a prefix to use. No decision was made 
in our company. After the discussion I have not heard anything more. Half a year 
has past since then. 
 
Zson 
“As I said, it did not affect me”. 
 
C.4.8.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 2302 
Tson 
I think we will reach group goal satisfaction. So far we have not implemented the 
privatization in my company but I do not see any problem as we have quite few 
mobile users. 
 
Vson 
I should have used more time to push and support the companies. I could also 
have sent a letter to all staff members about the privatization in order to inform in   
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the same way using all arguments for the change. Some of them have been badly 
communicated. We have a plan for follow-up. I think we will exceed the cost cut 
goal. 
 
Yson 
The cost cut was already done by us so that is quite well implemented. The prefix 
is not implemented at all.  
 
Zson 
“As I said, it did not affect me”. 
 
C.4.9 Decision 2303 Group Q-system 
C.4.9.1 Background and actual situation of decision 2303 
I observed in the minutes of meetings of the TMT that the question of a group 
joint Q-system was discussed a couple of times. I got the feeling that there was a 
resistance in the organization so I decided to look at the case. 
 
I have the following picture of the procedure. There are different operating 
quality systems in the group. The CEO initiated a principal investigation of a 
group joint Q-system, which was presented at a TMT-meeting. The TMT decides 
with an unclear formulation “principally, we are looking in the direction of a 
group quality system. A group survey of the state of the art will be carried out … 
and will be reported at the next sales conference”. Voting was organized some 
months later on the intranet giving a majority for a joint group Q-system. The 
TMT made a new decision to carry out an even more detailed investigation with 
the CEO as the responsible person but without a time limit.  
 
My interviews were done 3-5 months later. A follow-up phone call was made a 
year after the first interviews in order to get an actual picture of the case. Sson and 
Uson are decision makers while Aberg is the implementer.  
 
C.4.9.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 2303 
Sson 
Our company is running an ISO-system for the past couple of years. Our 
experiences are good. We are ready to share our experiences with the rest of the 
group. Our Quality Manager is involved in the on-going investigation. We think 
that a group Q-system is favorable in terms of cost effectiveness and knowledge 
sharing. But we have to overcome the fact that some managers do not see a quality 
system as a business tool. For us it is important to get a decision as soon as 
possible. We hope that it will be an ISO standard. But we do not know when such 
a decision will be made. 
 
Uson 
We have not yet made the final decision about a group Q-system. The question 
was discussed at a sales meeting half a year ago. The companies that have a Q-
system demanded a joint Q-system. The others were not interested in being forced 
into a system, as their customers do not demand a Q-system. The quality 
maturation is high even if a formal Q-system does not exist.  
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There was a TMT decision to make an investigation about a common Q-system. 
It is still running. The investigator does it as a side job and he offers as much time 
as he has available. There is no timetable for a report but “I think it will come 
soon”. “I suppose it will contain a C/B analysis”. All together, the way we are 
handling the question indicates that it is not so important. 
 
It will take time to implement a common Q-system, if there will be a TMT 
decision. “I will give it a 30% chance that we have a Q-system at the end of next 
year” (that is from the interview event 23 months ahead).  
 
A year later Uson says that the TMT has understood that the consequences of 
one common quality system are extensive in terms of customer relations and 
internal costs. “Therefore, we have decided to implement a selected Q-system as a 
first step in just the parent company and then we have to decide if we go further 
on”.  
 
Aberg 
At our latest sales conference, we spoke a lot about the Q-system. Someone had 
got a task to map the quality system in our group. We got a survey report. We 
decided not to make a decision now and there. The CEO should ask some 
questions on the intranet about a joint Q-system of the group. The answer was a 
huge “yes” majority. We will have a new sales conference within two months and 
I expect a report. I am convinced that the decision will be a group joint Q-system. 
But it will take time to implement, probably more than one year after the decision 
is made. From the customers’ point of view, it matters of course to have a Q-
system but it is not necessarily to be certified. 
 
  A year later Aberg does not know what has happened. At least no Q-system has 
been installed. He has heard that investigations are running but he has not heard 
anything about a decision. He is not convinced that a decision will come about a 
group Q-system, as it is difficult to calculate a pay off.  
 
C.4.9.3 Comments to respondent opinions on decision 2303 
Uson and Aberg (Sson has not been available) differ in the level of actual 
information when they are contacted a year later. They also have more divergent 
opinions about the case then, probably because the case is delayed.  
 
C.4.10 Decision 2304 Human resource committee, HRC 
C.4.10.1 Background and actual situation of decision 2304 
The minutes of the TMT meetings show that the question of a HRC was on the 
agenda a couple of times until a decision was made saying that “the 
representatives of the staff members get a task to design a proposal for the 
implementation of a HRC and to clarify the legitimacy of a HRC”. The 
implementation of a HRC was on-going without any further decisions noted in the 
minutes but with reports from the CEO coming up and noted about the state of the 
art. When the interviews are carried out, a HRC is in operation.  
 
Aberg and Cberg are representatives of the staff members but also members of 
the group Board of Directors as trade union representatives while Cberg is the   
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CEO. The double roles of Aberg and Cberg should be kept in mind but in a HRC 
context they represent all staff members irrespective of the memberships in trade 
unions.  
 
C.4.10.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 2304 
Aberg 
“I cannot even verify that such a decision is made!” As I remember, the process to 
establish a HRC was started even before we got a new CEO. But he took over and 
pushed the process. He was, and is, keen to have good relations with staff 
members through trade unions. As a colleague and I were members of the Board 
of Directors we got a task from the CEO to design an arrangement. So we did this 
and our proposal was accepted.  
 
Our proposal was quite clear that a HRC should have no formal status regarding 
MBL, which the CEO initially wanted. But we meant that the negotiations 
according to MBL must be carried out in the subsidiaries. A HRC should be a 
forum for discussions in early stages and testing ideas. So it was.  
 
Bberg 
There was a decision made to implement a “consultant time bank”. The decision 
was made without sufficient discussions between the CEO and the representatives 
of trade unions. So we proposed that the CEO set up a HRC to avoid such 
situations in the future. Our proposal was received in a very positive manner and 
the decision was made quite soon. 
 
Cberg 
My basic belief is that there will be group advantages if we have a close 
cooperation with the trade unions. That was my experience from the company I 
managed before I was appointed CEO. We had a committee. Therefore I wanted to 
create such a committee at the group level. My proposal was well received by the 
TMT.  
 
C.4.10.3 Implementation Context of decision 2304 
Aberg 
There were some complications regarding roles, demarcations and formal handling 
around trade unions, representation in the Board of Directors, MBL and the status 
of a HRC. The representatives of staff members and the CEO discussed and solved 
the problem in a good atmosphere. 
 
Bberg 
There were two alternatives for organization of a HRC. To avoid a too large 
committee we preferred representation from every company, that is, 5x2=10 
persons. If we should have representatives from every office, there would have 
been a number exceeding 20 persons. A HRC does not include employer people. 
A HRC has no decision capacity. It does not take over any of the trade unions’ 
negotiation rights. It is just for communication with the CEO as a sounding board. 
A HRC can also raise questions itself. This design is decided in an agreement 
between us and the CEO. 
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Cberg 
The proposal to create a HRC was more or less foresighted as the staff members 
knew my record. Perhaps there was not at first a concordance of opinions between 
what TMT intended and staff members wanted. I was keen to start immediately 
even if the system and the structure were not designed. That had to be done during 
the on-going process.  
 
C.4.10.4 Implementation Profile of decision 2304 
Aberg 
The representatives of staff members got the task to implement the proposal upon 
which the CEO had agreed.  
 
Bberg 
As we totally agreed upon the organization and the task there was no problem at 
all. 
 
Cberg 
In my opinion, it was very clear! 
 
C.4.10.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 2304 
Aberg 
There were initially some mistakes done but now it is running excellently. 
 
Bberg 
Everything went very well, just a communication fault around the handling of a 
salary principle in the beginning. We have established the routines.  
 
Cberg 
The HRC is running better than my expectations. But I have missed a bit about 
communication due to lack of time. 
 
C.4.11 Decision 2305 Accounting for working hours 
C.4.11.1 Background and actual situation of decision 2305 
A decision in the minutes of meetings is formulated “we make weekly reports of 
working hours and we do it using a new IT module, PX”. A month later the 
minutes note, that “the decision about PX stands good”, supplemented with some 
information about the responsibility of the costs for education and installation. 
Some weeks later on, a couple of questions about details are solved and decided.  
 
The decision does not affect the routine for the collection of data about working 
hours to invoice the customers. Uson is an implementer as consultant but also 
chairman of a trade union and Bberg is a decision maker, member of the TMT.  
 
C.4.11.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 2305 
Uson 
There was a two-step-decision. First, a decision was made to collect information 
once a week in stead of once a month. The consultants did not like it because they 
had to use fax or letter, with many of them sitting at the offices of the customers.   
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The idea came up to use our IT system. I cannot remember who came up with the 
idea. Perhaps it was formulated as a request. But so what, we liked it. And the 
decision was made quickly.  
 
Bberg 
We have a Business Administrative System, BAS. Earlier, we collected 
information about the working hours of the consultants by using pen and paper. It 
was possible to use BAS for that purpose too. So we decided to collect 
information using IT. The decision was made over the heads of the consultants. 
 
C.4.11.3 Implementation Context of decision 2305 
Uson 
The system itself was very easy to implement. The consultants were familiar with 
the basic system. But they still think that once a week is too often to give this 
information. “It takes customer time”. They have not understood the aim of 
weekly collection. So the implementation context was a bit complicated.  
 
Bberg 
As the consultants got a system they had demanded it was no problem to 
implement. 
 
C.4.11.4 Implementation Profile of decision 2305 
Uson 
It was just an order to fulfill. Quite clear. And so we did it. 
 
Bberg 
It was decided that from a specific day everybody had to register the working 
hours in the IT-system.  
 
C.4.11.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 2305 
Uson 
Some of the Managing Directors have not used the information for follow-up and 
feed back well enough. 
  
Bberg 
Today the entire system works very well and the consultants are satisfied. Of 
course, we check if the hours are registered and send a reminder if they are not. 
But I do not hear any complaints about it. 
 
C.5 Presentation of data from Company C 
C.5.1 Specific information collection procedure for Company C 
The CEO of Company C was very positive to my research but had to decline to 
participate due to “too much to do”. As I was generally lacking enough 
information in the down-up perspective in other studied companies I once more 
contacted the CEO nine months later. I asked about the possibility to interview the 
chairmen of the four trade unions working in Company C and there was no 
problem to do so. An e-mail from the CEO including a short presentation of my   
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research, prepared by myself, was sent to them. A couple of days later I phoned 
them to agree about an interview. At the same time I asked them to think over one 
well and one poorly implemented decision according to their personal experience 
and opinion. 
 
The interviews followed the prepared check lists starting with corporate culture 
and leadership style. Then the two decisions (“well and poor”) were proposed for 
the continuing interviews without any remarks from my side beforehand in order 
to avoid bias in any dimension. The respondents had prepared themselves quite 
well and the selected decisions were all used for further gathering information.  
 
After these interviews, I find out that it would be very valuable if I could get the 
CEO to give his view on some of the cases. He was kind enough to accept my 
proposal and an interview was carried out where two decisions were selected by 
me. Quite frankly, I just decided to select the most successful and the most 
complicated decision according to my opinion after the interviews with the 
chairmen.  
 
The interviews were carried out over a period of 2 months.  
 
C.5.2 Business and organizational information of Company C 
Company C is a manufacturing company with a limited product range. It is a sub-
supplier of sophisticated technical business-to-business solutions. The main 
market area is the European countries. A few years ago a European manufacturing 
company was acquired. Company C is organized in subsidiaries but is now under 
re-organization into business areas. The HQ is situated in Sweden. Company C 
has some 300 employees. As a manufacturing company there is a tradition of 
strong trade unions. 
 
C.5.3 Respondent profiles of Company C 
A summary of the respondent apprehensions is shown in table C07. 
 
Table C07. Respondent profiles in Company C 
 
5401 Mson IMP Directive 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.0 5.0
5402 Mson IMP Directive 4.5 (0,0) (2,0)
Qson DM Value 5.0 1.5 5.5 5.0 1.5
5403 Nson IMP Value 4.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.0
5404 Nson IMP Value 4.5 4.0 6.0 6.0 3.0
Qson DM Value 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 5.0
5405 Oson IMP Value 4.5 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.0
5406 Pson IMP Value 4.8 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.5
5407:1 Pson IMP Value 4.8 5.5 5.5 0.5 5.0
5407:2 Pson IMP Value 4.8 5.5 5.5 0.5 0.5
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All respondents are males. The chairmen of the four operating trade unions and 
the CEO are interviewed. The chairmen have all been with the Company C for 
more than ten years. 
 
The respondent wanted to score in two different aspects of decision 5407. 
Therefore this decision is split in two parts. One respondent declined to score 
some variables in decision 5402, where there are missing values. He also 
estimated the implementation efficiency of a cancelled decision. Therefore these 
scores are placed in parentheses. 
 
C.5.4 Corporate profile of Company C 
Company C was founded by an entrepreneur and was introduced on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange O-list about 15 years ago. The sales figures the last 
three years, including 2003, have been established on a 15% lower level without 
any yearly growth depending on the market stagnation of their customers. The 
profit has been negative one year but it has definitely been on the positive side for 
the last two years without reaching the high level of five years ago.  
 
C.5.5 Corporate culture of Company C 
C.5.5.1 Respondent views on corporate culture of Company C 
Mson 
“The founder is still living in the walls”. Everybody can enter the room of the 
CEO for a talk. People go to their jobs with pleasure. It means also that people 
will be supported if they have problem. 
  
We are strong in product development. We have distinct management by bosses 
with individual freedom to act. But the over all strategies are not known. We do 
not know where to go. We have an over all shortage of communication. The trade 
unions are not represented at TMT meetings. It is “the secret group” but is 
nowadays more harmonious; earlier there were subgroups within the TMT. There 
is a continuous demand of reports but we do not get feed back. “We are supplying 
figures but we do not understand how or for which purpose they are used. There is 
no analysis of cause and effect.” 
 
Nson  
It is a very soft company, sometimes too soft, certainly in employee questions. 
There is still a lot of patriarchal culture in the walls but the new CEO has other 
values “coming in from Europe”. Nevertheless he also cares for the staff members. 
 
We have almost a monopoly market position balanced by very tough customers. 
It means that we can work systematically without “the pistol to the head”. 
Sometimes we launch solutions, which are not ready for manufacturing. Then we 
get quality and delivery problems. In the factories we now have “teams” and no 
“cells”.  
 
The information works but could be better. We have no groups or committees 
for dealings but the formal negotiations work quite well.  
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Oson 
“It is a nice little company”. The company has a strong history and there is still 
influence from the founder in spite of a development from handicraft to 
engineering and automation, from manufacturing to marketing focus, from good 
profitability to crises to unsatisfactory profitability. 
 
There is a gap between the blue and white collar employees but the cooperation 
between the trade unions is quite good. The loyalty of the staff members is strong; 
no problems with overtime or changed working hours if there is a need. But as the 
white collar employees are mainly in the age range of 40 to 50 years, and this job 
is their first one, there is a skepticism of change. It is not impossible to change but 
it takes time. This situation could have been better if we knew more about the 
future, not about the details but about the direction. Communication between the 
Top Management and the staff members exists but is not systematic and it 
sometimes lacks substance. At the office, everybody has an IT terminal but not in 
the factory. An IT terminal in the pause rooms would had provided a possibility 
for the staff members to get better updated with what is going on.  
 
Feedback is quick, and reproachful if there are mistakes, but we are often not 
encouraged when we are doing well. The Top Management is very seldom seen on 
the factory floor; “if they come we will be sure that something has gone wrong”.  
 
Pson 
“There is a barrier between the Top Management and the staff members”. The 
founder “listened and trusted people”. Now it is “listen, evaluate and decide”. We 
accept the decision and try to implement it in the best way for the company. There 
is a difference between the culture in the original company and the acquired 
company. Our CEO tries to bridge over these differences. It is easier to do so 
between the technical people (“iron doesn’t contradict!”) than between marketing 
people. The staff members have been with the company for long time. People 
know what to do and do so. The communication could be better. Both lack of time 
and the information style are reasons. The performances are not very often 
observed. It is much of a laissez-faire culture. And when feedback is given it is 
often sweeping and not individual. Knowledge is the strength; “or perhaps the 
capacity to generate new knowledge”. 
 
Qson 
The company is in a heavy process, changing from a supplier of a specific product 
to the domestic market to a supplier of customer solutions to an international 
market. The acquisition of the new subsidiary situated abroad has forced a culture 
conflict. It is not a question to combine or to merge the two cultures but to create a 
new culture. “I have spent much energy on designing the new culture but too little 
on communicating it”. There are no formal communication channels like intranet 
or corporate journals. 
 
The subsidiaries are strong in cultivating their own brand name but they have 
problems contributing to the over all new culture of business development and 
profitability. The old culture is characterized by “managing”, the new one by 
“developing”. There are communication problems in the language dimension.   
  249
English is the group language but too few in both Sweden and the European 
country subsidiary have a good command of it.  
 
There is no skill in the organization to manage deviations (analysis and 
proposals of changed action). One reason may be the fact that the company has 
never shown figures in the red. “All together, it is hard to implement big changes 
due to cultural resistance”.  
 
C.5.5.2 Comments to respondent opinions on corporate culture of Company C 
There are interesting differences in the definition or understanding of corporate 
culture among the respondents. The trade union chairmen speak about soft things 
like communication and loyalty, the CEO speaks about business related things like 
brand name and profitability. The scores in table C07 are surprisingly high taking 
into account that all respondents emphasize a corporate culture in change. I 
presume that the chairmen mainly judge the old, appreciated culture and the CEO 
judges the awareness of an ongoing change of corporate culture.  
 
C.5.6 Leadership style of Company C 
The judgments of leadership styles are shown in table C07. Three respondents 
classify the leadership of CEO as value-driven, the fourth one as directive. The 
CEO himself agrees with the majority. All respondents are sure according to my 
judgments.  
 
Some comments are to be cited. “The CEO hears what we say but he will do as 
he has decided”. “The leadership style is the clam-shell variety”. “We have met 
three quite different leadership styles of our three CEOs”. 
 
C.5.7 Decision 5401 New quality system 
C.5.7.1 Background and actual situation of 5401 
The decision was selected and commented by respondent Mson as an example of a 
well implemented decision. Mson is one of the implementers. 
 
C.5.7.2 Decision Making Process Profile of 5401 
Mson 
The decision to replace an existing quality system was forced by customers as far 
as Mson knows. The Board of Directors made the decision and Mson was not 
involved in the process but his boss supplied the Board of Directors with 
information and proposals.  
 
C.5.7.3 Implementation Context of 5401 
Mson 
Mson appreciated the decision to apply a new quality system in the company even 
if he had preferred another system. He finds the culture well prepared to take care 
of the implementation even if there is some lack of competence. 
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C.5.7.4 Implementation Profile of 5401 
Mson 
There is a plan that gives responsibility to selected staff members in project teams 
and a time schedule for implementation. The team members have not been 
released from other jobs but the implementation is more or less “a bit of our day-
to-day operations”.  
 
C.5.7.5 Implementation Efficiency of 5401 
Mson 
The implementation is not yet ready (dead line within some months) but 
everything seems to be on track. Mson judges that Goal Satisfaction will be well 
achieved as well as Process Efficiency.         
 
C.5.8 Decision 5402 Outsourcing  
C.5.8.1 Background and actual situation of 5402 
The case was selected and commented by respondent Mson as an example of a 
decision causing a lot of problems during implementation. A segment of the 
manufacturing in the subsidiary situated abroad was initially to be moved to 
China. This decision was cancelled and replaced by a decision of a total re-
structural approach to the manufacturing.  
 
Mson looks at the case as chairman of a trade union and Qson is the CEO and 
decision maker. 
 
C.5.8.2 Decision Making Process Profile of 5402 
Mson 
We were informed about the ideas of outsourcing a segment of our manufacturing 
abroad under certain conditions. We have understood this as “people and 
equipments”. There was a procedure going on to find a buyer. One day I was 
informed that the subsidiary management was giving notice to staff members and 
moving the manufacturing to a low cost price country. This was completely new 
stuff. We have got a new decision to implement! My trade union is not a direct 
part of the case but we always try to support each other, certainly in difficult 
situations. “The decision is difficult to manage as it is fixed when we got 
knowledge about it”. 
 
Qson 
When I entered the company I was confronted with the bad profit situation in our 
subsidiary abroad. The local management had decided to move a part of the 
manufacturing to China. It was motivated by the product calculation and so far all 
right. But the move should not improve the over all profitability; the fixed costs in 
the factory were not changed. “So I stopped the project”.  
 
Given the new business strategy to offer customer solutions, not manufactured 
products, an analysis of the situation clarified that it was necessary to outsource 
the manufacturing in order to get scale advantages as our volumes were too small. 
To sell the entire production was impossible: there was no buyer. Instead, the idea   
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was to re-structure the production. I myself designed a project plan. I informed all 
the staff members about the plan before the formal decision was made by the 
Board of Directors.  
 
C.5.8.3 Implementation Context of 5402 
Mson 
Following the legal rules there will not be any obstacles to execute it. “It is not 
possible to judge the context on your scale”. 
 
Qson 
The competence level of the local management, and their earlier decision, made it 
necessary to appoint a Swedish project manager supported by local consultants. 
The Chinese solution is still a part of the project but a European partner is also 
involved. As the latter group of people speaks the same educated language as the 
subsidiary people do, they will communicate. That fact has brought to the insight 
that it is possible to move the manufacturing, which they thought was impossible 
in the beginning. 
 
As the re-structuring project will result in lay-offs, the trade unions are heavily 
involved. Due to local culture, they have directly accepted the matter as fact (even 
if they said “there will be riots”) and the rest is a question of economic 
compensation. “We have put in money as this is a test case of our credibility”. The 
project does benefit from the fact that the region has been hit by big changes in the 
traditional manufacturing industry in the last decade. “It is a complex 
implementation context as we are new owners, we are not familiar with the local 
culture and its implication in stressful situations, and we have a problem with the 
local management. That is the reason for the score of 1.5”.  
 
C.5.8.4 Implementation Profile of 5402 
Mson 
The trade union has no part in the implementation. We will just try to support our 
colleagues. The Managing Director of the subsidiary has the full responsibility of 
implementation as far as I know. He has instructions to do it as cost effective as 
possible and on a time schedule.  
 
Qson 
There is a project plan, a responsible project manager and resources. The time 
schedule is however too optimistic; instead of the end of the 4
th quarter of 2004, 
the project will finish in the end of 1
st quarter 2005. I involved myself quite a lot 
in this project to show how a change will be implemented in a systematic way in 
the future.  
 
C.5.8.5 Implementation Efficiency of 5402 
Mson 
The decision is not fully implemented yet but Mson judges a 0 for the Goal 
Satisfaction as “we have not fulfilled the first decision; we have got a new one”. 
He also has a low score for process efficiency as the first decision was cancelled 
and replaced by a new.  
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If we had been involved earlier in the decision making process, we could have 
created trade union cooperation teams to look at different solutions. Even if we 
had not come to a better decision then we have made, we had been participating 
and therefore responsible. And the climate had been better both for actual 
implementation and for future decisions. 
 
Qson 
“We will almost completely reach the goal to improve the profitability”. Saying 
so, he is judging his own reformulated goal, not the initial one. He scores very low 
for process efficiency. The reasons are that the local management lacks 
competence, the higher costs to implement than calculated, and the delayed time 
schedule. But he also points to the future advantage of a successful project 
regarding goal achievement. “It may cost something in the actual project”.  
 
C.5.8.6 Other comments on 5402 
Mson 
“This case indicates that the CEO does not look at trade unions as assets. We will 
make a move to the CEO to improve communication and involvement. It is 
necessary to create better relations for the future. There will be more hard 
decisions to make”. 
 
C.5.9 Decision 5403 Dismissing people  
C.5.9.1 Background and actual situation of 5403 
The decision background was a decrease in sales volumes due to market weakness 
hitting the manufacturing department. Originally, Nson picked up the decision as 
an example of a poor implementation. The interview then turned into two parts, 
the original decision itself and the negotiations according to the Law on co-
determination at work (MBL). 
 
Nson looks at the case as chairman of a trade union but also as a blue collar 
employee of the actual department. The case has its focus not that much on 
implementation but on the long term effects of the premature reactions. 
 
C.5.9.2 Decision Making Process Profile of 5403 
Nson 
The selling volume forecast was presented to the Production Manager. He decided 
immediately without any contacts with the trade union to reduce the number of 
blue collar employees. Then we, the trade union, were involved and the 
negotiations started. 
 
C.5.9.3 Implementation Context of 5403 
Nson 
As there are legal and negotiated rules for such a situation, the context is formally 
simple even if many people will be affected. 
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C.5.9.4 Implementation Profile of 5403 
Nson 
“Just one thing to say: quite clear, we knew exactly what to negotiate about”.  
 
C.5.9.5 Implementation Efficiency of 5403 
Nson 
As the situation occurred, there will be two goals for satisfaction. The Top 
Management had decided on a number of employees to fire, and the trade union 
had a goal to reduce that figure as much as possible. Nson is judging from the 
trade union perspective and he says “we reached more than we thought and that 
depends on the attitude of the CEO”. But he also remarks that the implementation 
process was turbulent.  
 
C.5.9.6 Other comments on 5403 
Nson 
The decision was based on insufficient information and a weak analysis. “If you 
think of a 15% decrease and if in reality it is 10%, then it is 30% wrong. The 
speed was too fast on a too weak basis”. Nevertheless, we had to start the 
negotiations around a notice of a fixed number of staff members. We succeeded to 
cut the number by half. Our CEO showed a soft side and we got quite good 
economic solutions for the fired people, they were satisfied. But quite soon we had 
an upswing in the manufacturing trend, which gave us a lot of overtime. 
Everybody had left before the changed trend. The situation also influenced our 
working organization. We had introduced goal-managed teams excluding 
traditional supervisors. I think that neither the blue collar employees, nor the Top 
Management had understood the conditions for that organization to work well. So 
we went back to the traditional working organization. The old supervisors had got 
new jobs but they were called back. The staff members liked it and we got a 
higher productivity. We recruited new staff members and the over time is low 
today. But we have not any figures on recruiting and training costs.  
 
If the same situation would occur tomorrow, I think everyone understands that 
we must be calmer and, wait more before action. Earlier, we had manufacturing 
strategies saying “if market signals are for ‘decreasing volumes’, then we should 
break immediately; if market signals are for ‘increasing volumes’, then we should 
accelerate slowly. Now I think we will act slowly in both cases. Nobody can be 
sure about predictions.” 
 
C.5.10 Decision 5404 Laser cutter  
C.5.10.1 Background and actual situation of decision 5404 
The manufacturing department, the same as in decision 5403, is operating a laser 
cutter. The company also has a subcontract, manufacturing with the same 
technique, which can be brought home if the capacity grows. This investment 
decision is made mainly in order to improve productivity. The cutter will be in 
place within a couple of weeks after the interviews are carried out. 
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Nson is the implementer, process operator and chairman of a trade union while 
Qson is the decision maker and the CEO 
 
C.5.10.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 5404 
Nson 
The idea has been brought up for discussions now and then. The Production 
Manager mentioned at a meeting in the autumn of 2003 that he was calculating on 
an investment in a new laser cutter. Neither the blue collar employees, nor the 
trade unions were involved in the decision making process. The Board of 
Directors made the principal decision to invest. Then the trade unions were 
engaged in the project dealing with work organization (reducing shifts, moving 
people…), work environment, etc., but this is more an implementation question 
than a decision question. 
 
Qson 
The initiative was coming from the Factory Manager “who is a sowing but not a 
harvesting man”. It is a classic case: improving productivity by capital investment. 
The Production Manager, the head of the Factory Manager, presented the case for 
me. However, the new production strategy is to invest for the same purpose either 
in Sweden or abroad. But in this case it was simple. This type of manufacturing is 
going on within the group just in the Swedish factory so there were no co-
ordination aspects.  
 
The favorable investment pay off was obvious. Furthermore, the investment 
level was actually very low. I decided to go even if the Board of Directors made 
the formal decision.  
 
C.5.10.3 Implementation Context of decision 5404 
Nson 
As said above the new laser cutter will affect the operations in different ways. 
Nson means that the investment is a good thing but in the short term it will cause 
some turbulence nevertheless “the turbulence is manageable”. 
 
Qson 
The implementation will follow a traditional pattern. Even if the investment partly 
will introduce a new operating approach it is not a question of a large jump.  
 
C.5.10.4 Implementation Profile of decision 5404 
Nson 
It is normal that the Factory Manager is the responsible person, with all affected 
people involved. There is a clear plan with a definite take off day and with all 
other ingredients for a successful implementation.  
 
Qson 
When the decision was formally made by the Board of Directors there was already 
a designed implementation plan. As said above, this decision case is very 
traditional and therefore well-known by all people involved. 
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C.5.10.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 5404 
The judgments are made some weeks before the start of manufacturing. There is a 
delay of some weeks compared to the time schedule.  
 
Nson 
I have no doubts about Goal Satisfaction. But there is the same weakness in this 
case as many times before: an overly long start-up period causing unnecessary 
costs. “Therefore, I score just 3 for Process Efficiency”.  
 
Qson 
“Everything seems to go right but it is too early to give full scores”. 
 
C.5.10.6 Other comments on decision 5404 
Nson 
The investment will cause problems for the sub-contractor losing volume but we 
do not expand the number of employees. The new machine will be able to produce 
perhaps the doubled volume as it is possible to run the laser cutter automatically 
without any present operator. That is 168 hours a week! An on-going product 
development will enhance the investment. 
 
C.5.10.7 Comments to respondent opinions on 5404 
I checked, by a phone call, the implementation situation a couple of weeks after 
the interviews. Everything was on track. 
 
C.5.11 Decision 5405 Factory staff member reduction  
C.5.11.1 Background and actual situation of decision 5405 
In year 2001, the investments in new manufacturing technology caused an over-
sized employee force. A downsizing program was effectuated. Today there is a 
very trimmed organization.  
 
Oson is chairman of the trade union and the decision is an example of good 
implementation (by the way, Oson could not find an example of poor 
implementation!). 
 
C.5.11.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 5405 
Oson 
The trade unions were not involved in the earlier stage of the decision making 
process. But even for them it was obvious that a staff member reduction was 
necessary according to the investments and the profitability problems. Top 
Management made the initial decision without any contacts beforehand with the 
trade unions. When the decision (“reduction of staff members”) was made, we 
were invited to the negotiations about the number of people to lay-off, how to 
carry out the reduction and the conditions. The negotiation agreement consisted of 
essential financial support from the company to people aged 62+, a program of 
pre-retirement. Even for younger people, a few in fact, the company supported 
more than it was obliged to regarding the legal aspects.  
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C.5.11.3 Implementation Context of decision 5405 
Oson 
Of course there are always “heads down” when people are fired, even among them 
who are not affected. But all people appreciated the good economical conditions. 
“Given the situational necessity”, the case was not that difficult to implement.  
 
C.5.11.4 Implementation Profile of decision 5405 
Oson 
The Factory Manager was given the implementation task and the representatives 
of the trade unions supported this. There was a demand from Top Management for 
no delays.  
 
C.5.11.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 5405 
Oson 
The whole case was very well implemented. The process went easily and we 
achieved both company goals and private goals (“sufficient economic 
compensation”). The main reasons for success are good agreement conditions and 
short implementation time schedule leading to satisfied fired staff members. They 
are still happy over their “bonus retirement years”.  
 
C.5.12 Decision 5406 Painting investment  
C.5.12.1 Background and actual situation of decision 5406 
The Marketing Department registered that the customers demanded better quality 
lacquering. Today, new painting equipment is installed and running.  
 
Pson is chairman of a trade union but also involved as implementer in the case. 
 
C.5.12.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 5406 
Pson 
The old painting equipment was manual and, therefore, also a bit risky from the 
point of view of worker welfare. Our volumes were too small to make a robot-
equipped installation profitable. Therefore, we asked a business contact if they 
were ready for subcontract lacquering. The answer was yes and we made an 
agreement. That way we passed the volume break-even point. The investment was 
easily “calculated home”. So far, the case had been developed without any formal 
decision, so far as I know, but with a lot of informal dialogues. Of course there 
was a green light from the CEO to carry out an investigation. The technical 
development and the marketing departments prepared the decision facts and 
conditions. The Factory Manager was involved. The CEO presented the 
investment case for the Board of Directors, which made the desired decision. 
 
C.5.12.3 Implementation Context of decision 5406 
Pson 
The technique installed was well tested in other industries (“we were late”) so the 
risk of a wrong investment was low. We had to have a letter of acceptance from   
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our customers. As said above, we needed better worker welfare. So from both 
human and technical points of view the context was quite easy to manage.  
 
C.5.12.4 Implementation Profile of decision 5406 
Pson 
As a part of the investment plan a new Painting Manager was employed. He and 
the Production Manager were responsible for implementation. They prepared a 
tight time schedule in order to disturb the ongoing manufacturing as little as 
possible.  
 
C.5.12.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 5406 
Pson  
The time schedule was followed. The investment in total was slightly more 
expensive than decided. The take off was successful with minor problems and was 
quite soon running very well.  
 
The very fast process exposed a weakness: one of our customers with a very 
strong quality system was not ready to accept our quality approach immediately. 
But we went on without a letter of acceptance. We got it one year later. If they had 
not accepted, we would have been forced to make modifications with cost 
consequences.  
 
C.5.13 Decision 5407 Product development 
C.5.13.1 Background and actual situation of decision 5407 
The case happened some years ago before the acting CEO had joined the group. 
The Marketing Department promises a customer to develop a modified product 
aimed just for them. The customer gets the product delivered and is satisfied. 
 
Pson picked up the decision as an example of poor implementation. He is 
involved in the product development process and he is therefore the implementer. 
 
C.5.13.2 Decision Making Process Profile of decision 5407 
Pson 
The starting up of a new product development case followed the normal routines 
including contacts between stakeholders to certify that the capacity was available 
within the company. Everything was OK and the CEO decided to start the project. 
 
C.5.13.3 Implementation Context of decision 5407 
Pson 
Quite a normal task with no special problems in sight.  
 
C.5.13.4 Implementation Profile of decision 5407 
Pson 
Also in this aspect a routine case.  
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C.5.13.5 Implementation Efficiency of decision 5407 
Pson 
When “95%” of the development is made, just one thing remains: the testing of 
the durability in order to get a certificate of the product safety. There are given 
norms what to do and what to achieve. The Development Department knows, by 
experience and preliminary tests, that the product fulfils the real requirements of 
product safety. But the Development Department will not release the product for 
selling according to company policy and professional standards of product safety 
until the certification tests are completed. Nevertheless, the CEO decides to do so. 
“The product and the project are handed over to Marketing Department”. The 
product is manufactured and sold and the customer is satisfied but still the product 
is not certified. “Such a decision would not be made today”. 
 
Pson knows that the customer is satisfied. But he thinks that goal satisfaction as 
such is not achieved as we have sold a non-certified product. He divides the 
implementation process into two steps. The first step is up to the CEO’s decision 
to go selling. It is very successful. The second step follows thereafter and he 
means that the implementation of the product safety test went wrong. 
 
C.5.13.6 Comments to respondent opinions on decision 5407 
I do not think this is an example of poor implementation but an example of 
deviation from routines and corporate culture. It has not been possible to interview 
the CEO acting at that time. 
  